I want to look at a series of ownership and funding structures across modern football, often including  all of or a combination of private credit, private equity, insurance company funding.

I’m going to start with the one that impacted Everton most of all. I have written extensively on the topic, much of which is extremely lengthy and for many lost in the mists of time.

For those so inclined, the full tale as reported on this website can be found here

In the meantime, here’s a summary – it’s important for this is but a chapter in an unresolved and potentially still damaging period of football financing in which those offering funding were streets ahead of the regulators understanding of what was on offer……

777 Partners, A-CAP & related entities

A granular examination of the entities, individuals, legal proceedings, and fraudulent structures behind one of the most complex private equity collapses in recent American financial history, and its far-reaching consequences across five continents.

777 Partners LLC, Corporate structure & collapse

Founded in Miami in 2015, 777 Partners positioned itself as a multi-sector alternative investment firm. Its true model, funding speculative acquisitions with insurance policyholder premiums channeled through offshore reinsurance, was concealed behind a web of interrelated entities and fabricated financial documents.

777 Partners LLC was founded by Josh Wander and Steven Pasko, operating from Miami’s Brickell Avenue financial district. The firm described itself as specialising in specialty finance, insurance, and sports investment. In practice, it operated as a holding company for an expanding portfolio of assets funded not by conventional private equity capital raises but by a pipeline of insurance float, policyholder premiums held by A-CAP-affiliated insurers, channeled through a Bermuda-based offshore reinsurance vehicle, 777re.

The structure, described unimaginatively by investigators as the “Bermuda Triangle”, worked as follows: A-CAP’s US insurance subsidiaries ceded at least $2.4 billion in policyholder cash to 777re in Bermuda. 777re then deployed this capital into 777 Partners’ portfolio of investments, including football clubs, airlines, legal settlements, and structured finance assets. Regulatory oversight of the reinsurance layer was minimal compared to that of the originating US insurers, creating a near-invisible conduit for deploying what was, in effect, ringf enced policyholder money into illiquid, speculative investments.

⚠  The Bermuda Triangle Strategy

US insurer premiums → A-CAP subsidiaries → 777re Bermuda (ceded via reinsurance) → 777 Partners LLC investment vehicles → football clubs, airlines, structured settlements. When 777re’s licence was revoked by the Bermuda Monetary Authority in Q4 2023, the entire structure began to implode.

In May 2024, Wander and Pasko were removed from the board of the football division and subsequently resigned as managing partners. B. Riley Financial was brought in to manage an operational restructuring. In August 2025, a Delaware judge placed 777 Partners into limited receivership over unpaid legal bills of nearly $600,000 owed to former CFO Damien Alfalla. On 9 October 2024, 777 Partners had entered bankruptcy proceedings in the United Kingdom.

The $300 Million Credit Facility Overdraw

At the heart of the SEC’s civil case is the allegation that Wander and Alfalla misused a key credit facility, resulting in a $300 million overdraw. This overdraw was concealed from investors through falsified compliance reports and financial statements. Investors who had been told the companies were profitable enough to pay a 10% annual dividend were, in reality, holding equity in entities in a severe and worsening liquidity crisis.

Entity Map: Subsidiaries & related parties

777 Partners operated through a web of interrelated LLCs. The complexity was not accidental, it was a structural feature that obscured collateral pledging, concealed liabilities, and impeded creditor recovery efforts.

Football Club Portfolio 

777 Partners’ multi-club ownership strategy spanned five countries. Not a single club prospered under 777’s ownership. All suffered financial stress, transfer bans, unpaid debts, or fan protests. Following the A-CAP takeover in July 2024, the clubs were placed on the market or passed to new owners in distressed circumstances.

A-CAP: Advantage Capital Holdings

The role of A-CAP and its CEO Kenneth King is perhaps the most complex dimension of the entire 777 saga. A-CAP portrays itself as a senior secured creditor, i.e. a victim. Leadenhall’s legal teams, the SEC complaint, and investigative reporting paint a far more troubling picture.

A-CAP is a New York-based insurance holding company that owns five US life and annuity insurers. According to the Leadenhall complaint, A-CAP provided “the financial firepower to fuel 777 Partners’ deal making” ceding at least $2.4 billion in policyholder funds to the 777re offshore vehicle. A-CAP and Kenneth King are named defendants in Leadenhall’s fraud action alongside Wander and Pasko.

