Eagle Football Group Universal Registration Document-2024-2025
This is Eagle Football Group’s Universal Registration Document (referred to as URD or document in this report) for the fiscal year ended 30 June 2025, filed with the AMF on 10 December 2025. It is one of the most revealing and troubling financial documents in European football.
Overview and context
Eagle Football Group SA (EFG), formerly OL Groupe SA, is the Euronext Paris-listed parent company of Olympique Lyonnais, one of France’s most historically significant football clubs. The document is not signed by John Textor, who controlled the company for nearly three years and drove it to the brink of regulatory extinction, but by Michele Kang, who assumed the role of Chairwoman and CEO on 30 June 2025, the very last day of the financial year being reported.
That timing is not incidental. It signals the full extent of the governance crisis that defines this document.
The URD reveals a business in acute structural distress: a €201 million net loss, negative consolidated equity of €163 million, a deteriorating cash position, a near-miss relegation to Ligue 2 by France’s football regulator, a UEFA financial settlement carrying conditional sanction risk, a labyrinthine network of related-party transactions with Botafogo and the wider Eagle Football Holdings group, an unresolved €124 million receivable of uncertain collectability, and a going concern position that depends entirely on post-balance sheet injections from the very shareholder network that created the problems. It also contains a discrete disclosure that UK litigation involving Textor and one of EFG’s controlling shareholders could result in a change of control of the entire group.
Profit and Loss Account
The consolidated income statement for the twelve months to 30 June 2025 tells a stark story of a company whose cost structure accelerated dramatically while revenue stripped back sharply due to both one-off effects and structural deterioration.
Revenue (excluding player trading) fell by €101.5 million, or 38%, to €162.6 million from €264.1 million in the prior year. However, this headline collapse is substantially explained by non-recurring items: the prior year included €50 million of LFP/CVC commercial assistance (the final tranche of OL’s share of CVC Capital Partners’ investment in the LFP’s commercial subsidiary), €26.9 million in one-off brand licensing income generated by the sale of the OL Féminin trademark to Michele Kang’s holding company YMK Holdings, and revenues from OL Reign (sold June 2024), OL Vallée Arena (sold June 2024) and OL Féminin (progressively sold through the year).
Stripping out these non-recurrents and scope changes, the document asserts like-for-like revenue growth of approximately €12.5 million or 5%, which primarily reflects the club’s return to the Europa League, delivering €22.9 million in UEFA TV rights, versus just €0.8 million in the prior year when OL was absent from European competition entirely.
Within the recurring revenue base, the performance is mixed. Ticketing grew by €8.9 million (26%) to €42.8 million, driven by European home matches and an improved home atmosphere in Ligue 1. Media and marketing rights collapsed by €49.7 million (52%) to €45.7 million, almost entirely explained by the LFP/CVC one-off in the prior year and the structural impact of the DAZN broadcasting crisis, DAZN’s contract with the LFP collapsed, triggering a significant reduction in domestic TV rights redistribution which the document acknowledges will persist into FY2026.
Sponsoring and advertising fell by €6.2 million (17%) to €30.9 million, largely due to the scope changes. Events revenue fell by €24.7 million (57%) to €18.7 million, reflecting the exceptional prior-year character of revenues (Rugby World Cup, concerts, Olympics preparation events) not repeated in FY2025. Brand-related revenue fell €29.9 million (55%) to €24.4 million, entirely because the prior year included the €26.9 million trademark license fee paid by YMK Holdings that will not recur.
Player trading generated proceeds of €111.1 million (up 14% from €97.3 million), with headline transfers including Rayan Cherki to Manchester City for €31.4 million, Jake O’Brien to Everton for €14.2 million, and Maxence Caqueret to Como for €12.7 million. These proceeds, against a residual carrying value of €39.9 million in player registrations, yielded a capital gain of €71.2 million, down marginally from €75.9 million in the prior year but still forming the indispensable financial core of the club’s viability model.
Personnel costs rose by €15.8 million (10%) to €177.7 million. This is the most damaging line in the document. With revenue excluding player trading of only €162.6 million, personnel costs alone exceed total operating revenue, producing a staff-cost-to-revenue ratio of 109%, up from 62% in the prior year, a ratio that is not merely unsustainable but arithmetically incompatible with financial stability.
The rise reflected the summer 2024 recruitment drive (Niakhate, Nuamah, Mikautadze, Abner, Tessmann, Veretout) which added €34.1 million to the professional squad wage bill, partially offset by €10.6 million of favourable scope changes (removal of OL Reign, OL Vallée Arena, OL Féminin staff costs). Severance payments under the voluntary departure plan added €3.3 million. The document’s disclosure that the planned FY2026 payroll reduction is expected to be approximately 40% confirms the severity of the problem created by Textor’s transfer policy.
EBITDA was negative at -€47.7 million, a collapse of €91.9 million from the +€44.2 million achieved in the prior year. This is the fundamental operational metric of the business and it is catastrophic. A club generating €162.6 million in non-trading revenue cannot cover €177.7 million in staff costs alone, before any external purchases (€95.8 million) or taxes.
Depreciation and amortisation rose by €34.9 million (62%) to €91.1 million, primarily driven by player registration amortisation of €70.8 million (up from €31.8 million in the prior year). This near-doubling of player amortisation is the direct accounting consequence of the summer 2024 transfer spend of €115.7 million, with contracts being amortised over their typical three-to-five-year terms. An additional €2.6 million impairment charge on player registrations was also recorded.
Other operating income and expenses shifted from a positive €38.5 million in FY2024 to a negative €11.9 million in FY2025. The prior year had benefited from approximately €50 million of capital gains on asset disposals (OL Féminin, OL Vallée Arena, OL Reign). The current year includes the €12.5 million charge for the UEFA Financial Fair Play settlement agreed in June 2025, partly offset by the €8.0 million positive de-consolidation impact from the final sale of OL Féminin stake.
Operating loss reached -€150.7 million (versus +€26.5 million in FY2024), a swing of €177.2 million. This is the most extreme operating result in the club’s history and one of the largest in French professional football.
Net financial expense rose to -€45.2 million from -€35.0 million, driven by non-recourse financing costs for player receivables (€14 million), foreign exchange losses (€5 million), and the growing interest burden of the debt structure. The cost of net financial debt was €27.4 million.
Net loss was -€201.1 million, of which -€201.2 million attributable to equity holders of the parent and +€0.14 million to non-controlling interests. Loss per share was -€1.07. No dividend has been or will be paid.
At the Eagle Football Group holding company level (unconsolidated), the net loss was -€207.8 million, driven almost entirely by a -€209.1 million financial result which reflects the deterioration in the value of investments in and loans to subsidiaries, and the mounting intra-group debt costs.
Cash flow statement
The cash flow statement is arguably more revealing than the P&L because it strips away accounting adjustments and shows the raw cash reality.
