Paul Quinn – CWTE Limited

2 August 2026

Event date:  Statements issued Saturday 1 August 2026 (Sky Sports)

The transaction  is provisional, being subject to a two-round pre-emption (right of first refusal) process, EFL Owners’ and Directors’ Test approval, and IFR notification obligations

TL;DR

Key points

1. The deal displaces the June EP agreement. Gold explicitly confirms the 12 June Křetínský deal and “other alternatives” “could not be brought to fruition.”
2. Price and valuation. £150m for 25.1% (Bloomberg), implying a c.£600m valuation (Sky News/Kleinman)).
3. Pre-emption is the decisive mechanism. A matching-price, two-round right-of-first-refusal regime, no shareholder veto over the signing of a conditional external contract; triggered and running; not waived; Křetínský threatening full exercise.
4. Regulatory gateways. EFL Owners’ and Directors’ Test (Championship) as the primary active gatekeeper; the IFR ODSE framework in a transitional phase with notification obligations; UEFA multi-club rules latent via Sparta Prague, where EP Corporate Group holds 56% voting control per the Czech commercial register.

Summary

On the evening of Saturday 1 August 2026, Vanessa Gold, joint-chair of West Ham United, issued a personal statement confirming she had reached a binding agreement to sell the Gold family’s 25.1% shareholding to a consortium led by former Newcastle United co-owner Amanda Staveley, her husband Mehrdad Ghodoussi and their vehicle PCP Capital Partners, in partnership with Chicago-based Ashland Forest Capital Partners. 

The statement was released to media (carried by Sky Sports, Reuters, Bloomberg and others) and accompanied by separate statements from the Staveley consortium and from West Ham United itself.

The critical facts:

• Provisional and subject to pre-emption. Existing shareholders may buy the shares (pro-rata in round one, then remaining shares in round two) at the agreed price. West Ham says the process will take approximately two months; nothing changes in ownership until it concludes.
• Consideration. Reported at £150m for the 25.1% stake (Bloomberg), implying a club valuation of around £600m (Sky News/Mark Kleinman). 
• Displaces a prior agreement struck on 12 June 2026, under which Daniel Křetínský’s EP Group (via 1890 Holdings) would have bought roughly 16% of the Gold stake to lift his holding from 27% to c.43% and become West Ham’s largest shareholder. Gold states that deal “and other alternatives” “could not be brought to fruition.”
• Křetínský is opposed. His spokesperson said the Staveley announcement destabilises the club and that EP is “reviewing all of our options, including exercising our pre-emption rights in full”, meaning Křetínský could yet block Staveley by matching the price.
• League status. West Ham is a Championship (EFL) club for 2026/27 following relegation. The primary active regulatory gateway is the EFL Owners’ and Directors’ Test; the Independent Football Regulator’s owner-suitability (ODSE) framework, established under the Football Governance Act 2025, remains in a transitional setup phase, with notification obligations for Championship clubs but staged enforcement.

Background and shareholding structure

West Ham United’s ownership (held through WH Holding Limited / West Ham United Football Club Limited) has been consistently reported as:

David Gold died on 4 January 2023. His daughter Vanessa took on his c.25.1% stake and joined the board as joint-chair with Sullivan in August 2023. She had appointed Rothschild & Co to advise on a possible sale as early as October 2023, so a Gold exit has been in contemplation for nearly three years.

Křetínský’s entry point is instructive for the current valuation. His acquisition completed on 10 November 2021, when, per AFP and West Ham’s own statement,  “Czech investment group 1890s holdings a.s has completed the acquisition of 27% shares of WH Holding Ltd,” the investment reportedly valuing the club “in the region of 600 million pounds” (Reuters, 11 November 2021). 

The striking implication is that the Staveley-implied valuation of c.£600m in 2026 is broadly flat on the 2021 entry price, despite relegation, which is why some analysts characterise West Ham as a “distressed asset” being valued on London-market and stadium optionality rather than on-pitch performance.

Two shocks reshaped the ownership question in 2026:

1. Relegation. West Ham finished 18th in the Premier League in 2025/26 and were relegated to the Championship, sharply reducing revenue and increasing the urgency of recapitalisation. The club begins 2026/27 under Nuno Espírito Santo.
2. The Sullivan allegations. In June 2026, a joint BBC Panorama / The Times investigation published decades-old historical allegations concerning Sullivan’s personal and business background prior to, and outside, football (which he denies). Sullivan resigned as co-chairman and as a director of WH Holding Limited and West Ham United FC; his public resignation statement of 6 June 2026 explicitly noted that “none of these allegations relate to West Ham United or any of its operations, or my more than 30 years in football.” The allegations should therefore not be conflated with any West Ham operational or safeguarding matter; their relevance to this report is confined to the governance and ownership consequences of his departure.

