With the Hill Dickenson Stadium just a few short days away from its first capacity crowd, I thought it would be interesting to compare the building of other stadia in England and the major European Leagues

It should be remembered that against almost all of the odds the Everton Stadium was funded virtually entirely by Everton, its shareholders and an astonishing array of (not always willing) lenders.

Moshiri gets absolutely no credit from me, given how close he drove us to extinction and how haphazard his funding arrangements (such as they were), were for the construction of the stadium. 

My personal view is that the stadium project is far from complete. Yes we have a gleaming new stadium, and how thrilling it will be to see it full of nearly 53,000 Evertonians, but there is so much more to be done surrounding the site in terms of other facilities, and of course, the issue which will not go away, that of the supporting infrastructure, particularly relating to transport.

The Friedkins have significant investments to make in order to maximise the potential of the new stadium in growing Everton’s income and also, the stadium acting as a catalyst for the urban regeneration North Liverpool desperately needs.

In order to put the new stadium in context I have looked at the major stadium developments across Europe since the UK’s Taylor Report.

Key Findings: The period under review marks a seismic shift from publicly-subsidised, functionally-driven stadium upgrades to an era of privately-financed, multi-purpose entertainment hubs. 

This evolution has been driven by a confluence of factors: regulatory changes, most notably the Taylor Report in England; the commercial imperative of maximising revenue streams such as corporate hospitality, naming rights, and non-matchday events; and the cyclical demand for modern venues to host major international tournaments.

Dominant Trends:

• Escalating Costs: Construction costs have spiralled from tens of millions in the 1990s to over €1 billion for flagship projects today. This inflation is attributable to more complex architectural designs, technological integration, and the expansion of projects to include wider commercial and real estate developments. The impact that Covid had on the construction industry is also a significant one off (one hopes) event.
• Sophisticated Financing: A distinct move away from simple public grants (particularly in Europe) towards complex financial models is evident. These now commonly involve senior bank debt, securitised bonds, private equity injections, intricate public-private partnerships (PPPs), and significant direct investment from club owners.
• The Stadium as a Commercial Asset: The modern stadium is no longer just a venue for football but a critical commercial asset, designed to generate year-round revenue and enhance club valuation. It is a balance sheet item. This strategic shift is most apparent in the design of multi-use arenas capable of hosting concerts, other sporting events, and corporate functions, thereby diversifying income away from the traditional matchday.

Section 1: The English Revolution – From Safety Mandates to Commercial Necessity

The stadium landscape in England has been completely reshaped since the early 1990’s, a transformation initially catalysed by the safety mandates of the Taylor Report but quickly accelerated by the commercial explosion of the Premier League. 

This section analyses the UK’s stadium boom, which began as a response to the need for all-seater venues and has since evolved into a high-stakes commercial race, particularly in London.

1.1 The National Symbol: The Rebuilding of Wembley Stadium

The creation of a new national stadium to replace the iconic 1923 original was a project of immense national significance and complexity. Completed in 2007, it stands as an example of a large-scale public-private project with all the pluses and minuses that brings,

Most consider Wembley to be a success these days but  it was a project fraught with delays and significant cost overruns that offer crucial lessons in major infrastructure financing.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The new Wembley Stadium boasts a 90,000 all-seater capacity, a relatively minor upgrade on the roughly 80,000 capacity of the old ground before its demolition. The financial scale of the project was monumental. While the final construction cost is officially cited at £798 million, the total project cost, including financing and the redevelopment of local transport infrastructure, is estimated to be in excess of £1 billion.

The project’s budget expanded significantly from its initial projection of £757 million. A major factor in this escalation was the fixed-price construction contract awarded to the Australian firm Multiplex. The contractor ultimately incurred losses of £183 million on the project, pushing the total expenditure from all parties involved towards the £1 billion figure and highlighting the risks of such agreements on uniquely complex builds. (Not too dissimilar to some of the issues at Everton’s stadium)

Financing Model

The financing for the new Wembley was a hybrid of public and private funding, demonstrating the need for a collaborative approach.

• Public Funding: A total of £161 million was provided by the public sector. This was composed of a £120 million National Lottery grant from Sport England—the largest it had ever awarded—which was primarily used to finance the £106 million acquisition of the old stadium site in 1999. Further contributions included £20 million from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and £21 million from the London Development Agency (LDA).
• Private Debt Financing: The cornerstone of the private financing was a substantial loan of between £426 million and £433 million from a banking consortium led by Westdeutsche Landesbank. This single loan represented over half of the project’s total funding, underscoring the critical role of private debt capital.
• FA Contribution: The remainder of the capital was provided by The Football Association (FA) and its dedicated subsidiary, Wembley National Stadium Limited (WNSL), which was established to manage the investment and operate the venue.

