Section 1: The Evolving Financial Landscape of English and European Football

The financial architecture of European football is undergoing a profound transformation. Driven by an unprecedented surge in revenue, the sport has attracted sophisticated financial actors, from global private equity firms to specialized corporate debt funds. 

Yet, as discussed previously, structural unprofitability and a complex, ever-shifting regulatory environment presents challenges. 

For all the capital inflows into football, I will continue to argue football is under-capitalised, debt plays too great a role, and given the lack of transparency surrounding some of the debt providers, presents regulatory and governance issues.

This report provides an analysis of this new financial ecosystem, detailing the primary lenders, their methods, potential and emerging conflicts of interest, and the specific debt profiles of English Premier League clubs.

1.1  Record Growth vs. Structural Unprofitability

The European football market has experienced explosive revenue growth. 

In the 2023/24 season, the market is estimated to have generated a record €38 billion, an 8% increase from the previous year. The continent’s ‘big five’ leagues—the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga, Serie A, and Ligue 1—surpassed the €20 billion revenue mark for the first time in the same period.

This growth is spearheaded by the English Premier League, whose clubs generated £6.3 billion in revenue, with commercial income alone exceeding £2 billion for the first time.

UEFA’s own analysis confirms this trajectory, with top-division club revenues hitting a record €26.8 billion in the 2023 financial year, the largest single-year increase on record, and projected to exceed €29 billion in 2024.

Despite this influx of cash, these substantial income streams are often insufficient to meet clubs’ immense funding needs. The primary cause of this structural unprofitability is an arms race for on-pitch talent.

As revenues from broadcasting and commercial deals grow, they are almost immediately consumed by spiraling player wages and record-breaking transfer expenditures. In the 2022/23 season, for example, Premier League clubs spent a record £2.8 billion on player transfers.

 UEFA data shows that while wage growth has recently slowed relative to revenue growth, all categories of wages—for players, coaches, and administrative staff—are now considerably higher than they were before the pandemic.

 This cost inflation means that most football clubs, even the largest, generate little to no profit, creating a perpetual gap between revenue and expenditure that must be bridged by external financing or owner support.

The need for debt is (in my opinion) a reflection of costs exceeding income and owners not prepared to fund via equity. Indeed one might argue that one of the business models within football is the extraction of cash through excessively expensive lending – often to offshore vehicles with favourable tax regimes. 

 

1.2 The Regulatory Response: PSR, FSR, and the Attempt to Impose Discipline

In response  the industries’ governing bodies have implemented differing regulatory frameworks. 

The most prominent are UEFA’s Financial Sustainability Regulations (FSR), the successor to the Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules, and the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR). The core principle of PSR is to limit club losses; over a three-year rolling assessment period, a club is permitted to lose a maximum of £105 million. However, this headline figure is nuanced. Clubs can only lose £15 million of their own money over three years; any losses above that, up to the £105 million ceiling, must be covered by owners through “secure funding,” typically by purchasing new shares.

 Certain expenditures deemed beneficial to the wider game, such as investment in infrastructure, women’s teams, and youth academies, are considered “allowable” deductions and do not count towards the loss calculation.

Rather than address the fundamental problem of constantly increasing costs, clubs are now incentivized to engage in often inventive planning and accounting strategies to navigate the rules. 

This includes the careful management of player amortisation—spreading a transfer fee over the life of a player’s contract, now capped at five years for accounting purposes in the Premier League—and player trading – to book profits within specific assessment periods. This has resulted in increasingly creative accounting, such as Chelsea’s controversial sale of two hotels to its own ownership group to generate revenue that helped it comply with PSR.

This regulatory landscape is far from static. The Premier League’s attempt to transition to a Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) system, which would limit spending to a percentage of revenue, has been delayed. Meanwhile, the league’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) rules, designed to ensure sponsorship deals with related companies are at “fair market value,” have faced a successful legal challenge from Manchester City, which argued they were unenforceable.

 This constant tension between powerful clubs and regulators underscores the instability of the current framework. It is precisely this combination of market inefficiency—the gap between revenue and costs—and regulatory complexity that has made European football so attractive to a new class of financial actors. 

Traditional banks are often wary of the sport’s volatility and regulatory risks. This has created a vacuum that alternative asset managers, such as private equity and credit funds, are uniquely positioned to fill. These firms specialize in navigating regulated industries and are adept at pricing risk. They are not simply lending to football; they are providing bespoke, albeit hugely expensive, capital solutions to the specific financial and regulatory challenges the sport has itself created.

Section 2: Modern lenders to the football industry

Lenders to European football clubs have diversified dramatically, moving far beyond traditional bank overdrafts. The modern landscape includes family offices on behalf of ultra high net worth individuals, and specialist firms offering niche products to global asset management giants deploying billions in sophisticated debt and equity instruments. 

2.1 Traditional Methods and Specialist Lenders

Firstly, some more traditional forms of non-equity funding.

Debt Factoring: This financial arrangement allows clubs to receive immediate cash by selling their rights to future, predictable income streams, such as broadcasting payments, sponsorship revenue, or transfer fee installments.

 Funders are attracted to these deals due to the low default rates associated with the debtors, which are often other major clubs or the leagues themselves. Specific protections such as the football creditors’ rule offer an unusual form of protection, but as I argued in my previous article do not protect against the systemic risk of growing inter-club debt. 

Debt factoring is typically structured in one of two ways: a legal assignment of the receivable, where the debtor (e.g., a buying club) is instructed to pay the funder directly, or through the use of promissory notes, which create a direct and unconditional obligation from the debtor to the funder.

 Arrangements can be “non-recourse,” where the funder assumes the full risk of non-payment, or “recourse,” where the selling club remains liable if the debtor defaults.

