Date:  2 October 2026

Author:  Paul Quinn, CWTE Limited

Scope:  2026/27 Premier League membership; 2025/26–2027/28 broadcast cycle; latest filed audited accounts

Summary

Key findings

1. Broadcast, not sponsorship, is the dominant channel of state money. beIN’s MENA deal is reported by The Athletic at £550m over 2025/26–2027/28 (c.£183m a year), approximately twice Manchester City’s estimated Abu Dhabi sponsorship income. Because it is distributed centrally, every club,  including the most “private”, takes c.£10m–£17m a year traceable to state-owned or state-funded broadcasters.
2. Club-level state exposure is narrow but deep. Only Manchester City, Arsenal, Newcastle (shrinking) and Aston Villa (new) carry material state-linked commercial income. At City, Abu Dhabi state-linked partners are an estimated 22%–38% of commercial revenue (for the purposes of this report) on a weak evidential base, since values are undisclosed.
3. The 25 September 2026 commission findings change how City’s income should be classified. As reported by The Telegraph, the commission found that more than £830m of the c.£950m commercial income City reported between 2009/10 and 2017/18 derived from arrangements that should have been treated as equity from Abu Dhabi United Group. Sanctions are pending and City is expected to appeal.
4. Newcastle’s related-party commercial income has largely gone. PIF-linked deals (Sela £25m, Noon c.£7.5m, Saudia c.£3m) were c.30% of 2024/25 commercial income of £120.2m. With Sela departed, PIF-related income is now estimated at c.3% of total income. The related-party channel has shifted to asset sales (£133.2m gain on St James’ Park and land sold to a PIF-majority sister company).
5. Concentration is the core risk. Gulf states (Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Saudi Arabia) account for c.72% of all state-linked revenue and c.84% of foreign-state exposure.
6. The mix is rotating, not retreating. Saudi club-level money has fallen c.75%; Rwanda has moved from Arsenal’s sleeve to Aston Villa’s shirt front; Emirates rises to £65m at Arsenal; the pending PIF-led take-private of EA Sports (the League’s lead partner) and Turkish Airlines at Liverpool from 2027/28 (49.12% Türkiye Wealth Fund) are material emerging exposures.
7. The ambiguous category is large. Minority sovereign holdings, Temasek in Standard Chartered, Qatar Holding in Barclays, Khazanah in Astro, PIF’s SURJ in DAZN, and the EA transaction,  could add £200m–£300m a year on a looser “state-influenced” test.

Recommendations in brief

• IFR and Premier League to require a standardised disclosure schedule of all counterparties with >25% state ownership or state veto rights, with contract values.
• Extend APT-style fair-value testing to intra-group asset disposals.
• Treat Manchester City’s state-linked commercial revenue as non-underwritable pending the sanction outcome, 2025/26 accounts and Etihad renewal terms,  apply a minimum 25% haircut in valuation work.
• Stress-test central distributions for a beIN non-renewal after 2027/28 (c.£9m per club per year at risk).

Methodology and taxonomy

Classification tiers

Rules applied

• Control test first. An entity is state-linked if a state or a vehicle it controls holds a majority, controlling stake or veto rights. Exception: Aldar (Mubadala 28.03%) is included because a City director sits on Aldar’s board, placing it inside City’s associated-party perimeter.
• Value hierarchy. Disclosed figures (club accounts, Premier League statements) → named press reports (The Athletic, The Telegraph, SportsPro, Sportcal, Shields Gazette, iNews) → analyst estimates (Matchday Finance, The Sponsor fair-value index).
• Confidence ratings. H = disclosed or multiply corroborated; M = single named press report; L = analyst estimate or inference.
• Denominators. Club percentages use the latest filed audited accounts (2024/25 where available). League aggregates use Deloitte’s Annual Review of Football Finance 2026: £6.8bn club revenue 2024/25 (broadcast £3.4bn; matchday >£1bn; implied commercial c.£2.4bn), with revenue projected to exceed £7bn in 2025/26.
• Broadcast attribution. Central rights are attributed pro rata to distributions; equal shares produce identical state-attributable sums for every club.
• Vintage mismatch. The aggregate combines 2025/26 broadcast run-rates with 2024/25 commercial actuals. It is a run-rate measure, not a single-year audited figure.

