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Analysis Series: The Football Association Premier League Limited, Annual report and financial statements for the year ended 31 July 2025

Paul Quinn

The Football Association Premier League Annual accounts 2024/25

The Premier League is not a normal trading company. It is a near-pure pass-through vehicle: a single‑purpose monopoly licensor of broadcasting and commercial rights for English top-flight football, owned by its 20 member clubs, with the Football Association holding a special “golden share”. 

Almost all of its £3.66bn turnover is contractually destined for redistribution (minus administration and operating costs). Because of that structure, the apparent profit on the face of the consolidated profit and loss account (£87.5m statutory, 2024: £118.2m) is largely an accounting illusion driven by mark-to-market gains on currency hedging, while the underlying profit retained by the company itself is just £1.0m (2024: £0.6m).

The 2024/25 result is the third and final year of the 2022–25 broadcasting cycle, and the financial statements clearly bear the markers of a transition year: turnover essentially flat (+0.3% underlying), club distributions falling £101.8m to £2,817.6m as parachute payments contract, but operating expenses up 22% almost entirely on a single £80m accrual booked against the 2021 Government “Exclusion Order” commitment. 

Cash on the balance sheet rose by £196m to £1.533bn. The treasury and currency-hedging operation generated £77.98m of fair-value gain on derivative contracts and contributed roughly £73m of net positive currency effect to the statutory P&L, a number larger than the underlying after-tax profit by a factor of seventy.

The year contained three structurally important events: (i) the conclusion of the Manchester City “115 charges” Commission hearing, with verdict still awaited; (ii) Royal Assent of the Football Governance Act 2025 on 21 July 2025, creating the Independent Football Regulator; and (iii) the announced ending of the 20-year IMG Media partnership, with international media production being taken in-house from Season 2026/27, an in-source decision with significant implications for the medium-term cost base.

Funding model, why the P&L looks the way it does

To understand the accounts, you must first understand the business model:

Revenue side. The Premier League negotiates broadcasting and commercial rights centrally on behalf of the 20 member clubs, in three or four-year cycles. Cash is invoiced and received in advance, sometimes years in advance, and held on the Group balance sheet as deferred income. Note 1 (Turnover) reveals £426.8m (2024: £363.2m) was received more than a year in advance of the season to which it relates. UK rights are recognised straight-line over the contract; international rights are stepped over the cycle to reflect contractual escalators.

Distribution side. Funds are then distributed to clubs, the FA, the EFL, the PFA, the Football Foundation, the Football Stadia Fund, and other “good causes”. In 2025 those distributions were:

What remains funds administration, the central operating function (circa 362 staff, costs £54.2m), bonuses, foreign tax suffered on overseas invoices (£37.8m), and a small underlying retained profit. The retained earnings on the underlying basis grew from £2,354k to £2,952k, i.e., the entire central organisation has accumulated less than £3m of real reserves over its history. Everything else on the balance sheet is timing, derivatives, or currency translation.

This is the central insight. The Premier League runs no balance-sheet risk for shareholders in the normal corporate sense. It distributes what comes in. Profit volatility is entirely a function of how foreign-currency derivatives are accounted for under FRS 102 in the absence of hedge accounting.

Profit and loss account 

The directors present the income statement in three columns: Underlying, Currency Remeasurements, and Total (statutory). The reason is that “payments to clubs are based on Underlying performance”, i.e., on revenue translated at the blended forward rate secured through the hedging programme, not at year-end spot rates. The Currency Remeasurements column adjusts to FRS 102 statutory presentation. Without this disclosure, the financial statements would be commercially misleading, clubs are paid out of underlying receipts, not out of unrealised mark-to-market gains.

Group consolidated P&L summary (£’000)

Line 2025 Underlying 2025 FX Remeasure 2025 Total 2024 Total Variance
Turnover 3,649,010 6,905 3,655,915 3,652,427 +3,488
Cost of sales (3,114,501) – (3,114,501) (3,202,113) +87,612
Gross profit 534,509 6,905 541,414 450,314 +91,100
Operating expenses (556,300) – (556,300) (456,148) (100,152)
Operating loss (21,791) 6,905 (14,886) (5,834) (9,052)
Fair-value movement on derivatives & FX – 73,294 73,294 138,575 (65,281)
Interest receivable 60,216 – 60,216 56,462 +3,754
Profit before tax 38,425 80,199 118,624 189,203 (70,579)
Tax (37,430) 6,343 (31,087) (71,002) +39,915
Profit after tax 995 86,542 87,537 118,201 (30,664)

Turnover 

Underlying turnover increased only 0.3% to £3,649.0m. 