 Clubs prefer non-recourse deals as they remove the liability from their balance sheets, but these transactions are regulated. The Premier League and English Football League (EFL) restrict the assignment of receivables to approved “Financial Institutions,” which are typically UK-regulated banks, though a small number of non-UK institutions have been approved.

Secured Loans: Secured loans are also common, secured against a club’s assets. While tangible assets like stadiums and training grounds can be used as collateral, lenders are typically cautious. The specialised nature of these properties limits their alternative use value, and enforcing security over a stadium carries significant reputational risk.

 Consequently, intangible assets are often more attractive collateral. These include future revenue streams from broadcasting and commercial contracts, intellectual property, and the economic rights associated with player registration contracts.

Two of the most prominent specialist lenders in this space have been:

• Rights and Media Funding (R&MF): R&MF have described themselves as one of the largest lenders to European football, R&MF and its principals have been active for over two decades, lending more than $3.6 billion in the last 10 years.
• R&MF has provided revolving credit facilities to numerous clubs, including Everton and, formerly, West Ham United, Nottingham Forest and others. Their longevity and repeat business with major clubs highlight their deep integration into the football financing network.
• Macquarie Bank: The Australian financial services giant has a dedicated Sports & Entertainment Finance division that provides tailored, secured financing solutions. A notable example of its activity in the Premier League is the £115 million bank loan provided to Wolverhampton Wanderers, secured against the club’s future Premier League television rights income.

2.2 The Rise of Private Capital: Corporate Debt & Credit Funds

The most significant development in football finance is the arrival of large-scale private capital, particularly from US-based alternative asset managers. These firms have stepped into the void left by risk-averse traditional banks, offering larger and more flexible, albeit often more expensive, financing solutions. Their involvement signals a maturation of football as an asset class.

In-Depth Lender Profiles:

• Ares Management: A global alternative investment manager with approximately $378 billion in assets under management, Ares has become a formidable force in sports finance. In 2022, it closed a $3.7 billion fund dedicated to sports, media, and entertainment investments. Its European football activities are extensive and complex. Ares was a key creditor to Eagle Football Holdings, the investment vehicle led by John Textor that held a 43% stake in Crystal Palace and a majority stake in French club Olympique Lyonnais. Eagle owed Ares $493 million across three tranches, with some loans carrying interest rates as high as 19.4% and 22%. Simultaneously, Ares provided a £410.2 million ($500 million) redeemable preferred equity facility to Chelsea’s holding company as part of the financing for the club’s acquisition by Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital.

 This positions Ares as a major financial player with significant, simultaneous interests in multiple top-tier European clubs, including direct competitors in the Premier League.

• Apollo Global Management: Another US asset management giant with over $548 billion in AUM, Apollo has also identified European football as a key lending market. It made its first known foray into the Premier League by providing an £80 million, three-year loan to Nottingham Forest in December 2023 at an interest rate of 8.75%. This loan was used to refinance existing debt with R&MF and provide working capital. Apollo has also provided financing to Portuguese club
  Sporting Lisbon. The firm is reportedly considering launching a permanent capital vehicle aimed at long-term lending to sports franchises and leagues, a move that would allow it to offer both debt and equity solutions.
• BDT & MSD Partners (formerly MSD Holdings): Originally established as the family office to manage the wealth of Michael Dell, MSD has become a key provider of high-interest, asset-backed loans to football clubs. Its most prominent deal in the Premier League was a £78.8 million loan to Southampton, taken out during the pandemic at a steep interest rate of 9.14% and secured with a mortgage on the St Mary’s stadium and the club’s training ground. The firm has also provided loans to other English clubs, including Derby County and Sunderland.

The emergence of these funds has created a stratified credit market. The cost and type of capital a club can access now directly reflects its perceived financial stability, ownership quality, and competitive standing. A “blue-chip” asset like the City Football Group can attract strategic equity investment at a high valuation. In contrast, clubs perceived as higher risk due to their financial position or ownership must turn to more expensive debt providers like MSD, who demand high interest rates and hard security over key assets. This dynamic is another factor widening the financial and competitive gap between the sport’s “haves” and “have-nots.”

2.3 Private Equity: The Dual Role of Investor and Influencer

Distinct from debt funds, private equity (PE) firms typically seek to acquire ownership stakes—either majority or minority—in clubs or leagues. Their strategy involves using financial leverage to fund the acquisition, then implementing operational and commercial improvements to increase the asset’s value over a defined investment horizon (typically 3-7 years) before seeking a profitable exit.

 Since 2016, PE firms have invested over €10 billion into European football, viewing clubs no longer just as trophy assets but as institutional-grade investments.

Key Players and Strategies:

• CVC Capital Partners: A major PE firm, CVC has pursued a league-level investment strategy. It has acquired significant minority stakes in the commercial and media rights of Spain’s La Liga and France’s Ligue 1. To manage its growing sports portfolio, valued at over £9 billion, CVC has established a new entity called ‘SportsCo,’ signaling a cohesive, long-term approach to maximising the value of its assets, which also include stakes in rugby and tennis.
• Silver Lake: This global leader in technology investing executed a landmark deal by making a $500 million equity investment in City Football Group (CFG), the parent company of Manchester City and a network of other global clubs. The investment gave Silver Lake a stake of just over 10% and valued the CFG enterprise at a massive $4.8 billion, validating the multi-club ownership model as an attractive proposition for top-tier institutional investors.
• RedBird Capital Partners: Led by Gerry Cardinale, RedBird exemplifies the club-level acquisition strategy. Its €1.2 billion takeover of Italian giants AC Milan was one of the most significant PE deals in football history, demonstrating the appetite for direct control of major European clubs. In addition Red Bird Capital Partners own an 11% stake in Fenway Sports Group – the ultimate owners of Liverpool FC.

