In professional football “home advantage” is an established and quantifiable fact. Across leagues and eras, teams consistently perform better, secure more points, and score more goals in their home fixtures than in their away matches.

What, if any, impact is there on home advantage when a club moves to a new stadium?

Does moving to a new, often larger and more modern, stadium enhance or disrupt a team’s home advantage in the immediate term?

Does  a new stadium act as a catalyst for improved performance? Does the move by representing progress and ambition, galvanise players, staff, and supporters? Fresh surroundings, coupled with state-of-the-art facilities and a significant increase in attendance, should theoretically create positive feedback, leading to a tangible uplift in home results.

Conversely, is it the case that the immediate aftermath of a stadium move is fraught with disruption. The loss of a familiar, historic ground—often cramped and intimidating for visiting teams as was the case with Goodison— might erode the intangible elements of home advantage. Is it the case that a period of acclimatisation is required for both players and fans to forge a new identity and connection with their surroundings, during which home performance might suffer?

To test both hypotheses, one has to analyse home league performance involving a direct, season-on-season comparison of a club’s final full league campaign at its former ground against its first full league campaign at its new stadium.

This table allows for direct and objective comparison between the final season at an old ground and the inaugural season at a new one. The inclusion of divisional status and the calculation of delta values (Δ) for points and points per game provide an immediate, high-level view of the performance shift for each club.

A cursory examination of the aggregate data from the above might suggest that stadium relocation has a net negative effect on home performance. 

Calculating the average change in Points Per Game (PPG) across the entire 13-club example reveals a decrease of approximately -0.06 PPG. 

However, such an aggregate view is inherently flawed as it fails to account for the most significant contextual factor influencing a team’s performance from one season to the next: the quality of its opposition.

The  data has to be segmented to create real value.

 The raw negative trend skewed by the performance of clubs whose stadium move coincided with a change in divisional status. To isolate the genuine stadium effect, the clubs are divided into three groups:

1. Promoted Clubs: This group includes Bolton Wanderers, Middlesbrough, and Brighton & Hove Albion. All three clubs enjoyed dominant, promotion-winning campaigns in their final season at their old grounds, reflected in their home PPGs (2.52, 2.04, and 2.39 respectively). Upon moving to their new stadiums, they also moved up to a more challenging league (the Premier League for Bolton and Middlesbrough, the Championship for Brighton). Their subsequent drops in home PPG (-0.99, -0.46, and -0.61) are significant but predictable. This performance decline is the consequence of facing superior opposition on a weekly basis. The stadium move was a component of a successful project, not the cause of a performance collapse.
2. Relegated Clubs: This group features Leicester City and Sunderland. Their situations are the inverse of the promoted clubs. Leicester endured a torrid final season at Filbert Street, culminating in relegation from the Premier League with a home PPG of just 0.84. Their first season at the new Walkers Stadium was in the division below, where they were a dominant force, earning an immediate promotion with a home PPG of 2.30. Similarly, Sunderland’s move from Roker Park to the Stadium of Light coincided with relegation, and their home form improved markedly against weaker opposition, with PPG rising from 1.26 to 2.13.
3. Clubs in the Same Division: This is the most crucial segment for analysis, as it isolates the stadium move as the primary independent variable. This group includes Arsenal, West Ham, Tottenham, Manchester City, Southampton, Derby County, Coventry City, and Brentford. A much more complex picture emerges with no uniform trend. Some clubs, like West Ham and Manchester City, experienced a notable decline in home performance. Others, such as Derby County and Coventry City, saw a significant improvement. The impact of a new stadium is highly conditional, and its effects—positive or negative—are driven by factors specific to the club and the nature of the transition itself.

Stadium moves within the Premier League

The pressures and scrutiny associated with a stadium move are most extreme in the Premier League. The financial stakes are higher, the media focus is more intense, and the competitive margins are finer. 

Examining the clubs that navigated this transition while remaining in the top flight provides the clearest insight into the potential pitfalls and opportunities of relocation at the elite level and from an Everton perspective most relevant.