This is striking because 2024/25 was the in-cycle final year, when broadcasting deals normally step up. 

The directors explain that the prior year (2023/24) had been flattered by a one-off accelerated recognition of accrued income following early termination of an international broadcasting contract. Stripping that out, the underlying trajectory is consistent. Of the £3,649.0m, £1,851.4m (50.7%) arose from sales of audio-visual rights to worldwide broadcasters for international transmission; the balance is principally domestic UK rights and central commercial sponsorships.

The £6.9m FX remeasurement, smaller than the £14.9m equivalent in 2024, reflects the difference between forward rates achieved and spot rates on receipt. This is a reclassification, not new income.

Cost of sales, falling parachute payments

Cost of sales of £3,114.5m is dominated by member club distributions of £2,817.6m. The £87.6m year-on-year fall in cost of sales reflects two things:

  1. The non-recurrence of the 2024 accelerated international turnover recognition (which had matched into accelerated club distributions);
  2. A reduction in the number of parachute clubs. Parachute payments are a structural feature unique to English football: clubs relegated from the Premier League receive 55% of basic UK TV money in year one, 45% in year two, and 20% in year three (only if they were in the PL for more than one season). The mix of clubs entitled changes year by year; in 2024/25 fewer clubs qualified, mechanically reducing the cost-of-sales line.

Operating expenses

Operating expenses jumped 22% from £456.1m to £556.3m. The Strategic Report explicitly identifies the cause: “recognition of an £80.0m accrual required to meet the Government’s £1.6bn Exclusion Order commitment that was agreed in 2021, which has arisen due to fewer parachute clubs than forecast.”

This is one of the most economically significant items in the report and warrants further explanation:

The accrual is real cash that will leave the Group; it is not a bookkeeping item. It explains the entire variance in operating expenses between the years and the bulk of the £21.8m operating loss in the underlying P&L (vs. £20.8m in 2024, actually a marginal worsening).

Charitable and wider football support (£m)

Recipient 2025 2024 Movement
Football Foundation 20.5 17.6 +2.9
Other charitable 36.1 36.3 (0.2)
Premier League Stadia Fund 11.0 16.2 (5.2)
Professional Footballers’ Association 25.4 25.4 0.0
Other wider football support (incl. £80m accrual) 104.1 21.8 +82.3
EFL Solidarity, Youth Development, Community 146.8 138.6 +8.2
Total 343.9 255.9 +88.0

These are the numbers EFL clubs, and Tracey Crouch’s Fan-Led Review,  fixate on. The £146.8m EFL line is a fraction of what the EFL has lobbied for (it has demanded circa 25% of combined media revenues, equivalent to circa £300m per year), and is the primary economic flash point that the Independent Football Regulator’s backstop powers will adjudicate.

Below the line, interest, derivatives, tax

Cash flow statement

The cash flow statement is the most economically truthful document in the file because it is independent of accounting choices around hedging.

Summary (£’000)

2025 2024
Net cash from operating activities 143,002 304,901
Cash inflow from investing activities 54,527 34,169
Net increase in cash 197,529 339,070
Cash at start of year 1,336,757 1,004,132
FX effect (1,609) (6,445)
Cash at end of year 1,532,677 1,336,757

Operating cash flow, £162m drop

Operating cash inflow more than halved (–53%). Note 15 (Reconciliation) shows why:

The £163m drop in cash generated by operations, despite a bigger increase in creditors, is explained by timing of broadcaster prepayments. In 2023/24, the Group received an unusual amount of advance cash, including the carryover from the prior cycle’s accrued income recognition. In 2024/25, with the cycle in its final year and the new 2025-2029 deals not yet flowing in volume, advance receipts moderated. Cash payments to clubs (recognised in creditors) lag cash receipts (recognised in deferred income), and the working-capital cycle this year released less.

This is not a sign of financial weakness. It is a sign that the company is at the inflection point between two broadcasting cycles. The new four-year UK deal worth £6.7bn (Sky circa £5.6bn for 215 matches per season; TNT circa £1bn for 52 matches; BBC retained for highlights) and an international deal worth approximately £6.5bn for the 2025–2028 cycle are about to begin flooding deferred income.

