17th September 2026
The Unresolved “115 Charges” Case: Causes of Delay, Comparative Precedent, Stakeholder Implications and Consequences for the Decision and Appeal
Author: Paul Quinn, CWTE Limited
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Summary
The Premier League referred Manchester City to an independent commission in February 2023, alleging breaches of its financial rules across seasons 2009/10 to 2017/18 and failures to cooperate between December 2018 and February 2023.
A 12-week confidential hearing closed in December 2024.
As of 16 September 2026, no decision has been published. The Premier League’s Chief Executive has publicly conceded that the process has taken longer than expected and that he can give no indication of timing.
This article sets out a probability-weighted assessment of why the decision is late, the comparative precedent for a delay of this length, the implications for each party, and the effect of the delay on the eventual decision, the sanction and the appellate route.
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The allegations
The referral comprised 115 numbered allegations in five broad categories. Subsequent reporting, following amendments, places the underlying rule-breach count at approximately 130. The allegations, as publicly described by the Premier League, concern:
- failure to provide accurate financial information giving a true and fair view of the club’s financial position (2009/10 to 2017/18);
- failure to provide full details of manager remuneration (2009/10 to 2012/13) and player remuneration (2010/11 to 2015/16);
- breaches of UEFA club licensing and Financial Fair Play requirements as incorporated into Premier League rules;
- breaches of the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (2015/16 to 2017/18); and
- failure to cooperate with the Premier League’s investigation (December 2018 to February 2023).
The investigation followed Der Spiegel’s November 2018 “Football Leaks” publications. UEFA’s separate proceedings on related material resulted in a two-year European ban in February 2020, which the Court of Arbitration for Sport set aside in July 2020, in part on limitation grounds, reducing the fine to €10m.
Chronology
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Nov 2018 | Der Spiegel publishes Football Leaks material concerning Manchester City. |
| Dec 2018 | Premier League investigation under way; start of alleged non-cooperation period. |
| Feb 2020 | UEFA CFCB imposes a two-season European ban and €30m fine. |
| Jul 2020 | CAS sets aside the ban; fine reduced to €10m. |
| 2019–2021 | Manchester City challenges the Premier League’s investigatory process through arbitration and the courts; the Court of Appeal rules in 2021 that a related judgment should be published. |
| 6 Feb 2023 | The Premier League refers Manchester City to an independent commission. |
| Nov 2023 – Feb 2024 | Everton PSR case: 10-point deduction reduced to six on appeal, illustrating the pace of the PSR-specific procedure. |
| 16 Sep 2024 | Hearing opens at the International Dispute Resolution Centre, London. |
| Oct 2024 | Separate Associated Party Transaction (APT) arbitration: partial award finding elements of the rules unlawful. |
| Dec 2024 | Hearing closes after 12 weeks. |
| Sep 2025 | Manchester City and the Premier League settle the APT dispute. |
| Apr 2026 | Legal press reports judgment still awaited more than 16 months after closing arguments. |
| May 2026 | Pep Guardiola leaves Manchester City; Enzo Maresca appointed. |
| Aug 2026 | Richard Masters states the process has taken “longer than expected”; no timing available. |
| 17 Sep 2026 | No published decision. c.21 months since close of hearing; c.43 months since charge. |
| Elapsed time as at 17 September 2026
From opening of investigation: nearly eight years From referral (charge): approximately 43 months From close of hearing: approximately 21 months English reserved-judgment norm: approximately three months |
Why the decision has taken so long
The proceedings are confidential. No external observer can identify the cause of delay with certainty. The assessment below weights candidate causes by probability, based on the procedural framework, the public record and comparable proceedings.
