Lancashire County Cricket Club annual-accounts-2025

The 2025 accounts show a reported surplus before tax of £25.8 million, total assets less current liabilities of £73.2 million, and net assets up from £7.6 million to £33.4 million.

The official narrative describes the year as transformational, the balance sheet as the strongest in the Club’s history, and the business as resilient. Each of these statements is, in isolation and without context, defensible but has to be qualified.

When the £29.2 million dividend from the Hundred franchise sale is separated from underlying operations, a very different picture emerges. 

• Underlying trading profit year on year has fallen by roughly two-thirds.
• Costs have grown more than six times faster than revenue.
• Cash flow is negative, with a significant debt bullet payment looming
• Conference, hotel and miscellaneous revenue lines have all softened.
• The Club has held two Special General Meetings in the year, lost its Chair, and faced an open vote of no confidence in its governance arrangements. 
• The 2026 outlook is materially weaker on the income side, with no Test match, no concert programme, and meaningful cost headwinds.

This report sets out the financial analysis in detail, projects the 2026 financial year on a bottom-up basis, and provides cash flow and debt analysis that put the headline numbers into proper context. 

It also benchmarks Lancashire against its nearest peer, Warwickshire, which made materially different strategic choices around the Hundred.

Headline is almost entirely a one-off event

The reported £25.8 million surplus is overwhelmingly the product of the £29.2 million dividend received from the ECB following the Hundred franchise sale (Note 3). This is non-recurring. Stripping it out:

• Operating profit before exceptional items falls from £30.7 million to approximately £1.5 million. The CEO confirms this on page 15 of the Strategic Report: “delivering a trading profit of just under £1.5 million is a creditable result”.
• That £1.5 million underlying trading profit compares with £4.7 million in 2024, meaning underlying business profit has fallen by two-thirds year-on-year.
• After depreciation (£2.65 million) and finance charges (£2.73 million), the underlying position before the dividend would have been a loss of approximately £3.4 million, against a barely-positive £200k in 2024.

The Club’s public messaging emphasises the £73.2 million “Assets less Current Liabilities” milestone and the transformational completion of the Hundred deal. That is fair. But the press release notably does not separate trading performance from the one-off receipt. A reader who only sees the headlines could reasonably assume the core business is thriving.

By any objective analysis, it is not.

Cost base has run away from revenue

This is the single biggest concern in the accounts:

Costs are growing six times faster than revenue. The salary line is particularly striking: total wage cost has gone up by £1.06 million while headcount has fallen by 128 people, partly through outsourcing of catering and retail. The cost per employee has therefore risen sharply, partly explained by the well-flagged and positive National Living Wage plus Employer National Insurance increases, and partly by first-team squad investment, but it remains a material operational gearing risk if revenue stays flat.

The CEO is candid in the Strategic Report: payroll has risen £2.4 million (22%) since 2019 and utilities by 56%, with business rates set to add a further £0.4 million over the next two years. The cumulative pressure on margins will continue unless top-line growth resumes.

Revenue mix shows diversification softness

The Club’s strategic narrative is built on a diversified business model anchored by the hotel, conference and events operations. The 2025 numbers do not support that narrative this year:

• Hotel revenue: £8.48 million (down 1.2% on £8.58 million); average daily rate slightly down.
• Conference and events: £3.88 million (down 7.2% on £4.18 million), significant in a year supposedly characterised by international fixtures driving footfall.
• Miscellaneous income collapsed from £3.09 million to £0.83 million, almost entirely because of the absence of concerts (three sold-out nights in 2024, zero in 2025). No concerts are forecast for 2026 either.
• Retail revenue dropped from £382k to £57k following the outsourcing to Castore. This removes risk, but also removes margin upside.
• ECB distributions marginally lower at £5.33 million versus £5.40 million.

The genuinely strong line was cricket itself: match receipts up 44% to £7.7 million, hospitality up 40% to £3.1 million. But this is entirely a function of the India men’s Test, the historic women’s IT20 v India (9,812 attendees, a record for a Lancashire women’s fixture) and the South Africa men’s IT20. 