Investing activities

There is no debt service line in the cash flow statement. The Group has no borrowings.

Balance Sheet, source and use of capital

Headlines (£m, Group)

2025 2024 Change
Tangible fixed assets 11.3 7.6 +3.8
Investments 0.5 0.5 –
Trade debtors and other receivables 1,081.0 923.0 +158.0
Derivative financial assets (current + non-current) 376.4 321.1 +55.3
Treasury deposits 134.3 137.4 (3.1)
Cash 1,532.7 1,336.8 +196.0
Total assets 3,136.3 2,726.3 +409.9
Trade and other payables (396.6) (257.0) (139.6)
Derivative liabilities (20.9) (33.7) +12.7
Deferred income (current + non-current) (2,361.6) (2,159.3) (202.3)
Provisions (deferred tax) (61.2) (67.9) +6.7
Net assets 296.0 208.5 +87.5

 

Liquidity is enormous: £1.667bn of cash plus treasury deposits, plus a further £376m of in-the-money derivative receivables. By any measure this is one of the most cash-rich sports bodies in the world.

There is no long-term debt. Note 12 (Trade creditors), Note 16 (Financial instruments) and the cash flow statement are unanimous: no bank loans, no notes, no leases requiring capitalisation under FRS 102 Section 20 (operating lease commitments of £80m are off-balance-sheet). The closest thing to a financing instrument is the £2,000 (yes, two thousand pounds) loan facility drawn down by the Football Association Premier League Medical Care Scheme Ltd subsidiary trustee. There is no recapitalisation issue because there is no capital structure to recapitalise.

The balance sheet is essentially a working-capital position. The single largest item on the balance sheet, by a wide margin. is deferred income of £2,361.6m. 

This represents broadcasting and commercial rights cash already received from broadcasters but relating to seasons not yet played. £426.9m of that deferred income is non-current (i.e., relates to seasons more than 12 months away). The deferred income figure has grown by £202m year-on-year, the footprint of the new 2025–2028 broadcasting cycle landing on the balance sheet.

The matched asset side of this is prepayments of £744.9m (2024: £681.4m), which Note 11 explicitly describes as “predominantly payments to clubs relating to the next financial year which have been paid in advance.” 

The Group is in effect a clearing house: it holds broadcaster cash (deferred income) on one side and pre-pays clubs (prepayments) on the other.

Equity and reserves, what the £296m represents

Net assets rose from £208.5m to £296.0m. The accumulated gains figure of £296.0m is composed almost entirely of unrealised gains on the cumulative position of foreign-currency forward contracts. The footnote on the parent statement of changes in equity is explicit: “the underlying retained earnings… is £2,952k (2024: £2,354k).”

This is the single most important sentence in the equity disclosure. Of the £296m equity, only £2.95m is “real” earned capital. The other £293m is the mark-to-market value of forward FX contracts that will only crystallise as cash when those contracts settle.

That £293m is a future economic benefit, the contracts are genuinely in the money,  but it is not capital available for distribution today.

Currency hedging and treasury 

Why hedge?

The Strategic Report sets out the rationale. International broadcasting income is denominated heavily in US Dollars and Euros (around half of the £3.65bn turnover, given the £1.85bn international audio-visual rights revenue). 

Payments to clubs are made in Sterling. Three clubs are promoted and three relegated each year. The Group must therefore commit cash distributions in Sterling that broadly match the Sterling value of broadcasting cash receipts. Any unhedged FX volatility would translate directly into volatility of club distributions, punishing relegated clubs and rewarding promoted ones in arbitrary ways.

The mechanism is forward currency contracts entered into to lock in a blended forward exchange rate over the life of the broadcasting cycle. This blended rate is what underpins Underlying turnover, the basis on which clubs are paid.

The portfolio

Note 17 sets out the open positions at 31 July 2025:

Maturity Currency Notional Avg. contract rate Net fair value (£’000)
Within 1 year EUR €783.3m 1.1068 26,933
Within 1 year USD $1,500.0m 1.2038 112,122
After 1 year EUR €2,766.7m 1.1022 3,030
After 1 year USD $3,000.0m 1.2038 213,431
Total 355,516

 

The Group is contractually committed to sell $4.5bn USD and €3.55bn EUR forward at locked-in rates averaging $1.2038 and circa €1.1024. 

