Having examined the situation across the Premier League with regards to multi-club ownership, the potential benefits and the potential pitfalls it is time to look specifically at Everton and the Friedkin’s additional ownership of AS Roma and AS Cannes.

So, I hope to provide a comprehensive analysis of The Friedkin Group’s strategic expansion into multi-club ownership (MCO) within European football.  Below I detail the acquisitions of AS Roma, Everton FC, and AS Cannes, highlighting the instrumental role of Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited in the Everton takeover.

The analysis underscores the significant financial capacity and long-term strategic vision underpinning the Friedkin Group’s investments.

A critical component of this report is the in-depth examination of potential challenges arising from UEFA’s evolving multi-club ownership regulations. While UEFA has adopted a more pragmatic stance, allowing MCOs to participate in different European competitions, stringent rules concerning competitive integrity, decisive influence, and operational independence remain. Recent enforcement actions, such as the Crystal Palace case, serve as crucial precedents. The report concludes with strategic considerations for The Friedkin Group to navigate this complex regulatory landscape effectively, emphasizing proactive compliance and transparent governance to mitigate future threats.

1. Introduction: The Evolving Landscape of Multi-Club Ownership (MCO)

As discussed previously, multi-club ownership (MCO) represents a transformative and increasingly prevalent phenomenon in the global football industry. This model is characterized by a single entity or individual exercising control or significant influence over multiple football clubs across various leagues and geographical regions.

It extends beyond mere financial investment, encompassing active operational control driven by strategic objectives that span sporting, commercial, and financial domains. This comprehensive approach should allow owners to build synergistic ecosystems, optimizing resource allocation and talent management across their portfolio.   

The expansion of the MCO model in European football has been particularly pronounced. By the 2024-2025 season, a substantial 41.7% of clubs in Europe’s “Big Five” leagues—the Premier League, La Liga, Bundesliga, Serie A, and Ligue 1—were part of MCO structures.

MCO is no longer a fringe strategy but has become a mainstream approach for investment, talent development, and brand expansion, underscoring its dominance and increasing attractiveness as a global business model. This widespread adoption places pressure on governing bodies like UEFA, as an outright ban on MCO would be economically unfeasible and would deter significant investment, which many clubs and leagues now rely upon.

Consequently, UEFA’s regulatory efforts are necessarily focused on managing the inherent risks of MCO rather than eliminating it entirely, leading to complex and sometimes criticized “workaround” solutions, such as the use of blind trusts.  

Within this evolving landscape, The Friedkin Group, led by American businessman Thomas Dan Friedkin, has emerged as a notable and strategic player. The group has established a multi-club portfolio that includes prominent European clubs, positioning itself at the forefront of this modern football ownership trend. The inherent strategic integration within MCOs, which aims to maximize group-wide benefits through shared scouting, player development pathways, and consolidated commercial opportunities, is precisely what creates the core conflict with UEFA’s mandate to preserve sporting integrity and prevent conflicts of interest between clubs in the same competition. This tension between the economic logic of MCO (synergy) and the regulatory ideal (independence) is a central theme that will frame the analysis of potential threats in this report.

2. The Friedkin Group: Profile and Strategic Vision

The Friedkin Group is a privately-held consortium with diverse global interests, chaired and led by American businessman and film producer Thomas Dan Friedkin. His estimated net worth of US$7.8 billion as of December 2024 underscores the substantial financial capacity available to the group’s ventures. Beyond its burgeoning football portfolio, The Friedkin Group’s extensive business interests span automotive distribution (notably Gulf States Toyota Distributors), entertainment (having shepherded multiple Palme d’Or winners), hospitality (through Auberge Resorts Collection), and adventure companies.   

The group’s strategic entry into football aligns with a broader corporate philosophy of diversification and long-term investment. Their public statements reflect a patient, strategic approach rather than short-term speculation.

