Football is a high risk business. Financial performance is determined by success on the pitch, the security of media rights deals, player acquisition and disposal, the cost and form of capital deployed, and when losses occur (as is usually the case) the ability of the owner or majority shareholders to continue to provide the additional necessary working capital to maintain solvency.

This is a cautionary tale of the impact of several factors – the pandemic, a hugely leveraged acquisition, a collapse in media rights, poor operational performance by the club’s owners and executive team, and the inability of the majority shareholder, John Textor, to provide the necessary capital to maintain control of the business.

Additionally it demonstrates the predatory nature of private credit lenders, the cost of their capital and the impact that has on the fortunes of football clubs

The fiscal landscape of European professional football has undergone a period of significant volatility since the onset of the global pandemic, and few entities illustrate this turbulence as vividly (or as publicly) as the entity formerly known as Olympique Lyonnais Groupe, now Eagle Football Group. 

Since the 2020/21 financial year, the organisation has attempted to navigate a complex path from being a stalwart of French family-owned sports capitalism under Jean-Michel Aulas to becoming the centerpiece of John Textor’s multi-club ownership model. 

Central to any evaluation of the group’s health and operating performance is the trajectory of its Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortisation (EBITDA), a metric that serves as the primary indicator of its cash-flow generation and its ability to service a sophisticated, costly and ultimately burdensome debt architecture.

The analysis of Eagle Football Group’s EBITDA since 2021 reveals a narrative of cyclical recovery, strategic monetisation of non-core assets, and a structural confrontation with the escalating costs of elite football competition. 

While the group returned to positive territory in the 2021/22 fiscal year following the systemic shocks of COVID-19 and the collapse of the French domestic media rights market, subsequent years have been characterised by aggressive financial re-engineering and a reliance on player trading that has struggled to keep pace with rising interest obligations and personnel costs. 

This report provides a granular examination of the EBITDA figures for each financial year since 2021, contextualising these data points within the broader mechanisms of the group’s operational and strategic evolution.

EBITDA performance and core financial metrics

The following data represents the consolidated EBITDA figures for Eagle Football Group (formerly Olympique Lyonnais Groupe) for the fiscal years ending June 30. These figures incorporate the group’s diverse revenue streams, including ticketing, media rights, sponsoring, brand-related activities, events, and the crucial trading component consisting of gains on player sales.

The EBITDA trajectory highlights a peak in 2023/2024, driven by non-recurring assistance and asset disposals, followed by a precipitous decline in 2024/2025 as structural costs and a contraction in media revenue exerted severe pressure on the bottom line.

Fiscal year 2020/21: The pandemic 

The 2020/21 financial year was defined by the maximal impact of the COVID-19 health crisis on the French football industry. For Olympique Lyonnais, the period was characterised by behind closed door matches and the sudden termination of the 2019/20 Ligue 1 season, which had long-term ramifications for revenue and qualification for European competitions. The reported EBITDA of -€33.9 million was a direct consequence of a massive contraction in matchday income, which fell to just €2.0 million for the entire year.

The operational loss in 2020/21 was part of a cumulative two-year pandemic impact estimated by the group to have reached €175 million on EBITDA and €250 million on total revenue. During this period, the group relied heavily on government-sponsored support mechanisms, including furlough schemes and state guaranteed loans (PGE), to maintain liquidity. The lack of European football, resulting from the premature end of the prior domestic season, further deprived the club of approximately €27 million in UEFA media rights compared to the previous cycle.

Despite the negative EBITDA, the group’s historical trading model provided a necessary buffer. Gains on the sale of player registrations, including the transfers of Bertrand Traoré to Aston Villa and Martin Terrier to Rennes, allowed the club to record €59.3 million in trading revenue, though this was insufficient to offset the collapse of the stadium-based business lines. This period underscored the fundamental risk of a capital-heavy, debt funded infrastructure model (the Groupama Stadium) when the ability to host spectators is forcibly removed.

Fiscal year 2021/22: Post-crisis rebound and operational recovery

The 2021/22 fiscal year marked a significant recovery for the group, with EBITDA returning to positive territory at €15.9 million. This improvement of nearly €50 million compared to the prior year was primarily driven by the full reopening of Groupama Stadium and a strong run in the UEFA Europa League, where the men’s team reached the quarter-finals.

Drivers of EBITDA improvement

The return to profitability was underpinned by a 42% surge in total revenue to €252.5 million. Ticketing revenue experienced a meteoric rise from €2.0 million to €36.3 million, of which €11.1 million was derived from European competitions. Furthermore, the group benefited from a record high in sponsoring and advertising revenue, which reached €41.9 million. This figure included a non-recurring positive impact of €3.9 million from the settlement of negotiations with Sportfive regarding pandemic-related disruptions.