| Cause | Probability | Evidence / reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Scale and nature of fact-finding | High | Factual trial across nine seasons; c.130 underlying breaches; evidence estimated in the hundreds of thousands of documents; findings of dishonesty-type conduct require cogent reasoning. |
| Defensive drafting for inevitable appeal | High | Both parties have invested too heavily to accept defeat; judgment will face appellate, High Court and global public scrutiny. |
| Part-time tribunal with no deadline | High | Panel members maintain other practices; one member reported to have appeared as counsel since the hearing; no time limit in the Rules or Arbitration Act 1996. |
| Three-member deliberation and possible disagreement | Medium | Majority suffices but unanimity is preferred; disagreement across c.130 breaches multiplies drafting. |
| The split between liability and sanction | Medium | Reported understanding that sanction would be dealt with separately; creates publication and sequencing questions. |
| Publication and redaction disputes | Medium | Direct precedent: 2021 Court of Appeal litigation over publication of a related judgment. |
| Further submissions on post-hearing legal developments | Medium (inferred) | APT awards and settlement; CJEU Diarra (C-650/22) and Seraing (C-600/23); possible competition-law defences to the rules themselves. |
| Collateral challenges (s.67/s.68) | Low–medium | No public evidence; such applications are heard in private and may surface later. |
| Settlement negotiations | Low | Club denies all charges; Chelsea precedent implies admission required; admissions would cascade across linked charges. |
| Incapacity of a panel member | Low | No evidence either way; would risk re-hearing. |
| Political interference | Very low | UAE representations to UK Government reported; no evidence of any influence on the tribunal; interference would be potentially criminal. |
This was a first-instance trial of disputed fact, not an appeal on law. The commission must make findings on nine seasons of accounts, commercial sponsorship flows, manager and player remuneration arrangements, and some 35 non-cooperation allegations. Football finance commentators have estimated the evidential record at around half a million documents.
The most serious allegations are, in substance, that owner funding was disguised as commercial revenue. English law applies a single civil standard, the balance of probabilities (Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35). But a tribunal making findings of that gravity must reason each adverse conclusion with corresponding cogency, engaging with the club’s case that it holds a “comprehensive body of irrefutable evidence”. That is slow, granular work.
The tribunal must also address the relationship with the 2020 CAS award. The parties are different, so issue estoppel does not strictly arise, but the club will have run abuse-of-process and consistency arguments that require reasoned rejection if they are to fail.
Drafting for an inevitable appeal
Both parties have invested at a scale that makes acceptance of a first-instance loss improbable; legal press estimates combined costs above £30m. The commission is therefore writing for the Appeal Board, for any Commercial Court challenge and for an unprecedented public readership. The incentive is to over-write rather than under-write, and each additional layer of reasoning adds time.
A part-time tribunal with no deadline
Arbitrators typically sit alongside active practices, and the Rules require one member to be an accountant or auditor who will also have a practice to maintain. This is normal. What is abnormal is the absence of any external pressure:
- the Premier League Rules set no deadline for the award;
- the Arbitration Act 1996 imposes no default time limit;
- there is no institutional supervision comparable to ICC practice, which expects prompt submission of draft awards and reduces arbitrators’ fees for late delivery; and
- the only statutory brakes, the s.33 duty to avoid unnecessary delay enforced through s.24 removal or a s.68 challenge, require substantial injustice and are rarely invoked. The Arbitration Act 2025 does not alter this position for proceedings already commenced.
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Three-member deliberation
A majority decision suffices, but tribunals prefer unanimity. Where members differ, resolving disagreement charge by charge, or allocating the drafting of majority and dissenting reasoning, is time-consuming. Across approximately 130 breaches, even limited disagreement has a multiplier effect.
The reported understanding is that, if liability is found, sanction will be determined at a further hearing. That creates two decisions, two sets of submissions and potentially two appeals. It also creates a publication problem: final awards must be published, while interlocutory decisions are published only where the League considers them of wider application. There is a risk that liability findings are withheld until sanction is determined, an approach one KC has described to the legal press as outrageous given the transparency interests of other clubs.
Publication and redaction disputes
The club has previously litigated publication. In Manchester City v Premier League [2021] EWCA Civ 1110 the Court of Appeal held that a judgment connected to the investigation should be published. The Rules provide for redaction only on limited medical and safeguarding grounds, but either party may seek wider redactions for commercial sensitivity, and the tribunal’s ruling on that could itself be challenged.
Further submissions on post-hearing developments
The legal environment has moved since December 2024: the APT awards and their September 2025 settlement, the CJEU’s Diarra and Seraing rulings on the legality and reviewability of sports governing body rules, and continuing scrutiny of associated-party regulation. If the club ran competition-law or legality defences against the rules themselves, as its APT strategy suggests it may have, the panel may have sought further submissions.