For instance, despite seemingly being a man of few words, Dan Friedkin articulated a “total” commitment to AS Roma, expressing a deep personal connection to the city. Similarly, the vision for Everton FC emphasizes building a “sustainable and successful future” and providing “immediate financial stability”. This long-term perspective is a crucial differentiator in an industry often characterised by volatile finances and high operational costs. The significant financial backing provided by Dan Friedkin’s net worth and the Friedkin Group’s diversified portfolio provides a deep reservoir of capital. This financial resilience positions the Friedkin Group’s clubs favorably in navigating financial regulations, such as UEFA’s Financial Sustainability Regulations (FSR) or the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR).

It suggests they are less likely to be forced into distress sales or short-sighted decisions due to financial pressures, which could provide a competitive advantage and greater stability for their clubs compared to less well-capitalized owners who might “chase the dream” through excessive borrowing. 

Furthermore, the Friedkin Group’s broader interests, particularly in entertainment and hospitality , suggest a potential for cross-sector synergies that extend beyond traditional football operations. For example, the success of their entertainment companies at the Cannes Film Festival could be leveraged for commercial partnerships or branding opportunities related to AS Cannes.

The appointment of Marc Watts, President at The Friedkin Group, as Everton’s Executive Chairman demonstrates a direct integration of high-level group management into club leadership. This indicates a strategic intent to apply best practices and executive talent from across their conglomerate to their football clubs. This integration of diverse expertise, from business management to high-performance sports (e.g., Jason Kidd’s involvement in Everton’s ownership), can enhance operational efficiency, commercial revenue generation, and overall club professionalism. However, this very integration also creates the challenge of demonstrating sufficient “independence” to UEFA, as shared personnel and strategic oversight can be interpreted as “decisive influence” under the multi-club ownership regulations.   

3. Friedkin Group’s European Football Club Acquisitions

The Friedkin Group has systematically built its European football portfolio through strategic acquisitions across different leagues and tiers, demonstrating a deliberate multi-tiered approach to multi-club ownership.

• 3.1. AS Roma (Italy): The Friedkin Group initiated negotiations to acquire the Italian Serie A club AS Roma in December 2019. A preliminary contract was subsequently signed on August 6, 2020, outlining an agreement to pay $591 million to the then-main shareholder, James Pallotta. The takeover was officially completed later in August 2020, with the transaction valued at over $700 million (€591 million). Initially, The Friedkin Group acquired an 86.6% majority stake in the club, followed by a mandatory tender offer for publicly held ordinary shares. As of current reporting, The Friedkin Group holds a commanding 95.97% ownership stake in AS Roma. Dan Friedkin himself serves as the President of the club. Under the Friedkin Group’s stewardship, AS Roma has experienced notable sporting achievements, including winning the inaugural UEFA Europa Conference League in 2022 and reaching the final of the UEFA Europa League in 2023. The women’s team has also achieved considerable success, securing all three Italian trophies and advancing to the Champions League quarter-finals.  

• 3.2. Everton FC (England): The Friedkin Group’s expansion into English football commenced with negotiations to purchase Everton in July 2024. An agreement to acquire Farhad Moshiri’s original 94.1% share of the club was reached in September 2024. The acquisition was formally completed on December 19, 2024, at which point The Friedkin Group became the majority owner, holding 99.5% of the club’s shares as a result of an immediate recapitalisation.
• The acquisition vehicle for Everton Football Club was specifically identified as Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited, an entity explicitly stated to be “within The Friedkin Group”. Prior to the transaction’s completion, Everton undertook proactive financial restructuring measures. This involved increasing the club’s share capital to convert outstanding debt owed to the previous owner’s entity, Blue Heaven Holdings, into equity, thereby facilitating additional equity investment from Roundhouse. This strategic financial maneuver was undertaken in view of recent changes to the Premier League’s shareholder loan regulations. Upon the takeover’s completion, Marc Watts, who serves as President at The Friedkin Group, was appointed Executive Chairman of Everton FC.  