The structure of this financing arrangement is revealing. To secure the private loan necessary for the project’s viability, the public sector funders had to accept that their financial interests would be largely subordinated to those of the senior bank lenders. This meant that in the event of default, the banks would have priority in recovering their investment. While public money was essential as seed capital and for political legitimacy, the project’s financial architecture was ultimately dictated by the risk-reward calculations of private lenders, not solely by the public interest. The result is a national symbol built primarily on private debt, with public funds playing a foundational but secondary role in the financial and security hierarchy.

1.2 Arsenal & Tottenham

The construction of new stadiums for Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur in North London provides a comparative analysis of two distinct strategic approaches to financing major infrastructure projects in the Premier League era. 

One represents a model of cost containment and self-sufficiency, while the other embodies a strategy of high-leverage investment against future revenue growth.

Case Study: Arsenal – The Emirates Stadium (2006)

Arsenal’s move from the historic but capacity-constrained Highbury, which held around 38,419 spectators, was driven by the need to compete commercially with rivals like Manchester United, who benefited from a much larger stadium. The Emirates Stadium, opened in 2006, provided a state-of-the-art venue with a capacity of 60,704. The project was completed at a cost of between £390 million and £430 million.

The financing model excelled in self-sufficiency and risk mitigation, relying on a diverse range of funding streams:

• Senior Debt: The core of the financing was a £260 million loan facility from a banking consortium that included the Royal Bank of Scotland. This was later refinanced through the issuance of long-term, fixed-rate bonds, a move designed to provide greater financial stability and reduce annual debt service costs.
• Asset Monetisation: A crucial element was the sale of the former Highbury ground for a residential development project, which generated £130 million in revenue directly channelled into the new stadium’s construction.
• Commercial Partnerships: The club secured a landmark 15-year, £100 million deal with Emirates Airline, which combined both stadium naming rights and shirt sponsorship. An additional £15 million was contributed by the catering firm Delaware North for a 20-year exclusive contract. At the time, these were significant deals.
• Fan Funding: A bond scheme, which offered fans and investors a fixed-rate return, successfully raised over £97 million.

Case Study: Tottenham Hotspur – Tottenham Hotspur Stadium (2019)

Tottenham’s objective was more ambitious than simply increasing capacity from the 31,848 at White Hart Lane. The goal was to create a multi-purpose global entertainment venue capable of generating vastly superior and diversified revenues. The resulting 62,850-capacity stadium, which opened in 2019, came at a cost of approximately £1 billion, making it one of the most expensive stadiums ever built.

The club’s financing strategy was one of high-leverage investment, predicated on the future revenue-generating power of the new venue:

• Massive Debt Financing: The project was underpinned by a £400 million loan from a consortium including Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC. This was later refinanced and extended to £637 million to manage escalating costs. The timing of the deal and the strength of the business case resulted in an extra-ordinary low fixed interest cost over a range of maturities from 15 to 30 years (average cost 2.6% pa).  During the COVID-19 pandemic, the club also utilized a £175 million loan from the Bank of England’s Covid Corporate Financing Facility to manage cash flow.
• Public Funding and Incentives: The project received £32 million from the London Development Agency and £5 million from the Premier League for community and infrastructure support. It also benefited from an estimated £70 million in tax incentives through enhanced capital allowances.
• Owner Support: The club’s ownership group, ENIC, provided a £50 million letter of credit facility to further secure the financing package.

The divergent strategies of Arsenal and Tottenham reflect the evolution of the financial landscape for major sports projects over a decade. Arsenal’s model was one of cost containment and deleveraging; by selling assets like Highbury and pre-selling commercial rights, the club limited its debt exposure but, as a consequence, endured a period of on-pitch austerity as the debt was serviced. Tottenham, building a decade later in a market with a greater appetite for such investments, pursued a high-leverage growth strategy. They took on massive debt with the explicit plan that the new venue’s multi-use capabilities—most notably hosting NFL games and major concerts—would generate sufficient new revenue streams to service the debt and fund squad investment simultaneously. The immediate success of this strategy was evident, with the club’s matchday income doubling from £53.7 million in 2017 to £106.4 million in 2022.

1.3 The Legacy Projects: Public Assets, Private Gains

The conversion of publicly-funded athletics stadiums for club use offers a unique model of stadium development in England. The contrasting financial arrangements for Manchester City’s Etihad Stadium and West Ham United’s London Stadium provide a stark illustration of the best and worst-case scenarios for such legacy projects.

Case Study: Manchester City – Etihad Stadium (2003 Conversion)

The City of Manchester Stadium was originally constructed as the main venue for the 2002 Commonwealth Games, with a capacity of 38,000. The initial £110 million construction cost was almost entirely publicly funded, with £77 million from Sport England and the remainder provided by Manchester City Council.

