Multi-Club Ownership in Premier League Football: A Detailed Analysis of Structures, Control, and Strategic Implications

(This article excludes Everton and Roma and the multi-club ownership by the Friedkins – that topic will be dealt with separately)

Introduction: The Evolving Landscape of Multi-Club Ownership
Multi-club ownership (MCO) represents a transformative phenomenon in global football, characterized by a single entity or individual exercising control or significant influence over multiple football clubs across diverse leagues and geographical regions.
This extends beyond mere financial investment, encompassing active operational control often driven by strategic objectives that span sporting, commercial, and financial domains. The distinction between “control” and “investment interests” is particularly critical within this landscape.
Regulatory bodies, such as UEFA, primarily focus on the former to prevent conflicts of interest in competitions. This emphasis means that while a financial stake in several clubs might not trigger the most stringent regulatory scrutiny, active operational control or “decisive influence” certainly does. Consequently, MCO groups must meticulously structure their governance to navigate this definitional boundary, which can lead to varied levels of operational integration across their portfolio clubs.
The modern MCO model, while not entirely novel—with early examples like ENIC’s involvement with Tottenham Hotspur in the 1990s—has seen a dramatic acceleration in recent years. This rapid expansion was notably propelled by Red Bull’s marketing-driven acquisitions and the subsequent formation of the City Football Group (CFG) in 2013.
The scale of this growth is remarkable: between 2015 and 2023, the number of clubs integrated into MCO groups surged from 62 to 301. Concurrently, the number of distinct MCO groups more than doubled, from 58 to 124, between 2018 and 2023.3
By the 2024-2025 season, a significant 41.7% of clubs in Europe’s “Big Five” leagues—the Premier League, La Liga, Bundesliga, Serie A, and Ligue 1 were part of MCO structures. This expansion underscores MCO as a dominant and increasingly attractive business model globally, attractive at least to majority shareholders. This widespread adoption is not solely driven by the inherent attractiveness of the model itself, but also by a confluence of macroeconomic factors. The financial vulnerabilities of many football clubs, exacerbated by global events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have made them more susceptible to MCO buyouts.
Furthermore, the growing recognition of football clubs as a distinct asset class for investment, particularly for their seemingly inflation-resistant qualities and non-correlation with financial markets generally, has spurred a greater number of investors to explore the multi-ownership route for diversification and risk management.
Within many MCOs, a hierarchical structure often emerges, commonly referred to as a “pyramid-like structure”. At the apex of this pyramid typically sits a “flagship club,” which is usually the most popular and highest revenue-generating entity, such as Manchester City or Chelsea. Other clubs within the group frequently function as “feeder clubs.” While this term is sometimes disavowed by owners, it accurately describes their role in player development and facilitating player movement towards the flagship club.
This dynamic often creates a fundamental tension: MCOs promote the establishment of clear player development pathways, which is a sound business strategy. However, for fans of the smaller clubs within these structures, the underlying reality is often a perception of their team serving primarily as a developmental stepping stone. The statement, “well we don’t see them as feeder clubs… if a player gets to move to a better club then that’s amazing” directly exposes this disconnect. This situation presents a significant public relations challenge for MCOs, as their logical business approach to talent optimization frequently clashes with the deeply emotional and identity-driven nature of football fandom.
The broader implication is that MCOs, despite the financial and sporting benefits they may offer, risk alienating local fan bases if they fail to genuinely integrate and respect the individual identity and unique aspirations of each club, moving beyond its utility to the “crown jewel.”

Regulatory Framework: Navigating UEFA and Premier League Compliance
The proliferation of multi-club ownership models has necessitated the development and enforcement of complex regulatory frameworks by governing bodies to ensure competitive integrity and financial stability within football.
UEFA’s “Decisive Influence” and “Same Competition” Rules are specifically designed to prevent conflicts of interest and uphold the integrity of its competitions. A core tenet of these rules stipulates that two clubs controlled by the same entity cannot participate in the same European competition, such as the UEFA Champions League, Europa League, or Conference League.
The central concept underpinning this regulation is “decisive influence,” which encompasses both direct and indirect control mechanisms. To comply, MCOs are required to establish independent governance structures for each club and to avoid shared decision-making processes that could potentially impact match integrity – something which on the face of it, seems at odds with the the primary reason for MCOs to exist.
Furthermore, clubs under common ownership must maintain separate licensing and financial reporting to demonstrate their independent operations.The application and interpretation of “decisive influence” have, however, faced scrutiny for their potential ambiguity and inconsistency. The case involving Crystal Palace and Olympique Lyonnais provides a clear illustration. Despite John Textor holding a 43% minority stake in Crystal Palace and outright ownership of Lyon, and his presence on both clubs’ boards, Crystal Palace argued that he exerted “limited decision-making influence” and “no decisive influence” over their club.
UEFA’s decision to demote Crystal Palace from the Europa League, followed by suggestions that “larger, big money multi-club groups” might receive more lenient treatment, indicates that the definition of “decisive influence” may be subjective or applied inconsistently. This situation creates regulatory uncertainty and can foster a perception of unfairness, particularly among smaller clubs who may feel disproportionately affected by such rulings.

Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) and Fair Market Value (FMV) Rules
In response to the evolving ownership landscape, particularly following the acquisition of Newcastle United by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Premier League introduced Associated Party Transaction (APT) and Fair Market Value (FMV) rules in December 2021, with amendments made in March 2024.
The primary purpose of these regulations is to safeguard the financial stability, integrity, and competitive balance of the League. They aim to prevent clubs from artificially inflating revenues or reducing costs through arrangements with entities linked to their ownership that are not conducted at Fair Market Value. This ensures fairness among clubs and limits reliance on enhanced commercial revenues derived from owner-linked entities.
The mechanism for these rules mandates that any transaction with an “associated party”—a term broadly defined to include entities with common ownership, shared board members, or material influence—or any “Threshold Transaction” exceeding £1 million, must be submitted to the Premier League Board for an FMV assessment.
If the Board determines that an APT is not at FMV, it possesses the authority to require the club to “restate” or vary the terms of the transaction to reflect the fair market value. Independent entities are frequently tasked with determining fair prices for commercial revenues, such as sponsorship deals. The direct link between the introduction of these APT rules and the Newcastle United takeover by PIF suggests that these regulations are more than just general financial oversight. They represent a specific response to concerns regarding state-backed ownership and the potential for “sportswashing”. The idea that the Premier League or even UEFA hold Saudi Arabia to greater scrutiny than FIFA is a fascinating topic, worthy of much discussion.
By scrutinizing related-party transactions, the Premier League seeks to prevent owners from injecting disguised capital through inflated sponsorship deals, which could circumvent Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules and distort competitive balance. This indicates a deeper regulatory objective that extends beyond simple financial prudence, addressing issues of legitimacy and competitive fairness in an era characterized by diverse and powerful ownership models.

Notable Regulatory Challenges and Compliance Cases
The application of multi-club ownership regulations has led to several high-profile challenges and compliance adjustments:Crystal Palace and Olympique Lyonnais: Both clubs, part of John Textor’s (majority owned) Eagle Football Holdings, have qualified for the 2025/26 Europa League.
However, UEFA have demoted Crystal Palace to the third-tier Conference League, asserting that Textor’s “decisive influence” over both clubs violated the multi-club ownership rules for same-competition participation. A key compliance deadline of March 1, 2025, was missed by Palace, preventing the completion of Textor’s planned sale of his Palace shares before the assessment. Crystal Palace is currently appealing this decision to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The sale of Textor’s 43% stake to Woody Johnson, the owner of the New York Jets, is anticipated to resolve the conflict once approved by the Premier League.

Manchester United and OGC Nice – both clubs, under INEOS ownership, qualified for the 2024-25 Europa League. To comply with UEFA regulations, Sir Jim Ratcliffe reportedly agreed to a moratorium on player transfers from Nice to Manchester United until September 2025.
Additionally, Nice has been operated by a “blind trust” to demonstrate independence from INEOS, thereby mitigating direct conflicts of interest under UEFA rules.

Aston Villa and Vitória SC – These clubs encountered potential conflicts for the 2023-24 Conference League, but a solution approved by UEFA allowed both to participate. V Sports, the parent company of Aston Villa, reduced its stake in Portuguese side Vitória SC from 46% to 29% and relinquished board representation to comply with UEFA rules.

Manchester City and Girona – In a prior season, both City Football Group clubs qualified for the Champions League, leading UEFA to block direct player transfers between them. For the 2024-2025 season, CFG’s shareholding in Girona FC has been placed into an independent blind trust to ensure compliance with UEFA regulations.
The repeated reliance on “blind trusts” by groups like CFG (for Girona) and INEOS (for Nice) to navigate UEFA’s “same competition” rule suggests that these mechanisms are becoming a standard, albeit debated, approach for MCOs.
While the stated intent of these trusts is to demonstrate a lack of “decisive influence,” their actual effectiveness and genuine independence are under continuous scrutiny, especially when player movements or strategic decisions appear to align with the broader MCO’s interests.
This raises questions about whether these trusts truly insulate clubs or merely provide a legal veneer for continued coordinated operations, compelling regulators to continually refine their definitions of control.

Regulatory Challenges and Compliance Status (Selected Cases)

Premier League Clubs and Their Multi-Club Structures
This section provides a detailed breakdown of each Premier League club currently operating within a multi-club ownership structure, outlining their specific shareholders, control mechanisms, and the full extent of their global football networks.