A key component of the 2021/22 EBITDA result was the receipt of exceptional government aid. The group recorded €42.8 million in social security contribution exemptions and payment aid under the URSSAF schemes designed to support employers heavily impacted by public health restrictions. Without this state intervention, the group’s operational performance would have remained significantly challenged. Player trading also reached a high level of activity, with revenue from sales totaling €92.1 million, including major transactions such as Joachim Andersen to Crystal Palace and Maxwel Cornet to Burnley.

While the EBITDA margin returned to 6.3%, the group still posted a net loss of €55 million, reflecting high depreciation and amortisation costs associated with its stadium and player registrations. Nevertheless, the 2021/22 results suggested that the OL Model of integrated sports and entertainment was relatively sound once operational restrictions were lifted.

Fiscal Year 2022/23: Transition and ownership shift

The 2022/23 financial year was perhaps the most pivotal in the club’s modern history, marked by the finalised takeover of the group by Eagle Football Holdings on December 19, 2022. John Textor’s acquisition of a 77.49% stake signaled the end of the Aulas era and the beginning of a new, debt-driven multi-club strategy.

Financially, the year was one of slight regression in operational terms. The group reported a negative EBITDA of -€1.8 million for the full twelve-month period. The primary cause for this dip into negative territory was the club’s 8th place finish in Ligue 1 in the 2021/22 season, which resulted in a total absence from European cup competitions for the 2022/23 cycle. This deprivation of UEFA media rights and European matchday revenue created a gap that domestic activities could not fully bridge.

During the first half of 2022/23 (ending December 31, 2022), the group recorded an EBITDA loss of -€23.7 million. While revenue from operations (excluding trading) rose by 16% to €134.8 million, this growth was offset by rising operating expenses, particularly electricity and energy costs which were impacted by the international inflationary context. Furthermore, personnel costs continued to climb as the club attempted to restructure its squad following the takeover.

The transition to Eagle Football ownership brought an immediate capital injection, with the new parent company subscribing to a reserved capital increase of €86 million. However, this period also saw the introduction of a more complex financial structure, with the group beginning to refinance its historical stadium debt and taking on new liabilities to fund its global expansion.

Fiscal Year 2023/24: Asset monetisation and record EBITDA

The 2023/24 fiscal year saw the group report its highest EBITDA of the analysed period, reaching €44.2 million. At first glance, this 12.2% margin suggests a robust operational turnaround. However, a detailed examination of the consolidated accounts reveals that this performance was heavily reliant on non-recurring items and an aggressive strategy of asset disposal.

The impact of exceptional items

The 2023/24 EBITDA was significantly bolstered by two primary factors:

1. LFP/CVC deal: Following the investment by CVC Capital Partners into the LFP’s new commercial subsidiary, Olympique Lyonnais was allocated a total of €90 million to be received over several years. In 2023/24, a major tranche of €50 million was recognised, providing a massive non-dilutive cash injection that flowed directly into the group’s operating results.
2. Strategic disposals: Under the leadership of John Textor and the newly renamed Eagle Football Group, the organisation moved to liquidate non-core assets. The most significant of these was the sale of the LDLC Arena to Holnest (the family office of Jean-Michel Aulas) for €160 million in June 2024. Additionally, the group sold its majority stake in Olympique Lyonnais Féminin to Michele Kang and disposed of the NWSL franchise Seattle Reign FC.

These divestments provided approximately €45.2 million in capital gains that were recognised within the “Other ordinary income and expenses” line, significantly lifting the operating profit. While these actions improved the balance sheet and provided liquidity for squad reinvestment, they also reduced the group’s long-term revenue diversification by exiting the indoor arena and women’s sports markets.

Operational trends and personnel costs

Despite the record EBITDA, underlying operational pressures remained. Personnel costs rose by 3% to €161.9 million. While the sports division saw a decrease of €3.4 million due to the departure of several high-wage players in the summer of 2023, the administrative division saw an increase of €8.6 million, driven by head-count growth and the commissioning of the LDLC Arena prior to its sale.

Player trading remained a vital revenue source, with the sale of player registrations generating €97.3 million, yielding a capital gain of €75.9 million. Major transfers included Bradley Barcola to Paris Saint-Germain and Castello Lukeba to RB Leipzig. These sales were essential in funding the winter 2024 recruitment drive, which saw the arrival of players like Nemanja Matić and Saïd Benrahma in a bid to avoid relegation after a disastrous start to the season.

