The Analysis Series

Everton & Crystal Palace valuations, five-year capital requirements and a stress test of the reported £900m Crystal Palace valuation

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Prepared by:  Paul Quinn, CWTE Limited

Date:  7 October 2026

Headline conclusions

Everton: central equity value about £360m (range £270m–£455m); enterprise value about £790m (range £700m–£880m). Five-year owner equity requirement about £450m (range £400m–£550m).

Crystal Palace: the reported £900m is an owners’ asking price, not a transaction, and is not justified as a current value. Evidenced equity value about £550m (range £480m–£650m).

 

Summary

Everton’s equity is worth about £360m at the centre of a £270m–£455m range, slightly below my earlier September 2026 central estimate of £400m. The reduction arises solely from treating the £35.1m Burnley compensation award (plus accruing interest), currently under appeal, as a debt-like item. Over 2026/27–2030/31 the club needs approximately £450m of further owner equity.

The £900m figure attached to Crystal Palace is an asking price set by the owners for a Raine-run investment process. The evidence does not support it as a current value. Palace’s equity is worth about £550m, in a range of £480m–£650m.

Key findings

  • Identical revenue, divergent balance sheets. In 2024/25 Everton (£196.7m) and Palace (£196.6m) had almost exactly the same turnover. Everton has already built and refinanced an £813.1m stadium and carries £468.5m of borrowings. Palace carries much less debt,  a reported £125m Goldman Sachs-led facility,  but still has a £200m+ Main Stand to fund. The owners’ asking prices invert the fundamentals.
  • Higher interest rates hurt Palace more than Everton. The Bank of England held Bank Rate at 3.75% on 17 September 2026 (6–3, three votes for an increase); the Fed raised to 3.75%–4.00% on 16 September. Everton’s £350m private placement is fixed to 2055; Palace is seeking stand funding in a rising-rate market.
  • Squad Cost Ratio constrains both clubs, differently. Everton entered SCR outside the 85% limit. Palace’s European participation brings in the 70% UEFA limit, which forces continued player sales and undermines the “regular European club” thesis behind £900m.
  • Discounted cash flow supports neither price. On a cash-flow basis Everton’s EV is £100m–£300m, below its net debt. Premier League club values are predominantly a scarcity premium plus a future-sale option. Liverpool’s minority deal (about £5.5bn implied) and NFL multiples (Sportico: average 12.7x revenue) show where buyers price scarcity; they are a reason for disciplined multiples, not for paying any price.
  • Manchester City. An independent commission found City guilty of 114 of 115 charges of serious financial breaches (2009/10–2017/18). City lodged an appeal on 1 October 2026; no sanction has been imposed. For Everton and Palace, compensation claims should be valued at nil.

Methodology

Evidential hierarchy

Tier Category Examples
1 Audited fact Statutory accounts; club-published financial reviews
2 Documented fact Premier League, central bank and regulator statements
3 Reported figures Financial and sports press, credited to the outlet
4 My estimates Labelled as such throughout

 

Valuation methods

  • EV/revenue multiples benchmarked to recent Premier League transactions.
  • Comparable transactions (Johnson/Palace 2025; Friedkin/Everton 2024).
  • Stadium-adjusted sum of the parts.
  • Unlevered DCF as an intrinsic cross-check: WACC 9.5%–10.5%, terminal growth 3%.

Bridges and models

  • EV to equity: equity = EV less last audited net debt, less debt-like items (the Burnley award).
  • Capital requirement: five-year sources and uses, rolled forward one year from my 6 September 2026 model to 2026/27–2030/31; updated for the summer 2026 window, the Burnley ruling, the RCF maturity and the post-September rate environment.
  • Data basis: public sources only. Neither club’s 2025/26 accounts have been filed.

Everton FC: Revaluation and capital requirements

Audited baseline (year to 30 June 2025)

Line FY2024/25 FY2023/24 Note
Turnover £196.7m £186.9m Club record
  Broadcasting £129.2m £129.2m 16 live UK picks vs 23; facility fees £13.6m vs £20.1m
  Gate receipts £20.3m £19.1m Final Goodison season
  Sponsorship & merchandising £24.3m £21.6m Red Bull, Nemiroff, Corpay
  Other commercial £22.9m £17.0m Includes non-recurring Goodison legacy sales
Staff costs £152.1m £156.6m 77% of revenue (74% adjusted for outsourced retail/catering)
Player amortisation £50.9m £64.6m
Profit on player sales £31.3m £48.5m Onana the main contributor
Internal disposal gain £49.2m — Everton Women and Goodison sold to parent Roundhouse
Interest charged to P&L £14.6m £10.5m A further £32.3m capitalised into the stadium
Statutory loss £8.6m £53.2m
Underlying loss excl. internal sale £57.8m The figure that matters

 

Analyst note: headline versus underlying

The club’s release cites an operating profit before player trading of £28.3m. My reconstruction of the same accounts, on a different cost classification, shows an operating loss of £20.9m before trading. Boards should use underlying figures, not the club’s headline.

