WH_Holding_Limited Annual Accounts Full Year 2025
The financial trajectory of WH Holding Limited, the parent entity of West Ham United Football Club, during the fiscal year ended May 31, 2025, amply demonstrates the volatility of the European football economic model. This analysis provides a deconstruction of the group’s financial statements, the underlying mechanics of its capital structure, and the strategic shifts in ownership that have culminated in the landmark departure of Karren Brady and the realignment of power between David Sullivan and Daniel Kretinsky.
The report examines the transition from a period of anomalous profitability, driven by the historic disposal of Declan Rice, to a state of technical insolvency characterised by a £104.2 million pre-tax loss and a reliance on high-yield specialist debt.
Analysis of the Profit and Loss account: Collapse of operational margins
The consolidated statement of comprehensive income for the period ending May 31, 2025, shows a complete reversal in the club’s financial fortunes. The group reported a loss before taxation of £104.17 million, a stark contrast to the £57.22 million profit achieved in the 2023-24 financial year. This variance is not merely a consequence of a poor league finish but reflects a structural vulnerability to the absence of European competition and the volatility of player trading margins.
Revenue contraction and performance sensitivity
Group turnover for the year settled at £227.55 million, representing a 15.6% contraction from the £269.74 million recorded in the previous cycle. This decline falls predominantly within the broadcasting and matchday revenue streams. Broadcasting revenue fell by £34.6 million to £132.38 million. The reason for this decline is two-fold: the loss of UEFA Europa League distributions and a reduction in Premier League merit payments following a drop from 9th to 14th position. Furthermore, the club was selected for eighteen live Premier League matches compared to twenty-one in the prior year, leading to a reduction in facility fees.
Match receipts also experienced a downturn, falling from £44.63 million to £39.30 million. This £5.33 million variance is directly attributable to the lack of European fixtures at the London Stadium. Despite these headwinds, the club’s average league gate remained resilient at 62,432, maintaining its status as one of the highest attendances in the Premier League.
| Revenue Breakdown by Stream | FY 2025 (£000) | FY 2024 (£000) | Variance (%) |
| Match Receipts and related activities | 39,302 | 44,634 | -11.95% |
| Broadcast and central sponsorship | 132,382 | 167,022 | -20.74% |
| Commercial activities | 42,202 | 41,938 | +0.63% |
| Retail and merchandising | 13,666 | 16,146 | -15.36% |
| Total Group Turnover | 227,552 | 269,740 | -15.64% |
Commercial income provided a marginal bright spot, increasing by £0.26 million to £42.20 million, driven by improved partnership income and a successful pre-season tour, which mitigated the loss of corporate hospitality income from European match days. However, retail and merchandising revenue fell by £2.48 million to £13.67 million, as a disappointing domestic campaign dampened supporter sentiment and purchasing frequency.
Operating costs and wage-to-turnover disconnect
Total operating costs, including player trading expenses, surged to £336.24 million. Staff costs represent the primary driver of this expenditure, rising to £175.89 million from £160.97 million. The data suggests that while the club engaged in a squad clear-out, the acquisitions made during the 2024 summer transfer window added significant weight to the wage bill. These new additions, totaling £132.64 million in acquisition costs, included high-value contracts for players such as Max Kilman, Crysencio Summerville, and Niclas Füllkrug.
The resulting wage-to-turnover ratio reached 67.2%, up from 59.7% in the previous year. When adjusted for the club’s operations excluding player trading, which showed a loss of £5.39 million, it becomes evident that the core business is currently incapable of sustaining its fixed cost base without significant external support or high-value player disposals.
Balance sheet analysis: technical insolvency and asset valuation
The consolidated balance sheet as of May 31, 2025, reveals a precarious capital position. Total shareholders’ funds have transitioned from a surplus of £99.25 million to a deficit of £4.34 million. This erosion of equity is the direct result of the £103.59 million net loss after taxation being transferred to the profit and loss account, which now shows an accumulated deficit of £312.10 million.
Intangible assets and squad amortisation
The club’s primary asset class is its intangible assets, valued at £223.15 million. This represents the net book value of player registrations. The club’s strategy of aggressive squad reinvestment is reflected in the £132.64 million of additions during the year. However, the non-cash charge of amortisation rose significantly to £99.41 million, reflecting the shorter average contract lengths or higher acquisition costs of the current squad.
| Asset and Liability Composition | FY 2025 (£000) | FY 2024 (£000) |
| Intangible Assets (Player Registrations) | 223,152 | 213,949 |
| Tangible Fixed Assets | 35,464 | 26,843 |
| Current Assets (Inc. Debtors & Stocks) | 38,811 | 143,940 |
| Current Liabilities (Creditors < 1 Year) | (204,270) | (182,800) |
| Net Current Liabilities | (165,459) | (38,860) |
| Creditors (> 1 Year) | (90,821) | (93,207) |
| Net (Liabilities) / Assets | (4,340) | (99,247) |
The principal concern regarding this asset class is impairment risk. The directors assess the squad as a single cash-generating unit, but the lack of a Rice-level asset in the current squad suggests that the market value of these registrations may not significantly exceed their book value.