City Football Group (Manchester City)
Established in May 2013, City Football Group (CFG) is a British-based holding company that manages a global portfolio of football clubs, with Premier League powerhouse Manchester City serving as its undisputed “crown jewel”.3 CFG is majority-owned (81%) by Abu Dhabi United Group, which is controlled by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a prominent member of the Abu Dhabi royal family and Vice President of the United Arab Emirates.

American firm Silver Lake holds an 18% stake, while Chinese firms China Media Capital and CITIC Capital hold a combined 1%.
Key leadership figures within CFG include Khaldoon Al Mubarak and Ferran Soriano.
CFG’s global footprint is extensive, encompassing 12 clubs across five continents. Its fully owned clubs include Manchester City (England), Melbourne City (Australia), Mumbai City (India), New York City FC (USA), Montevideo City Torque (Uruguay), Palermo (Italy), Troyes (France), Lommel (Belgium), Bahia (Brazil), and Shenzhen Peng City (China).
CFG also holds stakes in Girona (Spain) and Yokohama F. Marinos (Japan). Beyond direct ownership, CFG maintains strategic “partner clubs” such as Club Bolivar (Bolivia), Vannes (France), Geylang International (Singapore), and İstanbul Başakşehir (Turkey). They foster collaborations that extend its influence. The strategic approach of CFG is widely regarded as a blueprint for scalable and sustainable success in modern football.
It is built upon a unified playing philosophy, characterized by proactive, possession-based football with high pressing and quick transitions, which filters down through the network in principle rather than strict prescription. This is complemented by centralized intelligence for scouting and data analytics, enabling early and global talent identification. The group leverages tailored player development pathways, facilitating efficient player movement within the network, which reduces adaptation time and optimizes resale strategies.
This global expansion across five continents is not merely about acquiring clubs; it is a deliberate strategy to establish a pervasive global brand presence, tap into diverse talent pools, and cultivate a sophisticated internal player market. The unified playing philosophy ensures that players developed at any CFG club can seamlessly integrate into Manchester City or other higher-tier clubs within the network, minimizing transfer risks and costs while maximizing player value through strategic loans and resales.
This global reach also opens new commercial markets and fan engagement opportunities, solidifying CFG as a comprehensive business model that extends beyond immediate sporting success. CFG has actively addressed UEFA’s scrutiny regarding multiple clubs participating in the same competition.
For the 2024-2025 season, CFG’s shareholding in Girona FC, which qualified for the Champions League alongside Manchester City, was placed into an independent blind trust to ensure compliance with UEFA rules. This measure follows previous instances where direct player transfers between Manchester City and Girona were restricted due to both clubs’ participation in the Champions League.
CFG continues to evaluate player loan opportunities to other network clubs such as Palermo and Troyes.

BlueCo (Chelsea)
BlueCo is a consortium established in 2022 as the investment vehicle for the takeover of Premier League club Chelsea F.C.
The consortium’s name is derived from Chelsea’s home colour – blue may well be the colour, but is football the game?

The group is led by Todd Boehly, Chairman and CEO of Eldridge Industries, and Clearlake Capital. Other prominent founders include Mark Walter, co-founder and CEO of Guggenheim Partners, and Hansjörg Wyss, founder of the Wyss Foundation.
Notably, Walter and Boehly also hold ownership stakes in the Los Angeles Dodgers and Los Angeles Sparks. BlueCo acquired Chelsea for £4.25 billion in May 2022 and committed an additional £1.75 billion towards enhancing the club’s infrastructure, including Stamford Bridge, the academy, and the women’s team.
Behdad Eghbali, a BlueCo shareholder, has reportedly exercised the final say on transfer decisions at RC Strasbourg Alsace.
BlueCo initiated its multi-club ownership strategy by acquiring a nearly 100% stake in French Ligue 1 club RC Strasbourg Alsace for €75 million in June 2023. While the acquisition of Strasbourg was intended to facilitate investment in its first teams and academy, questions have arisen regarding BlueCo’s strategic approach, particularly concerning the January 2025 transfer window.
Reports indicated that Strasbourg’s own transfer targets were rejected in favor of maximising playing time for Chelsea loanees, such as Ângelo Gabriel and Andrey Santos.This approach led to concerns about a lack of squad depth and potential player exhaustion for Strasbourg. Furthermore, reservations were expressed regarding Behdad Eghbali’s reported limited understanding of football and industry experience, despite his decisive role in Strasbourg’s transfer activities.
This situation suggests that BlueCo’s initial MCO model appears to function as a more direct “feeder club” for Chelsea, contrasting with the more integrated and decentralized “shared philosophy” observed in CFG.
The reported rejection of Strasbourg’s transfer targets in favor of Chelsea loanees, influenced by a shareholder with a perceived “limited understanding of football,” points to a highly centralized control that may prioritize the flagship club’s player development needs over the competitive aspirations and local context of the secondary club.
This centralised approach risks creating internal friction, undermining the smaller club’s performance, and potentially alienating its fanbase, which stands in contrast to the broader aim of MCOs to “balance” leagues.

