The relative stability of the club 12 months after the acquisition by the Friedkins is welcoming, and after years of near terminal decline, provided a platform from which the club can grow, challenge and ultimately succeed once more.

However it would be remiss not to point out areas that still require attention and can accelerate our recovery, development and competitiveness. 

The takeover of Everton Football Club by The Friedkin Group (TFG) on December 19, 2024, was a watershed moment for our beloved club.

 Executed through Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited, this transaction was not merely a change of control; it was a rescue operation of high-stakes financial engineering designed to stabilise an institution teetering on the brink of administration. 

The acquisition, valued at an enterprise level approaching £1 billion when accounting for the assumption and restructuring of distressed debt, working capital injections, and stadium completion costs, definitively ended the volatile and financially ruinous era of Farhad Moshiri.

The analysis indicates that while TFG has successfully averted immediate insolvency and professionalised the club’s governance, significant challenges remain. The club’s net debt has nominally increased due to the capitalisation of stadium costs, and the on-pitch reality of the competitive gap between Everton and the most successful modern clubs contrasts sharply with the boardroom stability. 

Despite my personal reservations,  the ownership’s quiet public relations strategy, combined with a sophisticated financial roadmap involving institutional heavyweights like JPMorgan Chase, suggests a long-term strategy prioritising asset appreciation and sustainable revenue growth over short-term populist gestures.

To fully appreciate the magnitude of the restructuring undertaken by Roundhouse Capital, one must first understand the depth of the crisis inherited from the Moshiri regime. As documented on this website on numerous occasions, By mid-2024, Everton was an asset in extreme distress, paralysed by a complex web of secured lending and regulatory breaches.

The failed takeover bid by 777 Partners left the club in a precarious liquidity trap. 777 Partners had advanced approximately £200 million in working capital loans to Everton during their exclusivity period. However, the collapse of 777 amid allegations of fraud in the Leadenhall Capital Partners vs. 777 Partners lawsuit in New York rendered this debt toxic. The loans were essentially backed by insurance assets (A-Cap) that were themselves subject to legal freezing orders and intense scrutiny. 

For a potential new owner, untangling this debt was not just a financial hurdle but a legal minefield, as repaying 777 directly could potentially violate court orders or involve the club in the proceeds of alleged fraud.

Perhaps the most debilitating aspect of Everton’s pre-takeover capital structure was the facility held by Rights and Media Funding (R&MF). This opaque (but well known to Evertonians) lender held a secured position with highly restrictive covenants, including negative pledge clauses. These clauses effectively granted R&MF veto power over the club’s strategic financial decisions, including the ability to raise new senior debt or secure additional lending against the stadium. The interest rates on these facilities were predatory, described in financial circles as credit card rates for a corporate entity, reportedly reaching as high as 18-20% when fees were included. The existence of this debt made the club uninvestable for standard institutional lenders.

Farhad Moshiri’s tenure had accumulated £450 million in shareholder loans. While nominally unsecured and interest-free, these loans sat on the balance sheet as a colossal liability that distorted the club’s equity value. For a takeover to be viable, these loans required a dissolution that would not trigger taxable events or regulatory breaches under the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR).

Roundhouse Capital and Pursuit Sports

The Friedkin Group did not acquire Everton directly through its primary US holding company. Instead, it deployed a multi-layered corporate structure designed to ring-fence risk, facilitate specific equity injections, and integrate the club into a broader sports portfolio.

Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited

The acquisition vehicle, Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited, was established to hold the 99.5% controlling stake in Everton Football Club Company Limited. This entity serves as the primary conduit for TFG’s investment.

The retention of the minority shareholding is a notable governance choice. While TFG possesses the legal mechanisms to squeeze out these minorities, retaining them maintains a tangible link to the club’s heritage and avoids the public relations friction associated with a forced buyout. 

However, as I have expressed previously, the necessary resulting dilution has created a devaluation of these shares. New issuances of shares have been at £175 per share – restricted only to Roundhouse following the removal of pre-emption rights. This is significantly lower than the historical buy-in price for some fans. Just prior to the takeover, shares were still being exchanged at auction through the Asset Match platform at or around £3,400.

Roundhouse Capital sits under the umbrella of Pursuit Sports, a newly formed division within TFG explicitly designed to manage its multi-club assets.