Arsenal: Highbury to the Emirates  (2006)

The move from Highbury to the Emirates Stadium in 2006 was a landmark moment for Arsenal. The move was deemed “vital to our future” by manager Arsène Wenger, intended to provide the revenue streams necessary to compete with the continent’s giants.

Arsenal’s last season at Highbury, with a capacity of just over 38,000, was an atmospheric and emotionally charged affair, marked by a season-long Final Salute celebration that culminated in a dramatic 4-2 victory over Wigan Athletic to secure Champions League qualification on the final day.

 The Emirates Stadium represented a quantum leap, with a capacity exceeding 60,000 and a more expansive, modern design.

The data reveals a marginal decline in overall home performance, with a drop of 3 points and 0.16 PPG. 

However, that’s not the whole story. Arsenal lost two fewer home games but also won two fewer, with the number of draws doubling from three to six. This pattern suggests a team that  struggled in the more spacious and less intimidating confines of their new home. While the team scored more home goals in total, their goals-per-game average remained similar, and their defensive record worsened slightly. The shift to frustrating stalemates became a theme in the early years at the Emirates, indicating that while the new ground did not make them easier to beat, it diluted the home advantage they once held.

West Ham United: Boleyn to the London Stadium (2016)

West Ham’s relocation from the Boleyn Ground (Upton Park) to the London Stadium in 2016 stands as one of the most contentious and challenging stadium moves in modern English football. 

It involved a transition from a beloved, traditional football ground to a repurposed multi-purpose athletics stadium, creating a host of architectural and atmospheric challenges.

The Boleyn Ground, West Ham’s home since 1904, was a compact and famously intense venue with a capacity of around 35,000. The final season was a resounding success, with the club finishing 7th. The move to the London Stadium, built for the 2012 Olympics, increased the matchday capacity to over 57,000 for the first season.

 However, the new venue was plagued by issues ill-suited to football, most notably the significant distance between the stands and the pitch due to the retained running track, which diluted the atmosphere and created a sense of detachment for supporters.

The impact on West Ham’s home form was immediate and severe. The club suffered  a loss of 9 points and 0.47 PPG. The number of home defeats more than doubled, increasing from just three in the final season at the Boleyn Ground to eight in the first season at the London Stadium. Defensively the team conceded 31 goals compared to 26 in the previous season, and their attacking threat diminished, scoring only 25 goals versus 34. 

 The architectural and atmospheric shortcomings of the new venue appeared to have a direct, tangible, and negative effect on performance, transforming a team that was difficult to beat at home into one that was vulnerable.

Tottenham Hotspur: The White Hart Lane, Wmbley, The Tottenham Stadium (2017-2019)

Tottenham’s journey to their new stadium was unique, complicated by a temporary relocation to Wembley Stadium while their new home was constructed on the site of the old one. The analysis must therefore compare the final season at the original White Hart Lane with the first full season at the new Tottenham Hotspur Stadium, acknowledging the intervening period.

The final season at White Hart Lane was a historic one for Tottenham. The club went the entire 2016-17 league campaign unbeaten at home, winning 17 of their 19 matches and conceding only nine goals. This created an emotional and performance-based peak that would be almost impossible to replicate. The new stadium, which officially opened in April 2019, is a state-of-the-art venue with a capacity of over 62,000, designed specifically to retain crowd noise and keep fans close to the action. The first full season in 2019-20 was also marked by a mid-season managerial change.

On the surface, the drop of 14 points and 0.74 PPG appears substantial. However, this is largely created by the extraordinary, outlier performance of the 2016-17 season. A home record of 17 wins and two draws is not a sustainable benchmark. A more insightful interpretation is that the performance in the new stadium represented not a collapse, but a regression to a more typical, albeit still very strong, elite home record. A PPG of 2.05 is consistent with a team challenging for European qualification. 

The key takeaway is not that the new stadium caused a decline, but that the emotional energy of leaving the old one created a temporary and exceptional peak. The new ground established a new, strong baseline, but one that was inevitably overshadowed by the flawless farewell to its predecessor.