Following the Games, the stadium was converted for football use. This £43 million project involved removing the athletics track and adding a new lower tier, increasing the capacity to 48,000. The cost of this conversion was shared, with the council contributing £22 million and Manchester City paying £21 million as part of its long-term lease agreement.

Since the club’s takeover by the Abu Dhabi United Group in 2008, all subsequent expansions—including the current £300 million North Stand project set to increase capacity beyond 61,000—have been privately funded by the club’s owners.

Case Study: West Ham United – London Stadium (2016 Move)

The London Stadium was built as the 80,000-seat centrepiece of the 2012 Olympic Games at a public cost of £429 million. Its subsequent conversion into a multi-use football stadium for anchor tenant West Ham United became a matter of significant public controversy due to escalating costs. The conversion bill, initially estimated at £160 million, ultimately soared to £323 million.

The financing of this conversion was overwhelmingly borne by the public purse:

• A £148.8 million settlement from the exchequer.
• A £40 million loan from Newham Council.
• Nearly £40 million from the original Olympic budget.
• A further £25 million from the government.

In stark contrast, West Ham United contributed just £15 million towards the conversion costs. The club pays an annual rent of only £2.5 million for a 99-year lease, while the public body that owns the stadium, a joint venture between the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) and Newham Council, remains responsible for all running costs.

This arrangement has led to the stadium forecasting annual losses of £20-24 million, which are covered by the taxpayer.

These two cases represent the opposite ends of the spectrum for major sport event legacy planning. The Etihad conversion is widely regarded as a success, securing a long-term anchor tenant for a public asset and catalysing wider urban regeneration, with the club eventually assuming the financial responsibility for further development. 

The London Stadium, however, has proven to be a significant financial burden on the public. The urgent need to avoid a “white elephant” stadium left the public sector with a weak negotiating position, allowing West Ham to secure what has been described as “the deal of the century”. This has resulted in an unsustainable, taxpayer-subsidised operating model where the private tenant (West Ham) reaps the revenue benefits of a Premier League stadium without bearing the full operational and capital expenditure risks.

1.4: New Builds Across England

Outside  London and Manchester, several clubs have undertaken the construction of new stadiums, often facing significant financial challenges in the process. These projects showcase more modest investments but highlight the risks for clubs without elite-level revenues.

Case Study: Leicester City – King Power Stadium (2002)

Leicester City moved from the outdated, 21,500-capacity Filbert Street to the new 32,261-seat King Power Stadium (originally the Walkers Stadium) in 2002. The construction cost was approximately £35-£37 million.

 The financial strain of this project, combined with relegation from the Premier League, pushed the club into administration shortly after the move. The stadium’s contractor, Birse, was forced to write off £5.5 million in bad debt. The club’s financial stability was only restored following the takeover by the Thai-led King Power consortium. The new owners have since provided significant financial support, including the conversion of £194 million in loans to equity in 2023, which has now positioned the club to pursue a stadium expansion to over 40,000 seats. 

These future plans are being financed through loans from Macquarie Bank secured against future Premier League and parachute payments.

Case Study: Southampton – St Mary’s Stadium (2001)

Southampton’s move from The Dell, with its cramped capacity of just 15,200, to the 32,384-seat St Mary’s Stadium in 2001 was a necessary step for a modern top-flight club. The stadium was built at a cost of £32 million. While initial financing details are not available, the club’s subsequent financial history illustrates the challenges of servicing such an asset.

 In June 2020, to mitigate the financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the club took out a substantial £78.8 million long term loan from the US investment firm MSD Capital. This loan carries a high interest rate of 9.14% and is secured against the stadium and the club’s training ground, demonstrating the emergence of alternative, more expensive lenders in the football finance market.

Case Study: Sunderland – Stadium of Light (1997)

Sunderland was one of the first clubs in the post-Taylor Report era to build a large new stadium, moving from the 22,500-capacity Roker Park to the Stadium of Light in 1997. 

The initial build cost a remarkably low £16-17 million for a 42,000-seat venue. A further £7 million was spent in 2002 to add a second tier to the North Stand, increasing the capacity to its current 48,707. The club has recently undertaken an “eight-figure investment” programme to modernise the stadium’s facilities, including new hospitality areas, a PA system, and safe standing, funded by the club to ensure the venue is “Premier League ready”.

The trajectories of these clubs underscore the immense financial risk of stadium development for teams outside the established elite. Leicester’s project led directly to administration, a stark reminder that a new stadium’s debt can become crippling if not supported by consistent on-pitch success and the associated revenue streams. It was only through the arrival of a wealthy benefactor willing to absorb significant losses that the club was able to turn the stadium into a long-term asset. 

Similarly, Southampton’s need to turn to high-interest private capital from firms like MSD Capital signals a market where traditional banks may view such clubs as too risky, forcing them into more expensive financing arrangements that place a greater strain on their operational budgets.