At the 31 July 2025 spot rates (which would have been around $1.32 / £ for USD and €1.15 / £ for EUR), these positions are deeply in the money, hence the £376m in-the-money derivative asset and the £20.8m out-of-the-money liability, netting to £355.5m gross fair value asset.

Contribution to the P&L

The total FX/treasury contribution to the statutory P&L (Note 5) was:

To which one must add the £6.9m remeasurement between the underlying achieved-forward-rate translation and spot-rate translation of turnover.

Together, currency-related items added approximately £80m to statutory profit before tax in 2025, against an underlying loss before tax (excluding interest income) of £21.8m. The Group made a statutory profit only because of accounting for unrealised currency gains.

Treasury function

The treasury function manages the £1.67bn of liquid funds. Notes 16 and 17 indicate counterparties are large rated banks (Barclays is named bankers; the Strategic Report notes derivative counterparties are banks “with high credit ratings assigned by international credit rating agencies”). The £134.3m of fixed-rate treasury deposits maturing in 2025/26 (3–5% yield, down from 5–6%) reflects falling UK interest rates. Note that the fall in deposit rates is what eventually compresses interest income from this enormous cash float, a soft tailwind that the company should expect to fade.

The structural risk hidden in plain sight

The Group does not apply hedge accounting under FRS 102 Sections 11 and 12. This is a deliberate choice: hedge accounting is administratively complex, and because the contracts are designed to perfectly match the cycle (not the individual transaction), they would arguably not qualify. 

The consequence is that mark-to-market gains and losses run through the P&L and cause the statutory profit to swing wildly, £138.6m in 2024, £73.3m in 2025, and unpredictable in future. 

This is fully disclosed but the auditors (Deloitte’s Helen Wildman) flag manual revenue adjustments as the area of greatest fraud risk in their report.

Debt and recapitalisation analysis

Long-term debt, there is none

There is no long-term debt in any conventional sense. Specifically:

The only debt-like disclosure is the £2,000 loan to the dormant Medical Care Scheme subsidiary, which is an internal liquidity facility.

Why no debt?

The funding model makes external debt structurally unnecessary. The Group is prepaid by broadcasters, often by years. Working capital is therefore highly negative (£2.36bn deferred income vs circa £0.4m trade payables) and self-financing. With £1.53bn of cash on hand at any point, no external lender is needed.

There is no recapitalisation event. Equity rose by £87.5m to £296.0m, driven entirely by the year’s profit. The footnote disclosure that the underlying retained earnings is only £2.95m (up from £2.35m) tells the truth: the company genuinely earns very little for itself, by design. It does not build capital because it is not supposed to.

What sometimes gets called balance sheet repair in the financial press in football contexts, for example concerning individual clubs, has no analogue here. The PL Group’s net assets are functionally a notional balancing figure; what matters is the £1.67bn of cash and the contractual matching of deferred income against future club distribution obligations.

Off-balance-sheet commitments

Three areas warrant specific attention:

  1. Operating lease commitments: £80.2m (2024: £15.2m). This jumped fivefold and is dominated by the £62.6m commitment falling due after five years. This is almost certainly the new long-term lease at Olympia London for Premier League Studios, recognised from when the new in-house operation begins in 2026/27.
  2. Parent company guarantees under s479C Companies Act 2006 over the liabilities of three subsidiaries (Premier League Studios Ltd, Premier League International Holdings Ltd, Premier League India Holdings Ltd), disclosed as enabling those companies to claim audit exemption. The Group considers the likelihood of being called on as remote.
  3. Guarantee in respect of PGMO and PGAAC (the joint refereeing and academy audit ventures with the FA and EFL), described in Note 9 but not quantified.

Post balance sheet events, September 2025 settlement

The Strategic Report flags a single explicit subsequent event:

On 3 September 2025, the Company and Manchester City FC reached a settlement in relation to the arbitration commenced by the club concerning the Company’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) Rules. (Strategic Report, page 4)

(Note: the Premier League and Manchester City joint statement is publicly dated 8 September 2025; the small discrepancy may reflect the date the Board was notified.)

Background to the APT arbitration

APT Rules govern transactions between Premier League clubs and entities related to their owners, most prominently sponsorship deals. They were strengthened in December 2021 in the wake of the Newcastle United takeover by the Saudi Public Investment Fund. The aim is to ensure related-party deals reflect fair market value so that owner wealth cannot be used to circumvent Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR).