The 2026 international programme is materially weaker.

Exceptional items: small but telling

Note 25 shows £391k of exceptional administrative expenses (up from £63k in 2024), comprising £288k of restructuring costs (linked to outsourcing of cleaning, plus the retail transition), £68k for two Special General Meetings, and £34k of legal and professional advice.

The SGM cost is the more interesting line. £68k is what it cost the Club to deal with a vote of no confidence in the Nominations Committee and a now superseded resolution to remove the Chair. While exceptional in accounting terms, it is symptomatic of a wider governance situation. 

It is also worth noting that £288k of restructuring is being booked as exceptional: this is at the margin of what should arguably be considered operational in a service business that is regularly outsourcing functions.

Cash Flow 

The 2025 cash flow statement is the document that, in my view, most clearly reveals the underlying operational picture once the dividend is stripped out.

Reconciliation of the £24.5m operating cash inflow

Strip out the £29.2 million Hundred dividend (which sits inside the £25.8 million surplus, as both income and cash) and underlying operating cash flow was approximately negative £4.6 million against positive £4.2 million in 2024. That is a year-on-year deterioration of nearly £8.8 million at the cash level.

Two things drove this:

(i) Working capital reversal of £5.7 million

In 2024 the Club ended the year with £5,975k of deferred income (mostly pre-sold 2025 cricket tickets and hospitality for the India Test). In 2025 that revenue was earned and the deferred income balance ran down to £2,860k. The £3.1 million drop is a cash outflow in working capital terms because the cash was received in 2024 but recognised as revenue in 2025.

This matters for 2026: the closing 2025 deferred income balance of £2.86 million is less than half what it was a year earlier. With less significant cricket fixtures in 2026, the deferred income balance is unlikely to rebuild meaningfully. The advance ticket sales tailwind that benefited 2024 cash flow will not repeat.

Separately, trade creditors fell sharply from £2.557 million to £372k, a £2.2 million cash outflow as the Club paid down suppliers (eased by the dividend). This is a one-off catch-up.

(ii) Underlying trading deterioration

The remaining year-on-year cash deterioration of approximately £3.1m reflects the underlying operational weakness already described above.

Cash use in 2025

The decision to direct £13.3 million at debt rather than build a larger cash war chest was correct. But the implication is that the £8.2 million year-end cash position is what remains of a £29.2 million dividend after debt repayment, trade creditor catch-up, working capital normalisation, and Capex.

Balance Sheet: Genuinely transformed, albeit with some question marks

Credit where due, the balance sheet transformation is real, albeit driven by an exceptional item

Three items merit specific attention:

Investment in Associate (£758k, Note 10)

The Club has capitalised £758k of transaction costs relating to its 30% holding in Manchester Originals Limited. Critically, no share of the associate’s profit or loss has been recognised because the associate’s financial statements were not available. 

While disclosed, this is somewhat unusual for a 30% holding in an entity owned alongside a professional PE-backed counterparty (RPSG). It also means the £758k will need to be tested for impairment in 2026 once results are available, and members have very limited visibility into the value of this stake right now.

Strategic divergence on the Hundred

The most interesting comparison here is with Warwickshire, who retained a controlling 51% stake in Birmingham Phoenix and have consolidated £7.6 million of Hundred revenues into their 2025 accounts. Lancashire took the lump-sum dividend route and now retain only a 30% interest. The accounting treatment hides the long-term economic difference: Lancashire have monetised early, Warwickshire have potentially a much greater upside. Which approach proves wiser depends entirely on the Hundred’s future trajectory.

Contingent liability: Trafford Council prosecution (Note 20)

A prosecution notice from Trafford Council under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, served in 2024, with a court hearing now set for 1 March 2027. No provision has been made in the accounts. The disclosure is appropriate, but the absence of any quantification, combined with the long delay before trial, means members and readers cannot easily assess the risk. A successful prosecution could result in an unlimited fine, costs, and reputational damage.

Debt analysis

The Structure Today

This is a genuine and material deleveraging: debt has been cut by 42% in one year. The other loans of £1.5 million have been cleared in full. Three finance leases were also settled early. The strategic decision to prioritise debt reduction once the dividend was received is unambiguously sound.