This is inference rather than reported fact, but it is a common cause of delay in reserved judgments.
Collateral challenges
A leaked 2014 internal email recorded the club chairman’s reported preference to spend 30 million on leading lawyers to litigate against UEFA for a decade rather than accept a penalty. There is no public evidence of a challenge in these proceedings, but applications under ss.67 and 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 are ordinarily heard in private and may not become known until later.
Low-probability causes
Settlement. The Board may conclude a written agreement on sanction, but the Chelsea precedent implies an admission is required, and the club denies all charges. Admissions on remuneration concealment would likely carry linked PSR breaches with them. The Premier League also acts, in effect, for 19 other clubs that may be preparing their own claims.
Incapacity. There is no evidence either way. If it occurred, it could require a re-hearing.
Political interference. Reports indicate that the UAE raised the charges in discussions with the UK Government. That is diplomatic representation, not interference with the tribunal. The panel is appointed through the chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel and is independent of the League, the club and the Government. No evidence supports the interference theory.
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A delay of this length is rare but not without precedent. The authorities establish a consistent principle: delay is not in itself a ground of appeal, but it requires heightened appellate scrutiny, and findings become vulnerable where the decision-maker may have lost command of the evidence.
English and Commonwealth civil litigation
| Case | Delay after hearing | Outcome | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bilta (UK) Ltd v NatWest Markets [2021] EWCA Civ 680 | c.19 months (5-week trial) | Retrial ordered | Leading authority. The court could no longer assume judgment reflected full recollection of evidence. City wait now exceeds this. |
| Bond v Dunster Properties [2011] EWCA Civ 455 | c.22 months | Heightened scrutiny applied | Confirms delay demands closer review of findings of fact. |
| Goose v Wilson Sandford (1998) | c.20 months | Delay condemned | Delay characterised as a denial of justice; not automatically fatal. |
| Cobham v Frett [2001] 1 WLR 1775 (PC) | Substantial | Principle stated | Delay may render findings unsafe where evidence is not properly addressed. |
| PrivatBank v Kolomoisky | Nearly 21 months (c.2-month trial) | Judgment stood | Closest analogue on duration and complexity; shared counsel (Andrew Hunter KC). |
| SKAT (Commercial Court) | c.6 months (c.1-year trial) | Judgment delivered | Demonstrates that complexity does not require delay of City’s length. |
| High Court judicial warning (Apr 2026) | 8 and 11 months | Formal warning issued | Marks the disciplinary threshold in ordinary High Court practice. |
International arbitration
In Yukos Universal v Russia (Permanent Court of Arbitration), the final awards followed the merits hearing by approximately 20 months in a case of comparable documentary scale. Such delays are treated as exceptional in institutional arbitration, where ICC practice links arbitrator remuneration to timely delivery of awards.
Sports disciplinary comparators
| Matter | Timescale | Observation |
|---|---|---|
| UEFA v Manchester City (CFCB / CAS) | Referral 2019 to CAS award July 2020 | Accelerated partly by limitation pressure under UEFA rules. |
| Calciopoli (Italy, 2006) | Weeks | Sporting justice prioritised speed over depth. |
| Juventus plusvalenze (Italy, 2023) | Months, including re-sanction | Shows iterative sanctioning is possible within a season. |
| Everton PSR (Premier League, 2023–24) | c.8 months to charge, decision and appeal | Conducted under the PSR-specific expedited procedure, which does not apply to the City charges. |
The human rights dimension
Following Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland (ECtHR, 2018), compulsory sports arbitration engages the fair-trial guarantees of Article 6 ECHR, including determination within a reasonable time. That obligation binds the state rather than the tribunal, but it strengthens any argument before an English court that excessive delay amounts to serious irregularity under s.68.