Fiscal year 2024/25: Structural crisis and EBITDA collapse

If 2023/24 was a year of artificial growth through divestment, 2024/25 represented a structural “perfect storm.” The group reported an EBITDA of -€47.7 million, a swing of nearly €92 million compared to the prior year. This result coincided with a record net loss of -€201.1 million, bringing the organisation’s financial stability into serious question.

The media rights contraction

The most devastating blow to the 2024/25 accounts was the precipitous decline in media and marketing rights. This revenue stream fell by 52%, from €95.4 million to just €45.7 million. This collapse was systemic; the LFP’s failure to secure a lucrative domestic broadcast deal for the 2024–2029 cycle left clubs facing significantly reduced payouts. With Ligue 1 matches being broadcast via the LFP’s own platform and discounted deals with DAZN, the “LFP-FFF” rights portion for the club shrunk drastically.

Furthermore, the 2024/25 period lacked the non-recurring items that had supported the previous year. The absence of CVC commercial assistance tranches and the one-off brand licensing income from the women’s team sale resulted in a €54 million year-on-year gap in the EBITDA calculation.

Personnel cost escalation and UEFA sanctions

While revenue contracted, expenses surged. Personnel costs reached an all-time high of €177.7 million, a 10% increase. This was the direct result of the summer 2024 transfer window, where the club spent aggressively to strengthen the squad for its return to European competition (the UEFA Europa League). The recruitment of players such as Moussa Niakhaté, Ernest Nuamah (following the exercise of purchase options), and Georges Mikautadze added significant weight to the wage bill.

Operational results were further marred by a €12.5 million charge related to a settlement agreement with UEFA regarding Financial Fair Play (FFP) compliance. Additionally, the “Events” business line saw a 57% decrease in revenue to €18.7 million, reflecting the divestment of the LDLC Arena and a lower volume of major concerts at Groupama Stadium compared to the record-breaking previous summer.

The 2024/25 results highlighted the danger of the group’s aggressive sporting strategy. By prioritising expensive recruitment to ensure Champions League qualification, the group expanded its cost base at exactly the moment its primary revenue stream (media rights) was entering a period of secular decline.

Debt architecture and the role of Ares Capital

The deteriorating EBITDA profile must be viewed in conjunction with the group’s increasingly complex debt structure. Since the takeover, Eagle Football has relied heavily on mezzanine financing from Ares Capital Corporation and its affiliates. By late 2025, the total debt owed to Ares and its syndicate was reported to have reached approximately $1.2 billion, up from an original principal of roughly $547 million.

The PIK interest mechanism

A critical component of this debt is the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) interest structure. Under this arrangement, rather than paying interest in cash, the interest amount is added to the principal balance of the loans. This mechanism protected the group’s near-term cash flow during the acquisition phase but ensured that the debt burden would outpace operational revenues. With interest rates reported at tiers of 16%, 18%, and up to 19.4%, the compounding effect has been profound.

By the 2024/25 fiscal year, the group’s interest coverage ratio, the ability to pay interest from EBITDA, was well below 1.0, signaling structural insolvency. This lack of coverage meant that the group was effectively relying on further borrowing or asset sales just to maintain its debt obligations. The collateral for these loans is Bidco’s 87.78% stake in Eagle Football Group, placing the very ownership of the club at risk in the event of a default.

Inter-company receivables and cash pooling

To manage liquidity across John Textor’s multi-club empire, Eagle Football Holdings implemented a centralised cash management system. Bidco granted a first-ranking pledge over inter-company receivables, including shareholder loans to Eagle Football Group and receivables under a cash pooling agreement with Olympique Lyonnais. This allows for the movement of capital from the more cash-generative French club to support other entities like Botafogo or RWD Molenbeek, further complicating the standalone financial health of the Lyon-based group.

H1 2025/26: Administration and postponement of results

The financial trajectory reached a breaking point on March 27, 2026, when administrators from Cork Gully were appointed by the London High Court for Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited, the parent entity of the group. This appointment followed a series of defaults that reportedly began in October 2025.

Consequently, the publication of the audited half-year financial statements as of December 31, 2025, has been postponed. However, preliminary activity reports for the first half of 2025/26 provide a snapshot of the continuing struggle to generate positive EBITDA. Total operating revenue for the half-year stood at €121.3 million, a 3% increase over the same period in the previous year.

Preliminary H1 2025/26 performance

The H1 data shows that while ticketing performed well (driven by participation in the Europa League group stage), the decline in Ligue 1 TV rights continued to erode core income, falling 44% to just €6.4 million for the half-year. The sharp drop in “Events” revenue (-67%) is particularly notable, as the prior year’s first half had been bolstered by 11 football matches for the Paris 2024 Olympics and a UEFA Nations League match.