Maturity profile: 2029 cliff

This is the single most important debt disclosure in the accounts (Note 16):

91% of the debt, £16.5 million, falls due between 2027 and 2030, with the Strategic Report explicitly confirming refinancing is due in “early 2029”. This is effectively a bullet maturity. 

The Club is therefore exposed to a single refinancing event in three years’ time, the terms of which will depend on prevailing rates, the Club’s trading position at that time, and the security position over Old Trafford (the land is subject to a first legal charge in favour of Metro Bank).

The Treasurer’s framing, that the Club is due to refinance in early 2029 when it will be in a good position to maximise the best borrowing deal, is correct only in that the lower debt level makes refinancing easier (all things being equal). But it ignores the binary nature of the refinancing risk. If 2027 and 2028 trading is poor, if macro-economic conditions deteriorate or if interest rates spike, the refinancing terms could be materially worse or more difficult to achieve than today’s.

Interest rate cap

The interest rate cap is an underappreciated item. The Club purchased a 3% cap in September 2021 on a notional of £24,572k. Today’s actual debt of £18.3m is materially less than the notional, meaning the Club is over-hedged.

The £586k loss reflects the market’s expectation that Bank of England base rates will spend more of the cap’s remaining life below 3% than was assumed a year ago. This is non-cash but it is real economic value lost: the protection is worth less because rates are lower. The cap also raises a capital allocation question: with £8.2 million of cash and a cap that is over-hedged, the Club is in the slightly awkward position of paying a hedge premium on debt it has already repaid.

Blended cost of debt

A 7.4% blended cost is relatively expensive, understandable given the Club’s covenant history but a real drag. Every £10 million of debt costs about £740k of cash interest annually. It is possible, but not certain, the 2029 refinancing will be done at a lower rate provided trading is solid and the broader rate environment cooperates.

Often overlooked: the Club has received £32.8 million of capital grants over the years. These are repayable if grant conditions are breached. None have been breached, and there is no current indication this will change, but it is a £32.8 million contingent liability that does not appear on the balance sheet as debt. For context, that is more than 90% of annual turnover.

The unamortised grant balance (£19.55 million at 31 December 2025) is being released to the P&L as the assets depreciate, providing a useful £776k tailwind to reported profit each year. This is real, but worth noting that it is not cash income.

Financial covenants

The Finance Report states: “All repayment and covenant requirements for 2025 have been met.” The covenants themselves are not disclosed. In typical commercial property/leisure loans, covenants would be expected to include some form of debt service cover ratio, interest cover, and possibly loan-to-value against the secured property. With underlying operating cash flow projected to be negative in 2026, DSCR will be the covenant most at risk unless further Hundred dividends are recycled through operating activities. This is something members are not given visibility on, and would be a fair question to raise at the AGM.

Smaller but notable items

• Restated 2024 share capital (Note 19). A 2024 understatement of share capital by £79 (because the eligible voting membership count had been wrong by 1,587 members) has been corrected. While not financially material, having to restate the number of voting members in the prior year is a control weakness in something fundamental to a members’ club.
• Unused tax losses of £9.28m (Note 8). Up from £6.90 million in 2024. This is the accumulated effect of years of accounting losses before the Hundred windfall. The deferred tax asset recognised is unchanged at £430k, suggesting management see only a modest portion as realistically recoverable.
• Membership numbers slipped from 6,609 to 6,470 (Note 19), a 2% decline. The Chair’s statement claims “over 8,000 Members” for 2026, but the 2024 release also claimed “over 9,000 in 2025”. The two figures may be measuring different things, but the disclosure could be clearer.
• Pension contributions in arrears: £114k unpaid at year-end (Note 2g), broadly in line with the £113k owed at the end of 2024. Not material, not unusual, but it has now been a feature for two consecutive year-ends.

