Author: Paul Quinn, CWTE Limited

Date: 28 September 2026  

Summary

This article examines the ownership, financing and regulatory position of The Sheffield United Football Club Limited (company no. 00061564) and its parent structures across the five financial years FY2020/21 to FY2024/25, together with post-balance-sheet events to 25 September 2026.. Throughout, primary documentary evidence is separated from party claims, from expert and media commentary, and from supporter commentary. A source reference in square brackets (e.g. [S2]) points to the source register at the end of the article.

Sheffield United was sold by Prince Abdullah bin Mosaad Al Saud’s United World group to an American consortium led by Steven Rosen and Helmy Eltoukhy on 23 December 2024 for a reported price of approximately £100–111m, payable partly in installments. 

The share purchase agreement was made between United World Holding Limited (Guernsey), COH Sports Bidco Limited (CSBL, company no. 15861084) as purchaser, and COH Sports United LLC (Delaware) [S43]. CSBL paid a first instalment of about £30m, paid a later instalment late, and did not pay installments falling due in 2026. 

In June 2026 the club was moved beneath a newly interposed Delaware entity, 1919 Partners LLC, leaving CSBL without the club. United World petitioned to wind up CSBL for more than £35m including interest; no defence was filed and the High Court made a compulsory winding-up order on 19 August 2026. 

The club’s own audited accounts show that CSBL lent the club £11m, interest-free and repayable on demand [S41]; that receivable now sits with CSBL’s liquidator. The club itself is trading, but at 30 June 2025 it had net current liabilities of £51.4m, £2.8m of cash, and a going-concern basis that expressly depends on support from its controlling parties [S41].

Headline numbers

Recommended actions

1. Issue a formal information notice to the club, 1919 Partners LLC and the controlling individuals for: the SPA (in particular clause 4.3(D) and the Deferred Hotel Amount), any guarantee by COH Sports United LLC, the Intercreditor Agreement with Macquarie, the MSD Term Loan Agreement and any intercreditor or subordination deed, and the current status of the £11m CSBL loan (Section 13).
2. Obtain from the Official Receiver (or appointed liquidator) of CSBL its position on (i) the £11m receivable from the club and (ii) the June 2026 share transfer, and agree a protocol so that any demand on the club is not made without notice to the Regulator.
3. Coordinate with the EFL on (i) whether the change of control to 1919 Partners LLC required and received prior approval; (ii) the application of the owners’ and directors’ disqualification provisions to Mr Rosen; and (iii) whether the club and CSBL should be treated as one economic entity for sanction purposes, taking account of the £11m intra-group loan.
4. Obtain from MSD, through the club, confirmation of whether any Event of Default has occurred under the Term Loan Agreement as a result of the 1919 interposition, the CSBL winding-up or the United World proceedings.
5. Open an ODSE suitability assessment of the incumbent controlling owners, with a source-of-funds and financial-soundness review that tests the owners’ capacity to settle the United World claim and replace the £11m CSBL loan without drawing on club resources.
6. Accept the Fan Advisory Board’s request for structured supporter engagement on process (not on confidential regulatory content).

Scope, method and source hierarchy

Scope

Financial analysis covers the five filed financial years FY2020/21 to FY2024/25 (year end 30 June). FY2025/26 accounts are not due at Companies House until 31 March 2027 and are therefore not available; post-balance-sheet events are covered from public records and reporting to 25 September 2026. Ownership history is traced back to 2013 where necessary to explain the security and property position.

How sources are classified

Because this matter is contested and partly sub judice in two jurisdictions, every material statement is tagged by evidential weight. The Board should give weight to material in the order below.

Ownership chronology 2013–2026

The table sets out the ownership and regulatory events that bear on the present position. The Tier column indicates the evidential status of each entry.

Group structure: Before and after June 2026

Structure at completion (December 2024)

Structure after the June 2026 restructuring

Five-year financial analysis (FY2020/21 – FY2024/25)

Profit and loss summary

All figures £m, year ended 30 June, club company (00061564) unless stated. FY23 to FY25 are taken directly from the audited FY24 and FY25 annual reports [S41][S42] (FY23 as restated). FY21 and FY22 remain as reported by press and analysts [S4].