Table 1: Summary of Major English Stadium Projects (Post-1992)

*Current capacity, with expansion to over 61,000 underway.

Section 2: The German Model – Efficiency, Ownership, and Fan Experience

The German approach to stadium development, particularly in the lead-up to the 2006 FIFA World Cup, is often held up as a model of financial prudence, architectural innovation, and a commitment to fan experience, including the widespread retention of safe standing areas. 

2.1 Allianz Arena (Bayern Munich)

The construction of the Allianz Arena was a strategic move by Bayern Munich to replace the aging, multi-purpose Olympiastadion with a purpose-built football arena. Opened in 2005 ahead of the World Cup, it has become an iconic global landmark and a formidable financial asset for the club.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The stadium’s capacity has grown over time. It opened with 66,000 seats and has since been expanded to accommodate 75,024 for domestic matches. The construction cost was a reported €340 million, a figure that did not include an additional €210 million spent by the city of Munich and the state of Bavaria on essential infrastructure and area development to support the new venue.

Financing Model

The financing of the Allianz Arena was an excellent example of risk-sharing and strategic acquisition:

• Joint Venture: The project was initially conceived as a 50/50 joint venture between Munich’s two major clubs, FC Bayern Munich and TSV 1860 Munich. This structure allowed the two clubs to share the significant €340 million construction cost.
• Corporate Partnership: A cornerstone of the financial plan was a long-term naming rights deal with the Munich-based financial services giant Allianz. This deal not only provided a crucial revenue stream but also integrated the stadium into Allianz’s global portfolio of sponsored venues, enhancing its international prestige.
• Strategic Buyout: In 2006, with TSV 1860 Munich facing financial difficulties, Bayern Munich seized the opportunity to become the sole owner of the stadium. They purchased their rival’s 50% share for just €11 million, a fraction of the initial investment.

This financing model demonstrates a powerful strategy. By initially partnering with their city rivals, Bayern Munich effectively mitigated half of the upfront financial risk associated with such a large-scale project. When their partner’s financial weakness became apparent, Bayern’s superior economic strength allowed them to acquire a world-class, revenue-generating asset for a remarkably low price. This shrewd business move has been a foundational element of their financial dominance in German and European football for over a decade, creating a significant competitive imbalance as they now solely benefit from an asset their rivals helped to build.

2.2 Signal Iduna Park (Borussia Dortmund)

In contrast to the new-build approach of Bayern Munich, Borussia Dortmund has pursued a strategy of phased expansion for its iconic Westfalenstadion, now known as Signal Iduna Park. This approach has been driven by the club’s sporting success and a commitment to accommodating its vast fan base, preserving the stadium’s world-renowned atmosphere.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The stadium’s capacity has evolved significantly. Originally built for the 1974 World Cup with a capacity of 54,000, it was reduced to 42,800 in 1992 to comply with UEFA all-seater regulations. Following a period of great success for the club, a series of expansions took its capacity to 68,600 by 1999 and ultimately to its current 81,365. A key feature is the South Stand, or “Yellow Wall,” which is Europe’s largest standing terrace with a capacity of 24,454.

The total cost of the various renovations up to 2006 amounted to €200 million. The club has continued to invest in the stadium, including a €10 million renovation in 2012 for pitch and structural upgrades.

Financing Model

The expansions were primarily financed by the club itself, a pioneering move in Germany at the time. The successful period of the 1990s, which included Bundesliga and Champions League titles, provided the financial resources to fund the expansions without relying on public subsidies or taking on excessive debt. This model of self-investment continues, with the club recently partnering with energy company RWE to install Germany’s largest stadium rooftop solar panel system, a move designed to reduce long-term energy costs and enhance sustainability.

Dortmund’s strategy represents a model of organic, fan-centric growth. By choosing incremental expansion over a single, high-cost rebuild, the club was able to align its infrastructure investment with its periods of sporting and financial success. This approach avoided the risk of crippling debt and, crucially, allowed the club to preserve and enhance the stadium’s unique atmosphere. The “Yellow Wall” is not just a stand; it is a core part of the club’s brand identity and a significant commercial and sporting asset that a completely new, all-seater stadium might have compromised.

2.3 Veltins-Arena (Schalke 04)

FC Schalke 04’s Veltins-Arena, opened in 2001, was a landmark project in German football. It replaced the outdated Parkstadion with a technologically advanced, multi-functional venue featuring a retractable roof and a slide-out pitch, setting a new standard for stadium design in Europe.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The Veltins-Arena has a capacity of 62,271 for domestic matches, a significant upgrade in quality and amenities from the old Parkstadion. The total construction cost was €191 million.

Financing Model

The project was a watershed moment for stadium finance in Germany as it was the first to be completely privately financed, with no government subsidies or public funds involved. To achieve this, the club took on a substantial loan to cover the €191 million cost. This debt became a significant long-term financial obligation for the club, which was finally paid off in 2019, 18 years after the stadium opened.