Operating cash flow was -€4.3 million, a significant improvement from the -€98.1 million of the prior year but achieved only through an extraordinary €151.4 million improvement in working capital.
This working capital improvement itself requires careful decomposition: trade receivables fell by €26.3 million (driven by collection of LFP receivables and other amounts), and other liabilities increased by €75.4 million, reflecting the rapid accumulation of unpaid social security obligations (up €20.5 million to €36.5 million) and trade payables (up €17.4 million to €70.4 million). In other words, a significant portion of the apparent working capital improvement represents the club deferring payments it should be making, a classic liquidity management technique under financial stress that the DNCG identified and the document explicitly acknowledges as arising from “cash flow challenges encountered during the 2024/2025 fiscal year.”
The underlying pre-tax cash flow generation (adjusted for non-cash items) was -€183.2 million.
Investing cash flow was +€36.2 million. Acquisitions of player registrations consumed -€75.7 million (net of changes in payables), while disposals generated +€103.8 million (net of receivable changes). Other intangible asset acquisitions (related to the Botafogo economic rights transaction) consumed -€14.3 million. The net position is a €36.2 million inflow, supported largely by the successful execution of player sales, but it is important to note that the Botafogo economic rights cycle consumed and returned almost identical gross amounts (€117.7 million acquired, €125.6 million then transferred back), generating a near-zero net cash impact while creating a complex balance sheet asset.
Financing cash flow was -€99.7 million, comprising net repayments of current account advances (-€40.0 million, representing the partial repayment of the John Textor current account), debt repayments (-€32.9 million), and interest payments (-€23.8 million).
Net change in cash was -€67.8 million, reducing cash from €129.4 million to €61.6 million. This represents a serious reduction in liquidity cushion that, without the post-balance sheet injection described below, would leave the club dangerously exposed to its operating needs and scheduled debt service.
Balance sheet
The consolidated balance sheet as at 30 June 2025 is that of a technically insolvent entity whose continued existence depends entirely on the financial support of its controlling shareholder.
Total assets are €800.1 million. Non-current assets of €541.4 million include player registrations (net) of €132.5 million, property, plant and equipment of €289.8 million (dominated by Groupama Stadium at approximately €271 million), right-of-use assets of €9.3 million, other financial assets of €21.3 million, a €66.4 million non-current receivable from Botafogo for transferred player economic rights, and investments in associates of €4.6 million (principally ASVEL basketball).
Current assets of €258.7 million include trade receivables of €28.7 million, player registration receivables of €17.4 million, other current assets of €146.5 million (which prominently includes a €43.2 million current-portion Botafogo receivable and €66.8 million in financial receivables from related parties), and cash of €62.1 million.
The Botafogo receivables demand particular attention. The total nominal amount of EFG’s receivables from SAF Botafogo is €124.2 million, split between €43.2 million current and €66.4 million non-current.
These arise from the transfer to Botafogo of economic rights in four OL players (the document notes five were acquired from Botafogo, with four subsequently returned in a transaction that generated €117.7 million in revenue but also €117.97 million in acquisition costs).
The document acknowledges that no impairment has been recognised on these receivables “on the basis” that Eagle Football Holdings Bidco has committed to either taking over the €124.2 million receivable from Botafogo, potentially offsetting it against the €66.8 million shareholder loan, or “work on an alternative solution.”
This is deeply conditional comfort. The accounting work and feasibility study are explicitly described as still ongoing. The risk that this receivable cannot be collected in full is material, and the absence of any impairment represents a significant area of judgement that the statutory auditors will have been required to assess carefully.
Notably, Botafogo reportedly factored the amounts owed to it from the economic rights transactions with financial institutions, suggesting the cash flows underlying this structure may not be straightforward.
Equity is deeply negative at -€163.6 million (including non-controlling interests of +€3.1 million). The equity attributable to shareholders of the parent is -€166.7 million, compared with +€36.4 million twelve months earlier.
The accumulated deficit (reserves and retained earnings including the current year loss) is -€604.4 million, only partially offset by share capital of €267.3 million and share premiums of €169.8 million.
This is a balance sheet of a company that has consumed all of its paid-in capital and more. Legal reserves stand at just €4.5 million. Un-recognised deferred tax assets total €124.2 million, representing losses that cannot be recognised because there is insufficient certainty of future taxable profit.
Non-current liabilities of €493.2 million include the dominant infrastructure securitisation debt of €298.4 million, the shareholder loan from Eagle Football Holdings Bidco of €27.4 million, non-current player registration payables of €67.6 million, the €65.6 million non-current portion of Botafogo player economic rights acquisition liabilities, lease liabilities of €6.8 million, and the CNDS investment grant deferred income of €14.5 million.
The €90.1 million “Other non-current liabilities” line has grown dramatically from €16.7 million in the prior year, almost entirely due to the Botafogo acquisition liabilities.
Current liabilities of €470.5 million include the most alarming items on the balance sheet. The entire senior bank debt, both the €41.3 million term loan and the €32.1 million RCF, has been reclassified as current because, at the balance sheet date, the Group had not yet received written confirmation from its lenders that they would waive their rights to enforce covenant breaches at June 30, 2025. This reclassification (which a waiver subsequently addressed in November 2025) has inflated the apparent current liability figure.
Current player registration payables stand at €77.5 million. Trade payables are €70.4 million. Tax and social security liabilities are €73.6 million, a figure the document candidly attributes to the club’s cash flow difficulties. Current financial liabilities include €83.3 million in “other financial liabilities” (which are the new current account advances from Eagle Football Holdings Bidco drawn during the year) and the €17.5 million John Textor current account balance remaining after partial repayment.
Debt facilities
FCT Securitisation (€305.1 million outstanding). The cornerstone of the December 2023 refinancing. A twenty-year amortising structure backed by trade receivables generated by the Groupama Stadium, rated BBB+ by KBRA Europe and BBB by DBRS Morningstar, at a fixed rate of 5.83% per annum.
Security includes a first-ranking mortgage over the stadium, the land and 1,600 underground parking spaces. Covenants include a historical debt service coverage ratio of 1.375x and a projected debt service coverage ratio of 1.375x, both measured at OL SASU level.
The maturity schedule runs well beyond 2040, with annual amortisation of approximately €6.8 million per year in the near term rising to much larger amounts over the 10–20 year range. The fixed rate structure provides interest certainty but creates a very long-tailed liability, and any breach of the coverage covenant, highly plausible given the current revenue trajectory, could trigger acceleration events.
The security package is comprehensive and, critically, includes cross-default clauses that would be triggered by material events of default under the other facility.
Term Loan (€41.3 million outstanding, classified as current).
Part of the €65 million additional senior debt facility from December 2023. Variable rate (EURIBOR plus margin). Maturity 2028. Formally classified as current at 30 June 2025 because the covenant waiver had not been received at that date. Subsequent November 2025 waiver corrected this.