Notes: FY21 staff costs derived from the FY22 filing’s statement that salaries fell by £56m to £42m. FY22 pre-tax figure is Blades Leisure (£16.2m); the club figure reported was £15.2m. FY23 staff costs are the Swiss Ramble total; the FY24 accounts do not restate that line in the pages reviewed. FY21 pre-tax result is not verified. FY25 staff costs include £1.84m redundancy and ex-gratia payments (FY24 £1.45m).

FY2023/24 reconciliation, resolved

The earlier draft recorded three competing FY24 results. The audited accounts reconcile them precisely [S42]:

Key ratios (computed)

Method: author’s computation from Section 5.1. The club’s own KPI table reports wage-to-turnover of 58% (FY25) and 46% (FY24) [S41], consistent with the above. Underlying operating result adds back tangible and intercompany impairments.

What the five years show

• Structural broadcast dependency. Broadcasting never fell below two-thirds of revenue. Sponsorship and advertising collapsed to £2.98m in FY25; total commercial income including the hotel and facility line was £8.32m.
• Player trading as the balancing item. Profit on disposals was £60.4m across FY22–FY25. The FY25 CEO statement says player trading was “essential to generate required liquidity” [S41]. After the year end, summer 2025 disposals produced a further £11.4m profit while £19.1m was committed to acquisitions (note 31) [S41].
• Cumulative result. On audited club figures FY23–FY25 the cumulative pre-tax result is −£25.0m and cumulative total comprehensive income −£38.4m. Adding FY22 (−£16.2m, Tier 2) gives a four-year pre-tax loss of c. £41m.
• Rising finance cost. Gross interest payable of £9.48m in FY25 (12% of revenue) comprised £3.24m of loan interest and £6.13m of unwinding discount on deferred transfer payables [S41].
• Related-party extraction under the previous owner. Consultancy fees to United World entities were £3.83m (FY23), £3.01m (FY24) and £1.63m (FY25, to December 2024), alongside purchases from United World SA of £1.58m in FY24 [S41][S42]. The FY25 accounts attribute part of the fall in administrative expenses to removal of these charges on change of control.
• Current-owner remuneration. Directors’ emoluments of £151,113 were paid in FY25 (FY24: nil) to the highest-paid director [S41].

Balance sheet and liquidity, 30 June 2023–2025 (primary)

Source: FY24 and FY25 audited accounts, notes 13–21, 25, 32 [S41][S42]. Transfer payables/receivables sum the current and non-current amounts disclosed as relating to player registrations.

• The net current liability deficit has increased seven-fold in two years. The movement in FY25 is largely reclassification: the £23.95m Macquarie loan became current because final repayment was due in May 2026 [S41].
• Receivables already spent. Factored loans of £21.50m are secured over the trade debtors to which they relate [S41]; against £23.28m of transfer receivables, roughly 92% of future transfer income due to the club had already been borrowed against at 30 June 2025.
• The Macquarie refinancing. The bank loan was secured on the club’s assets and Premier League central funds and fell due in May 2026 [S41][S42]. The MSD term loan and debenture executed on 14 January 2026 [S44] are consistent with a refinancing of that facility; the amount, pricing and terms of the MSD loan are not in the public domain. Charges 0038–0042 in favour of Macquarie still appear as outstanding on the register; whether they have been discharged but not yet satisfied at Companies House should be confirmed.
• Going concern. Directors reviewed forecasts to June 2027 showing the club can operate within its facilities “including, if required, support from its controlling parties” [S41]. Grant Thornton reported no material uncertainty. Both conclusions were reached before CSBL’s winding-up.

The £11m CSBL loan (primary finding)

The 2026/27 revenue cliff

Having been relegated after a single Premier League season, the club received two years of parachute payments (2024/25 and 2025/26). 2026/27 is the first year without them. Commentary in 2024 placed basic Championship central income at around £8m against around £100m in the Premier League [S32]. On the FY25 broadcast base of £57.93m the fall in central income is of the order of £40–50m (analyst estimate; the FY26 parachute amount is not verified). Mr Rosen has told supporters the wage bill has been reduced to comply with squad cost ratio rules [S19]. Summer 2025 sales (Ahmedhodžić, Souza and others) produced £11.4m of profit but were offset by £19.1m of acquisitions [S41].

