Following on from Part I published yesterday, I continue the analysis of the new financial rules impacting English football.
I’m going to start by looking at the six Premier League clubs that voted against the proposals. Ultimately the 14 votes were sufficient to carry the day:
The six clubs that voted against SCR: detailed analysis
The clubs were Bournemouth, Brentford, Brighton, Crystal Palace, Fulham and Leeds.
I’ve used the most recent audited accounts (at the time of the vote) for my analysis.
Squad cost numerator = wages + amortisation + impairment (agents’ fees are typically not separately disclosed in audited accounts, so excluded, this slightly understates each ratio). Adjusted revenue denominator = football turnover + net profit on player disposals.
Note that staff costs in audited accounts also include non-playing personnel; I’ve used the published numbers and flagged where the gap is material.
Bournemouth (Y/E 30 June 2024)
From the AFC Bournemouth Annual Report and Financial Statements: “resulted in increased amortisation costs of £61.6 million (2023: £41.2 million). In line with this, there was an increase in total staff costs to £136.2 million (2023: £100.1 million). Turnover was up by £19.8 million to £160.8 million (2023: £141.0 million).” Profit on disposal of player registrations was just £251k, while other operating income (which includes loan fees for players) more than quadrupled from £2 million to £9 million.
- Football revenue: £160.8 million
- Other operating income (incl. player loan fees): £9.0 million (of which £8.3 million is player-related)
- Wages (total staff): £136.2 million
- Player amortisation: £61.6 million
- Profit on player disposals: £0.25 million
Indicative SCR: (£136.2m + £61.6m) / (£160.8m + £9.0m + £0.25m) = £197.8m / £170.05m = 116% — above the Red Threshold of 115%.
This explains both why Bournemouth were the most vehement opponents of the change. Even a more generous methodology (as proposed by The Athletic) Bournemouth would have faced a sporting sanction under the new rules on 2023/24 numbers. The mitigation is forward-looking: “After the year end, the Company acquired 4 players for a cost of £54.9 million and disposed of 2 for total initial consideration of £56.6 million, resulting in an accounting profit on disposal of £35.1 million”, a single £35 million disposal profit transforms the 2024/25 SCR. Bournemouth’s case against SCR is essentially that it makes their established model (heavy investment, sell-on at peak value 1-2 years later) almost impossible without points-deduction risk in the bridging year.
Brentford (Y/E 30 June 2024 and 30 June 2025)
The 2024/25 results filed in February 2026 are the last audited accounts. From Brentford’s own statement: “Brentford FC has filed its annual financial accounts for the year ended 30 June 2025, which saw turnover grow to a club record of £173.1 million, an increase from £166.5 million in 2023/24. Player trading remained a key area of profitability with the club benefiting from an increased profit of £27.2 million (up from £25.2 million in 2024).”
Salaries and wages rose sharply from £114 million to £131 million following Brentford’s largest-ever recruitment spend. Player amortisation also increased, rising from £36 million to £48 million in 2024/25. Total staff costs reached £179 million.
- Football revenue: £173.1 million
- Wages: £131 million
- Player amortisation: £48 million
- Profit on player disposals: £27.2 million
- Total staff costs (incl. amortisation): £179 million
Indicative SCR (2024/25): (£131m + £48m) / (£173.1m + £27.2m) = £179m / £200.3m = 89%, in the amber zone (above Green, below Red).
On the prior year’s accounts: (£114.4m + £35.6m) / (£166.5m + £25.2m) = £150m / £191.7m = 78%, which would have been compliant.
Brentford’s no vote is more strategic than immediate-cliff: the 2024/25 numbers show the model is now close to the Green line because of the larger recruitment spend ahead of the Mbeumo and Wissa sales (which fall into the 2025/26 accounts). Net debt also jumped “from £29.8 million in 2024 to £71.0 million as a result of new financing to assist with player trading and further investment in the club’s infrastructure”. Brentford’s view, expressed at the consultation, was that for a club of its revenue size, the 30% buffer plus £85 million SSR stress test crystallises a structural disadvantage relative to clubs with European income.
Brighton & Hove Albion (Y/E 30 June 2024)
Wage bill rose £18 million (15%) from £128 million to £146 million and player amortisation rose from £33 million to £39 million. In addition, the club booked a £3 million player impairment. Revenue increased by 8.9% to £222.5 million.
Brighton’s headline 2023/24 pre-tax profit was £75 million, just ahead of Manchester City £74 million and West Ham £57 million. That tells you the player disposal profit was very large, Caicedo plus Sanchez departing, c.£113 m illionsales proceeds.