2.4 The Owner as Banker: Shareholder Loans and Strategic Debt-for-Equity Swaps

The most common form of financing in the Premier League comes not from third parties, but from the clubs’ own owners. Shareholder loans have been a ubiquitous feature of the landscape, providing a more flexible and patient form of capital than external debt.

• Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE) has provided loans to Arsenal totaling £324.1 million. This debt originated from the refinancing of stadium construction bonds and has since been used to fund recruitment, with the loans carrying a low interest rate.
• At Brighton & Hove Albion, chairman Tony Bloom has historically funded the club’s rise with hundreds of millions in loans. Following recent profitability, the club is now repaying him, while also planning to convert a significant portion of the outstanding debt into equity.
• The owners of Wolverhampton Wanderers, Fosun International, have provided loans to the club alongside external bank debt.

A critical financial maneuver associated with this model is the debt-for-equity swap. This is a powerful tool for managing a club’s balance sheet and navigating financial regulations. A prime example is Leicester City. In the 2022/23 accounting period, the club’s parent company, King Power International, converted £194 million of loans and related interest into equity. This single transaction wiped a huge liability off the club’s books, turning it into a capital injection. Similarly, Wolves’ owners Fosun converted £79 million of debt into equity in 2024. This strategy is particularly effective in the context of PSR. By funding operational losses through loans and then converting that debt to equity, owners can strengthen the club’s balance sheet, reduce debt service costs, and present a much healthier financial picture to regulators, effectively subsidising unprofitability in a manner that is more favorably treated under the rules.

During Moshiri’s troubled ownership of Everton, BlueSky Capital, a company controlled by Farhad Moshiri provided £450 million of interest free, shareholder loans, eventually converted to equity at a substantial discount at the time of the Friedkin takeover.

The table below provides a summary of the key third-party lenders and their known involvement in European football, illustrating the breadth of this new financial ecosystem.

Section 3: The Potential for Conflicts of Interest: 

The influx of private capital and the proliferation of new ownership models have created an intricate web of financial relationships that poses significant challenges to the integrity of European football. 

While regulatory focus has historically been on straightforward dual ownership, the modern landscape is characterised by more subtle and complex conflicts of interest, spanning multi-club networks held through both equity and debt, and the overlapping business interests of club owners.

3.1 Multi-Club Ownership (MCO): A Threat to Sporting Integrity?

The Multi-Club Ownership (MCO) model, where a single investor or entity holds stakes in multiple clubs, has become a dominant investment trend. The strategic rationale is compelling: it allows for the diversification of risk across different leagues and markets, the creation of a global pipeline for player development and transfers, and the leveraging of commercial, data, and  potentially marketing synergies across the network.However, this model inherently creates potential conflicts of interest and raises concerns about competitive balance.

Case Study 1: Eagle Football (John Textor – Crystal Palace & Lyon)

The conflict inherent in the MCO model was brought into sharp focus during the 2023/24 season. Both Crystal Palace, in which John Textor’s Eagle Football held a 43% stake, and Olympique Lyonnais, majority-owned by Eagle, qualified for the UEFA Europa League.

 UEFA’s integrity rules prohibit two clubs under common control or influence from participating in the same competition. Consequently, the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) ruled that only one could participate. Based on league position, Lyon retained its place, and Crystal Palace was demoted to the lower-tier Conference League.

 This case is particularly instructive because it demonstrates that even a non-controlling minority stake can be deemed to constitute “influence” sufficient to trigger regulatory action. Palace argued that Textor held only 25% of the voting rights and had no decisive influence, but this was not enough to sway UEFA, highlighting the regulator’s strict interpretation of its rules.

Case Study 2: 777 Partners

The Miami-based private investment firm 777 Partners provides a cautionary tale of a poorly executed and over-leveraged MCO strategy. The firm rapidly assembled a sprawling network of clubs, including Genoa (Italy), Standard Liège (Belgium), Hertha BSC (Germany), Vasco da Gama (Brazil), and Red Star FC (France).Rather than creating synergies, the network became plagued by financial distress. Standard Liège was hit with a transfer ban for late payments, fan protests erupted at multiple clubs over a perceived lack of investment, and the entire enterprise faced lawsuits over alleged non-payments and fraudulent practices.

The firm’s attempt to acquire Everton collapsed, but not before it had loaned the club approximately £200 million for working capital, transforming a potential buyer into a major creditor. The 777 saga illustrates the immense risk of an MCO built on a fragile financial foundation, threatening the stability of every club within its network.

Case Study 3: City Football Group (CFG)

At the other end of the spectrum is City Football Group, widely regarded as the “gold standard” of the MCO model. Comprising Manchester City and a dozen other clubs worldwide, CFG has successfully implemented a synergistic model for player development, global branding, and commercial growth.

The $500 million investment from top-tier PE firm Silver Lake served as a powerful validation of its strategy and valuation. However, even this successful model is not without criticism. Concerns persist that the MCO structure risks diluting the individual identities of its clubs, turning them into “feeder” teams, and that the financial power of the parent entity can distort competitive balance within leagues.

3.2 Lenders with Multiple Interests: The Unregulated Frontier

While regulators have focused on the conflicts arising from equity-based MCOs, a new and more opaque network of influence is forming through debt. A handful of powerful credit funds are now major lenders to multiple, often competing, clubs. This creates a potential for conflicts of interest that falls largely outside the scope of current regulations.

The Ares Management Nexus:

Ares Management’s activities represent the most salient example of this emerging dynamic. The firm has established a complex web of financial relationships across several top European clubs.

1. It provided hundreds of millions of dollars in high-interest loans to Eagle Football, the entity that controlled Lyon and held a significant stake in Crystal Palace.
2. Simultaneously, it provided a £410.2 million preferred equity facility to Blueco, the holding company of Chelsea.
3. Ares has also been linked to financing for Atlético Madrid and holds a stake in Inter Miami.

