With the publication of the Everton Stadium Development Company Accounts 2024/25, it is possible to complete the analysis of the fiscal year ending 30 June 2025.

Everton Stadium Development Company Accounts 202425

The fiscal year ending 30 June 2025 was the most consequential in the financial history of Everton Football Club and its infrastructure vehicle, Everton Stadium Development Limited (ESDL). 

For the first time in nearly a decade, the club transitioned from a state of chronic deficit and capital fragility to a position of re-capitalised stability. This transition was facilitated by the acquisition of the club by The Friedkin Group through its strategic vehicle, Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited, on 18 December 2024. The acquisition marked the end of the Farhad Moshiri era, a period characterised by significant personal investment exceeding £750 million, which was ultimately undermined by poor capital allocation, appalling resource management,  predatory high-interest borrowing, and the catastrophic impact of geopolitical sanctions.

Prior to the Friedkin takeover, the club had been ensnared in a precarious liquidity trap, exacerbated by the eventual collapse of a protracted but always impossible to complete takeover bid by 777 Partners. During this interregnum, the club was forced to rely on working capital loans from 777 Partners and other distressed lenders at interest rates approaching 15% to 20%. Analysis of the 2024/25 accounts reveals a comprehensive rescue operation that moved the club from this distressed shareholder-led financing model to a more sustainable, institutional debt model. 

This report evaluates the mechanisms of this balance sheet repair, the nuances of the profit and loss accounts, the reclassification of liabilities, and the long-term debt strategy centered on the Hill Dickinson Stadium.

Analysis of the Profit and Loss Account

The consolidated Profit and Loss account for the 2024/25 period documents a year of stabilisation and the recording of a club-record turnover. Turnover reached £196.7 million, an increase of £9.8 million over the previous year. While the statutory loss was reduced from £53.2 million in 2023/24 to just £8.6 million in 2024/25, a  dissection of these figures reveals that this improvement was heavily supported by non-recurring, internal asset disposals and a significant reduction in player-related costs.

Revenue streams and commercial resilience

The growth in turnover to £196.7 million signifies commercial resilience during the club’s final season at Goodison Park. Commercial revenue rose to £24.3 million, a £2.7 million increase, driven by new partnerships with global brands such as Red Bull, Nemiroff, and Corpay. Additionally, Other Commercial Revenue experienced a surge of £5.9 million to reach £22.9 million. This increase is primarily attributable to the successful monetisation of the “Everton Way” stones at the new stadium site and the sale of commemorative Goodison Park items to the fan-base.

Broadcast revenue remained the club’s primary revenue anchor at £129.2 million. However, the underlying composition of this revenue shifted significantly. While merit payments improved due to a 13th-place finish in the Premier League, generating £12.9 million compared to £10.1 million in the prior season, these gains were offset by a sharp decline in facility fees. The club was selected for live domestic broadcast only 16 times in the 2024/25 season, a substantial reduction from the 23 selections in 2023/24, which resulted in facility fee income falling from £20.1 million to £13.6 million.

Matchday revenue also reached a historic high of £20.3 million, reflecting continued strong attendances for the final season at Goodison Park. This equates to approximately 10.3% of total turnover, a figure that the club expects to increase significantly following the transition to the Hill Dickinson Stadium, which offers a 52,888 capacity and enhanced hospitality yields.

Operating expenses 

The most critical improvement in the P&L is the reduction in staff costs, which fell from £156.6 million to £152.1 million. This reduction was driven by the club’s strategic decision to cycle out high-earning, veteran players in favour of a younger, more cost-efficient recruitment profile. When combined with the record turnover, the wage-to-turnover ratio improved from 81% in 2023/24 to 74% in 2024/25. This ratio is now more aligned with sustainable Premier League models and facilitates compliance with the league’s evolving Squad Cost Ratio frameworks.

However, it is vital to note that even with these improvements, the club’s total staff costs of £203 million (including pension and social security) still exceeded total revenue, leading to an underlying operating loss. Operating expenses (excluding player trading and exceptional items) increased to £210.5 million, reflecting rising costs associated with utilities, maintenance, and the doubling of stadium-related operating expenses as the move to Bramley-Moore Dock neared.

