Paul Quinn  CWTE Limited 

3 October 2026

Summary

This paper recommends that the Commission not rely on expulsion or several seasons of points deductions as the main sanction against Manchester City. It proposes three things instead. 

First, a compensation and disgorgement fund of approximately £300m. 

Second, a bespoke 50% Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) cap for five seasons, which removes about £883m of the spending power City would otherwise be allowed. That is roughly the same as the £921m of misstatement the Commission identified.

Third, fresh fitness-and-propriety proceedings against the individuals the unpublished Appendices identify as having known of and approved the schemes.

The package is offered as a single settlement.

Agreement to it by all parties is conditional on a mutual undertaking that no party will seek damages from any other party in respect of the matters covered by the Commission’s decision.

What the numbers mean. The owner did not “find” £830m. It paid the money itself, as owners may. The wrong was dressing equity up as commercial revenue so that City appeared to comply with UEFA break-even and Premier League PSR when it did not, failing “by a very substantial amount” in every season tested. The advantage City gained was therefore regulatory headroom, not cash. The sanction that fits that wrong most closely is to take the headroom back, prospectively and in the same currency: permitted squad spending. Compensation then addresses the identifiable victims, the mutual no-damages undertaking closes off satellite litigation, and personal accountability addresses the people.

Facts of the decision

Chronology

Charges: proven and not proven

Points on the record that matter for sanction.

• City’s alternative explanation, that the Abu Dhabi government subsidised the sponsors, was found to have been “concocted well after the event” (¶77).
• Several important Club witnesses gave evidence that was false in key respects, and some gave evidence they knew to be untrue (¶29).
• Regulators “and even the Club’s auditors” were unaware of the Scheme (fn 7).
• ¶70 records “no direct evidence” that one redacted individual knew of or authorised the Scheme.
• Footnote 13 records that some of City’s arguments “reduce the extent/degree” of the breaches; the detail is in the unpublished Appendices.
• The “114 of 115” figure does not appear in the decision, which says only “well over 100” breaches.

Reconciling the headline numbers. £830.69m of Tagged Sums, plus £24.5m of Fordham income and £66.18m of understated expenses (£90.68m together), gives £921.37m.

Sponsors: what is and is not confirmed

The published decision redacts every sponsor’s identity. It also records that two Abu Dhabi arrangements were accepted as arm’s-length (¶58, ¶60), again without naming them. Which partners were “AD Sponsors” under the Scheme cannot be verified from the decision. Press reporting of the 2018 leaks (Aabar, Etihad) is context only. Etihad rejects any implication of impropriety, says it was never heard, and is taking legal advice. That is relevant both to natural justice and to the scope of the no-damages undertaking (Section 7).

The manager remuneration device

• Confirmed: a manager’s remuneration of £8.866m, funded by ADUG, was recorded in a consultancy agreement with a third party over four seasons. It was a sham (¶92–93, ¶116–120).
• Strong inference, not a finding: Tax Policy Associates identified the manager as Roberto Mancini, from tenure, redaction width and payment totals matching the leaked bundle.
• Tax: Tax Policy Associates estimates about £11.6m of unpaid PAYE and NIC, and £23m–£24m including interest and penalties.

The player device (£7.4m over six seasons) has been linked in press reporting to Yaya Touré’s image rights. That link is not verified.

Individuals

The Core Decision names no individual. It states that the devices were operated with the knowledge and approval of at least those individuals identified in Appendices 16–18 (¶87, ¶98), which are unpublished. Officers and senior executives in post during 2009–2018 are a matter of public record at Companies House (club company 00040946), but inclusion in that record is not an allegation, and this paper does not identify any individual as responsible.

Status: sanction and appeal

• No sanction has been imposed. The sanction hearing will be before the same three-person Commission.
• The Appeal Board can dismiss or allow the appeal, remit the case, or alter any sanction or compensation order.
• There is no CAS route. A challenge under ss.67/68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is possible but faces high thresholds.
• City says the decision “contains clear material errors, of law, principle and fact, and is unsafe”.

Quantifying the disguised funding

Season by season

Phase 1 (2009/10–2012/13): £227.50m of Tagged Sums. No domestic loss cap applied, so ADUG could lawfully have injected the same money as equity. The wrong was misreporting; sporting causation is weak.

Phase 2 (2013/14–2017/18): £603.19m of Tagged Sums. Compliance genuinely bound City here. The Tagged Sums in each PSR window (£338.87m, £356.96m and £384.49m) were 3.2–3.7 times the entire £105m permitted three-year loss.

