Nottingham Forest Annual Accounts 2024/25
Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited over the reporting period ending 30 June 2025, and into the subsequent 2025/26 campaign, has been subject to (beneficiary of?) one of the most aggressive capital deployment strategies in the English Premier League.
Under the ultimate beneficial ownership of Evangelos Marinakis, the club has gone from a legacy Championship outfit to a top-tier competitor, finishing 7th in the 2024/25 season and securing UEFA Europa League qualification. This sporting success, however, is underpinned by a high-stakes financial model characterised by structural operating losses, a reliance on sophisticated private credit, and a controversial system of multi-club player trading. This report provides an examination of the club’s financial statements, the mechanisms of its re-capitalisation, the nuances of its debt structure, and the complex operational style of its ownership.
Statement of comprehensive income
The profit and loss performance for the year ended 30 June 2025 demonstrates a huge (but not untypical) disconnect between record-breaking revenue generation and bottom-line stability. Turnover reached an all-time high of £221.7 million, representing a 16.9% increase over the previous year. This growth was catalysed by the club’s sporting merit, which maximised central broadcast distributions and commercial yields.
However, the club’s cost base escalated at a rate that suggests a deliberate strategy of deficit spending to secure competitive advantage.
The expansion of turnover is distributed across several key categories, reflecting both the premium attached to Premier League status and the club’s aggressive commercial repricing.
| Revenue Category | 2025 (£’000) | 2024 (£’000) | 2023 (£’000) |
| Media Related Activity | 158,600 | 130,019 | 124,158 |
| Other Commercial | 28,421 | 21,088 | 15,350 |
| Gate Receipts | 20,251 | 14,408 | 10,250 |
| Merchandising | 10,090 | 8,550 | 5,000 |
| Loan Fees Received | 4,384 | 15,487 | – |
| Total Turnover | 221,746 | 189,552 | 154,758 |
Examination of matchday income reveals that the 40.5% increase in gate receipts was only marginally supported by volume increases, as average attendance grew from 29,363 to 30,064. The primary driver was a 24% hike in ticket prices, which saw the average revenue per fan per matchday rise from £23.20 to £31.30.
This aggressive extraction of value from the local supporter base highlights the board’s commitment to maximising football-related revenue in anticipation of the Premier League’s move toward a Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) framework.
Media revenue remains the dominant engine of the club, comprising 71.5% of total turnover, exposing the club to significant relegation risk should league status be lost.
Operational expenditure
The club’s administrative expenses reached £271.4 million, a figure that exceeds total turnover by nearly £50 million. This imbalance is primarily driven by the amortisation of player registrations, which rose to £68.9 million. Amortisation represents the accounting cost of transfer fees spread over the life of player contracts; the continued rise in this figure, up 80% since 2022/23, reflects the cumulative impact of spending more than £380 million on talent since promotion.
Staffing costs provide the most concerning metric. Total remuneration for the club’s 337 permanent and 447 temporary employees reached £166.7 million in basic wages and social security.
When adjusted for related administrative overheads, total staff costs reached £241 million, or 109% of revenue. This means that for every £1 the club earns, it spends £1.09 on its personnel before a single penny is allocated to stadium operations, utilities, or travel. This ratio is unsustainable under the new 85% Squad Cost Ratio rules, necessitating a radical shift in either revenue generation or squad liquidation in future periods.
Volatility of player trading profits
The club’s 2024 profit of £12.1 million was essentially an accounting artifact created by the £100.5 million profit on player sales. In 2025, without similar high-value disposals, the club returned to a loss before tax of £78.9 million. This volatility demonstrates that the club’s financial health is not yet organically sustainable; it is entirely dependent on either owner capital or the periodic sale of marquee assets.
The 2025 accounts include an impairment charge of £5.3 million on player registrations, indicating that certain assets acquired in previous windows are no longer valued at their carrying cost on the balance sheet, further eroding the club’s equity position.
Analysis of balance sheet and re-capitalisation
The balance sheet as of 30 June 2025 reflects a net liability position of £5.2 million. While this represents a technical improvement from the £15.4 million liability reported in 2024, the improvement is entirely synthetic, resulting from the conversion of debt into equity rather than operational profitability.
Intangible assets
The club’s most significant asset class is its intangible player registrations, valued at £178.9 million. This represents the book value of the squad. However, the directors provide a strategic caveat that the market value of the squad is believed to be in excess of its carrying value, which they view as a potential source of liquidity in a distress scenario.