Manchester City: Maine Road to the Etihad  (2003)

Manchester City’s move in 2003 marked a transition from one of English football’s most historic grounds to a modern, multi-purpose venue built with public funds for the 2002 Commonwealth Games. This was a move that predated the club’s transformative takeover and represented a step into a new era.

 Maine Road, City’s home since 1923, was a sprawling ground that once held the record for the highest attendance at an English club ground (84,569 in 1934).

By 2003, its capacity was around 35,000. The final season was notable for a 3-1 derby victory over Manchester United. The new stadium, then known as the City of Manchester Stadium, offered superior facilities and a larger capacity of around 48,000.

The statistical narrative of Manchester City’s move closely mirrors that of Arsenal’s. The overall PPG dropped by 0.27, but the most significant change was the shift from decisive results to draws. Home wins fell from nine to five, while draws rose substantially from just two at Maine Road to nine at the new ground. The team became slightly harder to beat at home, with losses decreasing from eight to five, and their home defensive record improved. 

This reinforces a recurring theme for clubs moving into larger, more modern arenas: the loss of the old ground’s intimidating aura makes it more difficult to overwhelm visiting teams, who are often more content to defend resolutely and play for a point. The new stadium becomes a prestigious venue for an away draw, altering the dynamic of the fixture and leading to an increase in stalemates.

Southampton The Dell to St Mary’s (2001)

Southampton’s move from The Dell to St Mary’s Stadium was a necessity driven by the limitations of their historic home. The transition was a step into the modern era, enabling the club to accommodate a larger fanbase and generate increased revenue.

The Dell had been Southampton’s home for 103 years, but following the Taylor Report, its capacity was restricted to a mere 15,200, the smallest in the Premier League at the time.

 The move to St Mary’s was essential for the club’s long-term viability, more than doubling the capacity to over 32,000. The final competitive match at The Dell was a fairy-tale ending, with club legend Matthew Le Tissier scoring a spectacular last-minute volley to secure a 3-2 win against Arsenal.

Southampton’s experience aligns with the general trend of an acclimatisation deficit. Their home PPG dropped by 0.31, a clear, though not catastrophic, decline. 

The number of home wins fell from nine to seven, while the number of losses increased from five to seven. The team struggled to replicate the strengths of The Dell, a tight ground where the crowd was on top of the players. The move to the larger, more open St Mary’s appeared to diminish this intangible advantage, resulting in an erosion of their home form. This case provides further evidence that even for established top-flight clubs, the transition to a new environment, despite its long-term benefits, often comes with a short-term performance cost.

A consistent pattern emerges from these elite-level case studies. The move to a new, larger, and more modern stadium frequently corresponds with a decline in home wins and a notable increase in home draws. 

 The new venues, while architecturally impressive, often lack the raw, intimidating atmosphere of their predecessors. This change appears to benefit visiting teams.

Furthermore, the prestige of being one of the first teams to play at a landmark stadium like the Emirates or the new Tottenham Hotspur Stadium can provide an additional source of motivation for opponents. They arrive not just to compete, but to make a statement. This combined with the less hostile environment, makes it harder for the home side to break down stubborn opposition, turning a number of possible victories into frustrating draws. This suggests the performance dip is not solely a failure of the home team to adapt, but also a consequence of the heightened determination of the visiting team.

 Stadium moves outside the Premier League

Examining stadium moves within the English Football League raises many more questions than the limited data from the Premier League.

In the English Football League the financial landscapes, competitive pressures, and motivations for relocation differ, leading to a more varied and often more positive set of performance outcomes.

 Bolton, Middlesbrough, and Brighton

Often ambitious clubs in the Football League align a stadium move with a push for promotion. For Bolton Wanderers, Middlesbrough, and Brighton & Hove Albion, the new ground was a manifestation of their on-pitch success.

In all three cases, the clubs experienced a significant drop in their home Points Per Game in the season immediately following their move. Bolton’s PPG fell by nearly a full point per game after swapping Burnden Park for the Reebok Stadium. Brighton saw a drop of 0.61 PPG in their move from the Withdean Stadium to the Amex.

