3 July 2026
West Ham United Football Club Limited (00066516) · WH Holding Limited (05993863)
Working assumption: any new Křetínský funding is debt, not new equity
This article is an analysis of West Ham United’s secured funding position as at 3 July 2026. It (i) draws down the full Companies House charge register for West Ham United Football Club Limited (company 00066516, ‘the Club’) and WH Holding Limited (company 05993863, ‘WHH’, the parent), (ii) details all disclosed credit facilities and the transfer receivable/payable position from the audited FY25 accounts (year ended 31 May 2025, filed 27 February 2026), and (iii) assesses what security could realistically be offered to Daniel Křetínský, through 1890s Holdings a.s. or another EP-group vehicle, were he to fund the Club’s immediate cash flow and capital injection requirements by way of debt rather than new equity.
Sources: the live Companies House charge registers for both entities (retrieved 3 July 2026); the signed WH Holding Limited FY25 Annual Report & Financial Statements; Premier League and EFL rulebooks as they bear on security over club assets; and financial press reporting (FT, Reuters, The Times, Sky Sports) on the June 2026 ownership restructuring. Where a figure could not be verified to a primary source it is flagged rather than estimated. The FY25 balance sheet is thirteen months stale against a season that ended in relegation; every balance-sheet figure quoted must be read with that in mind.
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Summary
- The Club-level balance sheet is fully encumbered; the holding company is clean. West Ham United Football Club Limited carries 3 outstanding charges: two Barclays charges created 16 July 2025 (a fixed charge and a charge over present and future estates/interests, in substance a fixed and floating package securing the £40.0m overdraft) and one Rights and Media Funding (RMF) charge created 30 July 2025 over freehold land and buildings, sitting alongside the all-asset debenture disclosed in the accounts as securing the £124.0m term loan. WH Holding Limited has no outstanding charges at all, the single most important structural fact for any new lender.
- The senior debt stack is £164m of commitments against a Championship revenue base. RMF’s five-year £124.0m facility (28 July 2025; £89.0m drawn at signing) plus the £40.0m Barclays overdraft (£16.3m drawn at the FY25 balance-sheet date) sit under an intercreditor agreement. RMF lends against Premier League broadcast flows; relegation converts a c.£97m central distribution baseline into roughly £49m of parachute income plus an EFL share, and the facility must be presumed to contain relegation-linked prepayment or borrowing-base mechanics whose terms are not public.
- FY25 discloses a club already stressed before the relegation shock.
- Group pre-tax loss of £104.2m; turnover down £42.1m to £227.6m;
- shareholders’ funds a £4.3m deficit;
- £204.3m of creditors due within twelve months;
- £22.0m of interest paid including £15.2m of implied interest on extended transfer payment terms;
- gross player-related payables of £195.8m (£110.9m due within one year);
- and a going-concern note that already forecast a summer 2026 liquidity shortfall requiring player sales or shareholder funding, before relegation was known.
- What can actually be pledged to Křetínský is narrow but real. Player registrations cannot be charged under league rules; central distributions can only be charged within league-consent gateways; the London Stadium is a leasehold concession, not a mortgageable freehold; and RMF plus Barclays already hold fixed and floating security over the Club’s assets, including the Rush Green and Chadwell Heath properties. The realistic security menu is therefore: (i) second-ranking Club-level security by intercreditor accession, (ii) first-ranking security at the unencumbered WHH level, share pledges over the Club and holdco receivables, accepting structural subordination, (iii) assignment of specific unencumbered transfer receivables, and (iv) contractual protections (guarantees, covenants, board rights) substituting for asset cover.
- The strategic reality: any Křetínský loan is a bridge to control economics, and should be priced and structured as such. At c.43% and rising, with the Sullivan block in play and league fair-market-value rules governing associated-party lending, the rational structure is senior-subordinated debt on arm’s-length terms with equity linkage (conversion or set-off rights against a future rights issue) rather than a maximal security grab that would collide with RMF’s intercreditor, league consent requirements, and the optics of a shareholder foreclosing on his own club.