Debt, security and the charges register (primary source)

The Companies House register for The Sheffield United Football Club Limited records 45 charges, of which 10 are shown as outstanding and 35 satisfied [S2]. The two instruments that matter for this case, charges 0041 and 0044, have now been reviewed in full [S43][S44].

Outstanding charges

Charge 0041: the United World debenture (23 December 2024)

Charge 0044: the MSD debenture (14 January 2026)

How the two security packages interact

• No collision on assets. The MSD deed carves the hotel out, preserving United World’s hotel security; on the face of the documents there is no breach of either negative pledge.
• A contractual tripwire. Under clause 3.4(b)(v) of the MSD deed, MSD’s floating charge over the club’s assets crystallises automatically if any other floating charge created by the club crystallises. United World may convert its hotel floating charge by notice once an event of default is continuing (0041, cl. 2.6(B)). A step by United World to enforce against the hotel could therefore crystallise MSD’s security over the whole club, restricting the club’s ability to deal with its assets without MSD’s consent.
• Macquarie legacy. United World’s deed is subject to an intercreditor agreement with Macquarie. If Macquarie has been refinanced by MSD, the Regulator should establish whether that intercreditor was novated to MSD or replaced.
• Parent-level default risk. The MSD Term Loan Agreement has not been seen. Change-of-control and group-insolvency events of default are standard in such facilities. The June 2026 interposition of 1919 Partners LLC and the winding-up of CSBL both need to be tested against it. The 1919 spokesperson’s reference to investing “alongside our lender MSD Capital” [S13] suggests MSD was consulted on the restructuring, but this is inference.
• Serial receivables financing. The Macquarie and Close Leasing charges pattern (2020–2025) confirms that the club has borrowed against transfer receivables throughout the review period, under both owners [S2][S41].

The deferred consideration dispute: Claims and counter-claims

What is established

Payment history as reported

The SPA itself has not been disclosed. The United World debenture confirms that it was made between United World Holding Limited, CSBL and COH Sports United LLC, and that it contains a separate “Deferred Hotel Amount” payable under clause 4.3(D) and secured on the hotel [S43]. The overall schedule, interest rate and any guarantee by COH Sports United LLC remain undisclosed [S13]. With a headline price of £100–111m and a first instalment of £30m, the reported numbers imply that between roughly £35m and £45m was paid in later installments before default; this is an arithmetic inference only, since the £35m claim includes interest and the headline price is not confirmed.

Claim and counter-claim matrix

The CSBL liquidation and the 1919 transfer: Insolvency analysis

This section is analytical and is not legal advice. It identifies the questions a liquidator of CSBL can be expected to ask, because the answers will drive both the vendor’s recovery and the regulatory outcome.

Process

• On a compulsory order the Official Receiver becomes liquidator unless and until an insolvency practitioner is appointed. United World has said it will support the officeholders’ investigations and pursue “those personally responsible” [S10].
• The Star noted that CSBL appears to hold no assets, having ceased to be the parent company [S3]. A shell with a single large creditor is a natural candidate for creditor-funded investigation.

Transactions a liquidator will review

Section 423 is notable because it is not confined to the liquidator: a victim of the transaction (here, plausibly United World) may apply directly, and there is no insolvency time limit. The statutory test turns on purpose, so the owners’ public explanation of the restructuring (Section 4) will be tested against contemporaneous documents. The court can make orders restoring the position, which in principle could include re-vesting the club group or its value in CSBL.

Regulatory exposure: EFL and IFR

Official positions

The four regulatory questions

(a) Does the CSBL winding-up trigger an insolvency sanction?

Not automatically. It was CSBL, not the club, that was wound up, and CSBL had ceased to be parent before the order [S17]. The relevant precedent is Southampton in 2009, docked ten points after its parent company entered administration on the basis that parent and club were one economic entity [S16]. The Southampton parent was the parent at the time of its insolvency; here the owners interposed a new parent first. The EFL will have to decide whether an unapproved interposition shortly before a creditor’s petition can defeat the one-economic-entity analysis. The analyst view is that it should not be allowed to, but that the EFL is likely to wait for the liquidator’s findings. The audited accounts strengthen the economic-entity case: until June 2026 CSBL was the club’s funder as well as its owner, and at 30 June 2025 the club owed it £11m on demand [S41].