Strategic internal asset sales and accounting gains

The most controversial  feature of the 2024/25 accounts is the £49.2 million profit recognised from the sale of Everton Football Club Women Limited and Goodison Park Stadium Limited to the ultimate parent company, Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited. These transactions occurred on 27 June 2025, just before the reporting deadline, and were designed specifically to manage the club’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) position.

Without this £49.2 million gain, the club’s underlying loss for the year would have been approximately £58 million. While this maneuver follows a precedent set by other Premier League clubs, its use highlights the ongoing tension between operational profitability and regulatory compliance. For the board, the inclusion of these gains suggests a successful navigation of PSR thresholds, provided that the league deems these internal “fair market value” transactions allowable.

Comprehensive Balance Sheet analysis and equity repair

The 30 June 2025 balance sheet reveals the most dramatic transformation of Everton’s capital structure in the modern era. The previous year’s accounts exhibited a business with severe net liability concerns and a terminal reliance on distressed debt. The 2024/25 accounts document the eradication of this structural debt and the subsequent re-capitalisation of the entity.

The Mechanism of Re-capitalisation

The Shareholders’ Funds increased from £168.5 million to £393.3 million during the reporting period. This massive increase was the result of three principal transactions occurring in the wake of the Friedkin acquisition:

1. Moshiri debt conversion: Farhad Moshiri’s vehicle, Bluesky Capital Limited, converted £450.75 million of interest-free shareholder loans into 150,250 new ordinary shares. This conversion was executed at a rate of £3,000 per share, effectively wiping nearly half a billion pounds of debt from the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
2. Roundhouse Capital equity injection: Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited subscribed to a further 1,336,537 new ordinary shares at a price of £174.66 per share. This injection provided £233.44 million in fresh capital, which was immediately deployed to satisfy working capital needs and repay third-party lenders such as Rights and Media Funding and 777/A-Cap.
3. Capital reduction and cleansing: The club utilised its Share Premium account, which surged to £1,004 million, to offset a massive accumulated profit and loss deficit of £650.2 million. This accounting “cleansing” of the balance sheet is a critical legal prerequisite that allows the club to pay future dividends once operational profitability is achieved.

Tangible fixed assets and infrastructure valuation

The valuation of Tangible Fixed Assets rose significantly to £815.0 million in the consolidated accounts, driven almost entirely by the “Asset Under Construction” category, representing the Hill Dickinson Stadium. In the subsidiary accounts of ESDL, tangible assets are recorded at £851.2 million. This figure includes the cumulative cost of construction, land acquisition, and capitalised borrowing costs directly related to the project.

The club follows a critical accounting policy (Note 1f) that allows for the capitalisation of interest on loans specifically used to fund the stadium development. In the 2024/25 period, ESDL capitalised £39.28 million in borrowing costs, while the consolidated group capitalised £32.3 million. This accounting treatment prevents massive interest payments from depressing the P&L until the stadium becomes operational and depreciation commences. Following the safety certification on 21 August 2025, this capitalisation ceased, and the asset began its estimated 40-year useful life.

Current liabilities and the liquidity shift

The club’s liquidity position underwent a dramatic shift. ESDL’s net current liabilities fell from £779.9 million to £180.7 million. This improvement was facilitated by the repayment of the £200 million bridge facility (Blythe Capital) and the reclassification of inter-company balances. In the consolidated group, total borrowings fell from £593.8 million in 2024 to £468.5 million in 2025. Most importantly, the profile of the debt shifted from short-term liabilities (due within one year) to long-term institutional debt (due after five years).

Analysis of the Cash Flow statement and capital allocation

The 2024/25 Consolidated Cash Flow Statement provides a granular view of how the club navigated the transition from the Moshiri owner-funding model to the Friedkin re-capitalisation model.

Operating cash flows

Net cash generated from operations was £2.5 million, a recovery from the £3.1 million net usage in the previous season. This improvement was driven by the reduction in operational losses and the timing of working capital movements. Operating cash flows before movements in working capital reached £26.0 million, compared to a negative £24.6 million in the prior year. This suggests that the core business is moving toward cash-flow neutrality, although it remains sensitive to the timing of broadcasting and sponsorship receipts.