On 12 June 2026, Křetínský and Vanessa Gold announced agreed key terms for 1890 Holdings to acquire a portion of the Gold shares (widely reported as c.16%), lifting EP to c.43% and making it the largest shareholder,  surpassing Sullivan’s 38.8%. The parties said EP would “provide the additional financing the club needs” and that EP and the Gold family would vote jointly. Completion was expected “in the next couple of weeks.” By late July, that had not happened, no completion, and reportedly no injection of the much-discussed capital (a figure of around £90m of Křetínský funding was referenced in fan and analyst commentary). It is this stalled deal that Gold’s 1 August statement supersedes.

Vanessa Gold statement (1 August 2026)

The statement was issued as a personal statement from Vanessa Gold to the media on the evening of Saturday 1 August 2026. It was published alongside (a) a statement from the Staveley consortium, (b) a formal West Ham United club statement, and (c) a reactive statement from Křetínský’s spokesperson. It was not, in the first instance, a club-website statement under Gold’s name; the club issued its own separate holding statement.

The statement is structured as a personal narrative in roughly five movements:

1. Legacy framing. Gold opens by describing the “great honour” of stepping into the joint-chair and director role after her father’s death in 2023, invoking David Gold’s priority to “champion and protect this great club” and her “huge personal pride” in continuing that legacy.
2. The failed Křetínský deal. She confirms: “On June 12, Daniel Kretinsky and I agreed a sale that would have made EP Group the single largest shareholder in West Ham.” She then states that “since that time, the original deal and other alternatives that we have discussed could not be brought to fruition”, a pointed acknowledgement that the EP transaction and subsequent variants had collapsed.
3. The new agreement. She announces she has “now reached an agreement to sell my family’s shareholding” to the consortium of PCP Capital Partners, led by Amanda Staveley and Mehrdad Ghodoussi, in partnership with Ashland Forest Capital Partners.
4. Pre-emption caveat and transparency rationale. She notes the sale “remains subject to a pre-emption process” under which existing shareholders have the option to buy the shares instead, adding that although the process has not yet concluded, she “wanted to be open with our fans” about where things stand and her intentions.
5. Endorsement and continuity. She frames her ambition as securing “the right leadership and ownership” to enable West Ham to achieve its potential and return to the Premier League, expresses “every confidence” in Staveley and partners’ “deep experience,” and pledges to “continue to act in the club’s best interests” during the process.

The statement is notably restrained rather than combative. Its implicit grievances are:

• A clear signal that the Křetínský route failed, “could not be brought to fruition”, placing responsibility for the collapse on the process rather than on herself.
• An implicit judgement that Staveley’s consortium offers better leadership and ownership than the alternatives, which reads as a rebuke to both Sullivan (departed) and Křetínský (stalled).
• A procedural assertion that she is entitled to execute a conditional contract with an outside party before the offer round, which correctly reflects the right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) structure: pre-emption is triggered after a bona fide third-party contract is provisionally executed, giving existing shareholders the right to match the exact terms and price, but no independent veto over her choice of counterparty and no prior-approval stage.

The purchasing parties

• Amanda Staveley and Mehrdad Ghodoussi,  the husband-and-wife team who fronted the 2021 Saudi PIF-backed takeover of Newcastle United. That £305m purchase from Mike Ashley completed on 7 October 2021, with PIF taking 80%, the Reuben family 10% and Staveley/PCP 10%. Staveley and Ghodoussi oversaw the club’s rise before exiting: their initial 10% stake had been diluted to approximately 5.7–6% via equity raisings they did not participate in, and Newcastle confirmed the exit on 12 July 2024, stating that PIF and RB Sports & Media would together acquire PCP’s shareholding and that Staveley would step down from all positions. Staveley runs PCP Capital Partners.
• Ashland Forest Capital Partners,  described by Bloomberg as a Chicago-based investment group and by The Times as an American private investment firm. This is the only named institutional co-backer in the official statements.