Manchester City, owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan via City Football Group, challenged the rules in 2023 after the Premier League rejected proposed sponsorship submissions involving Etihad Airways and First Abu Dhabi Bank. 

In October 2024, an independent tribunal found that key elements of the rules were unlawful as they excluded shareholder loans from the fair-market-value test, and partially breached UK competition law. The Premier League amended the rules in November 2024, but City launched a fresh arbitration in January 2025 challenging the amendments as ultra vires.

The settlement

According to the joint statement and reporting from the Premier League and the club, the settlement provides that Manchester City accepts that the current APT Rules are valid and binding, and both parties have agreed to make no further public comment. The arbitration was terminated.

There are no quantified financial consequences in the 2024/25 accounts. The settlement does not crystallise a payment, a fine, or a damages line. From the Group’s point of view it is litigation cost saved and regulatory authority preserved; from the club’s point of view it ends a corrosive reputational standoff with the league it competes in.

The settlement does not affect the entirely separate Manchester City “115 charges” Profit and Sustainability case, the hearing of which is referenced in the Strategic Report (“The proceedings before the Commission were heard during the current financial year”). 

The verdict is awaited, and was expected within the 2025/26 financial year. If the verdict goes against the club and includes financial restitution to other clubs, that would be a separate, subsequent-period event, but no provision has been recognised in these accounts, consistent with the contingent and unquantifiable nature of the outcome.

The Football Governance Act 2025

Royal Assent was granted on 21 July 2025, eleven days before the period end. The Act establishes the Independent Football Regulator (IFR), the world’s first statutory regulator of men’s elite football. Its remit covers the top five tiers (Premier League down to National League). Key powers include:

The Strategic Report notes the company “continue[s] to engage with the IFR as it moves towards implementation of reforms.” 

The economic significance for the Premier League is potentially profound: the backstop powers represent a credible threat to the existing distribution model. The £1.6bn 2022–25 commitment that produced this year’s £80m accrual is a direct shadow of where the IFR might land. The Premier League’s preferred posture has been to negotiate a voluntary deal with the EFL to avoid statutory intervention; the EFL has been more willing to escalate.

The 115 Charges, the elephant in the next room

The report’s only reference is dryly procedural: charges referred to an independent Commission in February 2023 under Rule W.3.4, hearing held during the financial year, no further comment. 

Publicly, the Commission heard the case from 16 September to 6 December 2024. Pep Guardiola said in February 2025 he expected a verdict “in one month”; that estimate came and went. As of the date of these accounts (signed 4 December 2025), the verdict was still outstanding. Reporting indicates the alleged breaches relate to nine years (2009–2018), the period during which the club was acquired and won three titles, with allegations including mislabelling owner funding as sponsorship revenue and failing to cooperate with investigations. The number of individual breaches is reported as 130 rather than the headline “115”.

The financial implications for the Group are largely indirect, disciplinary fines payable to the Premier League would offset existing distributions. The reputational and political implications are immense and will be seen in regulatory reform, fan trust, and broadcaster commercial confidence.

IMG / Premier League Productions transition

The Strategic Report announces that from Season 2026/27, the Group will bring all international media content production and distribution in-house, ending a 20-year partnership with IMG Media operating as Premier League Productions. The decision was approved by all 20 clubs at a unanimous shareholders’ meeting in November 2024.

PLP currently delivers around 6,000 hours of content per season to 55 international broadcast partners across 189 markets. The new operation, Premier League Studios, will be housed at Olympia London, explaining the £4.087m of “Assets under construction” on the balance sheet and the fivefold jump in long-term operating lease commitments (£62.6m due after five years).

CEO Richard Masters has publicly suggested this in-house move provides “optionality” for a future direct-to-consumer service, i.e., a Premier League-owned streaming platform, though he cautioned this is not imminent.

The strategic and financial implications:

Owner factors

The Premier League has no controlling owner. Each of its 20 member clubs holds one ordinary share; the FA holds a special preference share. No individual club holds majority voting rights. Club ownership is heterogeneous and increasingly dominated by foreign capital:

The diversity is itself a governance and policy problem, owners’ interests in the league’s distribution and regulatory model diverge sharply by their type. This is why two-thirds majority votes on key issues are now routinely contentious (the November 2023 vote on associated-party loans famously fell 13–7, one short of the threshold).