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Implications for the parties
| Party | Interim effect of delay | Principal exposure | Net direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Manchester City | Normal trading; titles and revenues retained; long-term commercial deals signed | Valuation overhang; sanction falling on a new era; reputational erosion | Commercially favourable; reputationally adverse |
| Premier League | Enforcement credibility questioned; rule-making distorted | Legal costs; club frustration; regulatory scrutiny | Adverse |
| Rival clubs | Sporting and financial outcomes of an era remain contingent | Limitation and evidential decay on damages claims | Adverse |
| Clubs relegated 2009–18 | Claims unquantified | Changes of ownership complicate title to claims | Adverse |
| Players, staff, sponsors | Honours, bonuses and morality clauses contingent | Uncertain; sponsor risk unpriced | Neutral to adverse |
| UEFA | 2020 CAS outcome implicitly revisited | Credibility of own enforcement | Uncertain |
| Government / IFR | Diplomatic sensitivity; systemic uncertainty | Limits of self-regulated enforcement exposed | Adverse |
| Supporters | Trust in an era’s results suspended | Loss of confidence in governance | Adverse |
| The commission | Reputational exposure | Findings read for signs of lost recollection; theoretical s.24 risk | Adverse |
Manchester City
The club has continued to trade normally throughout, including a reported ten-year, £1bn kit agreement with Puma and the opening of a stand named after Pep Guardiola. It has retained titles, prize money and Champions League revenue, and enjoyed the time value of those receipts. Against this sits a permanent contingent liability affecting valuation, any capital event at City Football Group level, and recruitment conversations. The Guardiola era has ended without vindication, and any sporting sanction will fall on a squad, manager and supporter base largely unconnected to 2009–18.
The Premier League
The League’s credibility as a regulator is damaged whatever the outcome. Rival clubs have been openly critical, and LaLiga’s president has framed the problem as uncertainty about how the rules are applied, given that other clubs were charged and sanctioned in the same period. The League’s most significant enforcement case remains unresolved while it tenders future media rights and adapts to independent regulation. The League’s public position is that its role is to present allegations and allow the commission to establish the truth, unqualified by the time taken. That position is correct in principle but offers no answer to the governance question.
Rival clubs and potential claimants
Clubs that finished behind City in the relevant seasons, or were relegated during them, face three compounding problems:
- Limitation. Contractual claims carry a six-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1980. Claims relating to 2009–18 will depend on postponement for deliberate concealment under s.32. The longer the delay, the more that argument must carry the whole claim.
- Evidential decay. Causation and quantum evidence for events up to 17 years old weakens as witnesses’ memories fade and personnel move on.
- Quantum discipline. The Burnley v Everton award (PLJP 2023/3), £26.0m against a £51.7m claim, shows that commissions will rigorously test loss-of-chance quantum. Claims relating to far older seasons face a harder evidential task.
Interest continues to accrue on any eventual award, which partly offsets these disadvantages. Clubs that have since changed ownership must also establish who holds the benefit of any claim under their sale documentation.
Government, the IFR and the wider system
The Independent Football Regulator, established under the Football Governance Act 2025, has no role in Premier League disciplinary proceedings but carries the systemic consequences: contested historic competitive outcomes, potential inter-club litigation cascades, and diminished confidence in league self-enforcement. The case is strong evidence for the Regulator’s assessment of whether the League’s own enforcement machinery is fit for purpose.
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Impact on the decision, sanction and appeal
Either party may appeal within 14 days to a fresh three-member commission appointed by the chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel, Murray Rosen KC. That decision is final, with no further appeal to CAS. Recourse beyond it lies only to the Commercial Court under the Arbitration Act 1996: s.67 (substantive jurisdiction) and s.68 (serious irregularity causing substantial injustice). Appeal on a point of law under s.69 is ordinarily excluded in rule-based sports arbitration; the precise exclusion should be confirmed against the current text of the Rules.
| Stage | Forum | Principal grounds | Indicative duration* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Liability decision | Independent commission | n/a | Pending |
| 2. Appeal on liability | Appeal Board | Error of law; irrational findings; failure to consider material evidence | 3–6 months |
| 3. Sanction hearing and decision | Independent commission | Gravity, mitigation, proportionality | 2–4 months |
| 4. Appeal on sanction | Appeal Board | Manifestly excessive or lenient; error of principle | 2–4 months |
| 5. Statutory challenge | Commercial Court | s.67 jurisdiction; s.68 serious irregularity | 6–12 months |
* Analyst estimates based on the Everton PSR appeal (c.3 months) and ordinary Commercial Court listing. Stages 2 and 3 may run in either order or be combined.