The Veltins-Arena proved that a major German club could undertake a large-scale, technologically ambitious project independently. However, the 18-year repayment period for the loan illustrates the significant long-term financial burden that such an approach entails. While private financing provides autonomy, it creates a long financial “tail” that can constrain a club’s financial flexibility in other areas, such as transfer spending and wages, for a generation. It is a model that requires consistent sporting success and prudent financial management to remain sustainable.

Table 2: Summary of Major German Stadium Projects (Post-1992)

Section 3: The Iberian Approach – Public-Private Partnerships and Urban Regeneration

In Spain, the development of new stadiums is often deeply intertwined with urban regeneration projects, frequently involving complex partnerships between clubs, city councils, and private investors. This approach positions the stadium not just as a sporting venue but as an anchor for wider economic and social development.

3.1 The Metropolitano Stadium (Atlético Madrid)

Atlético Madrid’s move from the iconic Vicente Calderón to the new Metropolitano Stadium in 2017 was a transformative step for the club. The project involved redeveloping an existing athletics stadium into a world-class football venue, serving as the centerpiece for an ambitious “City of Sport” development.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The new stadium increased the club’s capacity from approximately 54,907 at the Vicente Calderón to 68,456 at the Metropolitano. While the cost of the stadium conversion itself is not explicitly broken down, the wider “Ciudad del Deporte” (City of Sport) project surrounding the venue is a massive undertaking, with investment projected to be over €350 million.

Financing Model

The financing for this ambitious project is a modern, multi-layered strategy that goes beyond simple debt:

• Capital Increases: The club has repeatedly raised capital by issuing new shares to fund both squad investment and the stadium-related projects. This includes a €120 million increase in 2021 and a €70 million increase in the summer of 2024, with plans for at least another €60 million to follow.
• Private Equity Investment: The club has actively sought major external investment. The US firm Ares Management acquired a 34% stake in the club’s holding company in 2021. Furthermore, Atlético has been in advanced talks with another US private equity giant, Apollo Global Management, for a significant investment that could value the club at up to €3 billion. This investment is partly targeted at financing the €800 million real estate project around the stadium.
• League-Wide Funding: Atlético Madrid is utilising its approximately €130 million allocation from the LaLiga Impulso agreement—a league-wide deal with the investment fund CVC—to directly invest in the Sports City infrastructure.

Atlético’s strategy represents a new frontier in stadium development, where the venue is merely the anchor of a far larger real estate and commercial enterprise. The financing is not just for a stadium but for a diversified “Sports City” designed to create stable, year-round revenue streams from leisure and commercial facilities. This approach aims to insulate the club from the inherent volatility of on-pitch performance. It effectively transforms the football club into a hybrid sports and real estate development company, a model that may become increasingly necessary for clubs aiming to compete with the financial might of state-owned rivals.

3.2  San Mamés (Athletic Bilbao)

The construction of the new San Mamés stadium, which opened in 2013, is a unique case study that reflects Athletic Bilbao’s special status as a Basque cultural institution. It replaced the legendary original stadium, affectionately known as “La Catedral.”

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The new stadium has a capacity of 53,331, an increase from the approximately 40,000 of the old San Mamés. The total construction cost was €211 million.

Financing Model

The financing for the new San Mamés was a distinctive multi-partner Public-Private Partnership, a model that would be difficult to replicate elsewhere:

• Five-Way Partnership: The €211 million cost was divided among five key regional stakeholders.

• Athletic Club: €50 million
• BBK (Bilbao Biscay Savings Bank): €50 million
• The Council of Bizkaya (Provincial Government): €50 million
• The Basque Regional Government: €50 million
• Bilbao City Council: €11 million

In addition to its initial capital contribution, the club pays an annual rent of €500,000 and, in 2016, single-handedly funded a €12.6-€13 million roof extension to provide better protection from the rain for supporters in the lower tiers.

The financing of San Mamés is deeply rooted in the club’s unique identity. Athletic Bilbao’s policy of only using players of Basque origin has cemented its role as a powerful symbol of regional pride. 

Consequently, the stadium is viewed not merely as a private commercial venue but as a vital piece of civic infrastructure and a cultural landmark. This perception made it politically and socially tenable for four separate public and semi-public bodies to invest a combined €161 million in the project—a level of direct public subsidy for a club stadium that would be almost unthinkable in other European footballing nations like the UK.

3.3  RCDE Stadium (RCD Espanyol)

After leaving their historic home, the Estadi de Sarrià, in 1997 and spending over a decade at the publicly-owned Estadi Olímpic Lluís Companys, RCD Espanyol opened their own modern ground in 2009. The RCDE Stadium provided the club with a permanent home and control over its own stadium revenues.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The new all-seater stadium has a capacity of 40,000, slightly less than the final capacity of the old Estadi de Sarrià. The project was completed at a relatively modest cost of approximately €60-€65 million.