Eagle Football Holdings (Crystal Palace)
Established in 2022, Eagle Football Holdings operates (in Textor’s words) as a sports, entertainment, and technology company.
Crystal Palace was initially identified as a prominent club within its portfolio. John Textor serves as the Chairman and majority owner of Eagle Football Holdings. EFH currently holds a 43% minority stake in Crystal Palace and maintains outright ownership of Olympique Lyonnais (OL).
Michele Kang, a significant shareholder of Eagle Football Holdings, has since been appointed Chair and President of OL. Textor has recently shifted his focus to SAF Botafogo and Daring Brussels (formerly Molenbeek), alongside claiming to pursue a new club acquisition strategy in the UK.
A significant development in Crystal Palace’s ownership structure involves John Textor’s agreement to sell his 43% stake in the club to Woody Johnson, the billionaire owner of the New York Jets and former U.S. Ambassador to the UK.
This deal, reported to be valued between $220 million and $260 million, is currently awaiting approval from the Premier League.
Crystal Palace chairman Steve Parish is expected to continue his leadership role at the club.Under Eagle Football Holdings, the group’s portfolio includes four football clubs SAF Botafogo (Brazil), Olympique Lyonnais (France), Crystal Palace FC (England), and Daring Brussels (Belgium).
Additionally, OL Groupe, part of Eagle Football, holds a substantial stake in the French men’s and women’s basketball club ASVEL Basket.
Eagle Football claim their strategic approach aims to enhance its capabilities and leverage operational synergies, particularly in facilitating player transfers or loans between its football clubs. The company’s much sought after, but yet to be delivered,

U.S. IPO filing further highlights a strategy to capitalize on digital fan engagement, expanding its streaming platform, Eagle Stream (which boasts 1.2 million subscribers), and investing in AI-powered analytics to boost sponsorship deals and diversify revenue streams through merchandise, virtual experiences, and blockchain-based fan tokens.
This approach positions sports as an “inflation-resistant asset class” (in their words). Crystal Palace recently faced significant UEFA compliance issues, resulting in its demotion from the Europa League to the third-tier Conference League for the 2025/26 season.
This decision stemmed from John Textor’s 43% minority stake in Palace and his controlling interest in Lyon, with both clubs having qualified for the Europa League.
UEFA rules explicitly prohibit two clubs under the same “decisive influence” from competing in the same European tournament. Crystal Palace missed the critical compliance deadline of March 1, 2025, which was prior to the planned completion of Textor’s share sale. Crystal Palace chairman Steve Parish vehemently criticized the decision as “a terrible injustice” and confirmed the club’s consideration of an appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
The ongoing sale of Textor’s shares to Woody Johnson is anticipated to resolve the conflict once it receives official approval. The timing of John Textor’s sale of his Crystal Palace shares to Woody Johnson, directly following UEFA’s demotion of Palace from the Europa League, indicates a clear causal relationship.
The regulatory pressure from UEFA, specifically the “same competition” rule, compelled Textor to divest from one of his Premier League assets to allow Lyon to participate in the Europa League. This demonstrates that regulatory compliance is not merely a theoretical exercise but a tangible factor that can necessitate significant ownership changes and asset restructuring within MCO groups, directly impacting their strategic portfolio management.

V Sports (Aston Villa)
V Sports functions as a holding company overseeing association football clubs, jointly owned by Egyptian billionaire Nassef Sawiris and American billionaire Wes Edens.
The company was rebranded from NSWE in 2021, explicitly signaling its intention to pursue a multi-club model, with Aston Villa serving as its flagship club.
V Sports is jointly owned by Nassef Sawiris and Wes Edens, with a minority stake (32%) held by the American investment firm Atairos. Nassef Sawiris holds the position of Chairman of Aston Villa, and both Sawiris and Edens serve as club chairmen.
In May 2023, Chris Heck, formerly the president of the Philadelphia 76ers, was appointed President of Business Operations for both V Sports and Aston Villa, indicating a strategy of integrated management across the entities.
The V Sports portfolio includes full ownership of Aston Villa F.C. (England) and Aston Villa Women F.C. (England). The group also holds minority interests, including a 29% stake in Portuguese side Vitória S.C. (a reduction from a previous 46% for UEFA compliance, with no board representation).