From April 2023 onwards, when the Department of Justice states the scheme had already begun to unravel, A-CAP executives including King physically moved into 777’s Miami offices to oversee operations. An A-CAP “steering committee” became directly involved in investment decisions, cost control, payment of expenses, and vendor payments, with King often having final approval. This is not the behaviour of a passive arm’s-length creditor.

“The scheme would not have been possible, and would not have been able to operate undetected for so long, without A-Cap. While claiming to be nothing more than a ‘senior’ lender, A-Cap has not acted like one.”

— Leadenhall Capital Partners amended complaint, August 2024

Regulatory actions against A-CAP insurers

Utah and South Carolina regulators initiated severe actions against A-CAP-affiliated insurers in late 2024/early 2025. Utah’s Insurance Commissioner described a “years-long history of self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and obfuscation” by Kenneth King. Utah regulators sought rehabilitation of Sentinel Security Life, Haymarket Re, and Jazz Re after finding that over $2.1 billion,  approximately 26% of the Utah insurers’ admitted assets, had been invested in 777-affiliated investments with “virtually no return.” The case was settled out of court on undisclosed terms. AM Best downgraded A-CAP’s insurer ratings from B++ to B (Fair).

Oaktree takes control of Atlantic Coast Life (March 2026)

Oaktree Capital Management signed an agreement to acquire Atlantic Coast Life Insurance Company, A-CAP’s South Carolina subsidiary, following its designation as having a “hazardous financial condition.” The deal effectively removes one of A-CAP’s key insurance subsidiaries from King’s control. A-CAP as a holding company and Kenneth King personally remain subjects of ongoing civil litigation.

⚠  Kenneth King, Unresolved questions

King is a named defendant in the Leadenhall civil action. Utah regulators allege he and A-CAP employees ‘directly and improperly benefited’ from 777 investments via management fees, a Miami condo, mortgage loans, and direct compensation. The DOJ complaint against Wander notes ‘others known and unknown’ conspired together, leaving open the question of further indictments. King has not been criminally charged as of May 2026.

The Leadenhall Case

The Leadenhall Capital Partners lawsuit was the first major public disclosure of the alleged fraud at 777 Partners. It remains one of the most complex and multi-directional pieces of federal litigation in the US, having spawned at least five separate but interrelated legal proceedings.

Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP is a London-headquartered specialist insurance-linked securities (ILS) investment manager, founded in 2008. It is a joint venture connected to Japan’s MS&AD insurance group, with regulatory registrations in the UK, US, and Bermuda. Leadenhall manages approximately $6 billion in assets. Through its Life Insurance Linked Investments Fund, it entered into a secured credit facility agreement with 777 Partners entities.

The borrowers were meant to have pledged portfolios of structured settlement payments and medical receivables, held through the Signal and SuttonPark entities, as collateral, “free and clear” of any other security interest. 

Leadenhall alleges this representation was false: the same assets had been pledged to A-CAP as a senior secured lender and, in some cases, the assets either did not exist or were not owned by the pledging entities at all. Court documents allege that Wander-affiliated borrowers submitted forged financial statements to prevent Leadenhall from confirming double-pledging.

⚠  Core Leadenhall Claim

Leadenhall asserts 777 Partners and its entities owe $350 million for collateralised notes. After accelerating the debt and obtaining restraining orders, Leadenhall sought a worldwide asset freeze on more than $600 million total exposure. Courts in New York initially granted the asset freeze.

Chronological development of the litigation

May 2024  Leadenhall files federal lawsuit (1:24-cv-03453, S.D.N.Y.) against 777 Partners, Josh Wander, Steven Pasko, Kenneth King, A-CAP, and related entities. Court grants temporary restraining order. Complaint amended August 2024 to focus on A-CAP as co-conspirator.

July 2024  A-CAP and Haymarket Insurance seek to intervene, asserting senior creditor status over the same collateral Leadenhall claims to hold.

Mid 2024  777 Partners counter-sues Leadenhall in S.D. Florida (computer fraud/theft), accusing a former CTO of breaking into the Florida office to gather evidence.

Jan 16, 2025  Original Leadenhall case (1:24-cv-03453) terminated, folded into related proceedings. Broader litigation continues.