The transfer market creates a complex web of receivables and payables. The club is owed £39.8 million by other clubs for previous sales, but it owes £112.9 million in outstanding transfer installments. This transfer fee deficit of £73.1 million places considerable strain on working capital, particularly since £59.6 million of the payables are due within one year.
Re-capitalisation and balance sheet repair
The repair of the balance sheet is achieved through a recurring mechanism of debt for equity swaps performed by the parent company, NF Football Investments Limited. In the 2024/25 fiscal year, Evangelos Marinakis authorised the conversion of £89.1 million in shareholder loans into ordinary share capital.
| Date | Instrument | Amount (£) | Purpose |
| 10 January 2025 | Share Allotment | 72,070,000 | Conversion of parent company debt to equity |
| 25 June 2025 | Share Allotment | 17,000,000 | Conversion of parent company debt to equity |
| Total FY25 | 89,070,000 |
This strategy has two primary implications. First, it eliminates the interest-bearing potential of these loans, which is critical under the Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) rules that now scrutinise interest-free owner loans. Second, it improves the club’s debt-to-equity ratio, which is essential for maintaining compliance with Financial Fair Play (FFP) and PSR, as equity injections are treated more favorably than debt in these calculations. Since taking over in 2017, Marinakis has invested over £280 million, the vast majority of which has been converted into equity to keep the club’s head above water.
Source and use of capital
As traditional banking institutions have retreated from the volatility of the football sector, Nottingham Forest has turned to the private credit market for its long-term debt requirements. The source of this capital is increasingly global and high-yield in nature.
Apollo Global Management facility
In December 2024, the club entered into an £80 million term loan agreement with a Luxembourg-based financial institution affiliated with Apollo Global Management. This facility represents a major shift in the club’s financing strategy.
- Structure: The loan is a three-year term facility.
- Cost of capital: The annual interest rate is 8.75%, which is categorised as expensive or high-yield debt.
- Security: The debt is secured by a first priority fixed and floating charge over all club assets, including the City Ground.
- Utilisation: £55 million was used to refinance an existing facility with Rights and Media Funding Group, while £25 million was drawn as additional working capital to fund the stadium redevelopment and squad maintenance.
This reliance on private credit from firms like Apollo and Ares Management (which provided similar facilities to Eagle Football) indicates that the club is operating at the edge of its borrowing capacity. The high interest rate places a significant finance cost burden on the P&L, which amounted to £21.0 million in 2025, compared to £15.2 million in 2024.
Receivable factoring and discounting
To bridge the gap between lumpy cash inflows from broadcast rights and the constant demands of transfer payments, the club utilises receivable discounting. In October 2023, the club factored £28.2 million in future transfer receivables at a rate of 8.20%. This mechanism allows the club to bring forward cash from future years to satisfy current liabilities, but it essentially borrows against its future self, creating a perpetual need for new financing or player sales to fill the resulting holes in future budgets.
Cash flow statement and going concern risks
The Statement of Cash Flows for 2025 reveals that the club’s core operations are not self-sustaining. Operating activities absorbed £2.1 million in cash, while investing activities, primarily the purchase of players, used a net £77.2 million. This total cash requirement of nearly £80 million was met entirely through financing activities, including the proceeds from external loans and owner injections.
The auditor’s report from Azets Audit Services highlights the club’s dependence on its parent company. The going concern basis is adopted only because the ultimate beneficial owner has provided letters of support indicating an intention to provide financial support for at least 12 months from the date of the accounts. However, the accounts admit that a funding requirement exists in both the Premier League retention scenario and a relegation scenario, emphasising the club’s absolute reliance on Marinakis’ personal liquidity.
Player trading
A central element of this analysis is the club’s unconventional approach to player trading, particularly its relationship with John Textor’s Eagle Football Holdings. Textor, who has owned stakes in Lyon, Botafogo, and Crystal Palace, has described Marinakis as a partner and a close aide.
Textor has publicly stated that he and Marinakis adjust transfer fees between their clubs based on their ongoing relationship and previous transactions. This practice allows the two owners to compensate for perceived over-payments or underpayments in a way that benefits their respective multi-club networks.
- Moussa Niakhaté: The sale of Niakhaté from Forest to Lyon for €34 million (£29 million) in July 2024 was highlighted as a deal that helped Forest avoid more severe Premier League sanctions by generating high profit in a critical window.
- Igor Jesus: The striker was sold from Botafogo to Forest for £16.5 million in Summer 2025. Despite the player’s high market value, Textor admitted that the low price was partly an adjustment within the larger relationship with Marinakis.