Peer comparison

The recent Leonard Curtis Cricket Finance Report (2025) groups Lancashire with Surrey and Warwickshire as the “big three”, between them generating 44% of all county cricket revenue in 2023. The most relevant peer comparison is Warwickshire, whose 2025 results are now public:

Two observations. First, Warwickshire’s underlying operating profit (£2.4 million, up from £0.07 million) is approximately 60% higher than Lancashire’s underlying trading profit. Second, Warwickshire’s strategic decision to retain control of Birmingham Phoenix means they consolidate Hundred revenues every year. Lancashire’s £29 million is a single payment with future amounts at the ECB’s discretion and conditional on approved use cases.

That said, Lancashire in relative terms are better placed than some. Looking down the league, two counties are in ECB Special Measures (mentioned in passing in the Strategic Report), and several lower-tier counties rely on the ECB for 50-70% of revenue. Lancashire’s ECB dependence is around 15%. The Club is in the top tier financially. The question is whether it has used its Hundred windfall as well as it could have.

Governance and the public narrative

The official communications emphasise three points: the “strongest balance sheet in history”; “strong performances across international cricket, domestic matchday revenues and our off-field commercial operations” (cricket revenue yes, off-field commercial operations softer); and a “resilient business model and clear platform for sustainable long-term growth” (the underlying numbers suggest more pressure than that language implies).

Meanwhile the public record around the Club is markedly more turbulent than these accounts suggest. 

Andy Anson resigned as Chair the day after a Special General Meeting petition arrived (he disputes the timing was related). Rachel Downey resigned from the Board in mid-December 2025. James Sheridan resigned earlier in the year. There were two SGMs in 2025 (one of which had to be reconvened for legal clarification), and press coverage in October described members accusing the Club of being run like “a third-rate banana republic”. A vote of no confidence in the Nominations Committee remained on the table at year-end. The accounts capture some of this through the £68k SGM exceptional cost, but the narrative sections are silent on the substance of the disputes.

The Corporate Governance section notes that meeting attendance was generally strong, with one notable exception: the resigning Chair attended 0 of 2 Nominations Committee meetings that year. The phrase “no conflicts of interest declared” sits slightly oddly next to “two Special General Meetings”.

2026 Financial Year Projection

Fixture programme: 2025 vs 2026

Economic significance of losing the Test

This is the single biggest revenue swing. A five-day men’s Test at Old Trafford is the highest-value fixture available to any northern county. Based on the 2025 numbers and the disclosures, a reasonable working estimate is that the India Test alone contributed something in the order of £4-5 million of gross revenue across cricket match receipts, hospitality, and catering, with very high incremental margins because the fixed costs of opening the ground are already being absorbed by other days.

The 2024 accounts (with a Sri Lanka Test, generally a lower-revenue draw) recorded cricket match receipts of £5,366k. The 2025 figure jumped to £7,715k. Most of that £2.3 million delta is the India Test. In 2026, with no Test at all, cricket receipts should logically fall back to a number below 2024.

The two men’s IT20s plus four Women’s World Cup match days will provide some offset, but ICC global tournament hosting economics work differently from bilateral international fixtures: the ICC typically retains most commercial rights and pays the host a hosting fee, which is generally substantially below what a host generates from a self-staged bilateral fixture. The Club has not disclosed the hosting fee, but it would be unusual for it to fully replace the lost Test revenue.

Bottom-Up revenue projection for 2026

Using 2024 (a Sri Lanka Test year) as a more relevant baseline for the cricket lines than 2025, and applying the CEO’s “reasonably prudent” framing:

That is a projected revenue decline of approximately £4.8 million to £6.3 million, or -14% to -18%.

The CEO’s own framing (“International cricket will be challenging financially compared to previous years … other trading revenues outside of cricket are not expected to be materially different”) is consistent with this range, though arguably he is understating it, since hospitality and catering will fall along with cricket receipts.

Cost base 2026

The cost-side picture is the difficult one. 

The Strategic Report and Finance Report flag business rates rising £0.2 million in 2026 and a further £0.2 million in 2027 (cumulative 40% increase on 2025); continuing wage inflation, the April NLW step-up, and full-year impact of higher employer NI; utility market volatility; investment in playing squads (Meg Lanning, Ben McDermott, retained men’s overseas), with women’s playing budget rising as Tier One professionalisation embeds; partially offset by lower match-related cricket expenses (2025: £6,275k) and structural cost relief from outsourcing cleaning and retail.