Two governing ratios: a historical DSCR of 3.0x on a rolling 12-month basis and a Gearing ratio (net debt to equity) of 4.0x declining to 2.5x from December 2026. Given that consolidated equity is deeply negative, the Gearing covenant is already breached in all conventional formulations and continues to require waiver management.
Revolving Credit Facility (€32.1 million, fully drawn, classified as current). The €32.5 million RCF from December 2023. Variable rate. Also classified as current for the same covenant reasons. The RCF is fully drawn at June 30, 2025, meaning the Group has no remaining un-drawn revolving credit capacity. This is a significant liquidity vulnerability.
Eagle Football Holdings Bidco shareholder loan (€27.4 million non-current).
A December 2022 loan with six-year maturity, repayable at maturity. Tranche A of €21 million at SOFR (floor 2%, ceiling 8%) plus 8%; Tranche B of €29 million at 12-month EURIBOR plus 2.5%. The current outstanding balance of €27.4 million (including €2.8 million capitalised PIK interest in the year) has grown from €24.7 million.
This is the most junior of the structured debt facilities. It was used to partially finance the intra-group OL SASU shareholder loan.
John Textor current account advances (€17.5 million current).
Two loans from Textor personally: one to OL SASU for €20.9 million principal at Euribor + 3.5%, and one to OL Brésil for €35.4 million at 6% per annum. The Brésil loan was fully repaid in the year. The OL SASU balance stands at €17.5 million (including €1.1 million in accrued interest).
This is a personal loan from the former controlling shareholder who resigned in June 2025 and is now the subject of claims and counter-claims with the group.
Eagle Football Holdings Bidco current account (€83.3 million, within “other current financial liabilities”).
This is new indebtedness created during FY2025 under the centralised cash management agreement authorised by the Board in October 2024.
The EFG group drew down €83.3 million from Eagle Football Holdings Bidco under this agreement during the year. It bears interest at Euribor + 3.5%. This creates a direct current liability to the controlling shareholder of very substantial size, with no defined maturity, alongside the existing December 2022 shareholder loan at the non-current level.
Player registration payables (€145.1 million total).
Arising from the acquisitions of the summer 2024 transfer window, these deferred transfer fee obligations are owed to selling clubs: Nottingham Forest (Niakhate €29.9m), RWDM Molenbeek (Nuamah €27.3m, note this is a related party transaction given Molenbeek’s ownership by Eagle Football Holdings Bidco), FC Metz (Mikautadze), Real Betis (Abner), Venice (Tessmann), Olympique de Marseille (Veretout) and Nottingham Forest (Turner).
The payables have grown from €105.2 million to €145.1 million, with €77.5 million due within one year and €67.6 million due beyond one year.
The Nuamah acquisition from RWDM Molenbeek for €27.3 million is a related-party transaction in the strict sense of IAS 24, as both Molenbeek and OL are controlled by Eagle Football Holdings Bidco. While disclosed in the notes, the transaction has attracted regulatory scrutiny in the context of the DNCG’s assessment and UEFA’s review. The question of whether the €27.3 million represented fair market value for a 20-year-old Ghanaian winger who had played in the Belgian second division is analytically contestable.
Orange Bank (formerly Groupama Banque) training centre loan (€1.1 million outstanding). A legacy €14 million facility from 2015 with a 10-year term, of which the residual balance is minimal.
Player trading analysis
Player trading remains the financial lifeblood of Olympique Lyonnais. The OL Academy’s historic production of elite talent, four players from the academy (Cherki, Caqueret, M.Sarr, Lepenant) contributed €55.4 million of the €111.1 million total proceeds, representing 53% of total transfer income, is the most durable competitive and commercial asset the club possesses.
The summer 2024 acquisition programme was aggressive and, in hindsight, financially destabilising. The club spent €115.7 million (net of adjustments) bringing in Niakhate, Nuamah, Mikautadze, Abner, Tessmann, Veretout, and Turner.
Total player amortisation of €70.8 million in FY2025, up €39 million from FY2024, is the direct consequence of this spending, and the contracted amortisation burden of contracts expiring in 2028 (carrying value €104.6 million) will continue to suppress reported profits through to the 2027/28 fiscal year.
The Botafogo economic rights transaction is a structurally unusual arrangement that requires separate analysis.
OL acquired economic rights in five Botafogo players for a total of €125.6 million and subsequently transferred back the economic rights of four of those players to Botafogo for €117.7 million. The gross balance, €117.7 million revenue, €117.97 million cost, generates an almost negligible net gain.
However, the transaction creates a €124.2 million net receivable on OL’s balance sheet (combining current and non-current portions), representing the deferred consideration owed by Botafogo for the re-transferred rights.
The nature and commercial rationale of this structure, essentially a round-trip economic rights transaction between two Eagle Football Holdings companies, has clearly attracted regulatory attention and appears designed to generate reportable revenue without creating a net economic benefit.
The DNCG and UEFA would have had direct sight of this structure in their financial assessments of the club.
The squad’s market value has been estimated by the club (based on Transfermarkt and CIES benchmarks) at €214.1 million as at 30 June 2025 against a net book carrying value of €132.5 million, implying potential capital gains of €81.6 million, though critically, only 15% of this potential is attributable to academy-trained players (down from 54% in the prior year), reflecting the dilution of the academy-development business model by the expensive summer 2024 acquisitions.
The player registration expiry schedule shows €104.6 million of contracts expiring in 2028, which will generate the heaviest amortisation burden for the next three years. The club’s ability to sell players before their contract expires, and at a premium above book value, remains essential to financial sustainability, and the new management’s 40% payroll reduction target depends partly on this outflow of expensive, recently acquired talent.
Trade creditor and debtor positions
Trade receivables stand at €28.7 million net (€29.9 million gross, less provisions of €1.2 million), down significantly from €55.1 million in the prior year. The principal customers for operational receivables are the LFP (broadcast and marketing distributions) and Sportfive (sponsorship agency). The reduction reflects the collection of large LFP receivables (including residual CVC-related amounts) and the removal of OL Reign and OL Féminin from scope.
Trade payables stand at €70.4 million, up from €52.9 million, an increase of €17.4 million representing both genuine operational growth and an element of payment deferral under cash pressure. The disclosure on payment terms reveals that 8% of total supplier invoices are overdue by more than 91 days as of the balance sheet date, indicating that the company’s creditor position is already stressed and that suppliers are experiencing delays in payment.
The document acknowledges that the increase in current liabilities is partly attributable to the increase in tax and social liabilities (+€20.5 million) due to “cash flow challenges,” amounting to a frank admission that the company deferred payments to URSSAF (French social security) and the tax authorities, a pattern that French companies in financial difficulty commonly use as an informal working capital facility, and which the DNCG will have noted in its financial assessments.