• 3.3. AS Cannes (France): AS Cannes football club officially became part of The Friedkin Group on June 26, 2023. This acquisition of a lower-tier French club, currently competing in the Championnat National 2, suggests a strategic developmental role within the Friedkin Group’s portfolio. Ryan Friedkin serves as President of Association Sportive Cannes Football SAS, the entity controlling the men’s first team. The stated objective of this agreement is to enable the club to continue its “upward trajectory” and strive to “return to the elite levels of French football”. AS Cannes was also mentioned in connection with the group that acquired Everton , further indicating its integration into the broader MCO strategy.  
  The acquisitions of AS Roma (a top-tier, established club with European aspirations), Everton FC (a Premier League club with significant heritage but now considerable upside potential), and AS Cannes (a lower-tier, development-focused club) reveal a deliberate, multi-tiered acquisition strategy. Cannes, in particular, with Ryan Friedkin’s direct leadership and the stated goal of returning to “elite levels” , appears to be a clear developmental or “feeder” club within the MCO structure.

  As discussed, the “pyramid-like structure” is a common MCO model designed to create internal pathways for player development, talent identification, and potentially player movement across the group. It allows for optimized resource allocation, where a lower-tier club can serve as a proving ground or a destination for players not yet ready for the top leagues, thereby enhancing the overall sporting and commercial value of the entire portfolio.

  This strategy directly leverages the benefits of MCO, but also inherently creates the “decisive influence” and “integrity” challenges that UEFA seeks to regulate.   

Furthermore, the detailed account of Everton’s pre-acquisition financial restructuring, specifically “increasing the Club’s share capital to convert outstanding debt owed to BHH into equity, thereby facilitating additional equity investment from Roundhouse” , represents a critical financial maneuver.

This proactive approach to financial restructuring, undertaken “in view of recent changes to the Premier League’s shareholder loan regulations” , indicates a sophisticated understanding of both club finance and the evolving regulatory landscape (e.g., Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules, which are akin to UEFA’s Financial Sustainability Regulations ). This suggests that The Friedkin Group is not merely investing capital but is actively managing the financial health and regulatory compliance of its assets from the outset. This approach aims (and has succeeded in) to provide “immediate financial stability” and mitigate future risks of financial penalties or restrictions, which have plagued other Premier League clubs.  

Table 1: Friedkin Group’s European Football Club Portfolio

4. Shareholder Structure: Focus on Roundhouse Capital

The shareholder structure of The Friedkin Group’s football clubs, particularly Everton FC, reveals a deliberate corporate strategy involving dedicated entities and the strategic placement of key personnel.

Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited is explicitly identified as a direct “entity within The Friedkin Group”. This highlights a deliberate corporate structuring choice, where a specific subsidiary is used as the vehicle for club acquisition, in this case, Everton FC.

Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited is the primary shareholder of Everton FC, now holding 99.5% of the enlarged total issued shares. This confirms its central role in the Everton acquisition, which was finalized through an agreement between Roundhouse and the previous majority shareholder, Farhad Moshiri’s Blue Heaven Holdings. This layered corporate structure allows The Friedkin Group to centralize strategic control and financial oversight while potentially providing a degree of legal or operational separation for individual club entities. It could be designed to optimize tax efficiency, manage risk, or facilitate future transactions.

However, it is important to note that from UEFA’s perspective, the “decisive influence” rules are designed to look through such structures to the ultimate beneficial owner, meaning that the existence of Roundhouse as a subsidiary does not automatically grant independence if the Friedkin Group is still seen to exert control. 

Within the Everton FC ownership structure, several key individuals hold equity interests, reflecting a strategic infusion of multi-disciplinary expertise. Dan Friedkin, as the chairman and CEO of The Friedkin Group, holds an equity interest in Everton, which constitutes a ‘significant interest’ as defined by Premier League regulations. Christopher Sarofim also holds an equity interest in the club through Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited, and his interest is similarly deemed ‘significant’ by Premier League regulations (ie greater than 9.9%)

Sarofim brings nearly 40 years of experience in investment and fund management, which can be crucial for navigating financial regulations and optimizing club finances. Furthermore, Jason Kidd, the Head Coach of the Dallas Mavericks (NBA), has also joined the club’s ownership group, holding an undisclosed but not regulatory significant, equity interest.