Charitable and community contributions

The Directors’ Report notes:

Environmental disclosures

Streamlined Energy and Carbon Reporting shows total Scope 1+2+3 emissions of 159 tCO2e, down from 182 tCO2, a 13% fall driven primarily by reduced grid-emission factor (Scope 2) and improved business-travel data capture (Scope 3). Carbon intensity per FTE fell 27% to 0.44 tCO2e.

Note that the disclosure explicitly excludes most of the Group’s Scope 3 boundary, the carbon footprint of staging Premier League matches, broadcasting them globally, fan travel, and the supply chain of merchandising is not measured. At a sector level this is consistent with most sports league reporting, but the substantive footprint of the Premier League is enormously larger than the 159 tonnes shown.

Controversies, a catalogue

The Premier League has been at the centre of, or implicated in, the following live controversies, several of which intersect with the financial year under review:

  1. Manchester City PSR case (115/130 charges), verdict awaited.
  2. Manchester City APT arbitration, settled September 2025.
  3. Everton and Nottingham Forest PSR breaches, Everton deducted six then two points (later reduced) in 2023/24; Forest deducted four points 2023/24. 
  4. Newcastle United takeover (October 2021), accusations the Premier League blocked, then released, the deal under political and commercial pressure related to PIF / beIN piracy disputes.
  5. Project Big Picture (October 2020), abortive Liverpool/Manchester United proposal for league restructuring, defeated.
  6. European Super League (April 2021)  six PL clubs joined for under 48 hours; the resulting outcry produced the Crouch Fan-Led Review and ultimately the IFR.
  7. The Tracey Crouch Fan-Led Review (final report, November 2021) the genesis of every regulatory reform in train. Concluded that the Premier League under Masters had “lost the trust and confidence” of fans.
  8. EFL solidarity dispute,  lobbying for circa £300m per year of solidarity (vs the circa £146.8m delivered in 2025).
  9. Associated-party loans,  November 2023 vote on temporary ban failed 13–7, exposing the influence of multi-club ownership groups.
  10. Chelsea / Roman Abramovich era, Chelsea self-reported and paid circa £10m fine for historic illicit payments, treated as cooperative; this contrasts with City’s alleged non-cooperation in PSR investigations.
  11. 3pm blackout, broadly preserved in the 2025–2029 cycle but with simultaneous Saturday matches creating practical ambiguity.
  12. Independent Football Regulator opposition the league has been a vocal critic of statutory oversight, briefing against the Bill in its successive iterations under both Conservative and Labour governments.

Management style. Richard Masters and Brittain

Richard Masters (CEO)

Richard Masters, 58 (born June 1966), is now in his sixth full year as Chief Executive after a year as Interim. Educated at Solihull School and University College London (BSc Economics and Geography), he began his commercial career at the England and Wales Cricket Board (1994–2000), moved to the EFL as Commercial Director (2001–2006), and joined the Premier League as Director of Sales and Marketing in 2006. He became Managing Director in 2015 and Interim CEO in December 2018 following Richard Scudamore’s retirement.

He was famously the fourth choice for the permanent CEO role: Susanna Dinnage (Discovery), Tim Davie (now BBC DG) and David Pemsel (Guardian Media Group) had all been offered the role and declined or withdrawn. He was confirmed permanently in December 2019.

His leadership style as visible from public conduct, board minutes, and reported clubs’ commentary has these consistent features:

His total remuneration in 2024/25 was £2.632m (highest-paid director, including £1.071m of long-term incentive scheme). This is a 33% jump on £1.981m in 2023/24, reflecting both vesting of long-term incentives covering the prior cycle and salary progression. Total directors’ remuneration was £3.926m (2024: £3.240m), up 21%.

Headcount jumped from 302 to 362 average, a 20% increase. as the Olympia / Premier League Studios build-out begins. Total wages and salaries rose 25.7% to £45.6m.

Alison Brittain (Chair)

Alison Brittain CBE, 61, has been Chair since January 2023, the first woman to chair the Premier League. Born February 1965 in Derbyshire, BSc Business Studies (Stirling), MBA (Cambridge Judge / Girton). Career: 19 years at Barclays as a graduate trainee and into senior retail roles; Santander UK board director (2007–2011); Lloyds Banking Group head of Retail Banking (2011–2015); CEO of Whitbread plc (2016–2023), where she led the £3.9bn sale of Costa Coffee to Coca-Cola. Veuve Clicquot Business Woman of the Year 2017; CBE in 2019 for services to business and gender equality. Other current roles: Chair of Dunelm plc, Senior Independent Director at Experian, NED at British Airways, Chair of the King’s Trust (formerly Prince’s Trust). Married to Kevin Brittain (whom she met at a Barclays branch), two children.