Financing Model

The stadium was built by a joint venture that included the construction firm FCC. While specific details of the financing breakdown are not available, the project’s comparatively low cost suggests a more pragmatic and less debt-intensive approach than the mega-projects seen elsewhere in Europe. For a “second city” club like Espanyol, building and owning its own stadium was a crucial step in securing a distinct identity and independent revenue streams, allowing it to move out of the shadow of its giant neighbour, FC Barcelona, and escape the financial instability of renting a municipal facility.

Table 3: Summary of Major Spanish Stadium Projects (Post-1992)

Section 4: France – State-Driven Projects and Long-Term Concessions

Stadium development in France is heavily influenced by the country’s successful bids to host major international tournaments, such as the 1998 FIFA World Cup and UEFA Euro 2016. This has led to a prevalent model of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), where private consortiums are awarded long-term concession agreements to finance, build, and operate new and redeveloped stadiums, often with significant public subsidies.

4.1  Stade de France (1998)

The Stade de France was constructed as the centrepiece for the 1998 FIFA World Cup, addressing France’s lack of a national stadium with a capacity exceeding 80,000. It replaced the smaller Parc des Princes as the primary venue for the national football and rugby teams.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

The stadium has a capacity of 81,338, a substantial increase over the Parc des Princes’ capacity of around 48,000. The total construction cost was €364 million.

Financing Model

The project was structured as a 30-year concession agreement, a model that has become common in France.

• Concession Structure: A private consortium, comprising construction giants Bouygues, Dumez, and SGE, was awarded the contract in 1995 to finance, build, and operate the stadium until 2025. The French government granted the concession and provided financial support for the first 30 months of operation.
• Financing Challenges and Innovation: The consortium initially struggled to obtain traditional long-term bank financing for the project. To bridge the gap, the construction was funded by shareholder loans. Subsequently, a more sophisticated financing structure was employed. A special purpose company, Stade Finance, was created to issue Ffr799.3 million (approx. €122 million) in guaranteed bonds. This securitization of future revenues allowed the consortium to repay the initial shareholder loans and secure the necessary long-term funding.

4.2 The Euro 2016 Legacy: A Wave of PPPs

The hosting of UEFA Euro 2016 spurred a nationwide wave of stadium construction and redevelopment, largely following the PPP and concession model established by the Stade de France.

 Parc Olympique Lyonnais (Groupama Stadium)

Olympique Lyonnais moved from the municipal Stade de Gerland to their new, privately-owned 59,186-seat stadium in 2016. The project cost approximately €415 million. The financing was a complex project finance plan, which included approximately €180 million in public funds for associated infrastructure. The club now services a €320 million loan facility secured against stadium revenues, with a significant portion of income derived from a naming rights deal with insurer Groupama, valued at around €7 million annually.

Allianz Riviera (Nice)

OGC Nice moved from the small, 17,415-capacity Stade du Ray to the new 36,178-seat Allianz Riviera. The project cost €217.7 million (excluding tax) and was structured as a 30-year PPP. The financing included a substantial public subsidy of €60 million from the city, region, and state. The remainder was financed by a private company, Nice Eco Stadium, a consortium led by construction group VINCI.

 Matmut Atlantique (Bordeaux)

Girondins de Bordeaux relocated to the new 42,115-seat Matmut Atlantique. The stadium was built at a cost of €183 million under a 30-year PPP with a total investment value of €219 million. The funding was a mix of a €75 million public subsidy from the state, city, and region; €10 million in equity from the Vinci-Fayat construction consortium; and a €20 million contribution plus an annual rent of €3.8 million from the club’s owner, the M6 group.

The French model systematically uses major tournaments as a catalyst to leverage private investment for public infrastructure. The government effectively uses the fixed deadline of an event to incentivise the creation of modern venues through PPPs. Public subsidies de-risk the projects sufficiently to attract private construction and operating partners, who then bear the long-term risk and reward of managing the venues under concession agreements that typically last for 30 years. This results in a nationwide upgrade of sporting infrastructure that might not otherwise occur, but it locks public bodies and clubs into long-term, often complex, contractual relationships.

Table 4: Summary of Major French Stadium Projects (Post-1992)

Section 5: Italy – The Dawn of Club-Owned Stadiums

For decades, Italian football was characterised by clubs playing in large, aging, and atmospheric but crumbling municipally-owned stadiums, often featuring unpopular running tracks. This model severely limited clubs’ ability to generate commercial revenue. The construction of Juventus Stadium in 2011 marked a crucial paradigm shift, heralding a new era of club-owned venues in Serie A.