League Aggregate

Aggregate state-linked revenue (run-rate)

Interpretation

At the central estimate, approximately £1 in every £13 of Premier League revenue comes from a state counterparty. Club-level exposure is highly concentrated; league-level exposure is diffuse, because every club depends on beIN through central distribution. The systemic risk is therefore not “a few state-owned clubs” but that the League’s single largest overseas rights deal sits with a broadcaster owned by the State of Qatar, whose chairman Nasser Al-Khelaifi also chairs Qatar Sports Investments (owner of PSG) and the European Club Association.

Trend

No robust time series exists because values are rarely disclosed and composition has changed. Direction of travel from the evidence:

• 2015/16 (league revenue c.£3.6bn): dominated by Abu Dhabi money at City,  much of which the commission now finds was owner equity, plus Arsenal/Emirates, beIN MENA and the BBC.
• 2020/21 (c.£4.9bn, Covid-affected): similar composition. Newcastle’s October 2021 takeover added PIF-related deals from 2022/23.
• 2024/25–2025/26: peak Saudi club exposure (Sela, Noon, Saudia). beIN MENA renewal reported c.10% above the 2022–25 cycle (The Athletic). Sportcal’s figures imply a much larger uplift ($500m → $746.8m); The Athletic’s £550m is used here.
• 2026/27 onwards: Saudi club exposure falls; Rwanda moves to Villa; Emirates rises; ambiguous exposures (EA, Turkish Airlines) grow. Share of revenue broadly stable at mid-to-high single digits.

Club-by-Club Analysis (2026/27 membership)

Promoted for 2026/27: Coventry City (champions), Ipswich Town, Hull City (play-offs). Relegated after 2025/26: West Ham United, Burnley, Wolverhampton Wanderers,  none had state-linked partners identified (front-of-shirt sponsors were betting firms BoyleSports, 96.com and DEBET; Wolves’ owner Fosun is private). The 2026/27 front-of-shirt gambling ban reshaped the market: Score and Change counts eight financial-services shirt sponsors (up from three) and six gambling sleeve deals (double the prior season).

Summary table

Manchester City

• Partners and ownership. My board-mapping review (29 September 2026) counts 34 global partners, five owned or controlled by the Abu Dhabi/UAE state: Etihad Airways (full ownership transferred to ADQ, February 2024; ADQ chaired by Sheikh Tahnoun); e& (60% Emirates Investment Authority, chaired by Sheikh Mansour, plus veto special share); Experience Abu Dhabi (DCT Abu Dhabi, a government department); Emirates Palace Mandarin Oriental (Government of Abu Dhabi); Aldar (Mubadala 28.03%, City director Martin Edelman on Aldar’s board).
• First Abu Dhabi Bank. A proposed 2023 deal was blocked by the Premier League; the tribunal set that decision aside in October 2024.
• Values. None disclosed. Matchday Finance estimates Etihad (shirt plus stadium) at c.£65m a year; The Sponsor put front-of-shirt fair value at £72.8m (2023). The central £90m adds estimates for e&, Experience Abu Dhabi, Aldar and Emirates Palace. The £130m high case allows for a higher-value Etihad renewal; terms are not public.
• Accounting context. Retail is outsourced to Fanatics; reported commercial revenue (£340.4m) would be c.£60m higher on a gross basis, slightly flattering the state-linked share.
• Classification consequence. Per The Telegraph’s reporting of the commission’s findings (114 of 115 charges; decision redacted; sanctions pending; appeal expected), in 2017/18 only £11m of £145.73m recorded sponsorship fees was paid by the Abu Dhabi sponsors themselves. Kieran Maguire has noted that, because commercial revenues did not fall after 2018, scrutiny will turn to whether later revenues are genuine. Etihad rejects any implication of improper arrangements. Until 2025/26 accounts and further proceedings are available, City’s state-linked income should be treated as owner-perimeter funding of uncertain economic substance.