The inter-company receivable and payable position with Eagle Football Holdings and its affiliates is substantial and increasingly complex. EFG holds current financial receivables from Eagle Football Holdings LLC (US) of €44.8 million, receivables from Eagle Football Holdings Bidco (UK) of €10.6 million, and various trade and other receivables from Botafogo.
Simultaneously, it owes Eagle Football Holdings LLC (US) €31.3 million in current financial debt, Eagle Football Holdings Bidco (UK) €52.6 million in current debt, and John Textor €17.5 million.
The document’s disclosure that “the Group has received letters from entities within the Eagle Football group setting out certain claims. The Company strongly refutes the validity of these claims and has responded to these letters accordingly”, combined with the statement that “a global solution aiming to offset reciprocal debts and receivables between Eagle Football Holdings Bidco and the entities under its control is currently under review”, reveals active intra-group financial disputes and an unresolved complex netting exercise.
Relationship with the French football regulator (DNCG)
The DNCG (Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion) is the financial control body of French professional football, independent of the LFP, which monitors the financial health of Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 clubs and has powers to impose salary caps, transfer embargoes and administrative relegation where clubs cannot demonstrate financial stability.
The DNCG’s engagement with OL during the 2024/25 season constitutes the most serious regulatory crisis in the club’s history. On 15 November 2024, the DNCG imposed a salary cap, a recruitment ban, and a provisional administrative relegation to Ligue 2 at the end of the 2024/25 season. This decision was confirmed at first instance on 24 June 2025, at which point the club was, formally, scheduled to be relegated regardless of its final Ligue 1 position.
The documents make clear that this decision was the direct trigger for Textor’s resignation: facing the prospect of a Ligue 2 club under his governance, and with the DNCG’s concerns centred precisely on the financial commitments he had authorised, his departure was a prerequisite for the appeal process to have any chance of success.
On 9 July 2025, nine days after Michele Kang assumed the CEO role and following the provision of €87.3 million in new funding and a €30 million bank guarantee, the DNCG Federal Appeals Commission overturned the relegation decision. The new management’s credibility, the demonstrable change in financial philosophy, and the hard commitments of new liquidity were decisive. The DNCG imposed conditions including a new framework for recruitment, a cap on the payroll for the 2025/26 season, and ongoing financial monitoring.
The DNCG’s provisional relegation decision, upheld at first instance, is the single most powerful evidence in the document of the severity of the financial governance failure under Textor.
The DNCG’s standards require clubs to demonstrate that they can meet their financial commitments over the forthcoming season. By November 2024, six months into the financial year, the DNCG concluded that OL could not do so.
The specific concerns can be inferred from the document: the dramatic deterioration in EBITDA, the accumulation of unpaid social security obligations, the overextended transfer budget, and the dependence on a controlling shareholder who had been drawing down large current account advances from the group rather than injecting equity.
UEFA relationship and settlement
Following UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body’s monitoring of OL’s compliance with financial stability requirements for the 2024/25 period, OL SASU signed a four-year settlement agreement with the CFCB on 26 June 2025, four days before the end of the financial year. The agreement covers the 2025/26 to 2028/29 seasons.
The financial terms are: a fixed penalty of €12.5 million (recognised in the FY2025 income statement as an exceptional charge under “Other ordinary income and expenses”) plus conditional penalties of up to €37.5 million if OL fails to meet its financial commitments aimed at achieving a balanced financial situation by 2028.
If the club fails to meet its objectives or commitments, it risks exclusion from European competitions. The settlement also requires the club to demonstrate progressive improvement in its financial metrics through the four-year period.
This structure is comparable to, though somewhat less severe than, the settlement agreements UEFA has imposed on clubs including PSG and AC Milan in previous cycles.
The critical variable is whether OL can achieve the financial balance targets required by 2028. Under the new management’s strategy, a 40% payroll reduction, Europa League revenues in 2025/26, continued player trading, this is plausible but far from certain, and the conditional €37.5 million penalty creates a significant contingent liability that hangs over the club’s medium-term financial planning.
Board composition, board changes and relationships between members
The governance of Eagle Football Group during the period under review has been characterised by acute instability, conflicts of interest, and the progressive separation of power from its effective architects.
John Textor served as Chairman and CEO from 5 May 2023 until his resignation on 27 June 2025, effectively the moment the DNCG’s relegation decision was confirmed and it became clear that the existing governance structure could not survive the appeal process.
Textor received only director’s fees of €27,200 gross, having been compensated through Eagle Football Holdings LLC (the US entity he controls) via a €2 million annual service agreement with EFG.
He personally provided loans to OL SASU (€20.9 million, partially repaid) and OL Brésil (€35.4 million, fully repaid), creating direct personal financial relationships with the operating subsidiary he was governing.
His personal involvement in the Botafogo economic rights structure, and the complex interplay of receivables and payables between the EFG group entities and the various Eagle Football Holdings subsidiaries under his ultimate control, represent the kind of structural conflicts of interest that independent governance frameworks are designed to prevent.
The document also discloses that UK litigation is pending between John Textor and Iconic Sports (one of the shareholders of Eagle Football Holdings Limited, the ultimate parent of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco).
Iconic Sports was an early investor in the Eagle Football platform. The outcome of this litigation could, depending on the relief sought and granted, result in a change of control of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco and therefore of EFG itself. The document offers no further detail about the nature of the dispute or the amounts involved, which is itself a notable lacuna in an AMF-regulated document.
Michele Kang was a board member of EFG from 2023 and simultaneously the majority shareholder of OL Féminin (via YMK Holdings) following the sale transaction in February 2024. She therefore held a director role at EFG while simultaneously being the counterparty in multiple commercial agreements, the trademark license, the OL Féminin share sales, the stadium usage agreements, each of which required disclosure as a regulated agreement.
The document acknowledges that the December 2024 amendment to the OL Féminin sale agreements was entered into without prior board authorisation due to “an oversight on the part of management”, an oversight that is particularly notable given that it involved a transaction between a director (Kang) and the company. Kang was appointed Chairwoman and CEO on 30 June 2025 and her term runs until the general meeting approving the June 2028 financial statements.
Jamie Dinan and Mark Affolter (both directors connected with Eagle Football Holdings Bidco) resigned from the board after authorising the July 2025 shareholder loan from Eagle Football Holdings Bidco to EFG. Jean-Pierre Conte remains as a director connected with Eagle Football Holdings Bidco.
The document states that “the Board of Directors currently does not include any members affiliated with Holnest,” reflecting the progressive marginalisation of the Holnest/Aulas group. Holnest (Jean-Michel Aulas’s family office) retains a 2.41% shareholding and 2.77% of voting rights, protected by a shareholders’ agreement running until 31 December 2027, but has no board representation.
There are stated to be “agreements between the ultimate shareholders and creditors of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco concerning, among other things, the composition of the Company’s Board of Directors, the exact terms of which are not known to the Company.”