Investment activities and stadium expenditure

Cash used in investing activities totaled £37.2 million, a massive reduction from the £227.3 million utilised in 2023/24. This reflects the slowing rate of capital expenditure as the Hill Dickinson Stadium neared completion. Total cumulative spend on the stadium project reached £813 million by mid-2025. Player trading activities resulted in a net cash inflow, as the club prioritised sales (Onana, Iwobi) over major acquisitions to maintain PSR compliance.

Financing activities and debt servicing

Financing activities were dominated by the restructuring of the club’s debt. New gross loans of £480 million were offset by the repayment of existing borrowings totaling £385.6 million. This included the satisfaction of high-interest loans from Rights and Media Funding and the settlement of the 777/A-Cap debt. Total interest paid during the year was £24.4 million, a figure that is expected to stabilise as the club benefits from the lower rates associated with its new long-term institutional debt.

Analysis of long-term debt and institutional refinancing

The centrepiece of the Friedkin Group’s balance sheet repair was the comprehensive refinancing of the club’s debt, moving away from payday style, expensive arrangements toward long-term, institutional stability.

JPMorgan Chase Private Placement

On 20 February 2025, ESDL secured a £350 million long-term private-placement funding package arranged by JPMorgan Chase. This facility is co-issued by ESDL and Everton Stadium Development Holding Company Limited and was placed with a consortium of blue-chip institutional lenders.

The terms of this debt are vastly superior to the previous arrangements:

• Maturity: The debt is repayable over 30 years, with the final payment due on 30 June 2055. This aligns the debt repayment schedule with the 40-year useful life of the stadium asset.
• Interest Rates: The interest payments on this facility are reported to be more than halved compared to the 15-20% rates seen under the previous Moshiri/777 era. This transition will save the club tens of millions of pounds in debt servicing costs annually.
• Security: The notes are senior secured notes, secured against the assets of the stadium itself. This structure is a standard “StadCo” model, isolating the stadium debt from the operational risks of the football club.

Revolving credit facility (RCF)

In addition to the long-term notes, the club established a five-year revolving credit facility with JPMorgan Chase to manage working capital. As of 30 June 2025, the club recognised £127.6 million under this facility, categorised as debt payable within one year. This provides the club with the necessary liquidity to navigate the seasonal cash flow fluctuations inherent in professional football.

Interest capitalisation and financial projections

The club’s ability to capitalise interest during the construction phase was a vital accounting tool that prevented the P&L from collapsing under the weight of development debt. In the ESDL accounts, the total borrowing costs capitalised to date represent a significant portion of the asset’s £851 million book value. Moving forward, these interest payments will no longer be capitalised and must be serviced from the club’s operating cash flows, making the revenue uplift from the new stadium essential.

Stadium development, commercialisation, and revenue uplift

The Hill Dickinson Stadium is the primary economic engine for Everton’s future. The project reached structural completion in February 2024 and was handed over to the club in December 2024.

The Hill Dickinson naming rights deal

In May 2025, the club announced a landmark 10-year naming rights agreement with Hill Dickinson, a Liverpool-headquartered international law firm. The deal is reportedly worth £10 million per year, providing a total of £100 million in guaranteed commercial revenue. (Whilst reports suggest £10m per annum, my own assessment is lower than that)

This deal is ally significant for three reasons:

1. Reputational repair: After the collapse of the USM partnership due to sanctions, securing a 215-year-old local partner with global reach restores commercial credibility.
2. European benchmark: The deal is described as one of the largest stadium naming rights agreements in Europe, placing Everton in the top tier of commercial earners alongside Arsenal and Manchester City.
3. Community integration: The partnership includes support for “Everton in the Community,” reinforcing the stadium’s status as a civic asset for the regeneration of Liverpool’s waterfront.