This means a single financial institution held significant creditor positions or financial interests in at least three major European clubs—Chelsea, Crystal Palace, and Lyon—with the first two being direct competitors in the Premier League. While Ares does not have direct equity control in the same way an MCO owner does, its position as a key creditor grants it substantial influence, particularly over entities in financial distress like Eagle Football. 

This influence could be exerted through loan covenants, during restructuring negotiations, or in a default scenario, creating potential conflicts that are not currently monitored by football’s integrity rules.

The Apollo Global Management Network:

Similarly, Apollo Global Management has extended its lending activities across multiple European leagues. It is a known lender to Nottingham Forest in the Premier League and Sporting Lisbon in Portugal’s Primeira Liga.

 Both clubs are perennial contenders for European qualification and could conceivably compete in the same UEFA competition, creating a scenario where their common creditor could face a conflict of interest.

The influence wielded by these major creditors is more nuanced than that of an owner, but it is no less real. A lender’s primary objective is the return of its capital, and it will take steps to protect its investment. This could, in theory, lead to situations where a lender’s decisions regarding one club’s financing could be influenced by the potential impact on another club in its portfolio. This debt-based multi-club network represents an unregulated frontier in football governance.

3.3 Regulatory Responses and Their Limitations

Current football regulations are struggling to keep pace with modern finance structures. Their primary focus remains on direct, equity-based control, leaving significant grey areas.

• UEFA’s MCO Rules (Article 5): These rules are the most direct attempt to police the issue, focusing on preventing any individual or entity from having “control or influence” over more than one club in a UEFA competition. The definition of control includes holding a majority of voting rights, the right to appoint the board, or the ability to exercise “decisive influence”.44 As of May 2024, the rules were relaxed slightly to permit clubs under common ownership to participate in
  different UEFA competitions (e.g., one in the Champions League and one in the Europa League), a nod to the growing prevalence of the MCO model. However, these rules do not explicitly address the influence of a common creditor.
• Premier League Rules: The Premier League’s framework includes the Owners’ and Directors’ Test (ODT), which scrutinises individuals seeking to acquire control of a club, and rules on dual ownership, which prevent an individual from holding a stake of more than 10% in another Premier League club. A key battleground has been the league’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) rules, which require clubs to prove that any commercial deals with companies linked to their owners are at a fair market value. This is a direct attempt to stop owners from inflating revenues with disguised capital injections to circumvent PSR. However, Manchester City’s successful legal challenge, which reportedly found the rules “void and unenforceable,” represents a significant blow to the league’s regulatory authority and may embolden other clubs to contest its rules.

The fundamental limitation of these frameworks is their fixation on equity. They are designed to answer the question, “Who owns the club?” but are ill-equipped to address the more subtle question, “Who has financial influence over the club?”

 This leaves the door open for the kind of debt-based conflicts of interest embodied by firms like Ares Management.

Furthermore, another layer of conflict is emerging that is even more difficult for regulators to police: the intersection between a club’s needs and its owner’s other business interests. For example, Todd Boehly is a principal of Chelsea’s ownership group, and his separate firm, Eldridge, operates a major real estate debt business. Chelsea is planning a multi-billion-pound redevelopment of its Stamford Bridge stadium. This creates a potential scenario where a business connected to the club’s owner could be involved in financing or developing the club’s new stadium. While not necessarily improper, it represents a complex conflict where decisions about the club’s future infrastructure could be intertwined with the owner’s external commercial ventures, a domain far beyond the traditional remit of a football regulator.

The table below analyses some of the major multi-club structures, highlighting the nature of the relationship and the conflicts they have generated, thereby illustrating the regulatory gaps.

Section 4: Lenders vs. Owners: Distinguishing Debt from Equity

In the new financial landscape of European football, the traditional distinctions between lenders and owners are becoming increasingly blurred. While some actors operate in clearly defined roles, a growing number occupy a hybrid space, leveraging sophisticated financial instruments that defy easy categorisation. This ambiguity presents a significant challenge for regulators and complicates the governance of the sport.

4.1 Pure Debt Providers

These are entities whose relationship with a football club is purely that of a creditor. Their primary objective is the timely return of their principal investment plus a negotiated interest or fee. This category includes many of the specialist lenders and traditional banks.

• Rights and Media Funding (R&MF) and Macquarie Bank are prime examples. They provide secured loans or factor receivables, with their returns contractually defined and their relationship ending upon repayment of the debt.
• Barclays Bank’s £145 million overdraft facility for West Ham United, secured against future television income, is another classic example of a pure debt relationship.
  
  While these lenders hold security over club assets and can exert influence through covenants, their fundamental role is that of a financier, not a strategic partner or owner.

4.2 Pure Equity Holders

At the opposite end of the spectrum are ownership groups whose involvement is entirely through equity. They provide capital in exchange for a share of the club, and their return is dependent on the long-term appreciation of the club’s value.

• The clearest example in the Premier League is Newcastle United. The club is majority-owned by the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF). Following the takeover, the club’s previous debts were cleared, and it now operates on a debt-free basis.The financial constraints on Newcastle come not from debt service payments but from the revenue-based limits imposed by the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR). The owners’ vast wealth cannot be directly injected to fund transfers; it must be channelled through commercial revenues that grow organically, a limitation imposed entirely by regulation, not by a lack of capital.

4.3 The Hybrid Model: The Owner-Creditor

This is the most prevalent ownership structure in the Premier League, where the club’s owner is also its primary creditor. This model provides what is often termed “patient capital,” as owner loans typically come with more favourable terms (lower interest, longer or no fixed maturity) than third-party debt. However, it also concentrates immense power and risk, making the club’s financial health entirely dependent on the wealth, strategy, and continued goodwill of its owner.