A reasonable expectation is that the underlying cost base stays approximately flat in absolute terms (£32-33 million), as match-driven cost reductions offset inflation. That implies:

This is before any further Hundred dividend (which the Outlook section anticipates but does not quantify) and before depreciation and interest. On a fully-loaded basis, without further dividends, 2026 could be a £6-9 million statutory loss year. 

That is not catastrophic given the cash cushion built in 2025, but it underscores that the underlying business cannot self-fund the current cost base in a normal year. This is precisely why the ECB has structured Hundred proceeds with strict guardrails on use.

Projected 2026 cash flow

On the base case projection above:

In other words, without further Hundred dividend inflows in 2026, the Club would burn through roughly half its current cash balance.

Given the ECB’s published guardrails (debt repayment, mandatory cash reserve, revenue-generating capex), and the Club’s mention that “the Club will continue to receive proceeds … by way of dividends over the next few years,” it is reasonable to assume additional tranches will arrive. But quantum and timing are not disclosed and each application requires ECB approval.

The £5m mandatory cash reserve agreed with the ECB is a notable floor: usable cash above the reserve is only £3.2 million at year-end 2025. That is not a large cushion for a business of this scale facing the cost pressures described.

Summary conclusions

The fair conclusion is that 2025 was a good transactional year (based on cash realisation of part disposal of a significant asset) and a difficult operational one. The Hundred completion was genuinely transformational and has been deployed sensibly: debt down £13 million cash up £8 million, an agreed £5 m illionmandatory reserve, and meaningful capital investment at Farington and Old Trafford. That deserves acknowledgement.

But behind the headline:

• Underlying trading profit has collapsed roughly two-thirds, from £4.7m to £1.5m.

• Costs have grown over six times faster than revenue.

• The diversified non-cricket revenue base has slipped this year.

• Underlying operating cash flow was approximately negative £4.6 million once the dividend is stripped out.

• 2026 has a weaker international fixture programme, no concert income forecast, and projected revenue decline of £4.8 million to £6.3 million.

• Underlying operations may consume £4-5 million of cash in 2026 without further dividend tranches.

• The 30% Hundred stake delivers less recurring upside than peers like Warwickshire have secured.

• 91% of remaining debt (£16.5 million) matures in 2029 as a near-bullet, exposing the Club to refinancing risk.

• A material H&S prosecution sits unprovided.

• Governance has been openly disputed by a significant number of the membership and is not addressed in the narrative reports.

The Treasurer’s adoption of a reasonably prudent forecast for 2026 is partially accurate but does not portray an organisation in the full flushes of a growth cycle. Indeed, the risk is that the apparent strength of the 2025 accounts creates complacency: the Hundred dividend has given the Club a financial cushion, but it has not solved the underlying margin compression in the trading business. 

The strategic question for 2026 is whether the Club uses the breathing space from the Hundred dividend to make the underlying trading business profitable again, or whether the dividend simply funds two or three years of declining underlying operations. Warwickshire’s choice to consolidate Birmingham Phoenix gives them a recurring Hundred revenue line that may make this question less acute for them. Lancashire’s 30% stake will produce smaller and less reliable annual flows once dividend tranches end.

The real test will be the 2026 and 2027 accounts, once the dividend recedes from view.

Additionally the genuine governance concerns in what is still a member based organisation form a backdrop that is not supportive of better board/executive/member relationships, nor supportive of a more favourable operating background and executive performance, nor provides existing and future commercial partners with confidence that Lancashire County Cricket Club despite its history, stature and relative size, offer positive partnering opportunities.

There are significant headwinds, trading and financial hurdles ahead and what a dispassionate observer may describe as limited evidence of a leadership team capable of successfully overcoming such challenges in the immediate future.

It is difficult, indeed impossible, to present a case anywhere near as bullish as the official commentary surrounding the publication of the 2025 financial results and annual report.