- Other Transactions: The relationship has seen a flurry of business, with players like Jair Cunha, John Victor, and Cuiabano moving from Botafogo to Forest, while Danilo moved in the opposite direction.
While Textor insists these deals are “quite normal” negotiations between friends, the transparency and fair market value of these transactions have come under scrutiny from legal experts and rival clubs. Lawyers for Crystal Palace even referenced this relationship during their submission to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in July 2025 when challenging their demotion from the Europa League, a spot eventually taken by Forest.
O Globo investigation
In late 2025, an investigation by O Globo in Brazil suggested that the relationship might include complex repayment plans. The report claimed that Textor had promised to repay Marinakis for the release of certain players using Botafogo’s future revenues, and that Marinakis had acted as a creditor by holding back payments for other transfers to ensure debt satisfaction. This suggests the existence of a shadow financial structure between the owners that is not fully captured in the public accounts of their respective clubs.
Evangelos Marinakis
The financial health and operational direction of Nottingham Forest are inseparable from the personal history and wealth of Evangelos Marinakis. Born in Piraeus in 1967, Marinakis is the son of Miltiadis Marinakis, a shipowner and politician who was himself a supporter of Olympiacos.
Wealth accumulation and shipping
Marinakis’ wealth is primarily derived from the international maritime industry. He founded Capital Maritime & Trading Corp in 2005 and has grown it into a global leader with a fleet of over 146 vessels by 2025. His business strategy has been characterised by successfully timing new building and second-hand asset markets across multiple segments, including tankers, container ships, and LNG carriers.
| Entity | Role | Exchange | Strategic Impact |
| Capital Maritime & Trading Corp | Founder/Chairman | Private | The core holding company for the shipping group. |
| Capital Clean Energy Carriers Corp | Majority Owner | Nasdaq | Focuses on energy transition vessels; formerly Capital Product Partners. |
| Alter Ego Media | Majority Owner | Athex (Athens) | Controls Mega Channel and major newspapers; IPO’d in 2025. |
His 2025 ranking as the 10th most influential person in the shipping industry by Lloyd’s List reflects his scale and impact. This wealth is the ultimate backstop for Nottingham Forest; his ability to convert £89 million of debt into equity in a single year is a direct function of the cash flows generated by his 18-million-tonne maritime fleet.
Management style
Marinakis is widely recognised for an interventionist and often impatient management style. He is described as a football person to the core who demands immediate results and is willing to exert extreme pressure on his staff to achieve them. This is most evident in his treatment of head coaches. Since acquiring Nottingham Forest in 2017, he has sacked ten managers, with only Steve Cooper lasting more than two years.
| Manager | Tenure | Outcome |
| Mark Warburton | Mar 2017 – Dec 2017 | Sacked on New Year’s Eve. |
| Aitor Karanka | Jan 2018 – Jan 2019 | Resigned after boardroom fallout with Vrentzos. |
| Martin O’Neill | Jan 2019 – Jun 2019 | Sacked after 164 days, just before preseason. |
| Sabri Lamouchi | Jun 2019 – Oct 2020 | Sacked after losing play-off spot on final day. |
| Chris Hughton | Oct 2020 – Sep 2021 | Sacked after team fell to bottom of Championship. |
| Steve Cooper | Sep 2021 – Dec 2023 | Achieved promotion; sacked after poor PL run. |
| Nuno Espirito Santo | Dec 2023 – Sep 2025 | Sacked after three games into the 2025 season. |
| Ange Postecoglou | Sep 2025 – Oct 2025 | Sacked after only 39 days and 8 games. |
| Sean Dyche | Oct 2025 – Feb 2026 | Sacked after failing to motivate team against rivals. |
| Vitor Pereira | Feb 2026 – Present | Current appointment. |
At Olympiacos, the turnover is even more extreme, with 17 managers having been dismissed since he took control in 2010. This volatility suggests a belief in shock therapy for the squad. In 2018, he famously banished his entire first-team squad and fined them $492,000, telling them to go on holiday because they cared more about nice houses and cars than the team.
Relationship with finance director Ioannis Vrentzos
The most stable professional relationship in Marinakis’s sporting and business empire is with Ioannis (Giannis) Vrentzos. Vrentzos has served as Marinakis’s primary lieutenant for over 14 years, acting as the connective tissue between the Greek and English operations.
Vrentzos’s career path illustrates his role as the financial architect of the Marinakis group:
- Investment Banking (2003-2009): Worked in M&A and IPOs at EFG Eurobank Telesis.