The appointment of Marc Watts, who serves as President at The Friedkin Group, as Executive Chairman of Everton FC upon the completion of the takeover further illustrates the integrated nature of the ownership.

This strategic inclusion of individuals with diverse expertise, from business management to high-performance sports, aims to enhance the club’s performance both on and off the pitch. It suggests a hands-on approach to management and a commitment to leveraging the broader group’s talent pool, aiming to “add a more organised approach to the club’s operations” and “lead Everton into a new era, one that is marked by ambition and professionalism”.

This direct integration of talent from the parent group into the club’s leadership, while beneficial for club operations, simultaneously intensifies the scrutiny under UEFA’s “decisive influence” rules, as it blurs the lines of independent management.   

Table 2: Everton FC Shareholder Breakdown (as of acquisition completion)

5. UEFA Regulations on Multi-Club Ownership: Principles and Enforcement

UEFA’s regulatory framework concerning multi-club ownership is primarily designed to safeguard the “integrity of the competition” and prevent conflicts of interest that could arise from common ownership. The core of these regulations is enshrined in Article 5 of the UEFA Club Competitions Regulations (as seen in the 2025 edition).   

• 1. Core Regulatory Framework: Article 5 stipulates two key prohibitions aimed at maintaining competitive fairness. Firstly, it states that “No one may simultaneously be involved, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition”. This provision directly targets shared personnel and operational influence across multiple clubs. Secondly, it prohibits any “individual or legal entity [from having] control or decisive influence over more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition”. This broader prohibition extends to the ultimate beneficial ownership and its ability to dictate policy across multiple entities. UEFA’s definition of “control” or “decisive influence” is broad and comprehensive, encompassing various means such as share ownership, voting power, constitutional documents, or agreements. It is designed to capture both direct and indirect control mechanisms and any shared decision-making processes that could impact sporting outcomes or competitive balance. The most stringent aspect of these regulations is the “Same Competition” Rule, which explicitly prohibits two clubs controlled by the same entity from participating in the same European competition, whether it be the UEFA Champions League, Europa League, or Conference League.   