Additionally, V Sports acquired a 25% stake in Spanish side Real Unión by December 2024.
Beyond direct ownership, V Sports has established partnership agreements with ZED FC of the Egyptian Premier League and Vissel Kobe of the J1 League (Japan). These partnerships are strategically focused on youth development, providing technical assistance, coaching training, and access to scouting networks.
An example of this synergy is the transfer of Omar Khedr from ZED FC to Aston Villa. Furthermore, V Sports has invested in a youth academy in Senegal. The rebranding to V Sports in 2021 marked a clear strategic pivot towards a multi-club model. The group’s strategy appears to be heavily centered on talent development and establishing clear pathways for young players across different continents.
The partnerships with ZED FC and Vissel Kobe, for instance, enable young players to train with Aston Villa’s academy and gain valuable European experience, while simultaneously granting V Sports clubs priority access to sign these talents.
The involvement of Real Unión, a club owned by the family of Aston Villa manager Unai Emery, further solidifies the focus on player development and shared coaching methodologies within the network.This emphasis on youth partnerships and academy investments suggests a long-term “soft power” approach to talent acquisition and development. By investing in grassroots football in key regions such as Africa and Asia, V Sports is actively building a pipeline of future talent that can feed into its European clubs, potentially at lower acquisition costs.
This strategy also cultivates goodwill and brand loyalty in emerging football markets, establishing a sustainable competitive advantage that extends beyond immediate financial outlays.In terms of UEFA compliance, V Sports proactively reduced its stake in Vitória SC and removed its board representation when both Aston Villa and Vitória SC qualified for the 2023-24 Conference League. This action demonstrates a clear willingness to adapt ownership structures to ensure competitive eligibility and adhere to regulatory requirements.

INEOS (Manchester United) INEOS, a global chemicals group founded by Sir Jim Ratcliffe, has significantly expanded its presence in the sports industry, with a notable focus on football. Sir Jim Ratcliffe serves as the Chairman and CEO of INEOS. In February 2024, he acquired a 25% stake in Manchester United.
Crucially, despite the Glazer family retaining majority ownership, INEOS Sport assumed control over Manchester United’s football operations. Ratcliffe is recognized as the second wealthiest individual in the UK.
Beyond Manchester United, INEOS owns French Ligue 1 side OGC Nice, acquired in 2019, and Swiss Super League side FC Lausanne-Sport, acquired in 2017. The group also collaborates with partner club Racing Club Abidjan in Ivory Coast Ligue 1.
INEOS Sport’s broader portfolio extends beyond football, encompassing significant stakes in the Mercedes-AMG Petronas F1 Team (one-third shareholder) and ownership of the INEOS Grenadiers cycling team.
INEOS’s ambition for its football clubs is to achieve sustained success and financial sustainability in their respective leagues, with the ultimate goal of qualifying for European competitions. A key strategic focus involves the development of top young talent and the establishment of critical pathways for their progression across the various clubs.
However, Sir Jim Ratcliffe has publicly expressed a degree of disillusionment with Nice, noting that the club performed better without INEOS’ “interference” due to multi-club ownership rules. He has also signaled his intention to sell Nice to concentrate fully on Manchester United.
Both Manchester United and OGC Nice qualified for the Europa League in the 2024-25 season.
To comply with UEFA regulations, Sir Jim Ratcliffe reportedly agreed to a restriction on moving any players directly from Nice to Manchester United until September 2025. Furthermore, Nice has been operating under a “blind trust” this season, signifying that neither INEOS nor Ratcliffe exerts “control or decisive influence” over the club, a measure taken to satisfy UEFA’s multi-club regulations.
Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s public statements about selling Nice and his declared focus on Manchester United reveal a clear prioritization within the INEOS MCO. This decision is directly influenced by the regulatory challenges associated with having two clubs in the same European competition, and likely by the sheer scale and commercial potential of Manchester United compared to Nice. The necessity of a “blind trust” for Nice to comply with UEFA rules, coupled with Ratcliffe’s perceived lack of enjoyment in overseeing Nice, strongly suggests that regulatory hurdles can compel MCOs to re-evaluate and potentially divest assets that become liabilities or distractions from their primary strategic objectives, such as Manchester United’s sporting success.