Newcastle United

• 2024/25 accounts (year to 30 June 2025): turnover £335.3m; commercial £120.2m (up 44% from £83.6m); pre-tax profit £35m driven by a £133.2m gain on property sales to group companies, c.£98m loss without it. Ownership: PIF 85%, RB Sports & Media 15%.
• PIF-linked partners: Sela (shirt, £25m a year, 100% PIF; three-year total reported as £70m–£75m; also St James’ “STACK” fan zone naming, value unreported); Noon (sleeve, c.£7.5m — Kieran Maguire’s asking-price figure, not a confirmed contract value; c.50% PIF); Saudia (c.£3m a year, iNews; reportedly passed FMV checks). No published ruling cut any Newcastle deal.
• No evidence of other Saudi deals. No Newcastle partnership with Aramco, Visit Saudi or Riyadh Air was found (Riyadh Air sponsors Atlético Madrid). Unsubstantiated forum claims are disregarded.
• 2026/27: Sela did not renew. KNOX Hydration (South African, not PIF-linked) took the shirt on a three-year deal — The Athletic: c.£10m in 2026/27 rising to up to £25m; Shields Gazette: c.£80m total. KNOX also pays up to £6m a year for training-ground naming.
• Verification gap. The PIF-group sponsorship value in the 2024/25 related-party note was not verified line by line — priority check.

Arsenal

• Emirates (Investment Corporation of Dubai),  shirt and stadium naming, extended August 2026 to 2033; reported £65m a year for two seasons, then £75m.
• Visit Rwanda (Rwanda Development Board),  £10m in 2023/24 per The Athletic’s reading of the accounts. Ended by mutual consent June 2026, following DR Congo’s February 2025 appeal against “blood-stained” sponsorships and the Gunners for Peace campaign.
• Replacement sleeve sponsor Deel (private), reported £18m rising to £25m. Arsenal’s state-linked share stays at c.25% of commercial income but becomes a single-counterparty Dubai exposure.

Aston Villa

Visit Rwanda took the shirt front from 2026/27, replacing Betano, reported at up to £20m a year (TRT Afrika: c.$26m), as principal partner, official tourism partner and official coffee provider. Contract length and safeguards are unpublished. Amnesty International UK warned the club about the wider implications. Owner Nassef Sawiris is a private Egyptian investor, so the deal is tier A (foreign government) but not tier F. A suggested Visit Malta link was not verified against Villa’s current partner list.

Liverpool

No controlled-state partner in the central case. Standard Chartered’s largest shareholder is Temasek with a non-controlling c.16–18% stake and no board seat, tier G, high case only. From 1 June 2027, Turkish Airlines becomes main partner on a five-year deal reportedly worth over £60m a year. The airline’s 2023 investor roadshow lists the Türkiye Wealth Fund at 49.12%, with the Privatisation Administration retaining a golden share,  a tier C state enterprise. From 2027/28 this would be the League’s second-largest single state-linked shirt counterparty after Arsenal/Emirates.

Premier League central commercial partners

• 2026/27 partners: EA Sports (lead), Adobe, Barclays, Coca-Cola, Guinness, Microsoft, Puma; licensees Avery Dennison, Topps, Rezzil, Football Manager. Central commercial distribution was £7.9m per club in 2024/25 (c.£158m pool), reportedly c.£11.5m per club in 2025/26.
• Barclays: historic Qatar Holding minority, tier G, high case only.
• EA Sports: take-private agreed by a PIF/Silver Lake/Affinity Partners consortium. Completion status at October 2026 not verified. On completion the League’s lead partner becomes tier B, giving the central commercial pool its first Saudi-state counterparty. Fee undisclosed; £25m–£40m a year is a low-confidence estimate excluded from the central case.