 

Balance sheet at 30 June 2025

  • Total borrowings £468.5m: £127.6m due within one year (JP Morgan five-year RCF and short-term loans) and £341.0m due after five years (the £350m JP Morgan-arranged private placement, maturing 30 June 2055).
  • Cash £79.1m, giving net debt of £389.4m. Shareholders’ funds £393.3m.

Legacy debt clean-up (completed)

  • Moshiri/Bluesky loans of £450.75m converted to equity; Roundhouse injected £233.4m of new equity.
  • Rights & Media Funding repaid in full.
  • About £200m owed to 777 Partners/A-CAP settled for about £66m cash (c.33p in the pound) plus non-voting preferred equity and warrants.
  • The remaining PSR charge was dropped in January 2025.

Changes since the September 2026 report

  • Stake process: the FT reported on 3 September 2026 that The Friedkin Group (TFG) is working with advisers on an early-stage process that could see a significant minority stake sold. No valuation, stake size or adviser has been reported. Christopher Sarofim (reported >9.9%) and Jason Kidd took equity in Roundhouse Capital during 2025.
  • Summer 2026 window: Iliman Ndiaye to Manchester City for £60m plus up to £5m add-ons; Beto (c.£15m), Iroegbunam (c.£13m initial) and Patterson also left. Net-spend figures conflict (from c.£34m net spend to c.£22m net sales). My reading: roughly cash-neutral, with a large 2026/27 profit on disposal given Ndiaye’s low book value.
  • SCR position: PSRwatch estimates c.89.4% after the window against the 85% threshold (third-party estimate).
  • Burnley ruling (10 June 2026): £26m damages plus £9.1m interest (£35.1m); Burnley sought £51.7m. Interest continues to accrue (11.81% on my reading of PLJP 2023/3), taking the total towards c.£40m. Everton has appealed. Treated as debt-like until decided.
  • League position: 13th in 2025/26 on 49 points; average league attendance 52,132. After five games of 2026/27: 7th on 9 points, unbeaten, and in the Carabao Cup last 16.
  • Stadium economics: adds c.£35m–£40m revenue but c.£48m–£52m of new depreciation and interest no longer capitalised,  transformative for EV, roughly neutral to negative for early reported profit. Naming rights disputed (£10m p.a. per Telegraph/SportsPro vs c.£6m plus add-ons per my sourcing).

Price paid by Friedkin versus implied value

Measure Figure Source
Headline deal value In excess of £400m BBC
Reported equity acquisition cost c.£231m (c.£400m  Press reports
Implied EV/revenue multiple at entry c.2.1x–2.6x  

my calculation

 

On my central estimate TFG is at or slightly below breakeven on paper, consistent with raising minority capital at a fair price, not exiting at a premium.

Valuation

Method EV Equity (after £389.4m net debt and £38m Burnley) Comment
EV/revenue 3.0–3.8x on FY25/26E £232m (central 3.4x) £696m–£882m (central £789m) £270m–£455m (central £360m) Premium to usual 2x for owned new-build stadium
Comparable transactions (2.1–2.6x) £490m–£600m £60m–£175m Floor case; ignores stadium coming into use
Stadium-adjusted sum of the parts c.£690m–£750m c.£265m–£325m Football ops at 2.0x non-stadium revenue plus capitalised stadium uplift
Unlevered DCF (WACC 9.5–10.5%, g=3%, FCF c.£35m) c.£100m–£300m Negative Intrinsic cash flows do not cover net debt
Conclusion £700m–£880m; central c.£790m £270m–£455m; central c.£360m Down from £400m solely due to Burnley award

 

Downside risks to the equity value

Everton’s equity value is a Premier League scarcity option, not a cash-flow stream. That option collapses on relegation, when fixed depreciation and interest of c.£52m–£56m remain.