(b) Is Mr Rosen disqualified?

United World relies on EFL owners’ and directors’ provisions (reported as Regulation 2.1.16) disqualifying persons associated with two insolvency events within ten years [S14]. SEC filings show Mr Rosen was appointed an independent director of Invacare Holdings in 2022; Invacare filed for Chapter 11 in January 2023 [S18][S39]. He was a director of CSBL when it was wound up [S18]. EFL sources told the Guardian that an overseas insolvency counts [S15]. Mr Rosen’s response, that no company he directly controlled became insolvent [S18], answers a test that the regulation, as reported, does not set. Subject to the precise drafting and any exceptions, this is the most direct regulatory consequence and would require Mr Rosen to cease acting as a director and to reduce his control.

(c) Was the change of control properly notified and approved?

Consistent reporting is that neither the EFL nor the IFR approved, or was aware of, the transfer to 1919 Partners LLC before it happened [S17][S19]. Even where ultimate individuals are unchanged, the interposition of a new foreign parent is a change in the ownership chain that engages notification and, depending on drafting, prior-approval requirements. United World goes further and alleges that the EFL was misled [S10]. Any finding that incomplete or misleading information was given to a regulator goes directly to the ODSE honesty and integrity limb.

(d) Are the incumbent owners suitable?

The IFR’s ODSE regime allows it to examine incumbents where it has grounds for concern [S9]. The grounds here are specific and documentary: an unpaid, undefended debt arising from the acquisition of the club itself; a restructuring that stripped the obligor; apparent non-notification; a pending Delaware fraud-related claim concerning how the acquisition was assembled (Section 11); and a reported director-disqualification trigger. Financial soundness should be tested by asking a simple question: can the owners settle a £35m liability from their own resources without recourse to club assets or new club-level debt?

Scenario assessment

Likelihoods are the author’s qualitative judgement on the public record and are provided to support prioritisation, not as predictions of regulatory decisions.

Legacy Issues from the Prince Abdullah Era (2019–2024)

The present owners’ central counter-narrative is that the previous owner presided over financial distress [S11]. That narrative is partly supported by the record, and fairness requires it to be set out.

Payment defaults and sanctions

• Registration embargo, January–April 2023 for unpaid transfer installments, including sums due to Liverpool for Rhian Brewster; lifted after FA Cup income [S23].
• Two-point deduction for 2024/25, imposed by independent commission on a negotiated basis in April 2024, for defaults to other clubs during 2022/23 totalling more than 550 days; a further two points suspended; EFL costs £310,455. The club said sums had been paid, some only days late, and that it was itself awaiting overdue monies from other clubs [S22].
• CEO Stephen Bettis acknowledged in March 2023 that the club was “stretching every single pound” and had paid some suppliers late, while rejecting administration speculation in robust terms [S23].

Related-party arrangements

• Consultancy fees to United World entities: £1.525m (FY22, Tier 2) [S24]; £3.83m (FY23), £3.01m (FY24) and £1.63m (FY25 to December 2024) from the audited accounts [S41][S42], c. £10m over four years. Former finance director Darren Smith defended the arrangement as a benefit of group membership [S24].
• £14.38m owed to the club by its parent Blades Leisure was written off in FY24 (Section 5.2) [S42].
• Deferred share redemption. On 31 July 2024 the club redeemed all 681 deferred shares at £1 each; the FY24 accounts described the redemption as made in accordance with the Articles, but the FY25 accounts state it did not meet the conditions of the Companies Act and is being corrected [S41][S42]. The sums are trivial; the admitted statutory breach is not.
• United World lending of £6m to the club in FY22 [S24] and £22.72m in FY23 [S42].

Failed disposals

• Henry Mauriss and Dozy Mmobuosi both failed to complete in 2022–23 [S24]. The EFL publicly declined to process Mmobuosi’s bid in February 2023 pending answers to queries, including over a new share issue [S27]. Mmobuosi was later charged by the SEC with fraud concerning Tingo, and a $250m default judgment followed in 2024 [S27]. The EFL’s refusal to approve him is an example of the owners’ test working as intended.