Media rights analysis

Rights structure

• Domestic 2025/26–2028/29: £6.7bn over four years (c.£1.675bn a year). Sky holds four of five packages (≥215 matches); TNT Sports one (52 matches). BBC highlights unchanged at £75m a year. No evidence the 2029+ domestic tender has been run; a 2027–28 tender is likely.
• International 2025/26–2027/28: reported c.£2.0bn–£2.2bn a year (secondary sources cite a £6.5bn cycle, +23%; no official League figure). Some territories run longer: Thailand/Cambodia/Laos (Jasmine/Mono) and Japan (U-Next) six seasons; Vietnam (FPT via Jasmine) January 2026 to 2030/31; Ireland four seasons aligned with UK.
• Distribution 2025/26 (The Athletic): equal shares of £31.9m (UK) and £56.6m (international) per club, plus merit and facility fees. Relegated Wolves and Burnley still received £117.7m and £118.1m.

Broadcast partners and classification

The League’s official 2025–28 list names no public-service broadcaster outside the UK. Any free-to-air exposure in Africa, the Caribbean or the Pacific sits in undisclosed sublicences.

Per-club attribution of state-linked broadcast money

Concentration by State

Regulatory and risk context

Associated Party Transactions (APT)

• City sought arbitration on 24 January 2024 after the League blocked Etihad and FAB deals.
• First partial award (autumn 2024): parts of the rules unlawful (exclusion of shareholder loans; procedural unfairness), but the regime’s purpose upheld and no finding that it targeted Gulf-owned clubs.
• Clubs adopted amended rules in November 2024 by 16–4. Second partial award (13 February 2025) declared the former rules void and unenforceable.
• City launched a fresh challenge in February 2025, then settled on 8 September 2025, accepting the current rules as valid and binding. Newcastle, Chelsea and Everton representatives appeared as witnesses for City; Arsenal, Manchester United, Liverpool, West Ham, Brentford, Bournemouth, Fulham and Wolves supported the League.
• Implication: every tier F deal (City/Abu Dhabi; Newcastle/PIF) is now assessed against independent fair-market-value benchmarks. The Etihad renewal is the largest single test. Five City directors resigned from three CFG commercial subsidiaries on 19 September 2025, eleven days after settlement; no causal link is asserted.

Asset sales as the new related-party channel

On 27 June 2025 Newcastle sold St James’ Park leasehold improvements for £172.1m (book value £43.1m; profit £129.0m) and Newcastle United Projects Ltd for £17.1m to the PIF-majority PZ Newco group, a total gain of £133.2m. The club says the profit will be adjusted in FY2026 following a concluded Premier League fair-market-value process; the adjustment is undisclosed. UEFA does not recognise such intra-group disposals and the club faces reported UEFA fine risk. Regulators should expect value to migrate from sponsorship to property and asset transactions as sponsorship is more tightly policed.

Owners’ and Directors’ Test and the Independent Football Regulator

The Football Governance Act 2025 gives the IFR an owners and officers test and governance powers but does not prohibit state ownership. Newcastle’s 2021 takeover was approved on legally binding assurances that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would not control the club. My finding that four of six City directors hold current Abu Dhabi state or sovereign-fund roles illustrates the weakness of “control” assurances as a regulatory tool.

The newspaper analogue is instructive. Following the RedBird IMI bid for The Telegraph, regulations introduced in July 2025 cap passive foreign-state investment in UK newspaper owners at 15%, with consultation on applying the cap to combined holdings of different states. Football has no equivalent: a state can own 85% of a Premier League club while its influence over a national newspaper is tightly limited.

UEFA

UEFA’s squad-cost and fair-value rules also restate related-party income to fair value, and its refusal to recognise intra-group asset disposals is stricter than the Premier League’s current approach. Multi-club structures (City Football Group, 13 clubs) add cross-border related-party complexity beyond domestic APT reach.