- Football revenue: £222.5 million
- Wages: £146 million
- Player amortisation: £39 million
- Player impairment: £3 million
- Profit on player disposals: c. £80 million (derived from operating profit reconciliation)
Indicative SCR: (£146m + £39m + £3m) / (£222.5m + £80m) = £188m / £302.5m = 62%.
Brighton’s wage/revenue ratio is widely cited at 56 percent of the Albion’s turnover is used on their wage bill. The highest in English top flight football from 2023-24 accounts was Aston Villa with 96 percent”. They were comfortably compliant on 2023/24 data. Their no vote was a principled one about the cumulative regulatory burden on clubs that operate sustainably, the SSR liquidity test in particular is uncomfortable for any club with a Brighton-sized wage bill and a non-mega-rich owner.
Crystal Palace (Y/E 30 June 2024 and 30 June 2025)
Last filed: 2024/25. From previous research in the Analysis Series: “Turnover for the 2024/25 financial year reached £196.6 million… shifting from a post-tax loss of £32.9 million in the 2023/24 cycle to a reported pre-tax profit of £8.27 million… Player wage costs rose to £110.8 million, up from £101.8 million in the previous year.”
2023/24 figures: revenue £190.2 million , wages £130.6 million (total staff), player amortisation £47.1 million, with a £35.6 million loss before tax. The reversal in 2024/25 was driven by the FA Cup-winning season and the substantial profits on the sales of Olise (to Bayern Munich) and Guéhi.
For 2024/25 (last audited):
- Football revenue: £196.6 million
- Wages (player only): £110.8 million
- Player amortisation: estimated c.£50 million (consistent with rise in player register)
- Profit on player disposals: c.£90-100 m illion(derived from £8.2 7 million, post balance sheet reconciliation)
Indicative SCR (2024/25): c.(£110.8m + £50m) / (£196.6m + £95m) = £161m / £291.6m = 55%, easily compliant.
For 2023/24: (£101.8m + £47.1m) / (£190.2m + minimal disposal profit) = £149m / £190.2m = 78%, compliant.
Palace’s opposition is again strategic. Their model relies on cup runs and one-major-sale-per-summer to lift a single year’s SCR; the new rules, by being assessed annually rather than rolling, expose them to a poor cup run or a window where no buyer materialises.
Fulham (Y/E 30 June 2024)
Wages rose £16 million (11%) from £139 million, while player amortisation increased £11 million (26%) to £57 million. Matchday Finance, turnover of £181 million, similar to the £182 million the previous year. Staff costs increased by 15% and remain greater than turnover. Although the club earned £33 million from player sales, they still recorded a significant loss of £32 million.
- Football revenue: £181 million
- Wages: £155 million
- Player amortisation: £57 million
- Profit on player disposals: £33 million
- Loss before tax: £32 million
Indicative SCR: (£155m + £57m) / (£181m + £33m) = £212m / £214m = 99% — in the amber zone, very close to Red.
This is the most precarious of the no voters. Fulham’s accounts are essentially saying the cost of every pound of squad equals every pound of football revenue plus the player sales lottery. The £33 million sale profit was the difference between amber and red. Their no vote is direct: under the new annual assessment, a year without a £30 million+ player sale puts them through the Red Threshold and into a sporting sanction. Note also that Fulham’s transfer debt and £700 million owner investment creates SSR liquidity and positive-equity issues addressed below.
Leeds United (Y/E 30 June 2024, Championship season)
Leeds were in the Championship in 2023/24, but their no vote on the Premier League’s rule is a forward-looking one because they were promoted at the end of 2024/25. Their last audited accounts are for the Championship season, however. Revenue: £128 million, 33% [down]. Wages: £84 million, 42% down. Amortisation: £60 million, 27% down, Underlying loss: £70 million, 10% down. Player sale profits: £34 million , 54% down. Loss before tax: £61 million, 80% increase. Player purchases: £38 million… Transfer fees payables [cash owed in installment to other clubs]: £142 million”.
- Revenue: £128 million
- Wages: £84.4 million
- Player amortisation: £60.1 million
- Profit on player disposals: £34 million
- Loss before tax: £61.1 million
- Transfer fees payable: £142.3 million
- Transfer fees receivable: £69.2 million
Indicative SCR (Championship 2023/24 — against an 85% income limit): (£84.4m + £60.1m) / (£128m + £34m) = £144.5m / £162m = 89% — just above Championship’s 85% line.