The McCabe litigation tail

The 2019 High Court judgment, the refusal of permission to appeal in 2020 and the dismissal of SUL’s negligence claim against Shepherd and Wedderburn in 2023 close the McCabe ownership dispute as a matter of law [S25][S26]. McCabe has maintained that his 50% stake, sold for £5m, was worth around £52m, and has called the litigation system “a joke” [S26]. The continuing relevance to the IFR is property: the obligation to acquire the stadium and associated real estate from McCabe interests after 2019 explains the club’s ownership of the titles now charged to United World and MSD.

Other ownership litigation: Page v Rosen (Delaware and Ohio)

Governance and conduct under the current ownership

Record, December 2024 to September 2026

Recommendations and information requests

Documents to be obtained

Recommended decisions

1. Designate Sheffield United a priority case under the ODSE regime for incumbents and open a formal assessment of Mr Rosen and Mr Eltoukhy, sequenced with, but not deferred indefinitely to, the EFL process.
2. Seek a memorandum of understanding with the EFL on information-sharing for this case, so the club is not subject to duplicative requests and determinations are consistent.
3. Ask the owners to confirm in writing, within a short deadline, whether they will settle the United World liability and from which resources, and to undertake that no club asset will be encumbered or disposed of, and no dividend, management charge or loan repayment made to any owner entity, pending resolution.
4. Commission an independent review of the club’s short-term liquidity under a stress case in which the £11m owner loan is called and no further owner funding is provided.
5. Establish a structured supporter-engagement channel with the Fan Advisory Board, facilitated by the Football Supporters’ Association, limited to process and timetable.
6. Draw a policy lesson for the regime generally: interposition of a new holding entity above an acquisition vehicle that owes deferred consideration should require prior regulatory approval and evidence that the vendor has consented or been paid.

Commentary: Expert, media and supporter views

This section is expressly Tier 5 and Tier 6 material. It is included because supporter sentiment is itself relevant to the club’s sustainability and heritage. It is not evidence of fact.

Expert and media commentary

Supporter commentary

Register of liquidations and insolvency events relevant to the case

No insolvency event has been recorded against The Sheffield United Football Club Limited or Blades Leisure Limited on the evidence available. The research asked specifically about companies placed into liquidation. On the public record, the only company in the Sheffield United ownership chain placed into liquidation in the review period is COH Sports Bidco Limited. The McCabe-connected entry is shown for completeness because it appears on his Companies House appointments list; its identity and relevance should be confirmed before any reliance is placed on it.

Data limitations and caveats

• Accounts. FY24 and FY25 club accounts reviewed directly (FY23 via restated comparatives). FY21 and FY22 remain Tier 2 and the FY21 pre-tax result is not verified. Blades Leisure consolidated accounts not reviewed. The scanned FY24 accounts were read by OCR; key figures were cross-checked to FY25 comparatives.
• Charge instruments. Charges 0041 and 0044 reviewed in full (0044 by OCR). The Intercreditor Agreement, the MSD Term Loan Agreement and the SPA are referred to in those deeds but have not been seen; conclusions about events of default and priorities are conditional on them.
• Post-balance-sheet status of the £11m loan. The accounts are as at 30 June 2025. Repayment, capitalisation or assignment since then would change the risk materially.
• The share purchase agreement is private. Price, installment schedule, interest and guarantees are reported, not documented. The implied instalment arithmetic in Section 7.2 is illustrative.
• The 1919 mechanics are unknown. The legal form of the June 2026 transfer and its consideration are not public.
• EFL regulation references (e.g. Regulation 2.1.16) are as reported by Sky Sports and the Guardian; the current drafting of the EFL Regulations should be checked before any reliance.
• Litigation is live. The Delaware claim, any Ohio arbitration and any liquidator action may change the facts. Nothing in this report should be read as a finding of wrongdoing by any person.
• Time-stamp. Events are covered to 25 September 2026. FY2025/26 accounts are not due until 31 March 2027.
• Not legal advice. Sections 8 and 9 identify issues for the Board and its legal advisers; they are not legal opinions.

Source Register

Tier classification is set out in above. URLs are abbreviated; full links available on request.