Counterparty and geopolitical risk

Sports-washing and soft power

The evidence base is documented advocacy rather than proof of intent. At Newcastle’s takeover Amnesty International UK urged the League to add human-rights criteria to its owners’ test; in July 2026 it warned Aston Villa over Visit Rwanda. The Rwanda Development Board attributes 1.3 million visitors and $650m of tourism revenue in 2024 partly to the Arsenal partnership, self-reported, but explicit evidence of the nation-branding motive behind tier A spending.

Data limitations and caveats

Recommendations

1. IFR and Premier League: disclosure. Require a standard schedule of every counterparty with >25% state ownership or state veto rights, with contract values. Adopt a league-level counterparty concentration report covering central broadcast and commercial contracts, starting with beIN and EA.

2. Extend fair-value testing. Apply APT-style testing to asset disposals and to non-controlled state counterparties where the owner is itself a state. Rwanda and Dubai at non-state-owned clubs require disclosure only; Abu Dhabi entities at City and Saudi entities at Newcastle require FMV testing.

3. Investors and commissioning boards. Treat Manchester City’s state-linked commercial revenue as non-underwritable until 2025/26 accounts, the sanction outcome and Etihad renewal terms are public; apply at least a 25% haircut in valuation work.

4. Stress-test central income for a 2028 beIN non-renewal,  c.£9m per club per year, more than a mid-table club’s entire sleeve income.

5. Priority verifications before final adoption: Newcastle 2024/25 related-party note; EA completion status; Turkish Airlines/Türkiye Wealth Fund shareholding; Experience Kissimmee value; Migu and beIN Turkey values from the League’s 2025/26 financial statements.

Conclusions

The Premier League is not a “state-funded” competition in aggregate: c.92% of revenue derives from private broadcasters, private sponsors and supporters. But the state-linked 7.5% has three features that matter more than its size:

• It is concentrated in the Gulf: c.84% of foreign-state exposure.
• It reaches every club through central broadcast money that runs principally through one Qatari state broadcaster.
• At two clubs it is entwined with the owner itself,  and the evidence at City now points to state owner funding presented as sponsorship.

The trend is rotation, not retreat: from Saudi shirt deals to a potential Saudi-owned league partner; from Rwanda at Arsenal to Rwanda at Villa; towards Dubai and Turkish state carriers at the top clubs. Regulators should focus less on the headline percentage and more on transparency of values and on related-party flows outside sponsorship.