The 2025/26 accounts will probably show cash below £79.1m (the summer 2025 window alone cost an estimated net £114.3m). Each £25m of extra net debt removes £25m of equity.

Any change-of-control prepayment clause in the private placement would alter control-deal economics. This has not been verified.

A 25% minority stake would be worth c.£90 m before a 10%–20% discount for lack of control.

 

Five-year capital requirement, 2026/27–2030/31

£m FY26/27 FY27/28 FY28/29 FY29/30 FY30/31 Total
EBITDA 3 9 14 20 25 71
Cash interest (32) (32) (31) (30) (29) (154)
Net player capex (10) (35) (35) (35) (35) (150)
Training ground, academy, data, commercial (25) (45) (45) (35) (30) (180)
Private placement amortisation (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) (45)
Burnley compensation (contingent) (38) — — — — (38)
Gross cash requirement (111) (112) (106) (89) (78) (496)
Less opening liquidity and RCF headroom c.50
Owner equity requirement c.£450m (£400m–£550m)

 

Assumptions and sensitivities

  • Women’s team and Goodison Park: now within Roundhouse; their £20m–£25m five-year cost is a group-level call on the owner. Goodison redevelopment beyond operating costs is not modelled.
  • Refinancing: the JP Morgan RCF (£127.6m drawn at June 2025) was taken out in December 2024 and matures around December 2029, inside the window. A 100bp rise in its cost adds only c.£1.3m p.a.; the material exposure is refinancing and any change-of-control clause.
  • European qualification: adds perhaps £20m–£40m of revenue, but the 70% UEFA SCR limit would require cutting squad cost by c.£38m; first-year net effect roughly neutral.
  • Relegation: adds £150m–£200m to the equity requirement and would probably eliminate equity value.

Everton conclusion

TFG has done the expensive, value-creating work: the debt clean-up, the stadium and the refinancing. A minority investor is paying for that work, not earning it. Minority pricing should be contingent on the 2025/26 accounts (matchday revenue above £50m and commercial revenue above £60m would justify the upper half of the range), on disclosure of the private placement’s change-of-control terms, and on a specific indemnity or escrow for the Burnley appeal. A strong start to the season is not a reason to pay above the central estimate.

The Current Environment

Macro and the cost of capital

Economy Position Outlook
UK Bank Rate 3.75%, held 17 Sept 2026 (6–3; Pill, Mann, Greene for 4%). CPI 3.1% in August BoE expects slightly above 4% in early 2027; markets price c.4.4% by March 2027. Next decision 5 November
US Fed raised 25bp to 3.75%–4.00% on 16 Sept 2026 (12–0) Median dot 4.1% at end-2026: one more increase implied
Euro area ECB deposit rate 2.50% from 10 Sept 2026 —

 

Football’s cost of debt is roughly 50–100bp higher than in February 2025, when Everton priced its £350m placement. I add 50bp to the WACC for clubs still needing new money (Palace) and nothing for clubs whose financing is locked in (Everton’s placement).

Private credit stress

  • Eagle Football: Eagle Football Holdings Bidco entered UK administration in March 2026 after defaulting on Ares facilities; Ares was owed more than $547m (Bloomberg, 3 June 2026). Ares Capital booked a $70m realised loss in Q2 2026, having marked part of the position to c.16 cents in the dollar.
  • 777/A-CAP: still in multi-jurisdictional litigation, with further insolvency proceedings reported in August 2026.
  • Read-across: lenders now price clubs on sponsor quality and security. Everton (TFG backing, stadium security) and Palace (Goldman-led, partly stadium-linked) sit at the good end; highly leveraged multi-club structures are hard to finance, shrinking the pool of credible minority buyers.

Investor appetite and valuation trends

  • US sports: Sportico’s 2026 NFL valuations average $9.34bn (+31%) on revenue up only 6%, lifting the average multiple to 12.7x — more than double the 6.2x of 2020.
  • Premier League: FSG’s August 2026 sale to the Bhatia/Bezos consortium valued Liverpool at c.£5.5bn (reported as c.30% for £1.65bn, or 38% for more than £2bn). City AM notes this has encouraged other clubs to seek investment.
  • Caution: the LIV Golf Chapter 11 filing (September 2026) shows the fragility of sports assets reliant on owner willingness. NFL multiples reflect closed leagues and salary caps; clubs outside the top six carry relegation risk and should not be priced off them.