• Strategic Rationale: Pursuit Sports mimics the organisational structure of Fenway Sports Group (FSG). Its mandate is to centralise back-office functions, data analytics, medical departments, commercial sponsorship aggregation, and logistical planning, while leaving the front-office identities (branding, fan culture) distinct.
• Leadership: The division is led by Ryan Friedkin, Dan Friedkin’s son, who serves as President. This has been suggested in some quarters that the sports portfolio is a potentially a generational asset for the Friedkin family, not a short-term private equity play. This is not necessarily a view I hold.
• The Portfolio: Currently, Pursuit Sports encompasses AS Roma (Serie A), Everton FC (Premier League), and AS Cannes (French National 2). This vertical integration theoretically creates a player development pathway, allowing talent to move from the fourth tier of French football to the elite levels of England and Italy.

The reconstitution of the Everton Board of Directors reflects a stark departure from the localised, sentiment-driven governance of the Bill Kenwright era. The new board is technocratic, US-centric, and deeply embedded in TFG’s corporate ethos.

Key Board Appointments and Strategic Functions

The addition of Christopher Sarofim and the advisory role of Jason Kidd (NBA Hall of Famer and Dallas Mavericks coach) to Roundhouse Capital (rather than the club board directly) is a significant development. Sarofim, a minority owner of the Houston Texans, brings a wealth of experience in maximising the commercial yield of sports franchises and deep connections to US capital markets. His involvement signals TFG’s intent to leverage the new stadium for non-football events (NFL, concerts) to maximise revenue per square foot, a staple of US sports ownership models. One of the key, and as yet unaddressed concerns, remains the complete absence of a strategic infra-structure plan, particularly relating to transport. This is a glaring omission to date.

The most immediate and complex task facing Roundhouse Capital was the restructuring of Everton’s balance sheet. The approach taken was aggressive, capital-intensive, and legally sophisticated.

The restructuring process involved a sequential payment and settlement of debt designed to prioritise the exit of the most restrictive lenders.

1. Rights and Media Funding: TFG utilised equity injections into Roundhouse to settle the R&MF facility in cash. By extinguishing this debt (estimated to be greater than £200m), TFG removed the negative pledge clauses that had paralysed the club. This was the key that unlocked the ability to seek cheaper, long-term financing.
2. MSP Sports Capital: This £158 million secured loan, which was pivotal in keeping the stadium construction going during the sales process, was repaid in full. This cleared the charge against the stadium development company, freeing the asset to be used as collateral for future financing.
3. 777 Partners / A-Cap: The settlement of the £200m owed to 777 Partners was handled with extreme caution due to the fraud allegations. The resolution involved a discounted cash settlement of approximately £66 million, with the balance converted into preferred equity and warrants in the holding company. This structure allowed TFG to satisfy the debt without paying par value for a distressed loan, effectively forcing the creditors to take a haircut while retaining a sliver of upside potential should the club’s value increase in the future.
4. Moshiri’s Shareholder Loans: The £450 million in shareholder loans were converted to equity prior to the sale and subsequently acquired by Roundhouse for a nominal consideration within the overall deal structure. This effectively wrote off nearly half a billion pounds of debt, instantly improving the club’s debt-to-equity ratio and creating greater balance sheet strength.

With the toxic debt cleared, TFG engaged JPMorgan Chase to arrange a £350 million private placement and revolving credit facility.

• Interest Rate Arbitrage: The primary financial benefit of this deal was the reduction in the cost of capital. The interest rates on the JP Morgan notes are reported to be less than half of the 15-20% effective rates of the R&MF era. This creates an annual interest saving of tens of millions of pounds, directly improving PSR compliance headroom.
• Security Structure: The facility is secured primarily against the Everton Stadium Development Company (ESDC) and the leasehold of the stadium itself. This separates the infrastructure debt from the football operation’s working capital, a standard structure in US stadium financing (e.g., Tottenham Hotspur’s refinancing) but new to Everton.
• Tenure: The debt is structured as long-term senior secured notes, aligning the repayment schedule with the 30-40 year useful life of the stadium asset, rather than the short-term pressure of the previous 5-year operational loans.

The release of the accounts for the year ending June 30, 2024, and the interim updates for 2025, paint a picture of a business in transition.

Comparative Financial Performance (2022-2024)

Insight: While the headline Net Debt figure of £567.3m appears alarming, it is structurally distinct from previous debts. The majority of this (£312.7m of capital expenditure in 2024 alone) represents investment in a tangible asset (the stadium) which will increase revenue, unlike the dead money spent on transfer fees and wages in the Moshiri era. The initial challenge for TFG was managing the cash flow required to service this debt until the stadium revenue came fully online in the 2025/26 season.