This extraordinary statement, a listed company’s board admitting that it does not know the full terms of agreements that govern its own composition, is a significant governance red flag.
The independent audit committee and nominations/remuneration committee are described as having “a majority of independent members” but the identities and experience of those independent members are not fully specified in the sections extracted here.
Going concern status
The going concern assessment is the most critical and, ultimately, most precariously resolved question in the document. The accounts are presented on a going concern basis, but the basis for this assessment is entirely dependent on post-balance sheet events and commitments.
As at 30 June 2025, the going concern indicators are all negative: negative equity of -€163.6 million; cash reduced to €62.1 million with no un-drawn committed facilities (the RCF is fully drawn); a €201 million net loss; the entire senior bank debt classified as current due to covenant breaches; unpaid social and tax obligations of €73.6 million accumulated due to cash constraints; and a DNCG relegation decision awaiting an appeal outcome.
The basis on which the statutory auditors (Forvis Mazars and BDO) were able to sign off the accounts as a going concern rests on two post-balance sheet events:
First, on 7 July 2025, Eagle Football Holdings Bidco provided a loan of €87.3 million to EFG (subsequently on-lent as a capital injection into OL SASU), at a rate of SOFR plus 8% per annum. This is an expensive loan, at approximately 12–13% all-in cost, that further burdens the group’s interest expense.
It was raised by Eagle Football Holdings Bidco from its own shareholders and lenders, including Michele Kang herself.
Second, Michele Kang personally provided a €30 million bank guarantee to OL SASU “to cover any potential additional needs.”
Third, on 10 November 2025, the filing date of the first-quarter activity release, the Group signed a new waiver agreement with its RCF lenders confirming that the lenders will not invoke covenant events of default for the June 30, 2025 test date.
Fourth, the DNCG’s July 9, 2025 decision permitting OL to remain in Ligue 1 is essential, as relegated to Ligue 2 would reduce broadcasting income by approximately €10–15 million per season and would threaten the FCT securitisation’s DSCR covenant.
The document’s going concern statement is carefully calibrated but ultimately optimistic. It asserts that “thanks to the new liquidity provided and the goals set for the 2025/2026 season, all the Group’s operating needs and various financial commitments should be covered.” The word “should” carries significant weight.
The club remains heavily loss-making, its UEFA settlement creates conditional performance obligations over four years, its senior debt is subject to covenants that require ongoing waiver management, and the Botafogo receivable of €124.2 million remains of uncertain collectability.
Multi-club ownership model, John Textor and Eagle Football Holdings
Eagle Football Group is one component of a broader multi-club ownership (MCO) network controlled by Eagle Football Holdings through its Bidco structure. The full network encompasses OL/EFG (Ligue 1, France), Botafogo (Série A, Brazil), and RWDM Molenbeek (Belgian Pro League), with OL Reign (NWSL, USA) sold in June 2024 and OL Féminin progressively divested to Michele Kang’s YMK Holdings.
The MCO model’s structural tensions are made manifest throughout this document.
The Nuamah acquisition from Molenbeek (€27.3 million for a player moving between two clubs under the same ownership) represents an intra-group transfer at a price that requires independent validation.
The Botafogo economic rights round-trip (acquire five players’ economic rights, sell four back) generates revenue without genuine economic substance. The cash management agreement through which Eagle Football Holdings Bidco provided approximately €83.3 million in current account advances to OL blurs the lines between owner equity injection and intra-group lending.
The receivable from Botafogo of €124.2 million has no confirmed repayment mechanism.
The Board authorised in October 2024 (but noted as “not applied during the financial year”) the potential acquisition by EFG of EFG Bidco’s stakes in Crystal Palace (via Palace Holdco UK), Botafogo and Molenbeek, described as “a first step in the project to list Eagle Football on the US stock market.”
This structural consolidation, which would have brought Crystal Palace within the EFG consolidated perimeter, was the strategic move underlying much of the financial engineering of the Textor era.
Its non-implementation reflects the collapse of the US listing strategy as EFG’s financial position deteriorated.
Crystal Palace’s ongoing presence in the network was relevant but structurally separate.
Palace Holdco UK Limited was owned by Eagle Football Holdings Bidco rather than EFG, meaning Crystal Palace does not appear in EFG’s consolidated accounts, but the corporate relationship means that EFG’s controlling shareholder simultaneously controls a Premier League club.
Post-balance sheet events
The period from 1 July 2025 to the document’s filing date of 10 December 2025 has been defined by five categories of significant development.
Financial stabilisation. The €87.3 million shareholder loan (SOFR+8%, one year, convertible into equity) and the €30 million Michele Kang bank guarantee were provided in July 2025, enabling the DNCG appeal and restoring minimum operational liquidity.
The November 2025 waiver agreement with RCF lenders formalised the position on covenant non-compliance.
Player trading (summer 2025). In compliance with DNCG requirements and with the explicit objective of reducing the wage bill by approximately 40%, OL conducted significant sales: Mikautadze to Villarreal for €22.6 million, Lucas Perri to Leeds United for €13.0 million, Veretout to Al-Arabi for €0.5 million, Adryelson to Al Wasl for €1.2 million, and Patouillet to Al-Hilal for €0.3 million, totalling €37.6 million.
First-quarter FY2026 player trading revenue of €40.7 million (37% above Q1 FY2025) was disclosed in the November 2025 activity release. New signings were disciplined in cost: Morton from Liverpool (€10.5 million), Sulc from Viktoria Plzen (€8.0 million), Greif from Mallorca (€4.8 million), Kluivert from Casa Pia (€4.1 million), Moreira from Sporting (€2.2 million), a total of €29.6 million of acquisitions, markedly more modest than the prior summer.
Sports performance. OL finished the 2024/25 season in 6th place in Ligue 1, securing Europa League qualification for 2025/26, and reached the Europa League quarter-finals (losing to Manchester United).
Governance evolution. Michael Gerlinger was appointed General Manager of OL SASU (without corporate officer status). The Board reconstitution following the resignations of Dinan and Affolter represents a narrowing of the governance to Kang-aligned and independent directors.
The new management’s stated commitment to “transparent and compliant approach” and “autonomous management of EFG” represents an explicit repudiation of the Textor-era practices.
Commercial and partnership developments. The Groupama Stadium naming rights contract with Groupama was extended for a further five years to 2030. A partnership agreement with the Government of the Republic of Congo was signed for four seasons (2025/26 to 2028/29), providing jersey branding and development programme revenues. Upcoming concerts (Linkin Park, June 2026; Iron Maiden, June 2026) provide stadium revenue visibility.
Textor litigation. The disclosure that Textor and Iconic Sports are engaged in UK litigation with potential change-of-control consequences for the entire Eagle Football Holdings structure remained entirely unresolved as of the filing date.