Secured Lenders to West Ham United
Outstanding charges: West Ham United Football Club Limited (00066516)
The Companies House register shows 49 charges created since 1909-era filings, of which 46 are satisfied and 3 outstanding. The outstanding security, all created in a five-week window in summer 2025, is:
| Charge code | Created / Delivered | Persons entitled | Security description & analysis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0006 6516 0049 | 30 Jul 2025 / 13 Aug 2025 | Rights and Media Funding Limited | Charge over freehold land and buildings registered under specified title numbers, on the pattern of RMF’s satisfied 2017–2020 charges, this is the Rush Green training ground and/or Chadwell Heath academy property. Registered two days after the £124.0m facility was signed (28 July 2025); it is the real-property leg of RMF’s package. The accounts separately disclose that the facility is secured by a debenture over all the assets of the Club under an intercreditor agreement with Barclays, the full charge instrument should be pulled from Companies House to map the fixed/floating split and any negative pledge. |
| 0006 6516 0048 | 16 Jul 2025 / 17 Jul 2025 | Barclays Bank PLC | Contains fixed charge, the standard Barclays fixed-charge instrument, renewed in step with the overdraft. Replaces the equivalent 2023/2024 charges (0043–0046) satisfied on 6 October 2025. |
| 0006 6516 0047 | 16 Jul 2025 / 17 Jul 2025 | Barclays Bank PLC | Charge over all present and future estates or interests, with 0048, this constitutes in substance a fixed and floating package over the Club’s assets securing the £40.0m overdraft, consistent with the accounts’ disclosure that the overdraft is secured by fixed and floating charges on the assets of the Club. |
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The satisfied register is a sixteen-year history of the Club’s funding relationships, and it matters for the Křetínský assessment because it demonstrates both the Club’s pattern of specialist secured borrowing and the precedent for security being layered and released as lenders rotate:
| Period | Secured lender | Security / notes | Satisfied |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009–2013 | Standard Bank PLC (incl. as security trustee for Vibrac Corporation) | Legal mortgage (2009); deed of assignment (2012), the Icelandic-era and post-Icelandic funding tail | 2013 |
| 2013–2016 | CB Holding ehf. | Vendor/legacy security including over the Boleyn Ground freehold (title EGL564234), also registered at WHH level | 2016 |
| 2013–2015 | Vibrac Corporation | Fixed charges, the BVI football lender of that era | 2015 |
| 2014–2016 | Boelyn Phoenix Limited | Charge over the Boleyn Ground stadium, Upton Park, the stadium sale financing | 2016 |
| 2015–2016 | JG Funding Limited | Fixed charge, bridge-style funding | 2016 |
| 2016–present | Rights and Media Funding Limited | Rolling series of charges from 2016: fixed charges (0033), Chadwell Heath/training ground legal mortgages (0034–0038). RMF is the Club’s long-standing specialist lender, the accounts describe RMF as ‘historically reliable lenders to the Club’ | Rolled; current charge 0049 outstanding |
| 2020–2021 | Barclays Bank PLC | COVID-era fixed charges (0039–0040) | 2021 |
| 2021–2023 | MSD UK Holdings Limited (as security agent) | Charge over various freehold properties and intellectual property (0041), the Dell family office’s football lending arm; also registered and satisfied at WHH level | Aug 2023 |
| 2021–2024 | Macquarie Bank Limited, London Branch | Charge over specified receivables due to the Club (0042), transfer-receivable discounting | May 2024 |
| 2023–2025 | Barclays Bank PLC | Fixed and floating packages (0043–0046) securing the overdraft and the £5.0m term loan of 17 June 2024 (remaining £3.9m repaid in full 29 August 2025) | Oct 2025 |
WH Holding Limited (05993863)
WHH’s register shows only 3 charges, all satisfied: MSD UK Holdings (created 16 March 2021, satisfied 14 August 2023) and two CB Holding ehf. charges from 2013 (satisfied 2016). As at 3 July 2026 the holding company, owner of the Club, West Ham United Women FC Limited, and the £176.3m intercompany receivable from the Club, has zero outstanding charges. Its persons-with-significant-control register shows two active PSCs, with Křetínský notified from 10 November 2021. This unencumbered parent is the natural first-ranking security location for any new shareholder lender, and Part III builds on it.