Leeds’ opposition is materially different from the other five no voters. Promoted to the Premier League and now applying Premier League SCR rules in 2026/27, Leeds face a different calculation entirely. The relevant concern is that the 30% multi-year allowance is set at 30% only at first; if a club approaches the Red Threshold (e.g. by needing to rebuild a Premier League squad after promotion), the negative feedback loop bites: Each breach lowers the club’s allowance for the following season by the amount they breached it by. Leeds will want maximum flexibility for their first year back, and the SCR framework’s annual assessment limits that.
Summary of the six
| Club | Year | SCR (calculated) | Threshold position | What the No vote actually objected to |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bournemouth | 2023/24 | est. 104-116% | Amber / Red | Sporting sanction risk in transition years between investment and sale cycles |
| Brentford | 2024/25 | est. 89% | Amber | Lack of buffer for clubs with no European income to fall back on |
| Brighton | 2023/24 | est. 62% | Green | Cumulative regulatory burden; SSR liquidity test pressure |
| Crystal Palace | 2024/25 | est. 55% | Green | Annual vs three-year assessment exposes cup/sale-dependency |
| Fulham | 2023/24 | est. 99% | Amber, close to Red | Direct risk of sporting sanction in a year without a major sale |
| Leeds | 2023/24 (Champ.) | est. 89% (vs 85%) | Just above | Inflexibility for newly-promoted Premier League rebuild |
SSR Liquidity Headroom and Positive Equity Ratios
Methodology and caveats
The two SSR tests under Premier League rules are:
Liquidity Headroom = Liquid Assets + (40% × Squad Market Value) − Liquid Liabilities − £85m Stress Test Adjustment. Must be ≥ £0 for the current and following season. A club’s Liquidity Headroom is what’s left after taking its liquid assets, subtracting its liquid liabilities, and then taking away £85 million for the ‘Stress Test Adjustment’. The Liquidity Test calculation includes 40% of the club’s squad market value (as opposed to its book value) as a liquid asset.
Positive Equity Ratio = Total Liabilities ÷ Adjusted Assets. Must be ≤ 90% (2026/27), ≤ 85% (2027/28), ≤ 80% (2028/29 onwards). “The Positive Equity Ratio calculation includes the club’s full squad market value (or the net book value of players, if higher) as an adjusted asset. All liabilities reported on the club’s balance sheet are considered in the calculation, including shareholder loans and external debt.”
Important caveats:
- Squad market values are taken from Transfermarkt (October 2025 update) and converted from euros at €1 = £0.84. These are best-available estimates but not the values the Premier League itself will use.
- Liquid assets/liabilities are not always cleanly disclosed; I have used current assets and current liabilities as proxies, removing inventories and including cash plus trade and other receivables. This is a Premier League-defined concept and my proxy will diverge from their actual calculation.
- SSR applies formally only to the Premier League. For Championship clubs I have provided the same calculations purely as an analytical exercise, these would not be live tests under the Championship’s new SCR regime, which does not include SSR-style sustainability tests. The new framework is the £33 million three-year equity allowance instead.
- The most recent club balance sheet data available is 2023/24 audited accounts (Y/E May-July 2024) for most clubs, with a handful (Brentford, Crystal Palace) having filed 2024/25.
- The £85 million stress test was specifically calibrated for the Premier League to represent the revenue drop from relegation or loss of UEFA participation. It is not the right number for Championship clubs in absolute terms.
The numbers below are indicative, not the actual ratios the Premier League would publish.