Liability: delay as a ground of attack
If the club loses, Bilta supplies a ready argument: after more than 21 months following a 12-week hearing, adverse findings of dishonesty-type conduct cannot be presumed to rest on a full grasp of the evidence. That argument would be framed before the Appeal Board as a failure to consider material evidence or as irrationality, and before the High Court as a failure to comply with the s.33 duty causing substantial injustice under s.68(2)(a).
Three factors limit its force:
- the s.68 threshold is deliberately very high and is reserved for extreme cases;
- Bilta was a court appeal with full appellate review, not a challenge to an arbitral award; and
- the tribunal has full transcripts and documentary bundles, which mitigates the recollection concern that drove Bilta.
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Sanction: where delay matters most
Mitigation. By analogy with Attorney General’s Reference No 2 of 2001 [2003] UKHL 68, which accepts reduction of penalty as a remedy for unreasonable delay, the club will seek mitigation. The League will respond that much of the pre-hearing delay flowed from the club’s own 2019–2021 challenges and alleged non-cooperation, which is itself charged. Post-hearing delay, however, cannot be attributed to the club, and that portion of the argument is materially stronger.
Proportionality and the displaced burden. A points deduction applied in 2026/27 or 2027/28 falls on a squad, coaching staff and supporter base largely unconnected with 2009–18. The club will argue that heavy sporting sanctions are therefore disproportionate. The League will argue that financial penalties alone cannot neutralise the competitive advantage obtained, and that deferral cannot operate as immunity.
Available sanctions. The Rules expressly permit reprimand, fines, points deductions, suspension and expulsion, together with a residual power to impose such other penalty as the commission thinks fit. Removal of titles is not expressly listed and would rely on that residual power, inviting further challenge.
In-season timing. A sanction landing mid-season would affect the integrity of the live competition, including European qualification and relegation outcomes for third parties, which is itself a consideration the sanctioning commission may weigh.
Realistic resolution horizon
On the sequencing set out above, and assuming both liability and sanction are appealed, final resolution is unlikely before the 2027/28 season and could extend beyond it if a Commercial Court challenge is brought. Any inter-club compensation claims would follow thereafter.
Conclusions
- The delay is structural rather than sinister: a factual trial of unprecedented scale before a part-time three-member panel with no deadline, drafting for a certain appeal and probably bifurcated.
- At approximately 21 months since the hearing closed, the delay has passed the Bilta threshold and sits at the outer limit of English civil practice. It creates a real but not decisive line of attack on adverse findings.
- The delay has benefited Manchester City commercially, damaged the Premier League as a regulator and weakened the position of potential compensation claimants.
- The delay will affect sanction more than liability, through mitigation, proportionality and the displaced burden of any sporting penalty.
- A multi-stage appellate process makes final resolution before 2027/28 improbable.
Possible recommendations
| Addressee | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| Premier League Board | Introduce time limits for awards in independent commission proceedings, with case-management supervision by the Judicial Panel chair and a transparent, rule-based publication regime for liability and sanction decisions. |
| Club boards | Obtain advice on potential compensation claims now, including limitation and s.32 concealment arguments; preserve documents and witness evidence relating to 2009–18 competitive outcomes; review sale documentation for ownership of historic claims. |
| Independent Football Regulator | Treat the absence of timeliness safeguards in league disciplinary processes as a matter relevant to its assessment of league governance and systemic financial risk, including inter-club litigation cascade risk. |
| Commercial partners and investors | Price the contingent sanction and litigation risk explicitly into any transaction involving the club or clubs with potential claims. |
| Caveats
• The proceedings are confidential. The panel’s internal position, the existence of further submissions and any collateral challenges cannot be verified. • The charge count (115 numbered allegations versus c.130 underlying breaches) derives from media reporting, not a published document. • The split of liability and sanction is reported understanding, not confirmed procedure. • Probability ratings are analytical judgements, not measurements. • Durations are estimates. The precise scope of any s.69 exclusion should be confirmed against the current Premier League Rules. • Nothing in this report asserts or predicts that any allegation will be proven. Manchester City denies all charges. |
Sources available on request