Other devices

Uncertainty range

• Floor: £921.37m. The manager device is stated as “over” £8.866m.
• Possible downward adjustment: footnote 12 indicates £7.125m of the Fordham fee should later have been recorded as unpaid. If netted off, the total falls to £914.2m.
• Working range: £914m–£925m. The restated break-even and PSR figures (Appendices 29–30) are unpublished, so the true excess against each season’s threshold cannot be calculated from the public record.

The value of the benefit

Method

1. Spending counterfactual. A compliant City would have had to cut squad spending in each Phase 2 season by the Tagged Sum, less the loss it was allowed to make (£10m a year high case, £20m central, £35m low).
2. Points conversion. The Burnley v Everton Commission accepted a model converting overspend into 0.20–0.37 points per £1m. Because returns fall at the elite end, this paper applies 0.20 (high), 0.12 (central) and 0.06 (low).
3. Table re-run. Points are removed from City’s actual totals and final tables re-ordered, with ties broken against City.
4. Valuation. Premier League merit payments per place; City’s actual UEFA Champions League distributions; labelled estimates for matchday income, commercial bonuses, avoided UEFA penalties, player-trading value and legacy effects.
5. Time value. Low: none. Central: 4% simple a year over about 10 years (×1.40). High: the 11.81% rate set in Burnley v Everton (×2.18).

Counterfactual league positions

Even the low coefficient reverses the 2013/14 title and two Champions League places. Phase 1 outcomes, including Manchester United losing the 2011/12 title on goal difference, are not attributed in any scenario.

Valuation of the benefit to City (£m)

The central derived benefit (£301m) is about a third of the £921m misstatement. That reflects the fact that ADUG’s money was real and the squad would have been strong without it; the figure isolates what City gained relative to a compliant City. The figure most robust to challenge is the low case.

SCR sanction modelling

The rules

• Premier League clubs voted 14–6 on 21 November 2025 to replace PSR with the Squad Cost Ratio from 2026/27.
• Squad costs (wages, amortisation and agents’ fees) may not exceed 85% of football revenue plus net profit on player sales, with a levied allowance and sporting sanctions beyond it.
• “Top-to-bottom anchoring” was rejected.
• Clubs in UEFA competitions must also meet UEFA’s 70% rule.

City’s starting point

• 2024/25 audited figures: revenue £694.1m; total wages £408.4m; player amortisation £170m; profit on player sales £95.2m; pre-tax loss £9.9m.
• Estimated squad cost, 2026/27: about £560m, an SCR of about 60%–68%. Published trackers range from 60.3% to 84.9%; the divergence is flagged. This paper uses about 68%.
• Projection (central): football revenue £760m in 2027/28 growing 4% a year, plus £60m a year of player-trading profit; baseline squad cost £560m rising 3% a year.

Permitted squad cost under each cap: central case (£m)

Spending reduction (£m)

Sensitivity of the cumulative forced cut:

Competitive impact

• 70% cap: no bite for a club in UEFA competition. Reject it.
• 60% cap: about £65m a year of forced cuts. City remains a top-three spender; estimated expected finish 2nd–5th.
• 50% cap: about £150m a year of cuts, around 27% of squad cost. Estimated expected finish 3rd–6th: competitive but no longer dominant.
• Pro-cyclical risk: a revenue-linked cap shrinks if income falls. That is City’s strongest proportionality argument and must be stated openly.

Why 50%: the regulatory equivalence anchor

Over five years, a 50% cap removes £883m of spending power City would otherwise be entitled to under UEFA’s 70%, within 4% of the £921m misstatement. City gave itself about £0.9bn of regulatory headroom; the cap takes about £0.9bn back, in the same currency. Owner wealth cannot neutralise it.

Anti-avoidance terms:

• Associated-party revenue measured at fair market value under the APT rules.
• Profit on player sales counts only up to £40m a year.
• No levy band: any excess triggers an automatic 6-point deduction, plus one point per further £5m.
• Quarterly monitoring, with look-through access to sponsor funding sources.

Redistribution model

Principles

1. Compensation follows proven loss, using the Burnley v Everton method.
2. Disgorgement exceeds compensation. The difference between City’s central benefit (£301m) and identifiable rival losses (£108m) goes to league-wide and pyramid solidarity.
3. Opt-in, full and final, and mutual. Clubs that accept payment waive all damages claims for the same seasons, and the waiver runs in every direction between participating parties (Section 7).
4. Pay the club entity, not past owners.

Central case: rival losses by club (£m)

Tottenham and Everton gain only in the high scenario.

Allocation of a £300m fund

Method A (pro rata by lost merit money): Manchester United £78.2m, Arsenal £78.1m, Liverpool £78.0m, Southampton, West Ham and Chelsea about £21.9m each. Simple, but it ignores European qualification.