Broadcast rights

  • Domestic, 2025–29: £6.7bn over four years; live rights value up c.4%.
  • International: annual value reported up 23% to c.£2.17bn per season from 2025/26; secondary sources describe a c.£6.5bn three-year deal (2025–28).
  • Implication: central income is locked in to 2029 regardless of the City case. Integrity risk surfaces at the next domestic tender (c.2027/28). For mid-table clubs the risk lies in variable elements (Everton’s flat £129.2m reflects fewer live picks).

The Manchester City verdict: what is established

Element Status Classification
Findings Guilty of serious financial-rule breaches 2009/10–2017/18; 114 of 115 charges, one non-cooperation charge not upheld Confirmed by PL on 29 Sept 2026; count reported by The Athletic
Substance Sham commercial arrangements inflated revenue and reduced costs by more than £900m; more than £830m was disguised ADUG funding; misstated accounts; deliberate circumvention of the rules PL summary of commission findings
Sanction None imposed; set by the same commission at a separate private hearing. Rule W64 permits fines, points deductions, expulsion or other orders Documented
Appeal Lodged 1 Oct 2026. Hearing within 12 weeks, max five days, decision within 30 days. No CAS route; High Court challenge reported as possible Confirmed; High Court point reported
City’s position Denies wrongdoing; calls the findings unsafe; CEO describes the case as a conspiracy theory Documented
Possible scale Maguire suggests 40–60 points; Sky reports expulsion unlikely to command 15 votes Opinion and press

 

On the stated timetable, an appeal decision is likely by late January 2027 at the latest, so sanctions may land mid-season. City lead the 2026/27 table with five wins from five.

Implications for valuation

  • League integrity and commercial value: headline risk short term, but contracts to 2029 protect central income. A robust sanction is value-positive medium term; the worse outcome is a prolonged High Court fight leaving the 2026/27 table uncertain.
  • Compensation: Arsenal, Liverpool, Manchester United and Tottenham lodged protective notices in November 2024. Burnley v Everton set the loss-of-opportunity template, with Everton on the paying side. Everton’s best finish in the period was fifth (2013/14); Palace was outside the Premier League until 2013/14 and mid-table thereafter. Causation is speculative for both.
  • Regulatory risk premia: enforcement credibility reduces the discount for compliant clubs, but the proven cost of breaching rules raises downside for clubs near the limits. I add 25–50 bp to Everton’s discount rate (SCR overhang, open Burnley appeal); Palace neutral.
  • Independent Football Regulator: does not decide PL disciplinary cases but sets the frame via owner tests, financial soundness and licensing from autumn 2026. Buyers above 25% face source-of-wealth and fitness tests of up to five months, relevant to deal timing and to structuring stakes below 25%.
  • Table effects: a large City deduction moves every club below them up. For Everton each place is worth c.£2m–£3m in merit payments; expected-value upside under £5m, excluded from the central case.
Treatment adopted

Book City-related compensation receivables at nil for both clubs. Treat any recovery as un-modelled upside.

 

Crystal palace: stress-testing the £900m

Provenance of the figure

  • Original report: City AM (Frank Dalleres and Matt Hardy, 5 October 2026), citing multiple sources: the owners have valued the club at £900m and hired the Raine Group to field investment or sale interest. Palace declined to comment; investment rather than sale is reportedly the priority.
  • Context: the FT reported on 15 June 2026 that the US owners were exploring a sale through Raine. Owners’ rationale: rising sports valuations, scarcity of London Premier League clubs, and the Conference League win.
  • Status: an asking price, not a transaction. Not stated whether equity or enterprise value; no stake size; not reconciled to debt.
  • Johnson benchmark: £190m ($254m) for Textor’s 43% stake (ESPN, 23 June 2025; completed 24 July 2025). Swiss Ramble says 45%. Implies c.£442m for 100%.
  • Textor’s view: argued Palace could command four to six times revenue while conceding nobody else believed it, a self-interested view with a telling caveat.