Premier League, indicative SSR ratios (2023/24 audited accounts)
| Club | Squad MV (£m) | 40% MV (£m) | Net debt (£m) | Total liab (£m, est.) | Approx Liquidity Headroom (£m) | Approx Positive Equity Ratio | Pass 90%? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arsenal | c.1,100 | 440 | 342 | c.750 | Strongly positive | c.55% | Pass |
| Aston Villa | c.500 | 200 | c.250 | c.600 | Tight (cash-poor) | c.80% | Pass (close) |
| Bournemouth | c.300 | 120 | c.250 | c.450 | Negative (shareholder-loan funded) | >100% | Fail |
| Brentford | c.250 | 100 | 71 | c.300 | Marginally positive | c.85% | Pass (close) |
| Brighton | c.400 | 160 | 300 | c.500 | Positive | c.50% | Pass |
| Burnley | c.150 | 60 | c.50 | c.150 | Negative (very small revenue) | c.60% | Pass |
| Chelsea | c.950 | 380 | 303 (excl. intra-group) | c.1,400+ | Negative (Boehly-era spend) | c.110% (or compliant after parent re-cap) | Fail without recapitalisation |
| Crystal Palace | c.270 | 108 | <100 | c.250 | Positive | c.80% | Pass |
| Everton | c.270 | 108 | >1,000 (pre-recap) | c.1,200 | Strongly negative pre-Friedkin recapitalisation; positive post | c.95% pre-recap / c.70% post | Fail pre, pass post |
| Fulham | c.250 | 100 | c.250 (Khan loans) | c.700 (Khan investment ~£700m treated as liability) | Negative | c.120% | Fail |
| Leeds (promoted) | c.200 | 80 | (49ers loans) | c.250 | Negative (transfer payables) | c.95% | Fail |
| Liverpool | c.960 | 384 | 314 | c.700 | Positive | c.60% | Pass |
| Manchester City | c.1,090 | 436 | low (cash positive) | c.700 | Strongly positive | c.50% | Pass |
| Manchester United | c.610 | 244 | c.700 (Glazer debt) | c.1,200 | Marginal | c.85% | Pass (close) |
| Newcastle | c.500 | 200 | c.150 | c.400 | Positive (PIF backing) | c.65% | Pass |
| Nottingham Forest | c.350 | 140 | c.250 (Marinakis loans) | c.400 | Negative | c.95% | Fail |
| Sunderland (promoted) | c.250 | 100 | low | c.150 | Positive | c.60% | Pass |
| Tottenham | c.670 | 268 | c.700 (stadium debt) | c.1,100 | Marginal | c.80% | Pass (close) |
| West Ham | c.350 | 140 | near zero | c.300 | Positive | c.55% | Pass |
| Wolves | c.290 | 116 | c.250 | c.400 | Negative | c.85% | Pass (close) |
Key observations:
- Liquidity Headroom is the binding constraint for most mid-sized clubs. The £85m stress test is significant compared with cash reserves: across the league cash fell to £517m for all 20 clubs combined in 2023/24, less than half of the £1.1bn peak in 2020. Even with the 40% squad market value uplift, clubs with material net transfer payables and modest cash balances struggle.
- Positive Equity is binding mostly for highly-leveraged clubs. The treatment of shareholder loans is the critical point: Everton, Fulham, Nottingham Forest, Chelsea, Brighton (historically) and Bournemouth have all run with very large owner loans that count as liabilities. The path to compliance for several of these is the debt-to-equity swap, which Everton (£451 million Moshiri loan to Friedkin equity) and Chelsea would need before 2026/27. It’s also common for club owners to convert shareholder loans into equity, effectively removing the debt from the balance sheet. This approach has been used by Everton (subsequent to the reporting period), Fulham, Nottingham Forest and Brighton during the early years of Tony Bloom’s ownership.
- The 80% threshold from 2028/29 is the real test. Many of the clubs that are Pass (close) at 90% would be failing at 80%. Tottenham (stadium debt), Manchester United (Glazer debt), Aston Villa (overall leverage) and Brentford all need either substantial owner equity contributions or material on-pitch revenue growth to remain compliant when the ratchet tightens.
Championship, indicative ratios on the same basis
The figures below come from my previously published February 2026 dashboard, which is itself based on the 2023/24 and 2024/25 audited accounts as filed at Companies House. Squad market values are not centrally tracked for Championship clubs to the same extent, this analysis uses Transfermarkt where available and order-of-magnitude estimates elsewhere; the average revenue in the Championship in 2023/24 was £39.9 million, with squad market values typically in the £30-100m range outside parachute clubs.
I have not applied the £85 million stress test for Championship clubs because that figure is calibrated to Premier League relegation revenue loss; for Championship it would be a much smaller figure (around £10-15 million to reflect League One relegation impact). The “Liquidity proxy” column instead shows whether current liquid resources cover current liabilities and ongoing wage obligations.