This is a material uncertainty about the ownership structure of the company that is inadequately disclosed, the document mentions it in a single paragraph without any detail about the nature, amounts, or status of the dispute.
Concluding assessment
Eagle Football Group’s FY2025 Universal Registration Document portrays a company that came within nine days of administrative relegation from Ligue 1, a fate averted only by the resignation of its controlling shareholder/CEO and the emergency injection of €117 million of new liquidity.
The underlying financial position, stripped of accounting complexity, is one of a club that spent vastly beyond its means during the 2024 summer transfer window, created a cost structure incompatible with its revenue base, structured intra-group transactions with related-party clubs that generated reported revenue without economic substance, accumulated significant unpaid social and tax obligations, and relied on a controlling shareholder whose concurrent financial difficulties, documented through the Ares creditor pressures and the Iconic Sports UK litigation, represent an ongoing ownership risk.
The new management under Michele Kang inherits a structurally difficult situation: negative equity of €163 million, net debt of €577 million (including player payables), a €12.5 million fixed UEFA penalty with €37.5 million in conditional sanctions, a DNCG-monitored payroll cap, and a €87.3 million shareholder loan at a 12-13% annual interest rate that will further inflate financial costs in FY2026.
The 40% payroll reduction, if achieved, would reduce staff costs from €177.7 million to approximately €107 million, transforming EBITDA from deeply negative toward marginally positive territory, assuming UEFA and Europa League revenues were maintained. But the task requires sustained discipline, continued player trading success, and freedom from the related-party distractions that characterised the Textor era.
For all football fans, this document demonstrates with unusual clarity, systemic risks: ownership opacity (the unknown terms of intra-group agreements among EFG Bidco’s shareholders), regulatory arbitrage (Botafogo round-trips designed to generate revenue for financial compliance purposes), governance conflicts of interest (a director selling assets to the company she governs, without prior board approval), the inadequacy of an ownership test that permitted the Textor financial architecture to operate for three years before near-catastrophe, and the absence of any early intervention mechanism that could have interrupted the pattern before it reached DNCG relegation stage.
Please add to the above analysis the disposal of Crystal Palace holdings, the action taken by Ares in placing Bidco into administration and the ongoing dispute between OL and Botafogo.
Disposal of the Crystal Palace Holding
The URD filed in December 2025 makes almost no direct reference to Crystal Palace, because the disposal of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco’s stake in the Premier League club was a Bidco-level transaction that did not pass through EFG’s consolidated accounts.
Crystal Palace was held at Palace Holdco UK Limited, a subsidiary of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco rather than of Eagle Football Group, and therefore sat entirely outside the EFG consolidation perimeter. This jurisdictional separation, which was by design, meant that one of the most consequential disposals in the group’s history was largely invisible in the above accounts.
The background to the disposal requires understanding the UEFA multi-club ownership rules and their collision with sporting reality. Textor’s Eagle Football network encompassed both Crystal Palace (Premier League, England) and Olympique Lyonnais (Ligue 1, France) within the same ownership structure.
UEFA’s regulations prohibit clubs under common ownership from participating in the same UEFA club competition. For three seasons this was operationally irrelevant, because Lyon had failed to qualify for European competition in 2022/23 and 2023/24. The moment Lyon finished sixth in Ligue 1 at the end of the 2024/25 season, securing a Europa League berth, the regulatory conflict became acute, because Crystal Palace won the FA Cup on 18 May 2025, beating Manchester City through a single Eberechi Eze goal, and thereby also qualified for the Europa League as cup winners. Two clubs under the same ownership structure had qualified for the same UEFA competition simultaneously, a situation UEFA’s multi-club ownership rules were specifically designed to prevent.
UEFA dictated that Crystal Palace were prohibited from the competition under the multi-club ownership rule. Because Lyon had the higher league standing, Lyon was awarded the Europa League berth and Crystal Palace was demoted to the UEFA Conference League, with Nottingham Forest taking Palace’s original Europa League qualification place.
This was a direct financial and reputational blow to Crystal Palace, who had earned top-tier European competition through one of the most celebrated FA Cup victories in the club’s history, only to be relegated to a secondary tournament because of their ownership group’s governance choices.
The sale was therefore both a regulatory necessity and a financial imperative. Textor made a deal with Woody Johnson, owner of the NFL’s New York Jets and former US Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Johnson signed the legal documents for Crystal Palace on 23 June 2025, with a deal of approximately £190 million ($256 million). On 24 July 2025, the club announced that Johnson’s purchase was complete.
The financial architecture of this disposal is the critical point for understanding the subsequent collapse.
The sale of Bidco’s 43% stake in Crystal Palace FC for £190 million, with the majority of the proceeds used to pay down Ares’ debt, was one of the conditions of the standstill agreement Ares had imposed following Bidco’s October 2025 loan defaults.
Under the terms of the original loan facility, the proceeds from the Palace sale were required to be returned in full to Ares to recoup part of their investment. Despite this partial repayment, the relationship soured as Ares sought to retrieve the remaining approximately €200 million still outstanding.
This sequencing is fundamental to understanding the entire subsequent chain of events. Textor was forced to sell Crystal Palace, one of the group’s most commercially viable and now trophy-winning assets, in order to meet Ares’ debt demands. The proceeds of approximately €200 million went directly to Ares, generating no liquidity for the operating clubs.
Bidco still owed Ares at least a further €200 million after the disposal, now secured against a smaller and less commercially attractive asset base consisting principally of the stakes in Olympique Lyonnais, Botafogo and RWDM Molenbeek. The Crystal Palace sale was, in structural terms, a controlled asset strip under creditor pressure, not a strategic portfolio decision.
Ares administration of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco
The administration of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited on 27 March 2026 is the defining insolvency event in the history of football multi-club ownership. It demonstrates, with unusual clarity, almost every systemic risk that can be identified as a theoretical possibility: concentrated creditor control, covenant-triggered collapse, MCO network contagion, and the inadequacy of self-regulatory oversight structures when sophisticated financial actors are the counterparties.
The debt architecture that created the crisis. The original Ares loan to Eagle Football Holdings Bidco was approximately €400 million, provided to finance the acquisition of Olympique Lyonnais in December 2022.
This figure was reduced to approximately €200 million following the sale of Textor’s Crystal Palace stake to Woody Johnson for circa €200 million in the summer of 2025, with the proceeds returned in full to Ares. The structure of this debt, high-yield, PIK-style, secured by a first-ranking floating charge over Bidco’s entire undertaking including its shareholdings in all subsidiary clubs, gave Ares extraordinary enforcement rights that would ultimately prove decisive.
The October 2025 default and the standstill arrangement. In October 2025, Bidco defaulted on approximately $450 million in loans owed to Ares.