Credit Facilities, Transfer Receivables and Payables
The facilities
| Facility | Provider | Size / drawn | Terms & security |
|---|---|---|---|
| Term loan | Rights and Media Funding Limited | £124.0m committed; £89.0m drawn at the accounts signing date (Feb 2026); £35.0m then undrawn | Entered 28 July 2025; five-year term (reported maturity around mid-2030). Secured by a debenture over all the assets of the Club plus the charge 0049 real-property security, under an intercreditor agreement with Barclays. Pricing undisclosed; RMF’s specialist football lending has historically carried double-digit-adjacent rates, materially above clearing-bank cost. RMF lends principally against future Premier League broadcast and transfer flows, the borrowing base that relegation directly erodes. |
| Overdraft | Barclays Bank PLC | £40.0m committed; £16.3m drawn at 31 May 2025 | Renewed in mid-2025 with expiry in July 2026 (the strategic report cites renewal on 17 June 2025 through 15 July 2026; the notes reference renewal on 10 July 2025 to 9 July 2026, a minor internal inconsistency in the accounts; either way, renewal falls due this month). Secured by fixed and floating charges (0047/0048). The July 2026 renewal is the first hard test of lender appetite post-relegation: expect a reduced limit, wider pricing, tighter covenants, or all three. |
| Term loan (repaid) | Barclays Bank PLC | £5.0m (17 June 2024); remaining £3.9m repaid in full 29 August 2025 | Repayment coincided with the RMF drawdown, consistent with RMF proceeds refinancing bank term debt, and with Barclays’ 2023/24 charges being satisfied on 6 October 2025. |
| Receivables acceleration | Undisclosed counterparty(ies) | £12.0m cash received in FY25 after deduction of £0.7m interest charges | The accounts disclose the acceleration of a number of future transfer fee receivables, factoring/discounting of instalments due from other clubs (the Macquarie charge satisfied May 2024 evidences the prior programme). An effective c.5.5% discount for early receipt; a recurring liquidity tool that consumes future-year cash. |
| Shareholder funding | None outstanding at FY25 | — | No shareholder loans were outstanding in recent seasons and no equity has been raised since 2022. The going-concern note nonetheless contemplates additional shareholder funding as a mitigating action, supported by a shareholder letter of support, the doorway through which any Křetínský facility would walk. |
The stadium is not a facility and cannot become one
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The FY25 balance sheet, what the lenders are lending against
| Metric (FY ended 31 May 2025) | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Turnover (group) | £227.6m | Down £42.1m: 14th place (v 9th), no European income, fewer live selections |
| Pre-tax loss (group) | £(104.2)m | Versus £57.2m profit in FY24; player-sale profits fell to £20.0m from £96.3m |
| Shareholders’ funds (group) | £(4.3)m deficit | From £99.25m positive; accumulated P&L deficit £312.1m |
| Net liabilities (Club entity) | £(216.6)m | Club-level position; widened from £(108.4)m |
| Player registrations NBV | £223.2m | Gross cost £481.0m; additions £132.6m; amortisation charge £99.4m, the dominant asset, and the one that cannot be charged |
| Creditors due within one year | £204.3m | The headline twelve-month wall at group level |
| Interest payable | £22.0m | Including £15.2m of implied interest on transfer fees with extended payment terms, the true cost of instalment-funded squad building |
| Intercompany creditor (Club owes WHH) | £176.3m | Interest-free, repayable on demand; economically equity-like but legally an on-demand creditor, and not formally subordinated in the FY25 disclosure |
| Operating lease commitments | £409.4m | Substantially the London Stadium concession |
| UEFA Annex G adjustment | £3.9m | Disclosed in Note 33; irrelevant in the Championship |
Transfer payables and receivables
Player-related creditors, instalments owed to other clubs on past purchases, total £195.8m gross at 31 May 2025, of which £110.9m falls due within one year and £84.9m beyond. This is the decisive number in the cash flow analysis: the Club entered 2025/26 with nearly £200m of committed outflows to other clubs and continued buying (Kilman-profile deals on long instalment schedules being characteristic), against a wage bill and interest burden that FY25 income did not cover. Relegation does not reduce a single one of these instalments.
