Club statement issued at 0845 BST 9th October 2026

The Friedkin Group is exploring new investment options for Everton Football Club, including the potential sale of a controlling interest.

When TFG became custodians of Everton, the Club faced significant financial uncertainty and challenges both on and off the pitch. The immediate priority was to provide the stability, investment and support needed to secure the Club’s future, including helping to bring the long-promised stadium to completion for its deserving supporters.

With that foundation now safely in place, the time is right to consider the next chapter for Everton. We will only entertain interest from parties who we strongly believe will be the right stewards to take the Club forward and build on the momentum that has been established.

Throughout this process, TFG’s focus will remain unchanged. We will support the Club in all ways necessary to achieve success on the pitch and will continue efforts to make a positive difference in the communities the Club serves.

TFG and the Club will not be commenting further while this work is under way.

Moelis & Company has been retained by TFG.

I have written extensively in recent weeks about the Friedkins desire to sell their stake in Everton Football Club.

I’m going to break this down into two parts (i) why are the Friedkins looking to sell, and (ii) what are they selling, what’s the structure and who owns what.

The Friedkin’s bought Everton at a time of maximum distress, which I have documented on numerous occasions on this site. They bought a football club on its knees, almost in administration, technically insolvent, and with a yet to be fully funded and completed stadium.

They bought a distressed asset that they believed offered growth potential for a number of reasons; the seemingly never ending rise in the capital value of Premier League football clubs, the development potential of Everton’s first team, the reasonable prospects of future European football, the under-exploited commercial opportunities Everton presented and finally the stadium with its potential for increased match day revenues and cash flows, plus the development prospects around Bramley-Moore, the northern section of Liverpool Waters, the Ten Streets development opportunity and the wider economic development potential of the North end of the city of Liverpool.

I explained here  and here how they repaired Everton’s balance sheet, paid off lenders, negotiated hair cuts with A-Cap and wrote off Moshiri’s £450 million loan. They negotiated a long term secured funding package for the stadium and borrowed further for working capital purposes.

All well and good, except things did not go to plan.

Through a combination of poor due diligence and poor execution of commercial deals, several chickens came home to roost:

• Revenues have not grown as quickly as they anticipated – across the board
• Capital values outside of the prime clubs, have likely fallen not risen in the last two years
• The amount of funding required on the pitch to make us competitive is significantly higher than their due diligence anticipated
• The future capital requirements to make us competitive longer term are greater than expected
• The stadium is (i) not generating the cash they anticipated and (ii) the costs of running Hill Dickenson and Goodison are greater than thought
• There’s been virtually no progress in infrastructure development around the stadium – questions need to be asked of the local authorities and central government as to why the enabling funding hasn’t been provided
• The Burnley, and now Manchester City cases bring serious litigation, financial and ultimately systemic risk that was never anticipated at the time of acquisition

On top of the above, what was considered to be an advantageous operating structure known as multi-club ownership has proven under UEFA’s positioning to be anything but advantageous. The Friedkins thought they had a solution to the problem of two co-owned clubs competing in the same European competitions. They didn’t have an acceptable solution. Whether it was poor due diligence, a firmer stance by UEFA than anticipated, I can’t say, but the only workable solution, placing the less senior club into a blind trust doesn’t work for the Friedkins, existing minority investors, or indeed future minority investors as put forward by the Friedkins earlier this year.

So we have a combination of poor due diligence, unrealistic expectations as a result, a less favourable economic and operating environment and a massively increased systemic and litigation risk going forwards.

That is the reality that apart from the prime Premier League clubs, all clubs face.

Premier League football club ownership has become more expensive, carries greater economic and legislative risk, operates in an environment in which equity investors and lenders are just beginning to realise these factors, and faces significantly larger macroeconomic headwinds and greater geopolitical risk. 

Regardless of what investment bankers and those charged with broking deals might tell you, football is much riskier,  has less chance of success and is much less likely to produce the investment returns previously thought available.

The reported values for Everton Football Club are way off the mark.

The Friedkins have not helped themselves with poor due diligence,  a poor understanding of what they bought, poor board performance and particularly an appalling communication and PR strategy.

Having decided to sell, I suspect they will find the selling process at least as difficult, if not more, than they’ve found operating the club.

Part II will lay out in detail what the Friedkins and minority investors are actually selling.