Style: “down-to-earth”, retail-and-banking-trained, FTSE-100 governance reflexes, deeply experienced in regulated environments and stakeholder management. Reportedly seeking re-election for a second term; widely expected to obtain it. Her tenure has coincided with the most testing regulatory and litigation environment in the league’s history.

Mai Fyfield (INED)

R M Fyfield. Independent Non-Executive Director since October 2021, reappointed November 2024 for a further three-year term. Former Chief Strategy and Commercial Officer at Sky during a 20-year tenure that saw the business transformed and diversified. Currently on the boards of Roku Inc and BBC Commercial. Previously NED at Nationwide and ASOS plc, where she chaired the Remuneration Committee and acted as Senior Independent Director. Chairs the Premier League’s Remuneration Committee. Brings deep media-industry strategic perspective into the boardroom, invaluable as the IMG-to-in-house transition unfolds.

Dharmash Mistry (INED)

D P Mistry. Independent Non-Executive Director since October 2021, reappointed November 2024. Began his career at Procter & Gamble, then Boston Consulting Group; Group Managing Director of EMAP Consumer Media and EMAP Performance, where he co-led the FTSE 100 delisting and break-up of EMAP plc in 2008. Technology venture capitalist since 2008: partner at Balderton Capital, then established the London office of Lakestar; investments include Revolut, Glovo, Infarm, Blockchain.com and LoveFilm. Co-founded Blow Ltd (sold to Holland & Barrett 2021). Currently on boards of Halma plc and Rathbones plc; was a NED of the Competition and Markets Authority February 2024 to August 2025; previously NED at the BBC Executive Board, British Business Bank, Hargreaves Lansdown plc and Dixons plc. Chairs the Premier League’s Audit and Finance Committee, the most operationally important board committee for the matters covered in this analysis. Sits on the FA Board as the Premier League’s representative.

Matthew Ryder KC (INED)

M C Ryder. Independent Non-Executive Director since 2023, reappointed November 2025 for a second three-year term. Senior barrister at Matrix Chambers; appointed Queen’s Counsel (now King’s Counsel) in 2010. Educated at Cambridge and Columbia Law School (LLM in International Human Rights). Specialist in complex criminal, civil and regulatory work, public law, data protection and human rights; has appeared at the UK Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court. Deputy Mayor of London 2016–2018 under Sadiq Khan, leading on social integration, social mobility and community engagement. Authored The Ryder Review on biometric data law for the Ada Lovelace Institute; advised the Lammy Review on racial disparity in the criminal justice system. Trustee of the Scott Trust (which owns The Guardian). Within the Premier League he chairs the Legal Advisory Group, sits on the Audit and Finance Committee, and is the board’s Champion for Equality, Diversity and Inclusion. Son of a Jamaican mother and English father; his appointment is significant in a league that has otherwise struggled to diversify its boardroom composition.

Steve Christie (CFO)

S R Christie. Chief Financial Officer (not a statutory director). Operationally responsible for the matters covered in this analysis. Together with Mistry’s chairmanship of the Audit and Finance Committee, the audit assurance environment is robust by any normal standard.

Kevin Plumb (Company Secretary)

K M Plumb. Company Secretary; signed the Directors’ Report on 4 December 2025.

Control structure and voting rights

The legal structure

The Football Association Premier League Limited (Company Number 02719699) is a private company limited by shares. Note 14 sets out the share capital structure:

Authorised share capital: £100

Issued / paid up: £21

The 20 ordinary shares are held one each by the 20 Member Clubs in the Premier League at any given time. When a club is relegated, its share is transferred to the promoted club at the AGM following the close of season. The preference share is held by The Football Association Limited, the so-called “golden share”.

Rights attaching to shares

Ordinary shares (one each, held by clubs):

Preference share (held by the FA):

This is a deliberate constitutional architecture: clubs have economic and operational control, the FA retains a residual veto over institutional integrity items.

Voting thresholds

This 14/20 threshold is the single most important feature of Premier League corporate governance. It means that seven clubs acting together can block any change to the Rule Book or to commercial arrangements. Combined with three-team annual turnover through promotion and relegation, factional politics shifts year by year.