• Arsenal is owned by Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE), to whom it also owes £324.1 million in low-interest loans.
• Brighton & Hove Albion has been funded for years by loans from its owner, Tony Bloom, and is now in a position to begin repaying him.
• Liverpool’s owners, Fenway Sports Group (FSG), have provided significant intercompany loans, which increased to £198.7 million in 2024, primarily to finance the expansion of the Anfield Road Stand.
• Wolverhampton Wanderers is funded by a combination of a bank loan from Macquarie and loans from its owner, Fosun International.
  
  In this model, the line between an equity investment and a loan is often a strategic choice made by the owner, frequently with regulatory considerations in mind.

4.4 The Emerging Hybrid: The Creditor-Owner

A more recent and complex phenomenon is the emergence of the “Creditor-Owner” model, where financial institutions are creating pathways to gain equity-like influence or direct ownership through debt instruments. This trend signifies that the most sophisticated investors are moving beyond the binary choice of being either a lender or an owner, instead creating bespoke capital solutions that occupy the grey area between the two.

• Ares Management’s investment in Chelsea’s holding company is the most significant example. The £410.2 million facility is not a standard loan but is structured as “redeemable preferred equity”. This instrument behaves like debt, carrying a high Payment-In-Kind (PIK) interest rate of around 12%, where the interest accrues and is added to the principal rather than being paid in cash. However, its classification as a form of equity may afford the borrower different treatment on its balance sheet and from a regulatory perspective compared to a simple loan. This blurring of lines is intentional, providing Ares with debt-like security and returns while potentially offering Chelsea’s owners the balance sheet benefits of an equity injection.
• Apollo Global Management’s stated ambition to create a permanent capital vehicle that can flexibly provide both debt and equity further underscores this trend. Such a vehicle would allow the firm to enter a situation as a lender and potentially convert its position into an equity stake if the opportunity arises.
• The saga of 777 Partners at Everton provides another angle on this model. The firm’s provision of over £200 million in loans during its protracted and ultimately failed takeover attempt made it a major creditor to the club it was trying to buy. This demonstrates how a creditor relationship can be used as a strategic tool in a takeover bid, creating significant leverage and a complex financial entanglement that falls outside the traditional scope of the Owners’ and Directors’ Test.

This evolution from clear-cut roles to hybrid structures represents a fundamental challenge for football’s governing bodies. Regulations built on the assumption of a clear distinction between debt and equity are ill-suited to police a world of preferred equity, PIK notes, and convertible instruments. The financial engineering is designed not only to maximize returns but also to optimize for regulatory treatment, creating a legal and semantic game that football’s authorities are currently losing.

Section 5: In-Depth Analysis: Premier League Club Debt Profiles (2023/24 Season Data)

This section provides a granular, club-by-club analysis of the debt and financing structures within the English Premier League, based on the most recently available financial data. Each profile examines the club’s ownership model, identifies its primary lenders, quantifies its debt where possible, and analyses its financial strategy in the context of the league’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR).

Arsenal

• Ownership Model: Owner-Creditor Hybrid.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: The club’s primary creditor is its owner, Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE). As of the 2022-23 financial year, Arsenal’s debt to KSE stood at £259 million, which subsequently rose to £324.1 million. This debt originated when KSE refinanced the outstanding bonds related to the construction of the Emirates Stadium and has since been increased to provide funds for recruitment. The loans are not interest-free but are described as low-interest, representing a form of “patient capital” from the owner.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Arsenal’s strategy relies on owner funding to supplement its significant commercial and matchday revenues. The KSE loans provide financial stability and the ability to invest in the squad without resorting to expensive third-party debt. The club’s financial position is generally considered stable and compliant with PSR, supported by consistent qualification for European competitions.

Aston Villa

• Ownership Model: Owner-Funded, High-Spend.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Aston Villa has minimal conventional third-party debt, with its accounts showing only a £20 million overdraft facility. The club’s aggressive spending is almost entirely underwritten by its owners,
  Nassef Sawiris and Wes Edens (V Sports). Since their takeover in 2018, the owners have invested approximately £700 million, primarily through the issuance of new shares rather than loans. In 2023/24 alone, £148 million was raised via a share issue to cover negative operating cash flow.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Villa’s strategy is one of rapid investment to compete with the Premier League’s elite. This has resulted in a very high cost base; staff costs reached 126% of revenue in 2023/24, the highest in the league. The club has reported significant losses, including £120 million in 2022/23 and £86 million in 2023/24, pushing it very close to the PSR loss limits. Compliance is managed through allowable deductions (e.g., for academy and women’s team investment) and strategic player sales.

AFC Bournemouth

• Ownership Model: Owner-Funded, High-Dependency.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: The club is heavily reliant on its owner, Bill Foley, and his Black Knight Football Club group. Since their acquisition in December 2022, they have invested over £200 million, primarily through shareholder loans. By the end of the 2023/24 season, shareholder loans totaled £214 million, of which £124 million had been converted to equity, leaving £90 million outstanding. The club also has £33 million in bank loans, for a total debt of £123 million.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Bournemouth’s finances are constrained by a small stadium, which limits matchday and commercial revenue. Consequently, 84% of its income is from Premier League broadcast distributions, making its financial health highly dependent on its league position. The club reported a £66 million loss in 2023/24 and is operating close to its PSR limits. It notably avoided a breach in the previous cycle thanks to a £71.4 million shareholder loan write-off from the former owner, which was approved by the Premier League as part of the takeover transaction.

Brentford

• Ownership Model: Owner-Funded, Data-Driven.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Brentford is funded by its owner, Matthew Benham, whose total investment (a mix of equity and loans) has remained stable at £104.4 million. This sum includes £22.8 million in loans specifically for the Gtech Community Stadium project. Third-party debt is minimal, though it rose to
  £29.8 million as of June 2024 from just £0.5 million the previous year.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club operates a sustainable, data-driven model focused on smart player trading. While it recorded an operating loss of £29.2 million in 2024 (before player trading), this was balanced by £25.2 million in profit from player sales. Benham’s stable funding provides a solid foundation, and the club is considered to be in a healthy position regarding PSR.