Financial baseline

Line FY2024/25 FY2023/24
Turnover £196.6m £190.2m
Broadcasting / commercial / gate £142.3m / £38.7m / £15.6m (Swiss Ramble); club split £148.9m / £32.3m / £15.5m £145.5m / £31.0m / £13.8m
Total staff costs £148.3m (75% of revenue) £133.7m
Player wages £110.8m (56% of revenue) £101.8m
Player amortisation £54.1m £46.0m
Operating loss £42.5m £20.7m
Profit on player sales £66.1m (Olise, Andersen, Johnstone) £1.3m
Net interest £15.1m £13.6m
Pre-tax profit / (loss) £8.3m (Maguire: £5m, likely different entity) (£32.9m)
Net liabilities (£35.6m) after £50m intercompany waiver and £37.5m capital raise (£93.9m)

 

Debt

  • Maguire put borrowings at £94m and transfer payables at £67m in 2023/24; net transfer debt c.£66m at the latest year-end (WeArePalace).
  • December 2025: £125m Goldman Sachs-led loan (Bloomberg) replacing an earlier broadcast-secured facility, on more favourable terms with longer repayment tied to the stadium redevelopment. Rate, maturity and covenants undisclosed. Net interest of £15.1m on c.£94m implies the old money was expensive.

2025/26 (not yet filed)

  • Eze to Arsenal (£60m, potentially £67.5m); Guéhi to Manchester City (c.£20m); Strand Larsen signed for a club-record £43m.
  • Conference League winners (1–0 v Rayo Vallecano; c.£17.5m UEFA money); Community Shield winners; 15th in the Premier League on 45 points.
  • Glasner left in May 2026; Pierre Sage appointed June 2026. In 2026/27 Palace are in the Europa League and 15th after five games.
  • Ownership: Johnson c.43%, Harris c.18%, Blitzer c.18%, Parish c.10%; each of the four general partners holds 25% of votes.

Capital requirements, 2026/27–2030/31

Item Estimate Basis
Main Stand (25,486 to 34,259 capacity; hospitality c.2,000 to 8,000+) £200m+ total; c.£8.5m spent by June 2025 Parish (Sept 2026): funding not fully secured; costs up from c.£75m (2017)
Training ground and academy £50m–£80m (estimate) Benchmarked to peer projects; £11.5m spent on rehab centre
Squad investment under SCR Net c.£0–£50m over five years Europa League triggers 70% limit; model depends on sales
Total external capital need c.£200m–£280m Of which c.£75m+ unfunded beyond Goldman facility

 

The new stand is expected to add c.£20m of annual revenue (estimates range £15m–£30m), with a reported payback of up to a decade. On those figures it creates little or no net value; it is a defensive investment.

Can £900m be justified?

Test Result
Multiple on FY24/25 revenue (£196.6m) 4.6x as equity; c.5.2x if £900m is equity plus c.£125m net debt
Multiple on FY25/26E revenue (c.£220m) 4.1x — roughly 1.6–1.8x the Johnson and TFG entry multiples, 14 months on
Comparables Johnson c.2.25x (2025); Everton c.2.1–2.6x; Liverpool c.7–8x (global brand, not comparable)
Pro-forma “everything goes right” case Revenue c.£260m by c.2029 × 3.5x = c.£910m EV. The only route to £900m
Pro-forma discounted to today £910m discounted three years at 10% ≈ £684m, less c.£150m PV of remaining capex = c.£535m
SCR coherence FY24/25 SCR c.66% (player basis) / c.80% (total staff). Staying in Europe under 70% requires repeated top-player sales

 

Verdict

£900m is not justified as a current value. It capitalises a built-out, funded, Europe-every-year Palace in about 2029, without deducting the £200m+ required to get there or the risk of not getting there.

 

Alternative valuation

Low Central High
EV/revenue on FY25/26E £220m 2.75x 3.0x 3.25x
Enterprise value £605m £660m £715m
Less estimated net financial debt (unconfirmed) (£125m) (£125m) (£125m)
Equity £480m £535m £590m
Add: stand option value; London scarcity — +£15m +£60m
Equity range / point estimate £480m c.£550m £650m

 

The point estimate of c.£550m (EV c.£675m) is still about 25% above the Johnson-implied £442m, reflecting two trophies and a European title, the £37.5m equity raise and £50m waiver, and the rise in sports valuations. The £900m ask is about 64% above my point estimate. I expect a minority investor to anchor at £600m–£700m, with preferred terms or stadium-linked structures closing the gap on paper.