Anticipated matchday revenue

The move to the new stadium is projected to increase matchday revenue by £10 million to £20 million annually. This increase is driven by the 52,888 capacity, a significant jump from the 39,572 capacity of Goodison Park, and a dramatic improvement in hospitality yields. The club has also secured culinary partners such as Aramark and technology suppliers like HPE Aruba to enhance the fan experience and maximise spend-per-head. Early in the stadium’s life operational difficulties and the F&B product on offer still present issues, that require additional management intervention and changes

Beyond football, the stadium is designed as a multi-purpose venue capable of hosting concerts, rugby league (the 2025 Ashes), and potentially NFL games. Ownership anticipates that the stadium will generate £1.3 billion in economic value for the local economy, and its inclusion as a host venue for UEFA Euro 2028 further cements its status as a premier European infrastructure asset.

Post-balance sheet events and strategic outlook

Several key developments occurred after the 30 June 2025 reporting date that significantly impact the club’s financial and operational outlook.

The stadium received its official safety certificate on 21 August 2025. This followed three successful test events: a youth game against Wigan Athletic (10,000 fans), an U21 fixture (25,000 fans), and a near-capacity friendly. The first competitive Premier League fixture was held on 24 August 2025 against Brighton, marking the end of the 133-year residency at Goodison Park.

Pursuit Sports and multi-club ownership

In July 2025, the Friedkin Group launched Pursuit Sports, a dedicated multi-club management vehicle led by CEO Dave Beeston. Pursuit Sports is intended to provide strategic, data-driven support across the group’s football properties, including Everton and AS Roma. While the clubs maintain individual identities, this model facilitates shared efficiencies in player recruitment, commercial strategy, and performance analytics.

Commitment to the living pension

In August 2025, Everton became the first Premier League club to commit to a living pension for all staff. This initiative, while increasing the long-term cost base, aligns with the club’s ESG objectives and strengthens its People’s Club identity under the new American ownership.

Analysis of external and owner factors

The financial trajectory of Everton has been uniquely shaped by owner-specific factors and external geopolitical shocks.

Farhad Moshiri’s disastrous tenure was characterised by a transition from interest-free owner funding to a reliance on high-interest third-party debt- a function of appalling governance as much as geo-political events. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a black swan event that triggered sanctions against Alisher Usmanov and USM Holdings, Everton’s primary commercial partner. This created a funding void that forced the club into the hands of bridge lenders at predatory rates, leading to two separate PSR breaches and eight points deducted.

The 777 Partners and A-Cap liquidity trap

The club’s near-collapse during the 2023/24 season was exacerbated by the failed takeover attempt by 777 Partners. The inter-dependency between 777 Partners and the club led to a liquidity trap, where the club was unable to secure permanent financing while the takeover was pending. The eventual failure of 777 Partners amid fraud allegations necessitated the intervention of the Friedkin Group to prevent administration.

Friedkin strategic vision

Dan Friedkin’s stewardship represents a shift toward competence, innovation, and teamwork. The acquisition vehicle, Roundhouse Capital Holdings, was structured to ring-fence risk and integrate Everton into a broader sports portfolio. The move to hire David Moyes to ensure Premier League safety, combined with the strategic moneyball recruitment approach, suggests a long-term focus on sustainable growth rather than the volatile spending of the previous era.

The  analysis of the 2024/25 accounts for Everton Football Club and Everton Stadium Development Limited confirms that the club has successfully executed a seismic shift from financial instability to institutional re-capitalisation. The conversion of nearly half a billion pounds of shareholder debt into equity and the injection of fresh capital by the Friedkin Group have repaired the balance sheet and placed the club on its firmest footing in a decade.

However, the board must remain cognisant of the following strategic imperatives:

1. Operational profitability: The reliance on internal asset sales for PSR compliance is a one-off mechanism. Sustainable on-pitch success now requires the club to maximise the commercial and matchday revenue uplift of the Hill Dickinson Stadium to achieve true cash-flow neutrality.
2. Debt servicing: While the JPMorgan private placement offers low interest rates, the 30-year maturity requires a consistent revenue stream. The board must ensure that non-footballing events at the stadium are maximised to supplement broadcasting and matchday income.
3. Regulatory compliance: As the Premier League moves toward the new Squad Cost Ratio and SSR frameworks, the board must continue the wage-bill efficiency seen in 2024/25 to avoid further sanctions.
4. Stewardship and ESG: The commitments to the living pension and the Hill Dickinson community programs are vital for the club’s brand identity and civic standing, which in turn drive long-term commercial value.