Brighton & Hove Albion

• Ownership Model: Owner-Creditor, Sustainability-Focused.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: The club’s historic financing has come from its chairman, Tony Bloom, who has invested nearly half a billion pounds over the years, primarily through loans. Following record-breaking profits, the club is now in a position to repay this debt. It repaid Bloom £33.2 million in 2022-23 and a further £74 million in 2023-24, reducing the outstanding amount to just under £300 million. There are plans to convert another £200 million of this debt into equity, which would leave a remaining debt to Bloom of around £99 million.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Brighton has become a benchmark for sustainability in the Premier League. The club is highly profitable, reporting a combined profit of £186.7 million across the 2022-23 and 2023-24 seasons. This profitability is driven by a world-class player trading model, which saw a net transfer spend of just £9.1 million in 2023-24. With a wage-to-turnover ratio of a healthy 56% and no PSR concerns, Brighton’s model is one of self-sufficiency supplemented by historic, patient owner capital.

Chelsea

• Ownership Model: PE-Backed, High-Leverage (at Holding Company Level).
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Chelsea’s debt structure is complex and deliberately “ring-fenced” so that the debt sits with the parent holding companies (Blueco 22 Ltd and 22 Holdco Ltd), not on the club’s own balance sheet. The total borrowing exceeds £1.165 billion, split into two main tranches:

1. A £755.2 million revolving credit facility, repayable by July 2027 with an interest rate of 7.5-8%.
2. A £410.2 million redeemable preferred equity agreement with Ares Management, repayable by August 2033. This instrument accrues Payment-In-Kind (PIK) interest at around 12%.

• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The ownership group (led by Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital) is shouldering the debt burden, allowing the club’s football operations to function without being drained by interest payments—a stark contrast to the Glazer model at Manchester United. However, the club has engaged in massive transfer spending and reported huge losses, navigating PSR through aggressive player sales and controversial asset sales (like the hotel deal) and a similar sale of the women’s club. The long-term strategy is a high-stakes bet on future growth and appreciation of the asset.

Crystal Palace

• Ownership Model: Hybrid (US Investors).
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: The club itself is not reported to have significant external debt. The main financial story revolves around its former investor, Eagle Football Holdings. Eagle, led by John Textor, held a 43% stake in Palace but was burdened with over $1.2 billion in debt, with Ares Management as a primary creditor owed $493 million at very high interest rates. Textor’s stake has since been sold to American billionaire Woody Johnson, co-owner of the New York Jets, in a deal valuing the stake at around £190 million.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Palace operates with a more modest budget than many rivals and is generally considered to be compliant with PSR. The key issue was the MCO conflict with Lyon, which has now been resolved by the sale of Textor’s shares. The new investment from Woody Johnson, alongside existing US investors David Blitzer and Josh Harris, provides a stable ownership platform.

Everton

• Ownership Model: Recently Acquired (Friedkin Group).
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Everton had one of the most complex and precarious debt situations in the league, with secured debt exceeding £600 million. Its primary creditors included:

• Rights and Media Funding Limited: In June 2024 owed over £202 million plus €28 million via secured revolving credit facilities.
• Tdf Capital Management, L.L.C.: This entity acts as the security agent for loans provided by the new owner, the Friedkin Group, estimated to be in excess of £200 million. These funds were used for working capital and to pay off previous lenders R&MF.
• A-Cap (formerly 777 Partners): The club owed around £200 million to the entity that failed in its takeover bid. This debt is junior to the R&MF facility.
• Metro Bank: A smaller, secured lender.

• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Everton had been in a perilous financial state for years, with huge losses and multiple breaches of PSR leading to points deductions. The takeover by American billionaire Dan Friedkin has stabilised the situation, with his capital injection refinancing the club’s borrowings and providing funds to complete the new stadium at Bramley-Moore Dock. Previous shareholder loans were converted to equity at a substantial discount.  A major £350 million re-funding, secured against the new stadium, was led by JP Morgan bank. The club’s future strategy will be focused on increasing turnover to improve competitiveness on the pitch

Fulham

• Ownership Model: Owner-Funded.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Fulham reports very little external or third-party debt. The club’s net transfer payables are among the lowest in the league at just £44 million. This financial structure implies that the club is almost entirely funded by its owner,
  Shahid Khan, through equity injections or shareholder loans that are not publicly detailed but are understood to be substantial.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Fulham operates a model reliant on the deep pockets of its owner. While the club reported a loss of £33.4 million in 2024, its low external debt burden means it is not servicing expensive loans. Its PSR position is managed through this owner support and periodic player sales.

Ipswich Town

• Ownership Model: PE-Backed, Growth-Focused.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Following their promotion to the Premier League, Ipswich Town operates with a clean balance sheet. The club’s only formal debt is an £8 million loan linked to preference shares, which is offset by a loan receivable from its parent company, leaving it with no net debt. The previous owner, Marcus Evans, wrote off around £100 million in debt upon selling the club
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club is funded entirely through equity from its US-based owners, Gamechanger 20, which is backed by a state pension fund and now includes PE firm Bright Path Sports Partners as a 40% shareholder. Since the 2021 takeover, the owners have injected £132 million via share issues to cover operating losses and fund investment in the squad and infrastructure. As a newly promoted club in 2024/25, its PSR loss limit was lower, but its equity-funded model placed it in a  relatively strong position.