| Club | Turnover (£m) | Net debt (£m) | Net assets (£m) | Liquidity proxy | Positive Equity Ratio (est.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Birmingham City | 26.0 | Capitalised by Knighthead | Positive | Owner-funded, comfortable | c.60% |
| Blackburn Rovers | 19.9 | >200 (cumulative) | Negative | Severely strained, Indian court approvals required | >150% |
| Bristol City | 42.8 | 91.5 | (33.1) | Owner-supported | c. 110% |
| Charlton Athletic | 8.8 | Undisclosed | Undisclosed | Insufficient public data | n/a |
| Coventry City | c.30.0 | 30.0 | 3.1 | Positive (£15m equity 2025) | c.85% |
| Derby County | 31.9 | 63.0 | (44.9) | Negative, Clowes funding | c.110% |
| Hull City | 25.8 | 76.0 | (42.0) | Severely negative | c.165% |
| Ipswich Town (relegated) | 16.9* | 26 transfer | n/a | Boosted by parachute | c.80% |
| Leicester City (relegated) | 318.0 (grp) | 212.0 | n/a (post £124m swap) | Reliant on Macquarie factoring of TV rights | c.100% (post swap better) |
| Middlesbrough | 32.2 | 14.0 (post £148m swap) | 10.1 | Positive (Gibson) | c.70% |
| Millwall | 23.0 | n/a | n/a | Holdings PLC managed | c.85% |
| Norwich City | 39.0 | 66.0 | 5.0 (post £58m swap) | Owner-funded | c.95% |
| Oxford United | 8.4 | Undisclosed | Undisclosed | Owner-supported | n/a |
| Portsmouth | 20.4 | Undisclosed | Positive | Tornante funded | c.70% |
| Preston North End | 20.5 | 62.0 | (31.0) | Hemmings family funded | c.165% |
| Queens Park Rangers | 21.0 | Undisclosed | Negative historically | Tight | c.120% |
| Sheffield United (relegated) | 138.0 | 80.0 | n/a | Macquarie factoring | c.100% |
| Sheffield Wednesday | 20.0 | Undisclosed | Negative, in administration | Failed | n/a (insolvent) |
| Southampton (relegated) | 318.0 (grp) | High transfer debt | n/a | Sport Republic funded | c.95% |
| Stoke City | 28.8 | 0 (external) | n/a (Coates funded) | Comfortable | c.50% |
| Swansea City | 23.5 | Undisclosed | n/a | Tight, no institutional debt | c.85% |
| Watford | 57.6 | Macquarie factoring | Positive EBITDA | Tight (factored receivables) | c.80% |
| West Bromwich Albion | 28.2 | 39 (MSD) | (33.1) est. | Severely negative, punitive interest | c.150% |
| Wrexham | 26.7 | 0 (cleared £15m) | Strongly positive | Comfortable | c.30% |
For over half the league, positive net equity is an accounting illusion. It is achieved solely through owners executing massive debt-to-equity swaps (e.g., Middlesbrough’s £148 million, Leicester’s £124 million). This indicates that clubs are not generating enterprise value; rather, owners are absorbing sunken costs to satisfy the EFL’s Profitability and Sustainability thresholds and avoid technical insolvency.”
If the SSR-equivalent Positive Equity Ratio test (≤90% from 2026/27, ratcheting to ≤80% by 2028/29) were applied to the Championship, the picture is bleak even after recent debt-to-equity swaps:
- Comfortably pass at 80%: Wrexham, Stoke City, Middlesbrough (post-swap), Birmingham, Portsmouth.
- Borderline at 90%, fail at 80%: Coventry, Millwall, Swansea, Watford, Ipswich (parachute), Southampton (parachute), Norwich (post-swap).
- Fail even at 90%: Bristol City, Derby, Hull, Preston, QPR, Sheffield Wednesday (in administration), West Bromwich Albion, Blackburn Rovers.
This is the structural reason the Championship did not adopt SSR-style sustainability tests with its SCR vote, applying them would have made the majority of the division technically non-compliant on day one. The £33 million equity top-up over three years is the proxy mechanism: it allows owners to inject cash without triggering a positive-equity-style technical failure, while the in-season SCR monitoring deals with the runaway wage problem the old P&S regime addressed too slowly.
Concluding observations
Two structural points emerge from doing this work club-by-club rather than at headline level:
First, the six Premier League “no” voters are not a homogeneous bloc. Bournemouth and Fulham would have failed the new rules on 2023/24 numbers, their objection is concrete and immediate.
Brighton, Crystal Palace and (on prior-year numbers) Brentford were comfortably compliant, their objection is about the cumulative regulatory load and the SSR’s liquidity stress test in particular.
Leeds is a special case: their objection is to inflexibility on first-season-up rather than an immediate compliance problem.
Second, the Championship’s new SCR works only because it omits an SSR-style sustainability test. If the Championship had layered the Premier League’s three tests on top of the 85% SCR + £33 million equity allowance, somewhere between half and two-thirds of the division would have begun the season in formal breach. The political decision to keep the Championship framework “cost-control only” reflects the structural insolvency the division has been carrying for at least a decade, a problem Sheffield Wednesday’s administration in October 2025 brought into sharp focus and which Independent Football Regulator legislation is intended to address from outside the leagues’ own frameworks.