In summary, the 2024/25 period documents a successful “rescue operation of high-stakes financial engineering”. The club has emerged from a period of terminal decline with a world-class stadium, a stable capital structure, and a clear strategic path toward long-term growth in the Premier League.

Detailed Appendix: 

The History of the Stadium Project 

The development of the Hill Dickinson Stadium (formerly Bramley-Moore Dock) has been a multi-decade saga. To understand the current asset valuation of £851 million, one must look at the accounting judgments made since 2020. Prior to 30 June 2020, all expenditure on the stadium project was expensed through the Profit and Loss account. This was because, despite the club’s confidence, there was insufficient accounting certainty under FRS 102 that the future economic benefits would flow to the entity.

At the end of the 2020 reporting period, the board determined that the project had reached a level of certainty, bolstered by the unanimous planning approval from Liverpool City Council in February 2021, to justify capitalising all subsequent project spend. This shift is the mechanism behind the massive growth in tangible fixed assets seen in the current balance sheet. Analysis shows that this decision was pivotal; had the project remained expensed, the club would have breached PSR thresholds by hundreds of millions of pounds.

 Breakdown of FRS 102 Section 1A Applications

Everton Stadium Development Limited qualifies as a small entity under Section 1A of FRS 102, allowing for certain disclosure exemptions. However, the club has opted to provide additional transparency to ensure a true and fair view for its institutional lenders.

• Note 2.1: Basis of preparation: The financial statements are prepared under the historical cost convention. The functional currency is pounds sterling, reflecting the primary economic environment.
• Note 2.2: Going concern: The directors have received a letter of support from Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited, confirming financial support for at least 12 months from the date of signing (24 December 2025). This is the legal “guarantee” that prevents the club from being forced into administration despite its net current liability position.
• Note 2.5: Tangible fixed assets: Assets are recognised at cost less depreciation. Importantly, depreciation on the stadium only began after 30 June 2025, which explains why the 2024/25 accounts show the asset at its undepreciated cost of construction.

The  significance of the Hill Dickinson deal structure

The naming rights deal with Hill Dickinson is not merely a branding exercise; it is a B2B strategic partnership. Hill Dickinson, which reported an operating profit of £57 million in 2024, utilised this deal to launch a global re-branding initiative. For Everton, the reported £10 million annual fee is a clean revenue stream, unlike the USM deal which was entangled with the owner’s personal associations.

 The deal length, 10 years, indicates a desire for valuation compounding. By naming the stadium Hill Dickinson from the very first matchday, the club ensures that the corporate identity is woven into the fan experience immediately, reducing the shock to the system of future renames and increasing the long-term value of the asset.

External factor analysis:

The transformation of Bramley-Moore Dock from an abandoned wasteland to a Premier League stadium is an incredible engineering feat.  Reports indicate that the site contained 12 unexploded anti-aircraft shells from World War II at the bottom of the dock when Everton took possession. This symbolises the unexploded financial shells that the Friedkin Group had to defuse post-acquisition:

• The 777 Partners debt: Repaid at a discount through the equity injection, removing a predatory lender from the capital structure.
• The PSR point deductions: Managed through cost efficiency and the internal sale of the women’s team.
• The Usmanov sanctions: Resolved through the termination of Russian partnerships and the securing of blue-chip institutional debt and local naming rights.

Final financial verdict

The 2024/25 accounts for Everton Stadium Development Limited and the consolidated group represent a watershed moment. The  analysis demonstrates that while the club faced near-terminal decline under the weight of high-interest debt and regulatory pressure, the intervention of the Friedkin Group has successfully re-capitalised and repaired the balance sheet. 

With the Hill Dickinson Stadium now operational and the debt structure stabilised over a 30-year horizon, the club is positioned for a period of sustainable growth, provided that the operational board maintains the fiscal discipline established in the final half of the 2024/25 season.