Leicester City

• Ownership Model: Owner-Creditor.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Leicester’s finances were transformed in the 2022/23 season when its parent company, King Power International (owned by the Srivaddhanaprabha family), converted £194 million of loans and related interest into equity. This single action relieved the club of a significant debt burden. The club still has some legacy debt, including to
  Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, but the primary financing relationship is with its owner.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The debt-for-equity swap was a crucial move to strengthen the balance sheet and aid compliance with PSR, which the club was charged with breaching for the cycle ending in 2022/23. The strategy is wholly reliant on the continued financial commitment of the Srivaddhanaprabha family.

Liverpool

• Ownership Model: Owner-Creditor Hybrid.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Liverpool’s external net bank debt is relatively modest and decreased to £108.1 million as of May 2024. The more significant figure is the intercompany debt owed to its owner,
  Fenway Sports Group (FSG), which increased substantially from £71.4 million to £198.7 million in the same period. This interest-free loan was used primarily to fund the £80 million expansion of the Anfield Road Stand.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: FSG operates a self-sustaining model, where the club is expected to live within its means. Owner funding is provided strategically for capital projects like stadium expansion, rather than to cover operational losses. The club’s high revenues and prudent management ensure it remains comfortably compliant with PSR.

Manchester City

• Ownership Model: State-Linked MCO.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: The club is the crown jewel of the City Football Group (CFG), which is majority-owned by the Abu Dhabi United Group. Manchester City reports no significant external debt. It is funded by massive owner investment and record-breaking commercial revenues, which are the subject of the Premier League’s 115 charges relating to alleged breaches of financial rules and non-compliance with APT regulations.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club’s strategy is one of overwhelming financial power, leveraging its ownership links to generate commercial deals that fuel its on-pitch spending. Its PSR position is the central subject of its ongoing legal battle with the Premier League. The club’s valuation is immense, as evidenced by Forbes’ $4.25 billion estimate and Silver Lake’s investment which valued CFG at $4.8 billion.

Manchester United

• Ownership Model: Leveraged Buyout.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Manchester United’s financing is defined by the leveraged buyout executed by the Glazer family. The club carries a gross debt of approximately $930 million (£730 million), which sits directly on its own balance sheet. This debt has remained stubbornly high for more than a decade. The club’s own revenues are used to service the significant interest payments on this debt, a model that has drawn sustained criticism from fans.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Despite the debt burden, the club’s enormous global revenue streams have allowed it to service the debt while remaining one of the biggest spenders in the transfer market. The club operates within PSR limits due to its high turnover. The recent minority investment from Sir Jim Ratcliffe has not altered the fundamental debt structure.

Newcastle United

• Ownership Model: State-Owned.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: The club is entirely debt-free. Following the takeover by the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), all previous debts were cleared. The club is funded by direct equity investment from its owners.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Newcastle’s situation is unique. It has arguably the wealthiest owners in world football, but its spending power is severely constrained by PSR. Because its revenues were relatively low under the previous owner, its allowable losses are limited. The club’s primary financial challenge is not accessing capital, but growing its commercial revenue streams at a rate fast enough to allow for increased spending on players under the PSR framework.

Nottingham Forest

• Ownership Model: Owner-Funded, High-Spend.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: After securing promotion and investing heavily in the squad, Nottingham Forest, owned by Evangelos Marinakis, turned to the private credit market for financing. In December 2023, the club secured an £80 million, three-year loan from Apollo Global Management at an interest rate of 8.75%. This loan was used to refinance a previous facility with
  Rights and Media Funding and for additional working capital.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club’s strategy has been one of high-volume spending to establish itself in the Premier League. This has placed it under intense PSR pressure, resulting in a points deduction for breaching the rules in the cycle ending 2022/23. The expensive loan from Apollo highlights the cost of capital for clubs in this position.

Southampton

• Ownership Model: Recently Acquired (Sport Republic).
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Southampton has a multi-layered debt structure. The club itself has a significant loan from MSD Holdings (now BDT & MSD Partners), which stood at £69.6 million after recent repayments but has since been refinanced back up to £80 million on more favourable terms. Separately, the acquisition of the club by Sport Republic, a vehicle led by Dragan Solak, was financed by a £110 million loan that Solak took from United Group, a telecommunications company he founded.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club’s finances are heavily influenced by player trading. A profitable 2023/24 was achieved almost entirely due to £72.4 million in profit on player sales following relegation.  The high-interest MSD loan, taken out during the pandemic, illustrates the club’s past reliance on expensive external capital. The new ownership is tasked with managing this debt while navigating the financial volatility between the Premier League and the Championship.

Tottenham Hotspur

• Ownership Model: Infrastructure-Led Debt.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Tottenham’s debt is substantial, with gross debt reported at £853.9 million, but it is almost entirely related to the financing of its state-of-the-art stadium. The club has a sophisticated, long-term debt structure with a syndicate of lenders, including:

• Bank of America: £62 million loan.
• Investec: £22 million loan.
• US Institutional Investors: £775 million raised through two private placement bond issues with long maturities ranging from 2029 to 2051.

• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club’s strategy is built around the new stadium, which is designed to generate significantly increased matchday and commercial revenues. The debt is structured with long maturities and a blended interest rate of just 2.7%, making it manageable. The club operates well within PSR limits, with the stadium debt being an allowable infrastructure cost.

West Ham United

• Ownership Model: Traditional Private Ownership.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: West Ham utilizes traditional bank financing. The club has secured an overdraft facility of up to £145 million from Barclays Bank, which is borrowed against its future Premier League income over the next two seasons. The club is also supported by its shareholders, including David Sullivan and Daniel Kretinsky, who are prepared to inject funds if necessary.
• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: The club’s financing is relatively straightforward, relying on a major high-street bank and shareholder support. This approach avoids the complexities and high costs of private credit funds. The club’s financial position is considered stable and compliant with PSR.

Wolverhampton Wanderers

• Ownership Model: Owner-Creditor Hybrid.
• Primary Lenders & Debt Structure: Wolves’ gross financial debt stands at £180 million, split between two main sources:

1. A £115 million bank loan from Macquarie Bank, secured on the club’s Premier League TV rights.
2. £65 million in loans from its owners, Fosun International.