The default was driven by insufficient operating cash flow to cover the escalating PIK interest. The precise default triggers cited by Ares included, alongside the financial defaults, a “repeated failure to file accounts and other financial statements on time”, a technical default that the group had been accumulating through the progressive delay in EFG’s half-year financial statements, which were still outstanding as of 27 March 2026.
Rather than immediately enforcing its security, Ares agreed to a 12-month standstill on two conditions: the sale of the Crystal Palace stake (accomplished in July 2025), and the provision of a going concern support letter to the group’s auditors. This letter committed Ares to taking no enforcement action for twelve months, which allowed the auditors to issue a going concern opinion despite the technical defaults.
The collapse of governance from January 2026. The standstill arrangement depended on a functioning relationship between Ares and the Bidco board.
That relationship collapsed catastrophically in January 2026. On January 27, 2026, Ares sent correspondence to John Textor and to Companies House claiming that Ares had the authority to remove Textor as director of Eagle Bidco and to appoint Hemen Tseayo and Stephen Welch to the board in his replacement.
This assertion was disputed by Textor, who argued it lacked legal foundation under the Articles of Association. In a direct response to the Ares filings, Textor re-appointed himself as a director on January 29, 2026, leading to a state of conflicting documentation at Companies House.
Meanwhile, Textor alleged that Ares had been covertly controlling EFG, the listed French subsidiary, since June 2025 through a side agreement with Michele Kang. Textor alleges that while he publicly appeared to be in alignment with Michele Kang during her installation as Lyon’s president in mid-2025, she had already entered into a concealed agreement with Ares Management to form a shadow board. This five-person committee reportedly operated outside of Lyon’s official governance structures and effectively controlled the club’s operations, including player budgets and executive decisions.
Textor formally notified the French Financial Markets Authority (AMF) on January 28, 2026, alleging that this clandestine governance violated French market disclosure rules and constituted an unauthorised change of control of a publicly listed entity.
EFG itself disclosed on 10 March 2026 that the governance changes in June 2025 were “part of a stability package required to secure €87 million in emergency financing and a €30 million bank guarantee provided by Kang”, framing what Textor characterises as covert control as a disclosed commercial stabilisation arrangement.
In contrast to Textor’s claims, correspondence from Ares executive Juan Arciniegas suggests the side agreement was a defensive measure instituted because of Eagle Football’s severe financial distress. The competing characterisations, governance stabilisation versus covert takeover, remain unresolved in the legal proceedings.
Administration on 27 March 2026. On March 27, 2026, Ares utilised a qualifying floating charge, which had been established over the company’s entire undertaking in late 2025, to execute an out-of-court appointment under Paragraph 14 of Schedule B1 to the UK Insolvency Act 1986.
Ares unilaterally appointed the specialised insolvency firm Cork Gully as the administrator for Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited. Stephen Cork, Cork Gully’s managing partner, stated that the firm’s “immediate priority is to stabilise the company, manage its shareholdings responsibly, and work towards securing the future of the clubs involved” and invited interested parties to come forward.
Eagle Football’s response was furious. Eagle Football described Ares’ decision as “gravely offensive” and “unilateral and predatory,” accusing Ares of seeking to “break apart a financially viable multi-club business which has successfully turned-around insolvent clubs into sporting success stories which, when operated collaboratively, are cash-flow positive in 2026 and beyond.”
The statement further alleged that Ares had “secretly taken control of our French club, Olympique Lyonnais, in June 2025, through the creation of a shadow board, which violated both French and UK law.” Ares responded briefly through The Athletic that the statements were “highly misleading and inaccurate” and that it would defend its position through proper legal channels.
Consequences of the administration. The administration of Bidco triggers a series of cascading legal and financial consequences that remain unresolved as of 30 April 2026. While the parent holding company (Bidco) is in administration, the subsidiary clubs themselves, Botafogo, Olympique Lyonnais, and RWDM Brussels, are not formally considered insolvent under UK law.
However, because Cork Gully has assumed direct control of the majority equity stakes held by Bidco, the administrators effectively control the ultimate destiny of these clubs. Cork Gully has been reported to have placed the operating clubs on the open market, and by mid-April 2026 had placed classified advertisements in major financial publications actively inviting bidders to acquire Botafogo.
The administration also triggers Ares’ Payments Notice power. Ares holds a formidable first-ranking pledge over all inter-company receivables within the Eagle Football group.
Following the default, Ares gained the legal right to serve a Payments Notice, which legally mandates that operating clubs like Botafogo must pay all outstanding inter-company sums directly to Ares, completely bypassing the parent company and essentially stripping the Brazilian club of any remaining internal liquidity.
For Eagle Football Group SA, the Euronext-listed entity, the administration of its majority shareholder represents an acute governance crisis.
The EFG Board announced on 27 March 2026 that it would be unable to finalise its half-year financial statements for the six months to 31 December 2025 by the regulatory deadline.
The Board of Directors determined that the Company would not be able to finalise its interim financial statements by 31 March 2026, noting that the situation was created by the administration of the majority shareholder Eagle Bidco and that the Company was in discussions with certain financial partners to clarify underlying commitments. The statutory auditors’ review of the first half of 2025/26 remains ongoing as of the date of this supplementary analysis.
The implications for EFG as a Euronext Paris-listed entity are profound. Eagle Football Holdings Bidco holds 87.78% of EFG’s capital and 95.37% of its voting rights.
With Bidco in administration, Cork Gully effectively controls this blocking majority. The administrators’ mandate is creditor recovery, not club stewardship. Cork Gully’s advertisement of the clubs for sale includes, by implication, the sale of the Bidco majority stake in EFG, which would constitute a change of control of the listed company requiring French regulatory and AMF approval.
Any acquirer of the Bidco stake would become the controlling shareholder of Olympique Lyonnais.
Botafogo v Olympique Lyonnais litigation
The lawsuit filed by Botafogo SAF against Olympique Lyonnais in April 2026 constitutes, in the most direct possible way, the confirmation of the systemic risk that the URD’s analysis of the Botafogo receivable had already identified.
The €124.2 million receivable that EFG carried on its balance sheet as an unimpaired asset, representing amounts allegedly owed to OL by Botafogo for player economic rights transfers, turns out to be precisely the same underlying transactions that Botafogo characterises as loans it made to OL which OL has failed to repay.
The two clubs are engaged in litigation in which each claims to be the creditor of the other for sums arising from the same group of intra-group transactions.
The nature and origin of the dispute. Brazilian club Botafogo stated on 4 April 2026 that it had filed lawsuits against Lyon to recover unpaid debts totalling €125 million. According to Botafogo, the complaint concerns the loan of several players to Lyon when US businessman Textor was in charge of both clubs, as well as payments linked to alleged phantom transfers.
Botafogo’s legal position rests on a specific characterisation of what happened. The legal filings assert that the massive financial contributions funneled from Rio de Janeiro to France were strictly structured as secured intra-group loans with contractually defined expectations of repayment, rather than as equity transfers, inter-company subsidies, or non-refundable capital injections.