Board composition

The Premier League Board comprises:

The Board is appointed by the Shareholders (i.e. by clubs) subject to FA approval via the special share. The Board’s role is delegated executive: implementation of the Rule Book, dispute resolution, prosecution of rule breaches, recommendations to clubs. The Board cannot override club votes on commercial matters; it is an executive instrument of the membership.

The Audit and Finance Committee comprises Mistry (Chair) and Ryder, plus two club representatives, currently Andy Mollett (West Ham United) and Rebecca Caplehorn (Tottenham Hotspur). The Nominations Committee, Remuneration Committee (chaired by Fyfield), and various other operational committees follow similar structures.

Group structure

Note 9 sets out the corporate group:

The international holdings structure (US, China, India) is consistent with the strategic push into direct international engagement, a structure the Group will need to operate the in-house international media operation from 2026/27.

For an investor or analyst reading the report cold, the following are the items disclosed for the first time, or moved materially, in this set of accounts:

  1. The £80m Government Exclusion Order accrual in operating expenses, fully driving the 22% jump in opex and converting an underlying near-break-even into a £21.8m underlying operating loss.
  2. The decision to take international media production in-house from 2026/27, ending the 20-year IMG/PLP partnership, the most strategically significant operational decision of the year.
  3. Premier League Studios Limited incorporated 22 November 2024 as the vehicle for the in-house operation, consolidated from that date.
  4. £4.087m of “Assets under construction” in tangible fixed assets, the first balance-sheet appearance of Premier League Studios capex (Olympia London fit-out).
  5. Operating lease commitments rising from £15.2m to £80.2m, with £62.6m due after five years, the Olympia Studios long lease.
  6. Headcount up 20% to 362, the first wave of in-house media operation hires.
  7. The Manchester City APT settlement post-period (3/8 September 2025) ending one of the two existential litigation overhangs.
  8. The Football Governance Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent on 21 July 2025, ten days before the period end, establishing statutory regulation of English football for the first time.
  9. The 115/130-charges Commission hearing concluded during the financial year (December 2024), with verdict awaited.
  10. Fall in derivative fair-value gains from £143.6m to £77.98m, natural unwind as cumulative gains crystallise; expect further normalisation as the new cycle begins.
  11. £146.8m EFL solidarity / youth / community payment, up modestly but well below the EFL’s demands, against the backdrop of the IFR’s incoming backstop powers.
  12. Treasury deposit yield falling from 5–6% to 3–5%, a real economic headwind for interest income from the £1.67bn float as UK rates ease.
  13. Director remuneration up 21%, highest-paid director up 33% to £2.63m, matching the in-cycle bonus profile and renewed long-term incentive scheme vesting.

The Football Association Premier League Limited’s 2024/25 financial statements present a financially robust monopoly licensor at the inflection point between two broadcasting cycles, with an enormous cash float, no debt, no recapitalisation issues, and a hedging programme that successfully insulates club distributions from currency volatility while throwing accounting noise into the statutory P&L.

The substantive business questions for the next reporting period (2025/26) are strategic and regulatory:

  1. How quickly can the £6.7bn UK and circa £6.5bn international 2025–2028 cycles convert into deferred income and into club distributions?
  2. Can the in-house Premier League Studios operation be delivered on time, on budget, and at the quality level IMG provided?
  3. What is the verdict in the Manchester City PSR case, and what are its second-order regulatory and reputational consequences?
  4. How will the Independent Football Regulator’s licensing regime, owners’ tests, and revenue-distribution backstop powers be implemented from 2027/28, and how will the Premier League shape its position?
  5. How will the EFL solidarity envelope evolve under regulatory pressure, and at what cost to member club distributions?

The accounts give every appearance of being rigorously prepared. Deloitte’s audit report identifies manual revenue adjustments related to FX as the single greatest fraud risk and specifies the substantive procedures performed; the going-concern conclusion is supported by the £1.53bn cash position and three-year secured broadcasting income. The Audit and Finance Committee is appropriately composed. There are no qualifications, emphases of matter, or material uncertainties.

The defining feature of these accounts, and the defining feature of the Premier League itself, remains that this is not a normal company, and its finances must be read as those of a member-owned cooperative redistribution mechanism rather than a profit-maximising corporate entity. The £1.0m of underlying after-tax profit on £3.65bn of turnover is the entire point.

 

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