• Financial Strategy & PSR Position: Like Leicester, Wolves have used a debt-for-equity swap to manage their PSR position. In 2024, Fosun converted £79 million of its loans into equity, strengthening the balance sheet. The club relies heavily on player trading to remain compliant, generating £64 million in profit from sales in 2023/24 to offset operating losses and stay within the rules.

The table below provides a comprehensive summary of the debt and financing structures across the Premier League, offering a comparative snapshot of the diverse strategies employed by the 20 clubs.

Section 6: Strategic Outlook and Future Trends

How high level football is financed is in the midst of a significant structural shift with long-term implications. The strategies being deployed by clubs and investors today are setting the stage for the competitive and regulatory battles of tomorrow. Three key trends will define the future landscape: the “Americanisation” of finance, the growing chasm in regulation, and a new calculus of risk and opportunity for all stakeholders.

6.1 The Americanisation of European Football Finance

A defining feature of the new capital playbook is the importation of financial models and philosophies from the closed-league system of American professional sports. The most influential new actors—Ares, Apollo, Silver Lake, RedBird, Clearlake—are predominantly US-based firms, bringing with them a perspective honed in the NFL, NBA, and MLB. This is evident in the language used, with clubs increasingly referred to as “franchises,” “assets,” or “media properties,” and in the investment strategies themselves, which focus on maximising enterprise value through sophisticated commercial and media rights exploitation.

However, this trend carries a fundamental tension: these American models are being applied to a European system with the ever-present, existential risk of relegation—a concept entirely alien to US sports. The financial catastrophe of dropping from the Premier League to the Championship cannot be overstated, and this risk must be priced into any investment. This has led to a push for cost-control mechanisms that would make the European football economy more stable and predictable, mirroring the US system. The Premier League’s (delayed) move towards a Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) and the concept of “anchoring”—tying top clubs’ spending to a multiple of the bottom club’s revenue—are direct attempts to create a more controlled, US-style economic environment where costs are tethered to revenues, making the “asset” more attractive to institutional investors.

6.2 The Future of Regulation: A Widening Chasm?

The future of financial regulation in football appears to be one of escalating conflict and a widening gap between the rule-makers and the powerful, well-resourced entities they seek to govern. The sheer complexity of the financial instruments now being used—from redeemable preferred equity to multi-layered MCOs funded by offshore vehicles—is stretching the capabilities of governing bodies.

Manchester City’s successful legal challenge to the Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction rules could be a watershed moment. It signals that the most powerful clubs are not only willing but also able to contest regulations they deem anti-competitive or restrictive. This may embolden other clubs to launch their own challenges, potentially leading to a gradual erosion of the regulators’ authority.

A two-track regulatory reality is likely to emerge. On one hand, governing bodies like UEFA will continue to enforce clear-cut rules, such as those preventing two clubs under direct common ownership from playing in the same competition, as seen in the Crystal Palace/Lyon case. On the other hand, they will likely maintain a significant blind spot when it comes to the more nuanced, indirect influence wielded by major multi-club creditors or the complex internal conflicts of interest within ownership groups. The current frameworks are simply not designed to police these grey areas, and the political and legal will to create new rules that could withstand challenges from multi-billion dollar asset managers appears to be lacking.

6.3 Key Risks and Opportunities for Stakeholders

This new era presents a transformed landscape of risk and opportunity for all participants in the football ecosystem.

• For Investors: The opportunity is clear: European football is a high-growth, globally popular asset class with passionate, loyal customers, whose value has proven resilient to economic cycles. The primary risks are threefold. First, the intense competition for a limited number of top-tier assets could be creating a valuation bubble, driving prices above sustainable levels and squeezing future returns. Second, the regulatory landscape is volatile and uncertain; new rules could be implemented that materially impact investment theses. Third, and most uniquely, the financial model must always account for the catastrophic risk of relegation, which can wipe out value overnight.
• For Clubs: The opportunity is access to unprecedented levels of capital. This funding can be used to invest in world-class players, develop state-of-the-art stadiums and training facilities, and compete at the highest level. The risks, however, are a significant loss of sovereignty and an increase in financial precarity. Taking on high-cost debt from private credit funds can saddle a club with crippling interest payments. Becoming part of an MCO can mean a club’s strategic decisions are subordinated to the needs of the wider network, potentially turning it into a “feeder club”.28 The stability of the club becomes inextricably linked to the financial health and strategic whims of a distant financial institution.
• For Governing Bodies: The primary challenge for entities like the independent regulator, the Premier League and UEFA is to maintain their core purpose: ensuring the sporting integrity and competitive balance of their competitions. They face a tide of financial and legal power that threatens to overwhelm their authority. If they cannot design and enforce regulations that are robust, fair, and can withstand legal challenges, they risk becoming administrators of a game whose real power lies with a small group of global financial actors.

Ultimately, the most profound conflict of interest shaping the future of football is not between two clubs owned by the same entity, but a deeper, more philosophical one. It is the conflict between the vision of football as a global entertainment product and the reality of football as a collection of local, cultural institutions. The new capital flooding into the game is predicated on the former vision—that of a scalable, monetisable, institutional-grade asset class.

 The strategies of PE firms and credit funds are designed to professionalize management, optimize revenue, and maximize enterprise value. Yet, the very value they seek to unlock is derived from the latter reality—the unwavering, often irrational, loyalty of fans who view their clubs not as financial assets but as pillars of their community and identity. The long-term success of the new capital playbook will depend entirely on how this fundamental conflict is managed. If the drive for profit alienates the core fan base, the entire financial edifice could prove to be a house of cards. The game, for investors and regulators alike, is just beginning.

Ultimately we have conflict between custodianship and capitalism