5.1 Juventus Stadium (Allianz Stadium)

Juventus’s decision to demolish the deeply unpopular Stadio delle Alpi and build a modern, club-owned stadium on the same site was a revolutionary move in Italian football. The new venue was designed to create an intense atmosphere and serve as a powerful revenue-generating asset.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

A key strategic decision was to significantly reduce the capacity from the Delle Alpi’s 69,000 to a more intimate 41,507. This was done to eliminate the sight of empty seats, create a more intense and intimidating atmosphere for opposing teams, and ensure high demand for tickets. The project was completed at a cost of between €122 million and €155 million.

Financing Model

The financing model was as groundbreaking for Italy as the stadium itself:

• Fully Private Funding: The club explicitly stated that the project was completed without any public subsidies, a stark departure from the norm in Italy.
• Commercial Partnerships: A crucial upfront component was a €75 million, 12-year agreement with the sports marketing agency Sportfive, which covered naming rights and the marketing of premium seating. The stadium is now known as the Allianz Stadium.
• Debt Financing: The club secured a loan of €50 million, later increased to €60 million, from the Istituto per il Credito Sportivo, a bank specializing in financing sports infrastructure.
• Asset Sale: Juventus generated €20.25 million by selling adjacent land to the supermarket chain Nordiconad for a commercial development.

The Juventus Stadium project was arguably the most significant strategic development in modern Italian football. By breaking the mold of renting from municipalities, Juventus created a sustainable, multi-faceted revenue advantage over its domestic rivals. 

The ability to control and retain all income from matchday sales, corporate hospitality, naming rights, the club museum, and other non-matchday events provided a stable financial platform. This new income directly funded a decade of sporting dominance, creating a virtuous cycle where financial power led to on-pitch success, which in turn further boosted the club’s commercial appeal and revenues. The project single-handedly altered the financial landscape of Serie A and provided a blueprint for other Italian clubs to follow.

5.2  Stadio Friuli (Dacia Arena)

Udinese Calcio provided an alternative model for Italian clubs seeking to modernize their facilities. Instead of a full new build, the club undertook a major redevelopment of their existing municipal stadium, the Stadio Friuli.

Capacity and Cost Analysis

Similar to Juventus, the project involved a capacity reduction, from 41,652 to a more compact 25,144. The primary goal was to remove the athletics track and rebuild the stands closer to the pitch, dramatically improving the spectator experience and atmosphere. The redevelopment was completed at a cost of between €22.6 million and €50 million.

Financing Model

The project was a public-private collaboration. Udinese secured a 99-year lease on the stadium from the Udine municipality, which provided the long-term security needed to justify a major private investment. The club then financed the redevelopment works, securing a significant loan from the Istituto per il Credito Sportivo (ICS), which provided half of the initial €40 million budget.

Udinese’s approach represents a more financially accessible model for second-tier European clubs. By negotiating a long-term lease and privately funding a targeted modernization, the club achieved many of the same benefits as a new build—such as an improved atmosphere and enhanced facilities—for a fraction of the capital outlay and financial risk. This provides a pragmatic blueprint for other clubs in Italy and across Europe that lack the resources for a new stadium but need to upgrade their infrastructure to remain competitive.

Table 5: Summary of Major Italian Stadium Projects (Post-1992)

Section 6: Strategic Insights and Future Outlook

The examination of stadium construction across Europe’s major leagues since the early 1990’s reveals distinct national trends and a broader, continent-wide evolution in the role of the football stadium. 

6.1 Comparative Financial Analysis: A Continent of Contrasts

The case studies reveal a clear divergence in how stadium projects are financed across Europe, reflecting different political, economic, and cultural contexts.

• Public vs. Private Burden: A spectrum of financing models is evident. The German model is characterised by a strong emphasis on private and club-led financing, with an institutional aversion to long-term, crippling debt. The UK presents a mixed economy, which has shifted from using public seed money for legacy projects (Wembley, Etihad) towards highly leveraged private debt for new builds (Tottenham), with the London Stadium serving as a cautionary tale of almost complete public liability. 

In contrast, France and Spain have heavily utilized Public-Private Partnerships, where public land and subsidies are deployed to de-risk projects for private construction and operating consortiums, who then manage the venues under long-term concession agreements.

• The Role of Debt: There is an increasing reliance on sophisticated debt instruments. While Arsenal successfully refinanced its initial bank loan into stable, long-term bonds, Tottenham’s more recent project was built on massive bank loans secured against projected future earnings. This strategy increases financial risk but enables far more ambitious projects. 

The emergence of high-interest, alternative lenders like MSD Capital, which provided a £78.8 million loan to Southampton at a rate of 9.14%, signals a new, riskier tier of financing for clubs that may be deemed too great a risk by traditional banks.

• Revenue as the Ultimate Collateral: The common thread uniting all these models is that financing is ultimately secured against future revenue streams. The explosive growth in broadcast rights revenue since the early 1990s has been the fundamental enabler of this stadium construction boom. It provides the reliable, long-term income streams that give lenders the confidence to underwrite multi-hundred-million and even billion-euro loans.