Note 36: Prior period restatements and discrepancies
A critical detail is found in Note 36, which details a prior period restatement of the 2024 accounts. The restatement involved a grossing down of both debtors and creditors by £2.91 million to correctly present Club London deferred income and other debtors. This adjustment was necessary to remove amounts that had neither been received in cash nor invoiced prior to the 2024 year-end. Furthermore, £3.77 million was reclassified from other debtors to trade debtors to reflect amounts that had been invoiced prior to the 2024 balance sheet date. These adjustments suggest a previous overstatement of the group’s immediate receivable position and highlights the complexities of the club’s corporate hospitality accounting.
Cash flow analysis and funding model: Liquidity squeeze
The consolidated cash flow statement provides a visceral look at the group’s liquidity challenges. Net cash generated from operating activities collapsed from £77.82 million to just £722,000. This operational cash drought is a direct consequence of the loss of European revenues and the rising wage bill.
To fund its investing activities, which saw a net outflow of £51.13 million, the club utilised two primary mechanisms: the depletion of cash reserves and the acceleration of future transfer receivables. The club’s cash at bank plummeted from £33.06 million to just £457,000.
Examination of Note 15 reveals that the group entered into finance receivable arrangements for transfer fees with a carrying amount of £71.7 million. These arrangements are without recourse, meaning the club has sold the future installments owed by other clubs to third-party finance companies to receive cash upfront. This debt factoring or receivables finance strategy effectively mortgages the club’s future income to solve current liquidity shortfalls. Such arrangements typically attract service fees or discounts of between 8% and 10%, which are recorded as interest expenses, further eroding the club’s long-term profitability.
Long-term debt sources and high-yield financing
In July 2025, post-balance sheet, the club entered into a new £124.0 million term loan facility with Rights and Media Funding Limited. This facility is secured by a debenture on all the assets of the club and an Inter-Creditor agreement with Barclays Bank.
| Debt and Borrowing Summary | Amount (£m) | Source/Type |
| Rights and Media Funding (RMF) | 124.0 | Term Loan (Due 2030) |
| Barclays Bank | 40.0 | Overdraft (Due 2026) |
| Player Transfer Creditors (Short-term) | 110.9 | Installments to other clubs |
| Player Transfer Creditors (Long-term) | 84.9 | Installments to other clubs |
| Debenture Loans | 0.6 | Hammers Bond (150-year term) |
The reliance on R&MF is a significant strategic shift. R&MF is known for providing high-cost lending to clubs requiring immediate access to cash. Historical data suggests R&MF charges double-digit interest rates, potentially as high as 10.25%, which is vastly more expensive than traditional bank financing. The interest payable by West Ham rose to £22.0 million in FY25, including £15.2 million of implied interest on transfer fees with extended payment terms. This suggests that the club is paying a significant premium to sustain its squad investment strategy.
Player trading analysis:
The financial model of West Ham United has historically been underpinned by a sell-to-reinvest strategy. The £105 million disposal of Declan Rice to Arsenal in the previous year provided a Rice safety net that masked the club’s operating deficit. In the current financial year, this net was removed.
Profit on the disposal of player registrations fell from £96.31 million to £19.95 million. The departures of Flynn Downes, Saïd Benrahma, and Thilo Kehrer were insufficient to offset the heavy investment in new talent. The data shows that West Ham is currently over-leveraged in the transfer market, owing £195.85 million to other clubs in installments, while being owed only £3.91 million by other clubs, largely because they have already factored and cashed in their own receivables.
| Player Trading Metrics | FY 2025 (£000) | FY 2024 (£000) |
| Additions (Purchase of Registrations) | 132,644 | 165,459 (approx.) |
| Amortisation Charge | 99,408 | 83,489 |
| Profit on Disposal | 19,954 | 96,313 |
| Agent Fees Expensed | 18,348 | 19,019 |
Agent fees also remain a significant friction cost. The club spent £18.35 million on intermediaries during the year, involving 37 transactions across 31 players. This suggests that for all that is spent on player registrations, nearly 14% is lost to external agents rather than being retained within the squad’s value.
Ownership analysis:
The ownership of West Ham United has transitioned through several distinct eras, from its roots as a family club to its current status as a vehicle for international billionaire investment.
For over a century, West Ham was associated with the Cearns family. J.W.Y. (Jimmy) Cearns was a founding member of the club in 1900, and his descendants, including Len and Brian Cearns, held boardroom positions until 2006. This family owned era ended with the sale of the club for £85 million to an Icelandic consortium led by Eggert Magnússon and Björgólfur Guðmundsson.