Method B (weighted by total compensatory loss): Arsenal £134.1m, Manchester United £95.2m, Liverpool £56.2m, Chelsea, Southampton and West Ham £4.8m each. Tracks the economics, but overpays three clubs.

Method C (recommended): compensation, plus integrity dividend, plus pyramid solidarity.

Relegated clubs and cup losers are served through the solidarity pot, because neither relegation causation nor cup outcomes can be modelled credibly from a league-spending counterfactual. Routing payments through the League as distributor avoids standing problems for former members.

Director and executive accountability

Legal bases

Who is implicated

The findings implicate unnamed individuals: those identified in Appendices 15–19 as having knowledge of and approving the schemes, and witnesses found to have given evidence they knew to be untrue. Neither category can be matched to names from the public record, and press reporting is not a substitute.

Legal risk

Recommended standard

1. Trigger: identification in the unredacted Appendices as having knowledge and approval, or a finding of knowingly false evidence. Never press naming, and never mere board membership.
2. Process: separate proceedings (preferably IFR or FA) on the civil standard requiring strong, cogent evidence.
3. Tariff: knowing design or approval of a sham, 5–10 years’ disqualification; knowingly false evidence, 3–5 years; knowledge without approval, a fitness review and conditions; no knowledge, no sanction.
4. Precedent: Juventus executives were banned alongside the club’s points penalty in 2023.

Settlement condition: mutual undertaking not to seek damages

Scope

• Parties: Manchester City (and its parent and owner), the Premier League, and every club that accepts a payment from the fund. The EFL participates through its solidarity allocation.
• Claims waived: all claims for damages, compensation, restitution or costs, in contract, tort or under the Premier League Rules (including Rule W.51-type compensation claims), arising from the conduct covered by the Core Decision for seasons 2009/10–2017/18 and the investigation that followed.
• Direction: the waiver is mutual. Clubs do not sue City; City and its owner do not pursue the League, the Commission or participating clubs for losses or costs connected with the proceedings or the sanction; participating clubs do not pursue the League for regulatory failure in respect of the same matters.
• Mechanism: each participating party signs a deed of settlement and release on acceptance of its payment. Payment is conditional on the release, and releases take effect only once all designated parties have signed or a stated participation threshold is met.

What the undertaking does not cover

• Regulatory and disciplinary processes. It does not waive the sanction itself, monitoring of the SCR cap, or fitness proceedings against individuals by the Premier League, the FA or the IFR. Those protect the competition, not private interests, and cannot be traded away.
• Statutory and public authorities. HMRC, the Financial Reporting Council and any prosecuting authority are not parties and cannot be bound.
• Non-signatories. Sponsors such as Etihad, former club owners and clubs that decline payment are not bound. A club that declines payment keeps its right to claim, but forfeits its allocation.
• Appeal rights. City’s appeal against the findings is a separate matter. If City wishes to secure the release, the settlement would naturally be offered on the basis that the appeal is withdrawn; if it is not, the package can still be imposed by the Commission, but the releases would not take effect.

Why it matters

• Certainty for everyone. On the Burnley v Everton timetable, individual compensation claims would not produce awards before 2028, and a decade of satellite litigation would follow.
• Finality for City. City exchanges open-ended exposure to multiple damages claims for a defined, capped liability.
• Equal treatment. Clubs receive compensation by a published formula rather than according to litigation budgets.
• Protection for the League. The waiver closes off claims that the regulator itself failed to act sooner.

Legal points to confirm

• Enforceability of releases signed by club entities whose ownership has since changed.
• Whether the Premier League can make payment from the fund conditional on a release under its existing rules, or whether a resolution of member clubs is needed.
• Treatment of claims already notified (the four clubs that reserved rights in November 2024).
• Competition-law review of any term restricting clubs’ access to the courts.

Legal and policy feasibility

What the Commission can already do

• Compensation orders. Section W empowers a Commission to order payment of compensation, unlimited in amount, to any club, and to signal its intention to do so. The Everton Commission gave clubs 28 days to declare claims. No rule change is needed, but payments must rest on conventional causation.
• “Such other penalty as it shall think fit.” This supports a bespoke, time-limited SCR cap. City accepted bespoke spending limits from UEFA in 2014.
• Fines are unlimited in principle. Whether the Board can distribute fine proceeds to clubs must be confirmed. If not, the solidarity elements need City’s consent as part of the settlement in Section 7, or a resolution by the clubs.
• Director bans are outside the Commission’s powers and need separate proceedings.