 However, to interpret this as a failure of the new stadium would be wrong. Each of these clubs achieved promotion in the final season at their old ground. 

Bolton set a club record with 18 home wins in their final Division One campaign at Burnden Park. Brighton were crowned League One champions in their last season at the Withdean.

 Their subsequent performance decline  is an expected consequence of competing in a higher, more challenging division. The new stadium was not the cause of lower attainment; it was the reward for the success that precipitated it. For these clubs, the move was an integral part of an upward trajectory, and the data reflects the increased difficulty of their new competitive environment, not a negative stadium effect.

 Leicester City

The case of Leicester City demonstrating how a drop in division can create a dramatic, if somewhat artificial, performance upswing in a new stadium.

 Leicester’s final season at their historic Filbert Street home was an unmitigated disaster, resulting in relegation from the Premier League with a dismal home record of just three wins. 

They moved into the new Walkers Stadium (now the King Power Stadium) as a First Division club and immediately transformed into one of the league’s most formidable home sides. 

They won 16 of their 23 home games, suffering only two defeats, and secured immediate promotion back to the top flight. The new stadium contributed to a sense of a fresh start and renewed ambition. 

However, the primary driver of the +1.46 PPG improvement was the significant drop in the quality of opposition.

Derby County and Coventry City

Derby County and Coventry City represent perhaps the purest test case. 

Both clubs moved to new stadiums while remaining in the same division, and both experienced a clear and positive performance boost

 Derby County’s move from the dilapidated Baseball Ground to the modern Pride Park in 1997 saw their home form transform. They went from a respectable mid-table home side (8 wins, 6 draws, 5 losses) to one of the Premier League’s strongest (12 wins, 3 draws, 4 losses).

 Their home PPG surged by +0.47, and they finished 9th in the league, a significant improvement on 12th the previous season.

Coventry City’s experience was remarkably similar. Their final season at Highfield Road in the Championship was one of mediocrity, with an 8-7-8 home record.

The move to the Ricoh Arena in 2005 resulted in a dramatic upturn in fortunes. Their home record improved to 12-7-4, their home PPG jumped by +0.52, and they finished 8th in the league, a leap of 11 places from 19th the year before.

 For these clubs, which were not experiencing the extreme pressures of a title challenge or relegation battle, the new stadium appeared to act as a genuine catalyst. The psychological lift of a modern environment, combined with the statement of ambition the move represented, seemingly translated into improved on-pitch results.

Brentford

Brentford’s move from Griffin Park to the Brentford Community Stadium in 2020 offers a modern case study in how to mitigate the potential disruption of relocation.

Despite the emotional farewell to Griffin Park, their home of 116 years, Brentford’s performance level remained remarkably consistent. Their home PPG saw a very small dip of just -0.08. While they won two fewer home games, they also lost two fewer, becoming an even tougher side to beat at home.

 Crucially, the club achieved its ultimate goal of promotion to the Premier League via the play-offs in its very first season at the new ground.  In Brentford’s case we see a club with a deeply embedded and coherent strategy, a stable management and coaching structure, and a clear, data-led philosophy can effectively absorb the shock of a stadium move. 

For Brentford, the new stadium was not a disruptive variable but a seamless continuation of a well-executed, long-term project.

The varied outcomes in the Football League reveal a crucial truth: the on-pitch results following a stadium move are often a direct reflection of the club’s off-pitch health and strategy at the moment of transition. 

A club with a clear vision and stable leadership, like Brentford, can navigate the change with minimal disruption. A club that uses the move as a catalyst for a broader project of improvement, like Derby and Coventry, can thrive. 

In contrast, as seen with West Ham in the Premier League, a club where the move is contentious or strategically not aligned with footballing needs is likely to see that turmoil reflected in its home form. The stadium itself is a passive factor; it is the club’s strategy that activates its potential for success or failure.