Terry Brown, who joined the board in 1990 and served as chairman, made approximately £33.4 million from the sale. His tenure was frequently criticised by supporters for perceived financial mismanagement, a sentiment that has periodically resurfaced under the current administration. The Icelandic era proved brief and disastrous, coinciding with the 2008 financial crisis, which eventually forced the sale of the club to David Sullivan and David Gold in 2010.
David Sullivan: Pornography, publishing, and custodianship
David Sullivan, born in 1949, accumulated his wealth primarily through the adult entertainment and publishing industries. Alongside David Gold, his early ventures included selling softcore pornographic photographs and expanding into sex shops and adult magazines like Playbirds and Whitehouse. By the late 1970s, he controlled half of the UK adult magazine market and 150 shops. He launched the Sunday Sport in 1986, eventually selling his stake in the Sport titles for £40 million in 2007.
Sullivan’s career has been punctuated by controversy. In 1982, he was convicted of living off the immoral earnings of prostitutes, though he successfully appealed and served 71 days in prison. More recently, he was involved in a 2018 HMRC tax tribunal where he was ruled to have used West Ham to avoid £700,000 in tax through his family business, Conegate Ltd. His management style at West Ham is described as hands-on and old school, with Sullivan historically taking a lead role in transfer negotiations, a practice that has often drawn criticism from supporters and pundits alike.
Daniel Kretinsky:
Daniel Kretinsky, a billionaire lawyer, represents the modern, institutional face of the West Ham boardroom. His wealth is primarily derived from Energetický a průmyslový holding, a multinational energy group he founded in 2009. Kretinsky’s strategy involves acquiring dying fossil-fuel assets at a discount and profiting from them as the transition to green energy proceeds more slowly than predicted, a tactic that earned him the moniker “fossil hyena”.
Kretinsky’s business empire includes major stakes in Royal Mail (International Distributions Services), Sainsbury’s, and Foot Locker. At West Ham, he has been an enigmatic and hands-off figure since his 27% investment in 2021. However, his management of Sparta Prague, where he is the majority owner, suggests a more passionate and interventionist style behind the scenes, including involvement in choosing line-ups and tactics.
The management of West Ham United has been characterised for sixteen years by the triumvirate of David Sullivan, David Gold, and Karren Brady. This alliance, often referred to by fans as “GSB,” oversaw the transition from Upton Park to the London Stadium, a move marketed as a path to competing with the elite but one that resulted in a distinct dilution of identity for many supporters.
Karren Brady’s departure
On April 21, 2026, Baroness Karren Brady announced her departure as vice-chairwoman after 16 years. Her exit marks the end of a 40-year business relationship with David Sullivan that began at Birmingham City. While Sullivan described her as an exceptional leader, her legacy is viewed as deeply damaging by the club’s Fan Advisory Board (FAB), who cited year-on-year ticket price rises and a widening disconnect with the fan base.
The forensic significance of Brady’s departure lies in the simultaneous restructuring of ownership. Following David Gold’s death in 2023, his daughter Vanessa Gold appointed Rothschild & Co to explore the sale of the family’s 25.1% stake. It has now emerged that Sullivan and Kretinsky have lined up deals to purchase portions of this stake themselves.
| Expected Ownership Realignment (Post-Gold Share Sale) | Ownership % | Role |
| David Sullivan | >40% | Joint-Chairman |
| Daniel Kretinsky (1890s Holdings) | >40% | Joint-Chairman |
| J. Albert Smith (WHU LLC) | 8.0% | Director / Shareholder |
| Other Investors | ~1.1% | Minor Shareholders |
This shift transforms Kretinsky from a minority investor into a joint-chair with an equal stake to Sullivan. This power-sharing arrangement is intended to allow Kretinsky a greater say in boardroom strategy and executive recruitment. The departures of Chief Finance Officer Andy Mollett and Executive Director Nathan Thompson alongside Brady further suggest a comprehensive clearing out of the legacy management structure.
Re-capitalisation and the strategy for balance sheet repair
The repair of West Ham’s balance sheet is an urgent priority to ensure compliance with the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and the incoming Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) regulations.
The club’s forecast indicates that without mitigating actions, a liquidity shortfall will occur in Summer 2026. The primary mitigating action is cash receipts from further player trading. Analysts expect a summer of austerity in 2026, regardless of the club’s league status.
| Projected Savings and Costs (2025-2026 Cycle) | Estimated Impact (£m) |
| Wage savings from high-earner departures | -33.5 |
| Expected TV revenue drop (Lower position) | -24.0 |
| Estimated Transfer Amortisation | 80.3 |
| Projected Net Loss (Before player sales) | 77.0 |
The club’s wage bill, which stood at £176 million, is expected to fall by approximately £33.5 million. However, this is partially offset by the immediate wage commitments of new signings and the persistent burden of amortisation, which remains at approximately £80 million annually. To achieve balance sheet repair, the club may need to sell at least two big names in the summer of 2026 to generate the necessary cash to cover the R&MF loan repayments and Barclays overdraft.