Side-by-side comparison

Metric Everton Crystal Palace
FY24/25 revenue £196.7m £196.6m
FY25/26E revenue c.£232m (stadium year 1) c.£220m (Conference League)
Staff costs / revenue £152.1m / 77% £148.3m / 75%
Underlying result excl. one-offs Loss £57.8m Operating loss £42.5m; underlying c.£45m
Stadium Owned new build, 52,888 seats, £813.1m (c.£15.4k/seat) Selhurst Park 25,486; stand c.£200m+ for c.8,800 seats (c.£23k/extra seat)
Borrowings £468.5m gross; £389.4m net c.£125m Goldman-led (reported) plus c.£66m transfer payables
Main capital to spend, five years c.£180m infrastructure; c.£150m net squad c.£200m–£280m stand, training ground, academy
Five-year owner equity need c.£450m c.£100m–£175m (after Goldman funding)
SCR constraint c.89%–93% vs 85% c.66% vs 70% UEFA limit
Reported / asking price No ask; TFG entry >£400m £900m owners’ ask
Author EV / equity c.£790m / c.£360m c.£675m / c.£550m
EV/revenue (FY25/26E) c.3.4x c.3.1x (ask c.4.6x)

 

Why they diverge

  • Everton’s higher EV reflects a stadium already built and in use; its lower equity reflects the debt that built it plus the Burnley liability.
  • Palace has low debt and a good trading record, but its major capital project lies ahead and is only partly funded.
  • The asking prices reflect each seller’s position, not each asset’s value: TFG needs a partner to share the cost of competing; Palace’s owners are exploiting a strong market moment and a period of trophies.

Key risks

Risk Everton Crystal Palace
Relegation Critical: equity likely wiped out against fixed stadium costs High: parachutes and wage clauses help, but stand debt remains
Financing RCF maturity c.Dec 2029; change-of-control clauses undisclosed Stand funding gap in a rising-rate market; Goldman terms undisclosed
Regulatory Burnley appeal (c.£38m); SCR overhang; IFR approval for stakes >25% 70% UEFA SCR limit; multi-club ownership history; IFR tests
City verdict Small table upside; no compensation receivable Same
Execution Commercial repricing timing; Finch Farm replacement Construction inflation; possible redesign requiring new planning consent
Market Higher rates could compress multiples; scarcity buyers may cool £900m ask risks failed process and reputational repricing

 

Recommendations

  • Everton (board or minority investor): price any stake against central equity of c.£360m (EV c.£790m). Make the price conditional on the 2025/26 accounts; require escrow or indemnity for the Burnley appeal; obtain the private placement’s change-of-control terms before any control discussion; structure stakes below 25% where speed matters.
  • Everton (owner): budget c.£450m of equity over five years. Prioritise the training ground, recruitment capability and in-housing catering (to widen the SCR denominator) ahead of wages in the first two years. Plan the RCF refinancing now.
  • Palace (counterparties): treat £900m as an opening ask. Anchor at £550m–£650m of equity. Require the Goldman terms and a fully costed, funded Main Stand plan. Deliver upside through structure (stadium-linked preferred equity, or an earn-out tied to European qualification), not the headline price.
  • Both clubs: book City-related compensation at nil; add 50bp to WACC for unfunded capital needs; re-run valuations once the City sanction and appeal are decided (likely by late January 2027) and after the BoE’s November decision.

Data limitations and caveats

Limitations

Accounts: neither club’s 2025/26 accounts are filed (Everton’s first stadium year; Palace’s European year). All forward figures start from estimates. Palace figures derive from the club-published review and secondary analysis (Swiss Ramble, Maguire, Quinn), not the full Companies House filing; revenue splits and pre-tax profit differ between sources (£8.3m vs £5m).

Not public: Goldman facility terms; Palace’s total borrowings and net debt at June 2025 and 2026; Everton’s commercial contract expiries; the private placement’s change-of-control provisions. The Palace net-debt assumption (c.£125m) is an estimate.

Conflicting reports: Johnson’s stake (43% vs 45%); Everton’s summer 2026 net spend; Hill Dickinson naming-rights value (£10m vs c.£6m); Everton stadium cost (£813.1m vs £844m–£852m); Liverpool stake size (30% vs 38%).

City case: findings confirmed in summary by the Premier League; full reasons, sanction and appeal outcome are not public. Points scenarios are commentary, not forecasts.

Not assessed: UK tax changes; Deloitte Football Money League 2026 data; women’s team finances in detail.

Status: the five-year models and DCFs are my own and are disclosed so readers can substitute their own assumptions. This is independent analysis from public sources; it is not investment advice or a valuation to any professional standard. 

 

Principal Sources

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