Table 6: Comparative Analysis of Stadium Financing Models Across Europe

6.2 The Economics of a Modern Stadium: Justifying the Billion-Pound Bet

The modern stadium is an economic engine, and its design and financing are predicated on maximising a diverse range of revenue streams far beyond simple ticket sales. The justification for the enormous capital expenditure lies in transforming the venue into a year-round commercial asset.

• The Revenue Imperative: New stadiums are no longer judged on capacity alone, but on their ability to maximise revenue per seat. This is achieved through a multi-pronged approach:

• Premium Seating & Hospitality: A significant portion of a new stadium’s revenue is generated from VIP boxes, executive suites, and premium clubs, which command vastly higher prices than general admission seats. Juventus, for instance, included 84 executive suites in their new stadium design.
• Naming Rights: A long-term naming rights deal is now a standard and critical component of any financing plan, providing a guaranteed, multi-million-euro annual revenue stream. The deals for the Allianz Arena, Emirates Stadium, and Groupama Stadium are prime examples. Hill Dickenson being an innovative and more locally focused naming rights partner.
• Multi-Use Functionality: The ability to host concerts, conferences, and other sporting events like NFL games is central to the modern stadium business model. The Tottenham Hotspur Stadium was explicitly designed for this, a strategy that resulted in its matchday income doubling in its first few years of operation.13 Atlético Madrid’s “City of Sport” concept represents the ultimate expression of this trend, creating a destination that generates revenue 365 days a year.

While a new stadium can dramatically increase a club’s valuation—Tottenham’s value reportedly increased by 45% in the year after their stadium opened—it also creates immense financial pressure. The cases of Leicester City’s fall into administration and Schalke 04’s 18-year debt repayment period serve as stark warnings that the billion-pound bet on a new stadium is not without significant risk.

6.3 Future Trends and Outlook

The European stadium landscape continues to evolve, driven by financial innovation, technological advancements, and the ever-increasing commercialisation of football.

• The Rise of Private Equity: The growing involvement of private equity firms and alternative lenders, as seen with Ares Management’s stake in Atlético Madrid and MSD Capital’s loan to Southampton, marks a significant shift. As traditional financing becomes more difficult to secure for all but the very top clubs, this specialised capital will play an increasingly important role, potentially leading to more leveraged buyouts and higher borrowing costs.
• Sustainability and Technology: New builds are placing a greater emphasis on environmental sustainability and technological integration. Juventus’s reuse of materials from the old Delle Alpi and Dortmund’s massive solar panel installation are examples of the former, while Tottenham’s retractable pitch and Manchester City’s plans for a “Sky Bar” and enhanced digital connectivity exemplify the latter. Everton have made extensive claims as to the sustainability of our new stadium.
• The Stadium as a Regeneration Anchor: The trend of positioning stadiums as the centrepiece of wider urban regeneration and real estate developments, as seen with Atlético Madrid and Leicester City, is likely to accelerate. This approach helps diversify club revenues and can be crucial in securing the necessary public and political support for planning and infrastructure.
• The Widening Gap: Ultimately, the ability to finance and construct a new, revenue-generating stadium is becoming a key differentiator between the continent’s super-clubs and the rest. This “infrastructure gap” will likely exacerbate the existing financial and competitive disparities in European football, creating a virtuous cycle for the few who can afford to build these modern cathedrals of commerce, and a significant barrier to entry for those who cannot.

Everton – this can only be phase I of a greater development surely?

The comparisons in financing, use and infrastructure builds of differing new stadia across Europe is fascinating. For me it demonstrates that in almost every respect, despite us moving into the Hill Dickenson Stadium in a few days, there is so much more to do.

Our financing is now secured, on a much more solid and one assumes cost effective basis. The £350 million JP Morgan led senior debt package brings some certainty to a project that for the vast majority of its time had everything but certainty.

To fully utilise the commercial opportunities much more has to be done – the hinted at acquisition of the adjoining Nelson Dock and the building of a sporting arena plus hotels seems an obvious next step – assuming the Friedkins want to play in the property development game.

Infrastructure and public funding, plus political support at local and national level has been woefully inadequate, even by the UK’s standards in such matters. This has to be a major priority going forwards to ensure the travelling experience matches the in stadium experience.

Finally the role of the Hill Dickenson stadium in North Liverpool’s redevelopment. It is without any form of exaggeration that I have despaired at the lack of vision, the lack of alignment of interests and the lack of progress made by any of the interest parties, public and private, so far. 

We as Evertonians should demand more, as should all the good people of Liverpool, particularly those living in the economically challenged and deprived north of the city.

Other cities around Europe can do it, have done it, and are planning to do it. Why can’t we?