Public Investment Fund (Newcastle United)
The Public Investment Fund (PIF) is Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, recognized as one of the most financially powerful globally. In October 2021, PIF acquired an 80% stake in Premier League club Newcastle United.
PIF is chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Yasir Al-Rumayyan, the PIF governor and Newcastle chairman, holds a position as a sitting minister in the Saudi government. While PIF has publicly denied being a direct representative of the Saudi state, this is absolutely disproved by legal documents from a court case related to the LIV Golf and PGA Tour dispute which described PIF as “a sovereign instrumentality of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”.
Beyond Newcastle United, PIF has acquired majority stakes (75%) in four major Saudi Pro League clubs: Al Nassr (Cristiano Ronaldo’s club), Al Hilal, Al Ahli, and Al Ittihad.
Other Saudi clubs are owned by various state-backed companies, including Saudi oil giant Aramco and Neom.PIF’s extensive investments in football and other sports, such as golf, motorsports, wrestling, boxing, tennis, and eSports, are widely perceived as integral to Saudi Arabia’s “sportswashing” strategy.
This strategy aims to divert attention from human rights concerns, enhance the nation’s international image, and disseminate state-friendly narratives by leveraging the profound cultural significance and massive media attention that football commands globally.
PIF has secured a long-term partnership with FIFA, including direct and indirect sponsorship of the Club World Cup , and is actively pursuing the bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup. Reports also suggest ongoing attempts by Saudi-linked entities to acquire other football clubs in the UK.A debate exists regarding the classification of PIF’s Saudi Pro League club acquisitions as a multi-club ownership model directly involving Newcastle.
Sources close to PIF have stated that these acquisitions do not constitute such a model. However, UEFA has indicated that PIF’s influence raises questions about competitive integrity due to the presence of multi-club ownership.Notably, the Premier League’s APT rules were introduced partly in response to the Newcastle takeover, specifically aiming to prevent inflated sponsorship deals from associated parties.
The PIF’s MCO model, particularly its simultaneous ownership of a Premier League club (Newcastle) and multiple Saudi Pro League clubs, introduces a significant geopolitical dimension. Despite PIF’s denial of a direct MCO link with Newcastle, the inherent conflict of interest and the potential for strategic player movement or financial flows, even if indirect, raise legitimate competitive integrity concerns.
The “sportswashing” narrative suggests that the primary motivation for this MCO extends beyond traditional sporting or commercial synergies to broader state-level objectives. This presents a complex challenge for regulators, as their existing rules are primarily designed for commercial entities, not sovereign wealth funds with potentially non-sporting agendas, which can create regulatory blind spots or difficulties in enforcement.

Strategic Rationale and Operational Synergies of MCOs
The formation and expansion of multi-club ownership structures are driven by a confluence of strategic motivations and the pursuit of operational synergies designed to create value across the football ecosystem

Player Development and Talent Pathways
A significant advantage inherent in MCOs is their capacity to establish structured player development pathways. This model enables young players to gain invaluable experience at various levels and in diverse leagues within the group, thereby optimizing their progression and readiness for top-tier competition.
Examples include Aston Villa’s strategic partnerships with ZED FC in Egypt and Vissel Kobe in Japan, specifically aimed at youth development and facilitating player transfers.Similarly, CFG’s sophisticated internal player movement system allows talent to transition seamlessly between clubs like Girona, New York City FC, and Troyes.
This comprehensive approach is designed to provide increased playing time for emerging talents, streamline visa and work permit navigation, and implement more effective resale strategies, ultimately reducing the reliance on external loan markets. The emphasis on player development and internal pathways suggests that MCOs are strategically positioned to capitalize on inefficiencies within the global transfer market. By identifying and nurturing talent early within their expansive networks, they can acquire players at lower costs and meticulously develop them through tailored loan spells.
This process ultimately allows them to either integrate these players into their top-tier clubs or sell them for substantial profits. This approach mitigates reliance on expensive external transfers for “ready-made stars” and offers a more controlled environment for talent progression, effectively establishing a self-sustaining talent factory.

Centralized Scouting and Data Analytics
MCOs leverage centralized intelligence systems that integrate traditional scouting methods with advanced data analytics and video scouting capabilities. This coordinated approach is instrumental in identifying talent early and on a global scale, providing a competitive edge in the recruitment market. The use of proprietary tools and internal databases allows for a comprehensive global overview of talent, facilitating smarter squad planning across the entire network.
For instance, Eagle Football’s draft IPO filing specifically highlights planned investments in “AI-powered fan analytics” to enhance sponsorship deals, demonstrating the broader application of data beyond just player recruitment.

Commercial and Marketing Synergies
A key driver for MCOs is the pursuit of commercial and marketing synergies. These groups aim to unify their brands, leveraging collective strength in marketing, sponsorships, and merchandising across their multiple clubs. This can significantly enhance the commercial value proposition for partners and sponsors. Eagle Football, for example, is strategically expanding its streaming platform, Eagle Stream, to offer exclusive content and diversify its revenue streams through merchandise, virtual experiences, and blockchain-based fan tokens.

Financial Stability and Risk Diversification
The multi-club model is increasingly recognized for its ability to enhance financial stability and offer robust risk diversification. By strategically spreading investments across different leagues and geographical regions, MCOs can effectively mitigate risks associated with the performance or financial health of any single club within their portfolio.The sports industry, particularly with its growing reliance on subscription-based models for content, is increasingly viewed as an “inflation-resistant asset class”, making MCOs an attractive proposition for long-term investment and portfolio diversification.
While MCOs are subject to scrutiny under Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, their inherent structure can also serve as a strategic response to these pressures. By diversifying revenue streams, optimizing player trading, and potentially utilizing internal loan arrangements (which may not incur transfer fees), MCOs can theoretically improve the overall financial health of their portfolio.
The ability to move players between clubs for development and generate transfer fees offers a more controlled and potentially more sustainable financial model compared to relying solely on external market purchases, thereby aiding FFP compliance over the long term.
Key MCO Group Strategic Pillars and Synergies, MCO Group Stated Strategy/Objectives, Operational Synergies (e.g., player development, scouting, commercial)
Notable Examples: City Football Group -sporting/commercial potential of Manchester City; global multi-club strategy; sustainable success at scale.
Unified playing philosophy; centralized scouting/data analytics; tailored development pathways; internal player movement; global brand reach.Pep Guardiola’s philosophy filtering down;
Savinho’s development at Troyes/Girona before Man City.