The group’s reliance on player trading reached a new intensity in H1 2025/26, with sales generating €45.3 million compared to €34.7 million in the prior year’s first half. Key moves included the sale of Georges Mikautadze to Villarreal for €22.2 million and Lucas Perri to Leeds for €12.9 million. Despite these sales, the appointment of administrators confirms that the cash generated was insufficient to meet the demands of the Ares-led debt structure.

Comparative sector analysis and bench-marking

When evaluated against its peers in European football and the broader recreational services sector, Eagle Football Group’s EBITDA performance highlights a unique level of volatility and risk.

Bench-marking against European peers

• Borussia Dortmund: In contrast to Lyon’s negative EBITDA in multiple years, Dortmund has maintained a significantly more stable profile, with EBITDA margins often exceeding 20% due to a more conservative wage-to-revenue ratio and a stable domestic media rights market in Germany.
• AC Milan: The Italian club serves as a successful example of the financial re-engineering Eagle Football attempted. Under Elliott and later RedBird, Milan saw its revenue grow from €164 million to €411 million while keeping wage growth modest, resulting in a positive EBITDA of €29.3 million in 2021/22 and consistent profitability since.
• Ajax NV: While Ajax also relies heavily on a trading model, its EBITDA of -€16.8 million in 2025 (bench-marked) shows that the volatility of player sales and European qualification is a widespread challenge, though Lyon’s -€47.7 million figure remains an outlier in its magnitude.

The group’s EV/EBITDA ratio has fluctuated wildly, reaching a low of -12.6x in 2022 and averaging -9.0x over the 2021–2025 period. These negative multiples reflect the fact that the group’s enterprise value is anchored by its tangible assets (the stadium) and the market value of its player registrations rather than its current earnings power.

Operational components of EBITDA: 

To understand the 2021–2026 EBITDA trajectory, one must examine the fundamental components of the OL business model and how they have been stressed by the shift in ownership and market conditions.

The trading model and player amortisation

In the football industry, EBITDA is uniquely sensitive to the timing of player transfers. Gains on the sale of registrations are included in revenue, but the cost of those players is recognised through amortisation over the life of their contracts, which sits below the EBITDA line. This means a club can report a healthy EBITDA while suffering massive net losses.

In 2024/25, the group’s EBITDA of -€47.7 million already accounted for €71.2 million in trading gains. However, the operating result was much worse -€150.7 million, largely because player amortisation surged by €40 million to €91.1 million. This shows that the group’s summer 2024 spending spree created a long-term amortisation tail that will depress earnings for years to come, regardless of whether the players are sold or retained.

The infrastructure strategy: Stadium and LDLC Arena

The Groupama Stadium remains the group’s most resilient asset. Even in 2024/25, ticketing revenue grew by 26% to €42.8 million, demonstrating the sustained loyalty of the fan base despite the broader financial turmoil. The stadium also serves as the primary collateral for much of the group’s senior debt.

However, the 2024 disposal of the LDLC Arena was a defensive move that sacrificed the group’s most promising area of diversification. The arena, which opened in November 2023, was designed to host 100-120 events per year, providing non-cyclical revenue uncorrelated with football results. By selling it to Holnest for €160 million, Eagle Football Group essentially liquidated a high-growth asset to pay down high-interest debt, a move that improved the 2023/24 EBITDA but permanently lowered the group’s revenue ceiling.

Conclusion and strategic outlook

The analysis of Eagle Football Group’s EBITDA since 2021 reveals an organisation in the midst of a structural crisis that has been exacerbated by a transition in ownership and unfavorable macroeconomic shifts. The trajectory from a pandemic-stricken -€33.9 million in 2021 to a record -€47.7 million in 2025—punctuated by a mirage-like peak of €44.2 million in 2024, illustrates the failure of the group’s current model to achieve operational sustainability.

The primary takeaway for professional peers is that Eagle Football Group has become a pure-play on player trading and stadium attendance, having stripped away its diversification into women’s sports, US franchises, and multi-purpose arenas to service a high-interest debt facility from Ares Capital. With media rights in France facing a prolonged period of stagnation and personnel costs remaining stubbornly high due to previous recruitment commitments, the path back to a positive and sustainable EBITDA appears increasingly narrow.

The appointment of administrators in March 2026 for the parent entity Bidco suggests that the next phase of the group’s evolution will involve a significant restructuring of its liabilities, including the sale of the club to a more conservatively capitalised owner or a debt-for-equity swap with its mezzanine lenders. Until such a restructuring occurs, Eagle Football Group remains a cautionary tale of the risks inherent in leveraged multi-club ownership models within the fragile economic ecosystem of French professional football.