Backers and source of funds

The Athletic states the investment has financial backing from investors based in the Middle East and the United States. Sky Sports News understands the consortium has “brought together considerable funds.” The consortium is characterised as a “reboot” of the Newcastle group minus Saudi PIF. There has been speculation, from fan sites, and partially walked back by PCP itself in a statement to Spear’s,  linking the Reuben brothers (RB Sports & Media) to the group; any Reuben involvement is unconfirmed and would be legally constrained because Jamie Reuben sits on Newcastle United’s board.

Price, valuation and structure

Staveley and Ghodoussi’s Newcastle tenure is the reference point: relegation candidates transformed into Champions League participants and (after their exit) Carabao Cup winners. Their history also includes PCP’s earlier turbulence (Staveley’s pre-2010 business failures, an IVA),  relevant background for a suitability assessment but not disqualifying.

Pre-emption rights 

West Ham’s formal statement sets out the process in unusually explicit terms for a private company:

This describes a classic two-round transfer pre-emption regime contained in the company’s articles of association and/or shareholders’ agreement (the shareholders’ agreement terms are private and not published). Properly characterised, it is a right of first refusal (ROFR), not a prior-consent regime: existing shareholders may match, but they hold no independent veto over the vendor signing a conditional contract with an external buyer.

Two distinct concepts travel under the “pre-emption” label:

1. Statutory pre-emption on the issue of new shares (Companies Act 2006, ss.560–577). When a company issues new equity securities for cash, s.561 requires they first be offered to existing shareholders pro rata, on the same or more favourable terms, before being offered to outsiders, protecting against dilution. Private companies can exclude or modify these rights in their articles (s.567) or disapply them by special resolution (ss.569–571). This is the rights-issue context and is not what is happening in the Gold sale.
2. Contractual pre-emption on the transfer of existing shares. There is no statutory pre-emption on transfers; instead, private company articles and/or shareholders’ agreements routinely impose transfer restrictions and offer-round machinery (rights of first refusal). These are purely contractual/constitutional. West Ham’s regime is of this type.

Key board points:

• Such clauses are enforceable as a matter of contract and company constitution; a transfer in breach can be void, or the directors can refuse to register it.
• Valuation can be either “matching a genuine third-party offer” (as here) or “fair value fixed by an independent expert/auditor”,  the drafting determines which. West Ham’s disclosed process is a matching model.
• Drag-along (majority can force minorities to sell to a buyer for 100%) and tag-along (minorities can join a sale on the same terms) rights are separate provisions; nothing in the public record confirms the precise drag/tag terms in West Ham’s agreement. This is a genuine data gap.

Implications for current shareholders

 Daniel Křetínský / 1890 Holdings (27%), the decisive actor

Křetínský is the pivotal party. The pre-emption right hands him the ability to block Staveley by matching the price. His options:

David Sullivan (38.8%)

Sullivan, though resigned as co-chair, remains the largest single holder and also has pre-emption rights. He has issued no public statement on the Staveley agreement. Fan-site commentary suggests he would prefer to sell at a Premier League valuation (i.e. after promotion) to maximise value; this is unconfirmed. Staveley’s consortium is reported to regard his stake as the ultimate target for majority control. Sullivan’s choice, sell to Staveley, sit tight, or partner with Křetínský,  will shape the endgame.

Minority shareholders (Tripp Smith 8%; Harris/Brown c.1.1%)

These holders also receive pro-rata pre-emption entitlements. In the June EP episode, Tripp Smith, Daniel Harris and Terry Brown were reported as “fully aligned” with the stabilisation strategy. Whether they take up entitlements now (most likely they will not fund a matching purchase at scale) will marginally affect the round-two allocation. Their practical role is as potential swing votes rather than acquirers.

Board composition and control 

The board has thinned at shareholder-director level, Baroness Karren Brady stepped down prior to the end of the 2025/26 season, and Sullivan resigned in June 2026,  but the club is not without an operational management structure: corporate filings and official club communications confirm that day-to-day executive leadership was formally transitioned to interim CEO Karim Virani, reporting directly to the remaining board. Gold remains joint-chair but is now a committed seller. At ownership level, control is genuinely contestable for the first time since 2010. If Staveley completes and then secures Sullivan’s stake, majority control passes to the consortium; if Křetínský exercises in full, he becomes majority owner. Either outcome ends the Sullivan–Gold duopoly that has run the club since 2010.