With Chelsea: BlueCo Investment in first teams and academy of acquired clubs; multi-club ownership initiation.Player loans from flagship club to subsidiary; potential for shared resources.Focus on Chelsea loanees at Strasbourg, sometimes at expense of local targets.

Eagle Football Holdings: Capitalize on digital fan engagement; diversify revenue; sports, entertainment, technology company.Player transfers/loans between clubs; expanding streaming platform (Eagle Stream); AI-powered fan analytics; diversified revenue streams.Emphasis on player movement; IPO filing for digital infrastructure.

V Sports pursue multi-club model for talent development; expand into African football.Youth development partnerships; technical/coaching assistance; access to scouting network; player loans/transfers.ZED FC (Egypt) and Vissel Kobe (Japan) partnerships for youth talent; Real Unión for player development

INEOS: Successful and sustainable football clubs; reach European competition; develop top young talent.Player pathways; shared coaching methodology; potential for internal transfers.Focus on Man Utd sporting operations; Stated aim to develop young talent across clubs.

Public Investment Fund – Cement grip on global soccer; rehabilitate international image (“sportswashing”); invest massively in domestic football. Strategic investments in key leagues/tournaments; potential for player movement between Saudi clubs. FIFA Club World Cup sponsorship; acquisition of top Saudi clubs.

Challenges and Controversies of Multi-Club Ownership
Despite the potential strategic advantages, multi-club ownership models are frequently associated with inherent challenges and controversies, particularly concerning competitive integrity, fan perception, financial regulations, and geopolitical implications.For example:

Maintaining Competitive Integrity and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
A paramount concern within the MCO landscape is the potential for conflicts of interest, especially when two clubs under the same ownership compete in the same domestic league or European competition.
UEFA’s stringent regulations are specifically designed to mitigate such scenarios by prohibiting common ownership that exerts “decisive influence” over multiple clubs in the same competition. The recent cases involving Crystal Palace and Olympique Lyonnais, as well as Manchester United and OGC Nice, serve as clear examples of these challenges, compelling MCOs to implement measures such as blind trusts or even divestment to ensure compliance.
FIFA also imposes regulations aimed at ensuring fair competition, extending its oversight to both direct and indirect control mechanisms within MCO structures. The continuous evolution of MCO structures, marked by new acquisitions and strategic partnerships, is met with (one hopes) an equally dynamic regulatory response, characterized by stricter UEFA deadlines and the Premier League’s APT rules.
The increasing reliance on “blind trusts” as a compliance mechanism, followed by ongoing scrutiny and debate over their genuine effectiveness, indicates an enduring “cat and mouse” dynamic between MCOs seeking to maximize synergies and regulators striving to maintain competitive integrity. This continuous interplay suggests that the regulatory landscape for MCOs will remain fluid and subject to continuous adaptation, as governing bodies seek to close potential loopholes and ensure fair play.

Fan Perception and Concerns about Diluted Identity or “Feeder Club” Status
Fans of smaller clubs within an MCO structure frequently voice concerns that their club’s unique traditions or local identity are being diluted. There is a prevalent fear that their club may primarily serve as a “feeder club” for the flagship entity, rather than being able to pursue its own independent aspirations and competitive goals.
The perception that “their best players will leave” to join a larger, more prominent club within the same group, even if those players are subsequently replaced, significantly contributes to this sentiment. While MCOs offer undeniable potential financial and sporting benefits, the persistent concern from fans regarding “diluted identity” and “feeder club” status represents a substantial long-term risk.
In my opinion, football’s profound appeal is deeply rooted in its connection to local communities and the unique identity of each club.
If MCO strategies are perceived to undermine these fundamental aspects, it will inevitably lead to fan disengagement, reduced attendance, and a loss of the very emotional connection that makes football such a valuable and cherished sport. This suggests that MCOs must invest not only in sporting performance but also in genuine community engagement and fostering independent success for each club to mitigate this risk and ensure sustained, passionate fan support.