The Everton Stadium Development Company Limited (ESDC) is the operational engine behind the future commercial viability of the club. It functions as a distinct subsidiary, insulating the stadium assets from the football club’s trading and performance risks.

The construction of the Hill Dickinson Stadium at Bramley-Moore Dock reached completion in late 2024, with a formal handover in December 2024. The financial magnitude of the project is staggering:

• Total Capitalised Cost: The cumulative cost incurred on the project reached £737.6 million by mid-2025. This figure includes £54.55 million in capitalised borrowing costs for the 2023/24 year alone.
• Intercompany Debt: ESDC owes its parent company (Everton FC) £575.15 million in unsecured loans. This represents the flow of funds from the club’s external lenders down to the development company.

The total cost of the project is well in excess of £800 million.

In May 2025, Everton announced a landmark naming rights agreement with Hill Dickinson, an international commercial law firm with deep roots in Liverpool.

• Deal Value: The agreement is reportedly valued at approximately £10 million per annum over a long-term (10-year) horizon.
• Strategic Fit: While some fans may have dreamed of a mega-deal with a US tech giant, the Hill Dickinson partnership aligns with TFG’s community custodian narrative. It avoids the alienation of (for example) a generic gambling sponsor or unrelated corporate entity. The deal was brokered by Elevate, a US-based sports agency, highlighting TFG’s utilisation of American commercial networks.
• Revenue Impact: This £10m/year is pure incremental revenue compared to Goodison Park (which had no naming rights), directly boosting the club’s PSR calculation.

In a bold strategic move, CEO Angus Kinnear confirmed that Goodison Park will not be immediately demolished for housing. Instead, it will be retained as the permanent home for Everton Women, making Everton the first club to operate two Premier League-standard stadiums.

• Commercial Logic: This decision taps into the increasing popularity of women’s football. By giving the women’s team a historic, large-capacity venue, Everton positions itself to capture the growing commercial and broadcast revenue in the WSL.
• Cultural Context: The continued use of Goodison Park as a football venue cements the club’s rightful claim to being the senior club or presence within the city of Liverpool. It’s enormous commitment to the city, historically and cultural is self evident
• Liverpool Waters Context: The new stadium is the anchor tenant for Peel Waters’ £5 billion Liverpool Waters regeneration scheme. ESDC’s success is intrinsically linked to the wider development of the Northern docks, creating a potential for future real estate appreciation and ancillary revenue streams (hotels, leisure) around the stadium. As stated earlier, one of the key determinants though will be infrastructure investment in and around the stadium environs.

Under the direction of Angus Kinnear (appointed permanent CEO in May 2025) and the retained manager David Moyes (who returned in Jan 2025), the club aims to shift to a data-driven, sustainable operational model.

The Summer 2025 transfer window was the first true test of TFG’s financial backing. The data reveals a significant loosening of the purse strings, facilitated by the balance sheet restructuring.

Key Insights:

• Investment Signal: A net spend of £116 million (5th highest in the league) signals a definitive end to the sell-to-buyausterity of the late Moshiri era. TFG sanctioned significant outlay to revitalise an aging squad.
• Recruitment Profile: The recruitment focused on younger assets with resale value, more closely aligned to a “Moneyball” approach advocated by Kinnear. Notable dealings included the sale of Amadou Onana for £50m (booking a £32m profit against book value) to fund broader squad depth.
• Avoiding MCO Swaps: Despite rumors of a swap deal involving Beto (Everton) and Artem Dovbyk (Roma), the club largely avoided direct transfer business with AS Roma. This caution is likely driven by a desire to demonstrate operational independence to UEFA regulators.

Despite the financial stabilisation, the on-pitch performance remains a work in progress.  David Moyes has provided stability and a safe pair of hands to ensure Premier League survival, but questions remain about his ability to transition the team to the proactive, possession-based style demanded by modern elite football. My own opinion remains that he has been an excellent appointment in the interim, creating security, identity and stability at a time when it was most needed

Dan Friedkin

Dan Friedkin has utilised his ownership of AS Roma and Everton to carve out a significant power base within European football governance, navigating the complex currents of UEFA politics.