On the receivables side, the accounts confirm the acceleration programme (£12.0m received net in FY25) but the gross transfer-receivable balance and its maturity profile require extraction from the debtor notes of the filed accounts, this paper deliberately does not assert a figure it has not verified. Directionally: the Declan Rice £105m instalment stream (2023) has been substantially collected or accelerated; the largest recent receivable generator is the Mohammed Kudus sale to Tottenham in July 2025 (a FY26 event, reported at approximately £55m), with 2025/26 departures — including Lucas Paquetá’s January 2026 exit to Brazil, adding further instalment streams whose profiles are undisclosed. The critical analytical point stands regardless of the precise balance: unencumbered transfer receivables are one of the few first-ranking security candidates left, and the Club has been consuming them for liquidity by acceleration, meaning the pool available to pledge to a new lender is smaller than the headline sales suggest.
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Security available to Daniel Křetínský as debt funder
The changed context: lender and prospective controller are now the same person
When this question was first live, Křetínský at 27% behind Sullivan’s 38.8% and the Gold estate’s 25.1%, with J. Albert Smith at 8%, a Křetínský facility was minority-shareholder rescue lending. As at 3 July 2026 the position is transformed: Sullivan has resigned as co-chairman following the Panorama/Times allegations (which he denies);
Křetínský has agreed with Vanessa Gold to acquire Gold-estate shares lifting 1890s Holdings to approximately 43%, becoming the largest shareholder, with completion reported as weeks away; and his November 2021 investment agreement is reported to include an option over the Sullivan and Gold shareholdings at a set price. Any debt he now advances is, in economic substance, the incoming controller funding his own asset, which changes what security is worth to him, and what taking aggressive security would cost him in league, regulatory and supporter terms. The Independent Football Regulator’s owner and officer regime now also sits over any change-of-control sequence.
What cannot be taken as security
- Player registrations. The squad, £223.2m NBV, the dominant asset, is not chargeable collateral. Premier League and EFL rules alike prohibit clubs from granting security over players’ registrations; a registration is a creature of league rules, not a freely assignable property right, and no charge over it is enforceable in any conventional sense. Lenders reach player value only indirectly, through assignment of the receivables generated when a registration is transferred.
- Central distributions, only through the league gateway. Both the Premier League and (now operatively for 2026/27) the EFL restrict assignments or charges over central funds: security over a club’s share of broadcast/central distributions requires league consent under the respective rules, and the leagues police the priority of such assignments, not least to protect the football-creditor waterfall. RMF’s model operates within precisely this gateway; a second assignment behind RMF over parachute and EFL distributions is possible in principle but requires both EFL consent and RMF intercreditor accommodation, and the parachute stream is already the senior lender’s core collateral.
- The stadium. A leasehold concession with no mortgageable freehold. Not available.
- Already-encumbered Club assets. RMF’s all-asset debenture (with charge 0049 over the training-ground/academy freeholds) and Barclays’ fixed and floating package pre-empt first-ranking Club-level security across the board. Their intercreditor agreement will contain negative-pledge and permitted-security regimes; a new secured lender at Club level enters only by consent and accession.