Sources

1. The Esk  Manchester City FC & CFG board relationship mapping (29 Sept 2026)  https://theesk.org/2026/09/29/the-analysis-series-manchester-city-fc-city-football-group-board-relationship-mapping-the-abu-dhabi-state-its-sovereign-investment-vehicles-directors-private-interests-and-club-sponsors/
2. The Esk  Newcastle United Limited financial results 2024-25  https://theesk.org/2026/04/14/the-analysis-series-analysis-of-newcastle-united-limited-financial-results-2024-2025/
3. The Telegraph via Yahoo Sports  Did Man City stop wrongdoing in 2018?  https://sports.yahoo.com/articles/curious-sponsorships-raise-did-man-091551992.html
4. Deloitte  Annual Review of Football Finance: Premier League clubs  https://www.deloitte.com/global/en/industries/telecom-media-entertainment/perspectives/annual-review-of-football-finance-premier-league-clubs.html
5. Matchday Finance Premier League Financial Results 2024/25  https://www.matchdayfinance.com/post/premier-league-financial-results-2024-25
6. Matchday Finance Manchester City Financial Results 2024/25  https://www.matchdayfinance.com/post/manchester-city-financial-results-2024-25
7. Manchester City Annual Report 2025  Business Performance  https://www.mancity.com/annualreport2025/business-performance/
8. SportsPro  Ranking every PL club’s 2024/25 financial performance  https://www.sportspro.com/analysis/finance-investment/premier-league-club-finances-2024-25-profit-losses-revenue-chelsea/
9. SportsPro  Premier League pockets £550m in beIN MENA renewal  https://www.sportspro.com/news/premier-league-bein-sports-tv-rights-extension-mena-june-2025/
10. Sportcal beIN retains Premier League rights in MENA  https://www.sportcal.com/analyst-comment/bein-retains-premier-league-rights-in-mena/
11. Premier League international broadcast partners 2025-28  https://www.premierleague.com/en/news/3703577
12. ContentAsia  Premier League rights updates  https://www.contentasia.tv/news/premier-league-rights-updates-23-markets-official-list-philippines-mia
13. Swiss Ramble  Premier League TV deal 2025-29  https://swissramble.substack.com/p/premier-league-tv-deal-2025-29
14. Swiss Ramble  Newcastle United Finances 2024/25  https://swissramble.substack.com/p/newcastle-united-finances-202425
15. GiveMeSport PL broadcast revenue by club 2025/26  https://www.givemesport.com/premier-league-clubs-earnings-broadcast-revenue/
16. GiveMeSport Total prize money and earnings 2025-26  https://www.givemesport.com/premier-league-every-club-total-prize-money-earnings-2025-26/
17. Score and Change  2026/27 Premier League sponsors  https://www.scoreandchange.com/overview-of-the-2026-2027-premier-league-sponsors/
18. Sportcal Newcastle upgrade KNOX to front-of-shirt  https://www.sportcal.com/sponsorship/newcastle-upgrade-knox-to-front-of-shirt-partner-leeds-expand-kitman-deal/
19. Shields Gazette  Newcastle £80m new sponsor  https://www.shieldsgazette.com/sport/football/newcastle-united/newcastle-united-sponsorship-knox-shirt-adidas-8741663
20. True Faith The KNOX sponsorship deal  https://tf1892.substack.com/p/show-us-the-money-the-knox-sponsorship
21. SportsPro  Newcastle sleeve deal with PIF-backed Noon  https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/newcastle-united-noon-sleeve-sponsorship-kayak-saudi-arabia-pif/
22. Inside World Football  Newcastle Saudia renewal  https://www.insideworldfootball.com/2023/10/20/newcastle-land-saudi-airline-sponsorship-renewal/
23. Insider Media  Newcastle owners sell St James’ Park to themselves  https://www.insidermedia.com/news/north-east/newcastle-united-owners-sell-st-james-park-to-themselves
24. Goal  Newcastle face UEFA fine risk  https://www.goal.com/en-gb/lists/newcastle-face-huge-fine-uefa-rule-breach/blt7fb2659b3fb58807
25. AllAfrica  Arsenal to end Visit Rwanda sponsorship  https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00094822.html
26. Finance Football  Aston Villa seals Visit Rwanda  https://financefootball.com/en/2026/07/15/aston-villa-seals-visit-rwanda-as-new-front-of-shirt-sponsor/
27. TRT Afrika Aston Villa Visit Rwanda deal  https://www.trtafrika.com/english/article/4e9ae90d900f
28. Farrer & Co  City settles APT dispute  https://www.farrer.co.uk/news-and-insights/manchester-city-settles-dispute-with-premier-league-over-associated-party-transaction-rules/
29. Football Legal — Former APT rules declared void  https://www.football-legal.com/content/manchester-city-arbitration-premier-leagues-former-apt-rules-declared-void
30. ESPN City settle Premier League APT dispute  https://www.espn.com/soccer/story/_/id/46197481/manchester-city-settle-premier-league-dispute-apt-rules
31. CBS Sports Newcastle United takeover explained  https://www.cbssports.com/soccer/news/newcastle-united-takeover-what-to-know-about-the-historic-saudi-arabian-backed-deal-for-premier-league-club/
32. Wikipedia beIN Media Group (ownership reference)  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BeIN_Media_Group