Some thoughts

A distinct phenomenon observed in several cases is where a club’s performance in the final season at its old ground reaches an anomalous and unsustainable peak. The emotional energy generated by the impending departure creates a powerful psychological advantage, galvanising players and fans to produce extraordinary results.

Tottenham Hotspur’s final season at White Hart Lane in 2016-17 is the archetypal example. They completed the entire league campaign unbeaten at home, winning 17 of 19 games. Similarly, Brighton’s final season at the temporary Withdean Stadium saw them storm to the League One title with 17 home wins and a PPG of 2.39.

A perceived drop in performance can actually just be,  in reality, the team is simply regressing to a more sustainable performance mean.  (Obviously for Everton moving into the new Hill Dickeson stadium this is a mute point. 

As is the case with most stadium moves, the architectural shift from older, more compact grounds to modern, spacious arenas appears to have a tangible impact on the nature of home advantage. Many of the older grounds, such as West Ham’s Boleyn Ground, Arsenal’s Highbury, and Southampton’s The Dell, were known for their tight confines and steep stands, which placed supporters extremely close to the action. 

In contrast, new venues like the London Stadium, the Emirates, and St Mary’s (to a lesser extent)  are larger, more open bowls. While they offer superior sightlines and amenities, the increased distance between the stands and the pitch has diluted the acoustic intensity and the psychological pressure exerted by the crowd. This seems to benefit visiting teams. The significant increase in draws experienced by both Arsenal (from 3 to 6) and Manchester City (from 2 to 9) after their moves strongly supports this view. The loss of a claustrophobic atmosphere appears to make it harder for home teams to build the kind of sustained pressure that turns one point into three.

To further dissect the on-pitch changes, an analysis of the shift in home goals scored and conceded per game provides a more granular view of how relocation impacts a team’s tactical balance.

For clubs that struggled after moving within the same division, the impact was felt at both ends of the pitch. West Ham, for instance, saw their attack falter (scoring 0.47 fewer goals per game) while their defence became more porous (conceding 0.26 more goals per game). This points to a breakdown of their home advantage.

Conversely, the two most successful same-division movers, Derby and Coventry, built their improvement on defensive solidity. Derby’s attack improved, but their defence tightened significantly, conceding 0.21 fewer goals per game at Pride Park.

 Coventry’s improvement was even more pronounced defensively, with their goals conceded per game dropping by 0.35 at the Ricoh Arena. This suggests that while a new stadium can provide a platform for attacking expression, the most immediate and tangible benefit may come from an improved defensive performance. Attacking patterns, which can be more reliant on rhythm, confidence may be more susceptible to the disruption of a move.

The statistical evidence leads to a definitive conclusion:  the notion that moving to a new ground will inherently cause a dip in home form is a myth. Equally, the idea that a  modern venue guarantees a boost  is not universally supported by the data.

Instead, the home performance of a club in its first season at a new stadium is the outcome of a complex convergence of factors. The architectural characteristics of the new venue, the emotional weight of leaving a historic home, and the altered motivation of visiting opponents all play a role. However, the most critical determinant is not the newness of the stadium itself, but the stability, strategy, and league context of the club undertaking the move.

Ultimately, a new stadium is a passive variable. It is a tool and a platform. Its potential to become a fortress or a folly is activated by the health and clarity of the club that inhabits it. The on-pitch results are merely a reflection of the success or failure of that overarching club project.

With regards to the Hill Dickinson stadium, it appears we have several factors in our favour. Firstly, the stadium is purposely built as a football stadium and designed to retain all of the competitive advantages Goodison provided over many years. That undoubtedly will assist us going forwards as will the even greater levels and numbers of passionate supporters attending home games.

All said and done though, performance improves because of the strategic direction of the club and the resources (relative to the competition) available to it.

We, as Evertonians, will do everything we can to make the Hill Dickinson stadium a fortress – that was apparent by the atmosphere on Sunday. But ultimately it is down to the quality of management and the financial backing provided. In this modern regulatory environment, of course, the financial backing is driven by the income generated by the club – that perhaps is the single largest factor behind a move to a brand new stadium.