The realistic security menu
| Structure | Security taken | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| A. Second-ranking Club debenture | Second fixed and floating charge over all Club assets, behind RMF and Barclays, via intercreditor accession | The maximal-security route. Requires RMF and Barclays consent; expect standstill provisions, enforcement blockages and payment subordination that strip the second charge of most enforcement value while senior debt is outstanding. Real value is defensive, a seat at the intercreditor table, priority over unsecured creditors in an insolvency, and blocking rights against any third lender. League consent needed to the extent central funds are touched. Optics of a 43% shareholder taking enforcement-capable security over the club are poor but manageable if pricing is demonstrably arm’s length. |
| B. First-ranking WHH (holdco) security | Share pledge over WHH’s shares in the Club (and WHU Women FC); assignment of the £176.3m intercompany receivable; floating charge over WHH assets | The cleanest available first-ranking package, WHH is unencumbered. A share pledge over the Club is the classic loan-to-own instrument: enforcement delivers the equity, not the assets, sidestepping the RMF/Barclays asset security (though not their change-of-control and cross-default triggers, which must be checked and consent obtained). Assignment of the intercompany receivable gives the lender control of the largest single claim against the Club. Structurally subordinated to all Club-level creditors as regards Club assets, but for a lender whose strategic objective is control rather than recovery, that is a feature, not a bug. League and IFR approval dynamics on any enforcement-driven change of control apply. |
| C. Assignment of specific unencumbered transfer receivables | First-ranking assignment of named instalment streams (e.g. unaccelerated portions of the Kudus and 2025/26 departure receivables), to the extent released or excluded from RMF’s borrowing base | Precise, priceable, self-liquidating collateral with clean precedent (the satisfied Macquarie charge 0042 is the template). Capacity is the constraint: the acceleration programme has already consumed part of the pool, and RMF’s debenture likely captures the rest absent a carve-out. Best used to collateralise a defined tranche (£20–40m) rather than the whole facility. |
| D. Subordinated unsecured shareholder loan (PIK) | None, contractual subordination to RMF/Barclays, with covenants, information and board rights | The frictionless route: no consents beyond intercreditor deep-subordination, no league security gateway, fastest to fund a July liquidity need. PIK interest preserves cash. Under the Premier League’s associated-party-transaction regime as amended in 2024, shareholder loans must be on demonstrable fair-market-value terms (relevant again on promotion, and the direction of travel for the IFR); the EFL’s P&S framework meanwhile treats equity-like funding favourably. The trade-off is pure: no security, so recovery ranks behind £164m of senior commitments and £195.8m of transfer creditors. |
| E. Convertible / rights-issue-linked instrument | Unsecured or holdco-secured loan with conversion or set-off rights against a future WHH share issue | The structure that matches the strategic facts. Debt today (satisfying the working assumption), equity tomorrow: the loan converts into, or is set off against, a rights issue once the ownership reorganisation completes, capitalising the funding, repairing the £(4.3)m equity deficit, and avoiding a permanent high-cost debt layer on a Championship income statement. Pre-emption mechanics in the shareholders’ agreement (and the reported option arrangements) make this executable; non-participating shareholders dilute. This is the likeliest real-world outcome even if the first cheque is documented as a loan. |
Fair market value and the associated-party dimension
Křetínský at c.43% is unambiguously an associated party. Three regimes bear on the terms of any loan: (i) the Premier League’s APT rules, following the 2024 arbitration which found the exclusion of shareholder loans from fair-market-value assessment unlawful, the amended rules require shareholder financing to be benchmarked; while West Ham is outside the PL for 2026/27, promotion is the entire business case, and structuring that fails PL FMV testing now would need unwinding later; (ii) EFL Profitability & Sustainability rules, under which a parachute club has wider loss headroom and equity-funded losses are treated more generously than debt-funded ones, a substantive argument for the convertible route; (iii) the Football Governance Act regime, the IFR’s financial-regulation and owner-suitability powers make demonstrably arm’s-length, sustainability-enhancing funding the safe harbour. The practical consequence: interest at a defensible market rate (benchmarked against RMF’s own pricing as the observable market cost of Club risk), independent-director approval, and contemporaneous FMV documentation are not compliance decoration, they are what makes the facility usable across all three regimes.