The multi-million-euro outstanding amount reportedly stems from vital financial contributions made by Botafogo to Lyon at the end of 2022, funds provided as loans to rescue the French side when they were under immense pressure from banks. The assistance provided was pivotal, ensuring Lyon avoided administrative relegation and eventually qualified for the Europa League.
The critical legal battle is therefore not merely over amounts but over the fundamental characterisation of the transactions: were they loans (creating a debt obligation on OL to repay Botafogo) or were they the consideration in player economic rights transfers (creating a debt obligation on Botafogo to repay OL, as disclosed in the URD balance sheet)?
The answer to this question determines which party is the creditor. Both clubs’ legal teams are arguing from the same underlying transactions to diametrically opposite conclusions.
The URD’s note on related party transactions provides the OL perspective: the €124.2 million is characterised entirely as a receivable owed to OL by Botafogo, representing the consideration for four players’ economic rights transferred from OL to Botafogo.
The note candidly acknowledged that “a global solution aiming to offset reciprocal debts and receivables between Eagle Football Holdings Bidco and the entities under its control is currently under review”, but at the time of the URD’s filing, OL had not recognised any impairment, relying on a commitment from Eagle Football Holdings Bidco to either take over the receivable or find an alternative solution.
That solution has now definitively not materialised: Bidco is in administration, and Botafogo has gone to court.
The Brazilian court proceedings and initial ruling. Botafogo’s legal strategy was to pursue the dispute in Brazilian courts rather than in UK insolvency proceedings, where it would rank as an unsecured creditor in an English administration with limited prospects of recovery.
The objective of this litigation is to bypass the UK insolvency hierarchy entirely by legally enforcing the direct repayment of funds extracted from the South American operations. To manage the complexity of a multi-jurisdictional dispute, Botafogo’s legal counsel employed a strategy of fragmentation, breaking the €125 million total claim into multiple smaller actions to navigate Brazilian procedural requirements more efficiently.
The initial result was swift and favourable to Botafogo. According to Botafogo, a judge handed down a first decision in favour of the Brazilian club covering 122 million reais, approximately €20.8 million, ordering Lyon to pay this amount within three days.
However, OL had not been formally notified of this decision through adversarial proceedings at the time of the first reports, suggesting it was an ex parte interim order rather than a final judgment on the merits.
The €20.8 million interim order, if enforced, would represent a direct attachment of OL’s assets in satisfaction of a Brazilian court order, an extraordinary situation for a Euronext-listed French football club.
OL’s legal team would be expected to contest enforcement through French and EU legal channels, arguing inter alia that French courts lack an obligation to enforce Brazilian interim orders obtained in non-adversarial proceedings. This litigation will, at minimum, run for an extended period through multiple jurisdictions.
The broader systemic context of the Botafogo allegations. During his tenure, Textor heavily utilised a single cash register (caixa único) treasury model.
Under this centralised model, liquidity was ruthlessly extracted from the Brazilian operations to cover massive operational deficits in France, effectively prioritising the European flagship at the expense of the Brazilian club. Botafogo’s lawsuit is therefore not merely a contractual dispute but a direct challenge to the financial logic of the MCO model as Textor operated it: using the profitable Brazilian club as a source of working capital to fund the loss-making French club, in a structure that generated reportable revenue in France (the economic rights transfers) while creating obligations that Botafogo characterises as unpaid loans.
Botafogo officials claim that the debt was the main cause for FIFA’s transfer ban on the club at the end of 2025. This inability to register new players has left the South American champions in a vulnerable position in defending their titles, leading to the decision to take formal legal action. Legal documents also reveal that Lyon’s financial obligations go beyond Brazil’s borders, the Rio club states that OL also owes approximately €12 million to RWDM Brussels, also part of the Eagle Football portfolio.
Botafogo’s own financial position has been severely compromised by the collapse. Faced with the stark reality of zero financial recovery from the UK administration process and the prospect of being forcefully liquidated by foreign creditors, Botafogo SAF initiated a sweeping and highly aggressive legal campaign within the Brazilian judicial system.
On April 3 and 4, 2026, Botafogo formally announced the initiation of civil litigation directly against Olympique Lyonnais. The Brazilian club, Serie A champions in 2023, was simultaneously dealing with Ares’ Payments Notice demanding that it redirect all inter-company receivables directly to the creditor, a FIFA transfer ban for an unrelated unpaid fee to Atlanta United, and now the Cork Gully administration advertising it for sale.
The accounting implications for OL. The Botafogo lawsuit creates a direct accounting challenge for OL’s half-year financial statements and the next annual accounts. The URD carried the €124.2 million Botafogo receivable at full value with no impairment, supported by Eagle Football Holdings Bidco’s commitment to provide a solution.
Bidco is now in administration and cannot honour any such commitment.
Botafogo, far from repaying the receivable, is claiming the opposite, that OL owes it money. The prospects for recovery of any material portion of the €124.2 million, through any mechanism, have deteriorated dramatically since the URD was filed in December 2025.
The statutory auditors’ ongoing review of the half-year statements, which EFG announced it could not complete on time, will need to grapple directly with whether the Botafogo receivable requires full or partial impairment. If it does, and the analytical case for impairment is now compelling, the additional charge of up to €124.2 million would eliminate OL’s remaining tangible net asset base and drive equity to an even more deeply negative position.
Consolidated assessment:
Taken together, the URD analysis and the three subsequent developments present a picture of a complete structural collapse across every dimension of the Eagle Football MCO model.
The Crystal Palace disposal, rather than stabilising the group, acted as a partial debt repayment that reduced Ares’ exposure without resolving the fundamental non-viability of the remaining Bidco capital structure.
The administration of Bidco has transferred control of OL’s majority shareholding to an insolvency practitioner whose mandate is creditor recovery, not club stewardship.
And the Botafogo litigation has transformed the URD’s largest unimpaired asset, the €124.2 million receivable, into a contested liability that a Brazilian court has partially ruled against OL in non-adversarial proceedings.
For football regulators, the lessons are direct and concrete.
The entire Eagle Football structure was opaque to each football regulator in every jurisdiction: the DNCG could see OL’s accounts; the Premier League could see Crystal Palace’s accounts; the Brazilian football federation could monitor Botafogo’s accounts.
But the Ares loan at Bidco level, the floating charge over all subsidiary equity stakes, the Payments Notice powers, the side agreements between creditors and incoming management, and the central cash management arrangements that redistributed liquidity from Botafogo to Lyon, none of these were visible to any football regulator at any level. A regulator’s group-level monitoring, beneficial ownership transparency requirements, and hybrid instrument disclosure obligations would not have prevented this collapse, but they may have provided the visibility necessary to identify the risk years before it crystallised into administration, litigation and potential forced sale of one of France’s most significant clubs.