Financial Fair Play (FFP) Implications and Associated Party Transactions (APT)
The financial structure of a multi-club ownership group is subjected to rigorous scrutiny under UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations. Related-party transactions, revenue-sharing models, and inter-club funding arrangements are closely monitored to prevent any form of financial manipulation that could circumvent FFP restrictions.
The Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) and Fair Market Value (FMV) rules were specifically introduced to prevent clubs from gaining an unfair competitive advantage by inflating revenues or reducing costs through arrangements with owner-linked entities that are not conducted at fair market value.
Manchester City has publicly argued that these rules are unduly restrictive, potentially hindering their sponsorship growth compared to clubs operating in other leagues with less stringent regulations. The Premier League’s APT rules act as a significant constraint on the financial leverage that MCOs can derive from their ownership structures. By mandating fair market value for associated party transactions, the league directly limits the ability of wealthy owners to inject capital disguised as inflated commercial deals.
This is a deliberate attempt aimed at leveling the financial playing field and maintaining competitive balance, effectively placing a cap on how much “related” money can flow into a club without independent market validation, thereby directly impacting the financial strategy of MCOs.

Geopolitical Influence and “Sportswashing” Accusations
The involvement of sovereign wealth funds, such as Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) in Newcastle United, has raised widespread concerns about “sportswashing”.
This strategy involves using significant sports investments to deflect scrutiny from human rights issues and to enhance a nation’s international image and soft power. The PIF’s extensive investments across various sports, coupled with its active pursuit of hosting major international tournaments like the FIFA World Cup 2034, underscore a broader geopolitical agenda that extends beyond purely commercial or sporting objectives.
The “sportswashing” accusations against PIF highlight a fundamental challenge for football regulators: how to effectively address ownership motivations that extend beyond traditional sporting and commercial objectives. Current regulations primarily focus on financial fair play and competitive integrity within the sporting context.
However, if the primary driver for an MCO is geopolitical influence or image enhancement, these existing rules may prove insufficient to address the broader ethical and political implications. This situation suggests a need for more comprehensive governance frameworks that consider the source and intent of investment, potentially requiring collaboration with international political and human rights bodies, which traditionally falls outside the purview of sports regulation.

Conclusion and Future Outlook
Multi-club ownership has firmly established itself as a pervasive and growing phenomenon within Premier League football, with several top clubs now integrated into extensive global networks.
These sophisticated structures offer significant strategic advantages, particularly in optimizing player development, enhancing scouting capabilities, expanding commercial reach, and bolstering financial resilience across the group.
However, the expansion of MCOs has also led to increased scrutiny and stringent regulatory oversight from governing bodies such as UEFA and the Premier League, especially concerning competitive integrity and financial fair play.
The trend indicates a clear trajectory towards tighter and more consistently applied rules governing MCOs.
UEFA’s recent rigid stance on compliance deadlines and its interpretation of “decisive influence” suggest a less flexible approach than observed in previous years. There will likely be continued refinement of rules surrounding “blind trusts” and other mitigation measures, aimed at ensuring genuine independence and preventing the circumvention of regulations.
The Premier League’s APT rules will remain a critical instrument for maintaining financial integrity and competitive balance, with ongoing scrutiny of associated party transactions.
The repeated instances of MCOs utilizing mechanisms like “blind trusts” or adjusting ownership stakes to meet compliance requirements suggest that regulators are in a continuous state of adaptation. As MCOs become more sophisticated in their structures, the regulatory responses ought to follow suit, implying that existing “loopholes” or ambiguous areas should be tightened.
This could lead to more prescriptive rules and potentially greater enforcement actions, with the ultimate goal of preventing the formation of “pyramids where smaller clubs just act in benefit of a single club” thereby pushing MCOs towards more genuinely independent operations or compelling divestment.
Looking ahead, and despite all these issues, the MCO model is projected to continue its expansion, with an increasing number of clubs joining such groups annually.
Future trends may include greater diversification and specialization among MCOs, with some focusing on specific strategic niches such as youth development, digital engagement, or regional market penetration.
The geopolitical implications of state-backed MCOs are likely to intensify, leading to increased debate and potential calls for new regulatory frameworks that address “sportswashing” and broader ethical concerns. The long-term effect on competitive balance remains a critical question.
While MCOs can provide vital funding and talent pathways for smaller clubs, concerns persist regarding their potential “feeder club” status and the concentration of power within a few dominant groups.
Furthermore, MCOs will continue to leverage digital streaming, AI-driven fan experiences, and data-rich partnerships as essential tools for diversification and revenue generation. The growth of MCOs is fundamentally driven by a desire for centralized control, efficiency, and synergy.
However, the regulatory push is towards decentralization and independent operations to uphold competitive integrity. This creates a fundamental paradox: if regulations become overly stringent, they risk stifling the very synergies that make MCOs attractive and financially viable.

Conversely, if MCOs operate with excessive centralization, they risk undermining the competitive balance and local identities that are essential to football’s enduring appeal. The future trajectory of MCOs will depend on striking a delicate balance that allows for strategic benefits while preserving the core tenets of fair competition and robust fan engagement, potentially leading to the emergence of more nuanced and regionally adapted MCO models.
As ever, the fans, the true custodians of the beautiful game, remain a distant thought of both regulators and shareholders.