Re-capitalisation: Shareholder support vs. debt
The directors have obtained a “letter of support” from the investing owners (Sullivan and Kretinsky), committing them to provide a sufficient level of financial support if player sales do not generate enough liquidity. This support may take the form of direct equity injections or additional shareholder loans. Forensic observers suggest that Kretinsky’s willingness to fund these shortfalls is likely linked to his increased control of the club, as Sullivan has historically been more cautious with non-recourse funding.
Risk analysis: The “severe but plausible” impact of relegation
The Strategic Report explicitly analyses the risk of relegation, classified as a “severe but plausible scenario”. As of April 2026, West Ham sits in 17th place, just two points clear of the relegation zone with five matches remaining.
Financial and operational freefall
The financial hit of relegation to the EFL Championship is estimated at up to £120 million in lost revenue. This is driven by the collapse of Premier League TV income, which accounts for over half of the club’s turnover. While relegation wage clauses would automatically trigger pay cuts for senior players, the budget would remain under extreme strain.
The details of such a scenario include:
- Mandatory fire sale: The club would be forced into a rapid and value-destructive sale of its most valuable assets, to avoid a “Sunderland-style” financial freefall.
- Solvency risk: The group would forecast a “liquidity shortfall in Summer 2026 to a greater severity” than the current base case.
- Ownership implications: A drop in status might accelerate Sullivan’s exit or force Kretinsky to inject massive capital to stabilise the club, potentially triggering a full takeover.
| Relegation Impact Quantification | Impact Description |
| TV Revenue | Collapse from ~£132m to Championship levels (~£10-15m + Parachute) |
| Matchday Revenue | Decline in ticket prices and hospitality demand |
| Sponsorship | Potential exit clauses in major commercial contracts |
| Player Values | Significant depreciation as selling clubs gain leverage |
The threat of relegation is the primary business risk facing WH Holding Limited. The club’s ability to remain a going concern is contingent on its Premier League status, making the final matches of the 2025-26 season a pivotal moment in its 130-year history.
External factors
Beyond the core financial statements, several external factors warrant comment. The club remains under a civil compliance investigation by HMRC in relation to agents’ fees. While the criminal investigation has been terminated, the potential civil liability remains unknown and unprovided for in the accounts.
A further revelation involves a £14.0 million creditor balance owed to a Russian football club. The club is currently prohibited from making this payment due to UK Government sanctions. Although the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) ruled in West Ham’s favor, confirming payment cannot be made, this liability remains on the balance sheet as a blocked creditor.
The club also faces ongoing litigation with E20 Stadium LLP regarding stadium lease penalty payments. A successful appeal by the club has led to £3.9 million being held in Escrow, but these assets cannot be recognised until the legal process is fully concluded. These various legal and regulatory disputes add layers of uncertainty to the group’s “Total Shareholders Funds” position.
Final summary
An audit of WH Holding Limited indicates a group that has moved from a position of relative security into a phase of heightened financial and operational risk.
The record £104.2 million loss marks the definitive end of the Declan Rice era and exposes the underlying operating deficit of the club’s current model.
The funding model has shifted toward high cost, specialist debt, and the aggressive use of transfer receivable factoring. This has provided short-term liquidity at the expense of long-term margins. The balance sheet is technically insolvent, with its viability resting on the continued support of the primary shareholders and the generation of significant profits from player sales in the Summer 2026 window.
The departure of Karren Brady and the realignment of ownership between David Sullivan and Daniel Kretinsky represents the most significant boardroom transition in the club’s modern history.
This new era faces an immediate baptism of fire, with the club entrenched in a relegation battle that threatens to undo the commercial gains of the past decade. The structural repair of West Ham United’s finances will require a shift from the custodianship of the past toward a more institutionally funded, sustainably geared model, capable of absorbing the volatility of the Premier League without the constant threat of a liquidity crisis.
Relegation in season 2025/26 is still a significant risk, even at this late stage of the season. From a financial perspective, relegation would necessitate a fire sale of players, significant cost reductions, the rescheduling of debts where (if) possible an almost certain injection of fresh permanent capital by one or both of its largest shareholders. Any re-capitalisation would be done at a significantly lower value than if Premier League status was maintained. Depending upon who contributes what and at what price may break the current log jam in terms of control. It would, however, become a purchase of a distressed asset, both financially and performance-wise on the pitch. A quick path back to the Premier League would not be guaranteed.