Precedents
| Comparator | Structure | Read-across |
|---|---|---|
| Everton / Moshiri | c.£750m of unsecured, interest-free shareholder loans, ultimately capitalised/compromised in the Friedkin acquisition | The cautionary tale: unsecured shareholder debt at scale becomes de facto equity and is priced as such by any acquirer. Documenting security and interest from day one preserves optionality Moshiri never had. |
| Everton / Friedkin (2024–25) | Acquirer-provided secured debt refinancing external lenders (including 777-era exposures), then recapitalisation post-completion | The live template for ‘incoming controller funds via debt, converts on control’: closest analogue to the Křetínský position. |
| Arsenal / KSE | Owner refinanced stadium bonds with intercompany debt on arm’s-length-documented terms | Shareholder debt replacing third-party debt at lower friction, the end-state if Křetínský eventually takes out RMF. |
| Chelsea / Boehly-Clearlake | Multi-hundred-million shareholder loans at holdco level, deeply subordinated | Holdco-level lending keeping the club entity clean, structure B/D in the menu above. |
| Brighton / Bloom | Long-run interest-free shareholder loans, part-capitalised over time | The benign steady-state, but built in an era before FMV rules; not replicable as-is under current APT/IFR expectations. |
Křetínský’s leverage is close to absolute: the going-concern note names shareholder funding as the mitigation; the Barclays overdraft is at renewal this month into a relegation credit; RMF’s undrawn £35m is the only committed headroom and sits behind a borrowing base that relegation has impaired; the Gold estate is a seller; and Sullivan’s exit has removed the counterweight. The Club’s alternative to Křetínský money is forced player sales into a market that knows it is a forced seller.
The recommended structure, from a finance director’s chair assessing the counterparty’s likely ask: a two-tranche facility. Tranche 1 (c.£30–40m, immediate): bridge liquidity secured by structure C receivable assignments plus structure B holdco security (share pledge and intercompany-receivable assignment), PIK interest at an FMV-benchmarked rate, funding the summer wage and instalment wall. Tranche 2 (c.£60–90m, on completion of the ownership reorganisation): committed facility with conversion/set-off rights into a WHH rights issue (structure E), capitalising the bridge and rebuilding equity for the promotion push. Second-ranking Club security (structure A) is worth requesting for its intercreditor seat and third-lender blocking value, but should not be allowed to delay funding: its economic value behind RMF’s standstill is modest, and the share pledge already delivers the control economics. The board should assume Křetínský’s advisers reach the same conclusion, and should therefore negotiate hardest on conversion pricing and pre-emption protection for other shareholders, that, not the security schedule, is where value will actually transfer.
Previous article on impact of relegation 4th May 2026
Caveats and Data Limitations
- The FY25 accounts (31 May 2025 year-end, filed 27 February 2026) predate relegation, the Sullivan resignation and the Křetínský/Gold transaction; every balance-sheet figure is thirteen months stale against those events. FY26 accounts are due by 28 February 2027.
- Charge descriptions on the Companies House register are truncated summaries; the full instruments for charges 0047–0049 (fixed/floating split, negative pledges, title numbers, intercreditor references) should be downloaded before any structuring decision. The RMF all-asset debenture disclosed in the accounts should be reconciled to the register, the property charge 0049 is visible, and the debenture’s registration particulars should be confirmed from the charge documents themselves.
- The RMF facility’s pricing, covenants, relegation mechanics, borrowing base and the intercreditor terms with Barclays are not public; characterisations of standstill and consent dynamics are based on standard market practice, expressly flagged as such.
- The gross transfer-receivable balance and instalment profiles (including Kudus and Paquetá terms) are not asserted because they were not verifiable to a primary source; extract from the FY25 debtor notes and update for FY26 activity.
- The overdraft renewal dates show a minor inconsistency within the accounts themselves (17 June 2025→15 July 2026 in the strategic report; 10 July 2025→9 July 2026 in the notes per press extraction); either way renewal falls due in July 2026 and status should be confirmed directly.
- The Křetínský/Gold share transaction (27%→c.43%) was reported by the FT, Reuters and others as agreed but completing ‘in coming weeks’ as at mid-June 2026; completion, final percentages, and the terms of any option over the Sullivan block should be confirmed before this paper’s Part III is relied upon. Shareholders’-agreement terms (pre-emption, matching rights) are private and inferred only where flagged.
- Allegations concerning David Sullivan reported by BBC Panorama and The Times are denied by him and are unproven; they are referenced solely for their governance and ownership-structure consequences.
Disclaimer: this is a research and analysis document prepared from public filings and reporting. It is not legal, tax or investment advice; facility and shareholders’-agreement terms characterised as market-standard are inferences and are flagged as such. Allegations referenced are unproven and denied where stated.