- Olympiacos (2010-2017): Served as CEO/Managing Director, overseeing the restructuring that made the club financially dominant in Greece.
- Nottingham Forest (2017-2021): Served as CEO during the initial takeover years, relocation to Nottingham to run day-to-day operations.
- Alter Ego Media (2021-Present): Current CEO of the Greek media conglomerate, leading its 2025 IPO while remaining a director at Nottingham Forest.
Vrentzos is often viewed as the hard man of the management team. He was reportedly involved in screaming matches and backroom bullying during his time at Forest, leading to a staff exodus in 2021. However, he remains Marinakis’s most trusted associate, currently overseeing the transition of the media group into a public company while still advising on Forest’s European transfer strategy.
External factors
The analysis would be incomplete without addressing the significant external and legal factors that have shadowed the ownership. Evangelos Marinakis has been the subject of numerous allegations, though he has consistently maintained his innocence and secured acquittals in major cases.
George Lyngeridis trial (2025/2026)
In November 2025, a landmark trial commenced in Athens, with Marinakis and four other board members facing misdemeanour charges as part of a crackdown on sports-related violence. The trial stems from the 2023 death of riot police officer George Lyngeridis, who was killed by a flare during a volleyball match. Marinakis is accused of instigating violence and supporting a criminal organisation (the hardcore Olympiacos fan group) through public statements against the authorities. He has dismissed the case as totally baseless and politically motivated.
Historic legal matters
- Match-Fixing: In 2017, Marinakis was charged with criminal match-fixing offences in Greece and ordered to stand down as Olympiacos chairman by a panel of judges. He was eventually acquitted of all charges in 2018.
- Noor 1 Cargo ship: In 2014, a cargo ship was caught smuggling three tons of heroin into Greece. In 2018, Marinakis was implicated in the investigation, with allegations that he was involved in the trafficking ring. He was cleared of all charges in late 2018 due to a lack of evidence.
- Municipal influence: Marinakis has served as a municipal Councillor in Piraeus since 2014, using his political position to oppose the privatisation of the local port. Critics have labeled him a Greek oligarch due to his influence across shipping, media, politics, and sport.
Post-balance sheet events and future outlook
Events occurring since 30 June 2025 highlight a club that is doubling down on its spend-to-compete strategy.
The 2025 summer transfer window saw an unprecedented net expenditure. The club disclosed in its post-balance sheet notes that net costs for transfers and head coach changes reached £208.5 million. This included the arrival of Omari Hutchinson for £37.5 million and James McAtee for £30 million. This level of spending, occurring after a £79 million loss, indicates that the owner is anticipating a significant uplift in revenue from the Europa League and the new broadcast cycle beginning in 2025/26.
Relationship with John Textor
The association with John Textor had significant sporting consequences in 2025. Crystal Palace was demoted from the Europa League to the Conference League by UEFA due to integrity rules regarding Textor’s dual ownership of Palace and Lyon. Nottingham Forest, finishing 7th, was the direct beneficiary of this demotion, taking Palace’s spot in the Europa League. This vacancy illustrates how multi-club complexities can inadvertently benefit clubs within the same strategic network.
The analysis of Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited reveals a company that is fundamentally a loss-making entity, surviving only through the extraordinary capital injections of its ultimate beneficial owner. The balance sheet repair is a cosmetic exercise performed via debt-to-equity swaps, and the club’s liquidity is increasingly dependent on high-yield private credit and strategic player trading with preferred partners like John Textor – although Textor’s future role is to be questioned given the administration of Eagle Football.
While the club has achieved remarkable sporting heights, the financial model remains precarious. The 109% staff-cost-to-revenue ratio and the heavy reliance on the personal liquidity of Evangelos Marinakis, himself facing a prolonged landmark trial in Greece, create a risk profile that is among the highest in European football.
The club’s future depends entirely on maintaining its Premier League status and successfully navigating the transition to the Squad Cost Ratio framework, a transition that will require either a massive increase in commercial profitability or a substantial contraction of its aggressive spending habits.
| Key Ratios (2025) | Metric |
| Staff Cost to Revenue Ratio | 109% |
| Debt-to-Equity Conversion (Full Year 25) | £89.1 million |
| Net Current Liability Gap | £71.3 million |
| High-Yield External Debt Interest Rate | 8.75% |
| Transfer Fee Deficit | £73.1 million |
| Revenue Exposure to Broadcasting | 71.5% |
Note: Data derived from statutory accounts for the year ended 30 June 2025 and subsequent public disclosures.