Friedkin sits on the Executive Board of the European Club Association (ECA), which recently rebranded to “European Football Clubs” (EFC). Friedkin’s dual role places him in a unique position: he is a custodian of the “EFC” brand in Liverpool while serving on the board of the organisation appropriating that acronym globally. This dual role gives Everton a long lost voice at the top table of European football, something the club has lacked for decades. Friedkin’s alignment with Nasser Al-Khelaifi (PSG) and UEFA against the Super League has earned him political capital that may prove vital in the future.

The most potent regulatory threat to TFG’s future strategy is UEFA’s Article 5 regarding the integrity of competitions. With AS Roma and Everton both targeting European qualification, the decisive influence rule is a potential time bomb.

TFG is proactively managing this by maintaining distinct boards and avoiding shared management personnel between the clubs. However, the presence of Dan Friedkin at the apex of both structures remains a decisive influence indicator that UEFA typically scrutinises closely.

Stakeholder management: Public relations and fan engagement

TFG’s approach to stakeholder management has been characterised by a disciplined actions over words philosophy, contrasting sharply with the chaotic communication of previous regimes.

Unlike Moshiri, who frequently engaged in erratic text exchanges with journalists, Dan Friedkin and Roundhouse Capital are extremely private. They issue formal statements only when necessary and rely on executive proxies (Watts, Kinnear) for operational communication.

• Effectiveness: This silence remains an issue (in my opinion) with a fanbase traumatised by absenteeism. However, the competence demonstrated in the debt restructuring and the on-time delivery of the stadium has earned some trust. My view is that the Friedkins are missing out on additional benefits by their lack of engagement.

Despite the ownership’s reticence, Everton’s structural engagement with fans is considered to be best-in-class. In the 2024/25 Fan Engagement Index, Everton ranked 1st among Premier League clubs and 10th overall in English football, achieving a Bronze Award score of 165.

Premier League Fan Engagement Index Top 5 (2024/25)

This ranking validates TFG’s decision to retain the Fan Advisory Board (FAB) structures established during the crisis years. It suggests that while the owner is distant, the institution remains minimally  responsive in its dialogue with supporters as judged by football industry standards.

Personally, I believe these standards are nowhere near high enough, either structurally or by intent. Fan engagement across football, and certainly within the Friedkin model remains wholly inadequate, viewed as a tick box exercise when really it is a hugely valuable exercise in understanding the needs of their customer base.

The first year of The Friedkin Group’s ownership of Everton Football Club has been an exercise  in distressed asset turnaround. Through Roundhouse Capital, TFG has surgically excised the toxic debt that threatened the club’s existence, replacing predatory lenders with stable, long-term institutional partners like JPMorgan Chase. The completion of the Hill Dickinson Stadium and the innovative retention of Goodison Park for the women’s team demonstrate a commercial vision that is both ambitious and respectful of heritage.

However, the stabilisation phase is merely the precursor to the growth phase, which poses different challenges. The club must now navigate the treacherous waters of PSR with a net spend of £116m, requiring immediate on-pitch success to justify the outlay. The multi-club ownership issue with UEFA remains a dormant regulatory volcano, likely to erupt the moment both Everton and Roma qualify for Europe. Furthermore, the 1-4 defeat to Newcastle serves as a stark reminder that financial engineering does not score goals; the gap to the Premier League elite remains substantial.

Ultimately, TFG have moved Everton from being a complete basket case towards becoming a credible business. The Pursuit Sports model offers a pathway to modernity, leveraging US capital (Sarofim) and European political influence (ECA). If the football operations can match the competence of the financial restructuring, Everton is better positioned to reclaim its status as a top-tier institution.

However, there is a great deal more to be done across both footballing operations and the business itself.

Everton will comfortably satisfy the financial and ownership requirements of the newly independently regulated football environment, we will comfortably avoid relegation. That is an achievement given all that the Friedkins inherited. However, it cannot nor should not be the limit of their ambitions.

A year into their tenure, it would be wise for the Friedkins to credibly engage with our fan base, inform us of their footballing plans and ambitions, spell out the infrastructure and development plans around Bramley-Moore and perhaps demonstrate how we can reduce the competitive gap through innovation (for example Real Madrid’s transformation and creation of innovation/technology infrastructure around their stadium) and from a footballing perspective mirror or improve on academy excellence such as AZ Alkmaar. 

A solid start, but time to show more – both in terms of engagement but also deeds.