Precedents

Why this package beats expulsion or multi-season points deductions

1. It repairs the competition. Deductions pay nothing to the clubs that lost titles and Champions League places. The fund pays them.
2. It matches the wrong. City’s gain was regulatory headroom; the cap takes about £0.9bn back.
3. Owner wealth cannot neutralise it.
4. It is legally more robust. Expulsion invites proportionality, competition-law and broadcast-contract challenges, and senior executives at other clubs doubt the votes exist.
5. It ends the litigation. The mutual no-damages undertaking replaces a decade of claims with one settlement.

Counterarguments

• “Too lenient.” Breaching the cap triggers automatic deductions, and a one-season deduction for non-cooperation can be added without undermining the package.
• “Double jeopardy with UEFA and CAS.” Different rulebook, regulator and charges; CAS turned largely on limitation.
• “Strip titles.” Only 2013/14 is robustly reversed; annotation plus compensation to Liverpool is more defensible.
• “The counterfactual is speculative.” That is why low, central and high cases are published.
• “City will win on appeal.” The package is designed to be imposed only after the appeal.

Risks and data limitations

• Only the Core Decision is public. The 37 Appendices hold the restated figures, witness assessments and identities; the footnote 13 mitigations could reduce quantum.
• Redactions. Sponsor identities cannot be verified; the Mancini identification is inference, not a finding.
• Model sensitivity. The points-per-£m coefficients are calibrated, not estimated on City data. A season-level regression should be commissioned before any pleading.
• UEFA figures. Some City distribution figures are secondary-sourced; exchange rates are approximations.
• SCR inputs. Published estimates of City’s SCR conflict (about 60% to 85%).
• Rule numbering and powers. Section W numbering has changed between editions; distribution of fines and Owners’ and Directors’ Test triggers must be checked against the 2026/27 Handbook.
• Settlement uptake. The mutual no-damages undertaking depends on enough parties signing. A club that stays out keeps its claim and weakens the finality the package offers.
• Limitation. Clubs that did not lodge protective notices face limitation arguments, which is another reason for an opt-in fund.
• Third parties. Etihad’s threatened action, and any sponsor challenge, sit outside the settlement unless those parties join it.

Recommendations

1. The Commission should signal now that it may use its compensation power, and invite affected clubs to declare claims within 28 days.
2. Impose a £300m restitution order, structured under Method C: £107.8m compensatory, a £115.3m integrity dividend and a £76.9m EFL solidarity pot.
3. Make acceptance conditional on a mutual undertaking not to seek damages from any other party for the same matters, documented by deed of release.
4. Impose a 50% SCR cap for 2027/28–2031/32 with the anti-avoidance terms in Section 4.6. Use 60% as the fallback; reject 70%.
5. Order City to pay the Premier League’s costs in full.
6. Annotate the record for 2013/14 rather than strip titles.
7. Refer the findings to the IFR and the FA for individual fitness proceedings, which the settlement does not waive.
8. Refer the tax and accounting findings to HMRC and the FRC for their own assessment.
9. Make systemic changes: look-through confirmation of sponsor funding sources; sponsor-side attestations; an express power to distribute disgorged sums; and a deadline for Commission decisions.
10. Sequence everything after the appeal. If the appeal succeeds in part, rerun the model on the surviving findings.

Sources

• Premier League, Independent Commission Redacted Core Decision, 29 September 2026 (resources.premierleague.pulselive.com)
• Premier League statement: Manchester City FC, 29 September 2026 (premierleague.com)
• Burnley v Everton Compensation Decision (PLJP 2023/3), June 2026 (resources.premierleague.pulselive.com)
• The Esk, analysis of the Core Decision, 29 September 2026, and potential civil claimants and criminal exposure, 30 September 2026 (theesk.org)
• Tax Policy Associates, “Did Manchester City cheat HMRC out of £12m?”, 1 October 2026 (taxpolicy.org.uk)
• Sky Sports, key findings and Etihad response, September 2026; SCR vote, November 2025
• Al Jazeera, ESPN and Flashscore reporting on the verdict and appeal, September–October 2026
• Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer and LawInSport commentary on Burnley v Everton and Leicester City, 2026
• Brabners, ESPN and Sportcal on the Squad Cost Ratio rules, 2025
• Manchester City 2024/25 Annual Report; Swiss Ramble, PSR Watch, Read Man City and Greg Cordell analysis of City’s accounts and SCR
• UEFA Champions League financial distribution releases, 2014/15–2017/18
• Companies House, Manchester City Football Club Limited (00040946) officers
• Football Supporters’ Association, Football Governance Act 2025 clause-by-clause analysis; FA Disciplinary Regulations
• Der Spiegel / Football Leaks reporting as summarised by Sports Illustrated, November 2018