• 5.2. Recent Enforcement and Precedents: Recent years have seen UEFA actively enforce these regulations, providing critical precedents for multi-club ownership groups.
• • Crystal Palace and Olympique Lyonnais (Lyon): A prominent case involved US businessman John Textor, who currently holds a 43% stake in Crystal Palace (via Eagle Football) and a controlling stake in Lyon. Both clubs qualified for the Europa League, creating a direct conflict under Article 5. UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) concluded that the clubs breached Article 5.01 due to Textor’s “decisive influence”.
• • Consequently, Lyon was permitted to participate in the Europa League (owing to its higher domestic league finish), while Crystal Palace was demoted to the UEFA Conference League. Crystal Palace’s arguments, which included claims about Textor’s non-controlling voting rights and an agreement to sell his shares, did not satisfy UEFA. Palace is currently appealing this decision to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).  
  • Nottingham Forest and Olympiacos: Another case involved Evangelos Marinakis, who owned both Nottingham Forest and Olympiacos. To resolve a potential conflict as Forest contended for European qualification alongside Olympiacos, Marinakis temporarily divested control of Nottingham Forest by placing his shares into a blind trust by April 30, 2025. This transfer of control was subsequently reversed on June 6, 2025, after Forest missed Champions League qualification.   
  • Manchester City and Girona (City Football Group – CFG): In a notable instance, both Manchester City and Girona, part of the City Football Group, qualified for the Champions League in 2024. To comply with UEFA regulations, CFG placed its holdings in Girona into a blind trust, effective from July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025. This trust was overseen by a UEFA-approved independent panel , and as a result, both clubs were permitted to compete in the Champions League.  
  • Other Cases: Similar breaches of Article 5.01 involving pairs like Drogheda United FC / Silkeborg IF and Gyori ETO FC / FC DAC 1904 Dunajska Streda resulted in one club from each pair being rejected from the 2025/26 UEFA Conference League.   
• 5.3. Compliance Mechanisms: To navigate these regulations, MCOs employ various compliance mechanisms.
• The most frequently utilized is the “blind trust,” where the ultimate beneficial owner transfers control of assets to an independent third-party trustee who manages them “at arm’s length”. While UEFA actively promotes these as a solution , it is critical to note that these trusts are often unilaterally revocable by the original owner, as demonstrated by the Nottingham Forest case.
• Beyond trusts, MCOs are required to establish genuinely independent governance structures for each club, specifically avoiding shared decision-making processes that could impact match integrity. UEFA is also keen to ensure clubs remain independent in their operations and has secured commitments from MCOs (e.g., City Football Group, INEOS) to restrict player transfers, joint technical or commercial agreements, and shared scouting or player databases between affiliated clubs, particularly when they are in UEFA competitions.
• Domestically, the Premier League also requires a fair market value assessment for transfers between “associated parties”. A crucial procedural element for MCOs is the compliance deadline: ownership structures must be altered to ensure compliance by March 1st of the year of competition. 
• 5.4. Evolving UEFA Stance: UEFA’s stance on MCO is evolving, reflecting a pragmatic approach to a growing trend. President Aleksander Čeferin has acknowledged the increasing interest in MCO, stating that “we shouldn’t just say no to the investments”. This indicates a recognition of the significant financial benefits that MCO brings to football. As of May 1, 2024, UEFA implemented a “modernization” of its MCO clauses, now permitting clubs with common ownership to participate simultaneously in different European club competitions, provided they are not competing in the same tournament. This adjustment aims to strike a balance between maintaining competitive integrity and fostering strategic club alliances. Despite this relaxation for different competitions, UEFA maintains its intent to be “super strict” on clubs within their competitions to “cut out a lot of the negatives and try stop pyramids forming”. The focus remains firmly on preventing “decisive influence” and upholding integrity across its competitions.   

The core rule prohibiting “control or decisive influence” over multiple clubs in the same competition is challenged by the widespread use and UEFA’s “active promotion” of “blind trusts”. The critical aspect here is that these trusts are “unilaterally revocable by the original owner at a time of their choosing”. The Nottingham Forest case , where a blind trust was explicitly used temporarily and then reversed, highlights this tension. This suggests that while blind trusts may satisfy the  letter of UEFA’s rules by formally separating control, they may not always uphold the spirit of true independence.

This creates a perception that UEFA is “bending the rules” or that “there is no longer any real obstacle put in the way of MCO entities wishing to see as many of their clubs compete in Europe” , especially if they qualify for different competitions. This raises questions about the long-term effectiveness of these regulations in genuinely safeguarding competitive integrity.   

The repeated emphasis on the March 1st deadline for ownership structure changes is a critical procedural detail. Crystal Palace’s demotion was directly linked to missing this deadline, despite arguments about non-controlling stakes. This indicates that UEFA prioritizes timely formal compliance regardless of the perceived   degree of conflict.

For MCOs, this deadline necessitates proactive planning and monitoring of their clubs’ potential European qualification. It means that even if a conflict is anticipated, the window for resolution is fixed and relatively early in the season, requiring legal and financial teams to act decisively well before the end of domestic competitions. This adds a layer of operational complexity and risk management.

President Čeferin’s statement that “we shouldn’t just say no to the investments” , coupled with the “modernization” of rules allowing clubs from the same MCO in different European competitions , reveals UEFA’s pragmatic approach. They acknowledge the financial benefits and growing prevalence of MCO but simultaneously attempt to enforce “super strict” rules within their competitions.