Oct 2025  DOJ indictment unsealed. Leadenhall CEO confirms the DOJ complaint’s ‘Lender A’ is Leadenhall,  the primary defrauded party in the criminal schema.

Dec 2025  Haymarket Insurance (A-CAP unit) files counter-suit against Leadenhall (1:25-cv-10687, S.D.N.Y.), accusing Leadenhall Chairman John Wells of mismanaging investor capital. Seeks $75M+. Complaint also alleges Leadenhall ran a ‘public pressure campaign’ using football blog Josimar. (completely unsubstantiated)

Early 2026  Leadenhall acquires collateral assets for $3 in a foreclosure process, having previously valued those same assets at over $180 million. A-CAP files contempt motion alleging sale violated court orders.

Mar 23, 2026  CRITICAL: Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturns the $609M asset freeze on guarantors. Circuit Judge Myrna Pérez holds Leadenhall had no lien on guarantors’ assets. Major setback for Leadenhall’s recovery position.

May 2026  Discovery battles continue. RICO claims against A-CAP remain live. Haymarket counter-suit active. Wander criminal trial pending.

⚠  Litigation Status,  May 2026

At least four active proceedings: (1) Primary fraud/RICO civil case against 777, Wander, Pasko, and A-CAP in S.D.N.Y.; (2) Haymarket counter-suit against Leadenhall (1:25-cv-10687); (3) A-CAP contempt motion over foreclosure; (4) 777 computer fraud counter-suit in S.D. Florida. The Second Circuit’s March 2026 ruling is a significant win for A-CAP and a material setback for Leadenhall.

Key individuals, current status

The criminal and civil proceedings have fundamentally different implications for each principal actor. Wander alone has been criminally indicted; Pasko faces civil SEC charges; Alfalla has pleaded guilty and is cooperating. The divergence creates maximum evidentiary pressure on all remaining defendants.

Systemic conclusions & wider implications

The 777 Partners case is not merely a story of individual fraud. It is a structural indictment of the insurance-linked private equity model that emerged aggressively in the post-2008 regulatory environment. The same loosening of banking restrictions that gave rise to the MFS collapse in the UK also created the conditions in which firms like 777 could access billions of dollars of policyholder funds,  capital held in trust for insurance policyholders and deploy it into highly speculative, illiquid assets with no meaningful independent oversight.

The multi-entity, multi-jurisdictional structure was not incidental, it was the mechanism of the fraud. Each layer of complexity, Bermuda reinsurance, Delaware LLCs, Cayman SPVs, London operating subsidiaries, added opacity and made independent verification harder. The parallel with MFS is instructive: in both cases, sophisticated institutional investors failed to detect that the same collateral was being pledged multiple times. In both cases, a credible external presentation masked a deeply compromised underlying financial reality.

“777 managed to con people because they were effectively robbing Peter to pay Paul, moving assets around the group and shifting balances, giving the impression they had more cash than they actually had.”

 Kieran Maguire, University of Liverpool February 2026

For football governance, the 777 case has accelerated the passage of the UK Football Governance Act 2025 and the establishment of the Independent Football Regulator (IFR). The Acquisition Leverage Test and fit-and-proper ownership assessments are a direct response to the model that allowed 777 to hold seven football clubs across five countries while the entire structure was funded by misappropriated insurance policyholder capital.

For US insurance regulation, the 777/A-CAP case should prompt a fundamental reassessment of the reinsurance cession model by which private equity-affiliated holding companies can deploy insurance float into affiliated investment vehicles with limited regulatory visibility. The Utah and South Carolina regulatory actions demonstrate that the current framework, while capable of identifying problems, is too slow and too easily obstructed to prevent damage at the scale seen here.

The criminal trial of Josh Wander, the SEC civil case, and the ongoing Leadenhall litigation will collectively constitute one of the most significant financial fraud proceedings of the mid-2020s. With Damien Alfalla cooperating, the prosecution’s case will be substantially documentary, built on internal emails, compliance reports, and financial statements that Alfalla helped create and Wander allegedly directed him to falsify. Whether further indictments follow, against Pasko, King, or others described as ‘known and unknown’ co-conspirators, remains the central unanswered question of this unfolding saga.