 Post-relegation capital needs

Relegation has cut revenue and heightened the need for recapitalisation. The June EP deal was explicitly justified as providing “the additional financing the club needs,” yet that capital did not arrive. The Staveley bid offers a fresh, reportedly well-funded ownership with promised significant transfer investment and interest in the London Stadium,  but only after a two-month pre-emption delay that coincides with the transfer window and the start of the Championship season. The immediate risk is paralysis: an ownership contest that freezes decisive transfer spending precisely when a promotion push requires it. West Ham has stressed day-to-day operations are unaffected, but the club began pre-season with minimal transfer activity amid the uncertainty.

West Ham United’s formal response

West Ham issued a formal club statement on 1 August 2026 (published on whufc.com as “Club Statement, 1 August 2026” and carried by media), immediately following Gold’s announcement.

The club statement is a deliberately neutral, four-part holding statement:

1. Acknowledgement. It confirms awareness of the announcement from Joint-Chair Vanessa Gold that she has reached a “provisional agreement” to sell her shares to the consortium of PCP Capital Partners, led by Amanda Staveley and Mehrdad Ghodoussi, in partnership with Ashland Forest Capital Partners. Note the careful word “provisional.”
2. Process. It sets out the two-round pre-emption process and the c.two-month timeline (quoted in Section 5.1), stressing that “until it is completed, nothing will change” regarding the ownership structure of the club.
3. Reassurance. It assures supporters that the day-to-day running of the football club is “in no way affected,” that pre-season preparations continue “with diligence and focus,” and thanks fans for their “continued loyal backing.”
4. Silence pledge. It states the club will be making no further comment while the pre-emption process runs its course.

The club statement does not rebut or endorse Gold’s characterisation. It neither disputes her account of the failed Křetínský deal nor takes a position on the merits of the Staveley consortium. This is consistent with a board that is now internally divided (Gold as seller; Křetínský opposed) and must speak institutionally without favouring one shareholder faction.

The substantive opposition came not from the club but from Křetínský’s spokesperson, whose statement is the true counter-narrative to Gold’s:

Regulatory consideration

West Ham will compete in the EFL Championship in 2026/27. This changes the applicable ownership gateway from the Premier League Owners’ and Directors’ Test to the EFL version (EFL Regulations, Appendix 3). The two tests are broadly similar in disqualifying-event structure (criminal convictions, bans by sporting/professional bodies, insolvency events, etc.).

EFL Owners’ and Directors’ Test

Any person acquiring “control” (generally 30%+) or becoming a director of an EFL club must pass the EFL’s test. On the current facts:

• Staveley’s consortium acquiring 25.1% sits below the 30% control threshold for an individual, but the aggregation of consortium interests and any director appointments would trigger scrutiny.
• If Křetínský exercised in full to reach c.52%, that is plainly a change of control requiring approval.
• In the short term, the EFL ODT is the primary active regulatory gatekeeper with legal authority to approve or block ownership transfers (see Section 8.3 on the IFR’s transitional status).

Independent Football Regulator (IFR)

The Football Governance Act 2025 established the IFR and its owners, directors and senior executives (ODSE) framework. As of August 2026, however, the IFR operates under provisional setup and transitional-phase guidelines while its full statutory licensing and enforcement mechanisms are staged in. Compliance notifications are required for Championship clubs — West Ham must notify the IFR as soon as there is a reasonable prospect of a change in ownership or senior personnel — but the EFL Owners’ and Directors’ Test remains the primary active regulatory gatekeeper with legal authority to approve or block ownership transfers in the short term.

UEFA multi-club ownership

Not immediately live (West Ham is not in Europe in 2026/27), but relevant to Křetínský’s calculus: he also controls Sparta Prague, of which he is president. The official Czech commercial register confirms that EP Corporate Group holds 56% voting control of the club (Křetínský acquired an initial 40% in 2004 for £18.6m and subsequently increased the holding). A 56% controlling stake makes the potential multi-club conflict materially more direct than a minority 40% holding would, should European qualification be achieved. UEFA Article 5 prohibits control or decisive influence over more than one club in the same UEFA competition in the same season. A full Křetínský takeover of West Ham would create a live conflict if both clubs qualified for the same UEFA competition; solutions used elsewhere (blind trust, stake reduction, as at Manchester City/Girona, Nottingham Forest/Olympiacos) exist. This is a medium-term consideration, not a current bar.

Scenario analysis and conclusions