This indicates a recognition that MCO is here to stay and can bring significant investment. The threat is not an existential ban, but rather the strict application of rules to prevent direct sporting conflicts and perceived unfair advantages. The Friedkin Group must understand that while the door is open for their clubs to participate in Europe, the regulatory environment is dynamic and requires continuous vigilance and demonstrable compliance, especially regarding the “decisive influence” clause and any inter-club dealings. The focus has moved from preventing MCO to meticulously managing its potential negative impacts.  

Table 3: Key UEFA Multi-Club Ownership Regulations (Article 5)

Table 4: Recent UEFA MCO Enforcement Cases & Outcomes

6. Potential Threats from UEFA Regulations to The Friedkin Group’s MCO Model

The Friedkin Group’s multi-club ownership model, while strategically advantageous, faces several potential threats stemming from UEFA’s robust and evolving regulatory framework. These threats primarily revolve around competitive integrity, operational independence, and the inherent tension between MCO synergies and UEFA’s rules.

• 6.1. Risk of Simultaneous UEFA Competition Qualification: The most direct and immediate threat to The Friedkin Group’s MCO model is the prospect of two or more of its clubs qualifying for the same UEFA club competition.
• AS Roma, a Serie A club, and Everton FC, a Premier League club, both compete in top European leagues. While AS Cannes is currently in a lower French tier (Championnat National 2) , its stated ambition to return to “elite levels” means it could, in the future, also contend for European qualification. UEFA’s modernized rules, effective May 1, 2024, now permit clubs with common ownership to participate simultaneously in different European club competitions. This relaxation is a positive development, allowing for more flexibility.
• However, if AS Roma and Everton, for instance, both achieve league positions that qualify them for the Europa League, or if Cannes were to rise and qualify for any UEFA competition alongside Roma or Everton, a direct conflict would arise under Article 5 of the UEFA Club Competitions Regulations.   

  In such scenarios, UEFA’s established precedent dictates that only one club would be admitted to the competition, typically the one with the higher domestic league finish. The Crystal Palace case serves as a stark reminder of this consequence: despite arguments about non-controlling stakes, Palace was demoted from the Europa League to the Conference League because John Textor’s ownership in both Palace and Lyon constituted a “decisive influence” conflict, and Lyon had a higher domestic league finish. A critical procedural element that exacerbates this risk is the March 1st deadline for compliance adjustments. This means MCOs must anticipate potential European qualification conflicts well in advance of the season’s conclusion, forcing a high-stakes, proactive risk management exercise.

• Missing this deadline, as Crystal Palace did, leads to immediate and severe consequences, making it a critical strategic bottleneck for MCOs. This forces the Friedkin Group to consider the sporting performance of   all their clubs in relation to each other, not just individually. It could lead to strategic decisions that prioritize one club’s European participation over another’s, or necessitate complex and potentially costly compliance measures like blind trusts, which are still subject to UEFA approval and scrutiny
• 6.2. Ensuring Operational Independence and Governance Compliance: A significant ongoing challenge for The Friedkin Group is to demonstrate genuine operational independence and strict governance compliance across its multi-club portfolio. UEFA’s regulations are clear: “no one may simultaneously be involved, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance” of more than one club participating in a UEFA club competition. This extends to avoiding any form of “control or decisive influence”. The definition of “decisive influence” is broad, encompassing various means of control and shared decision-making processes.   The Friedkin Group’s current structure, while strategically beneficial, presents inherent challenges in this regard. The appointment of Marc Watts, President at The Friedkin Group, as Everton’s Executive Chairman , and Ryan Friedkin as President of AS Cannes , highlights the potential for perceived “decisive influence” emanating directly from the parent group. Even if formal reporting lines are separated, the presence of senior Friedkin Group executives in key leadership roles at multiple clubs could be interpreted by UEFA as a lack of true independence.
• The Crystal Palace case again provides a relevant precedent, where John Textor’s argument that he did not have controlling voting rights was dismissed, as UEFA still deemed him to have “decisive influence”. This indicates that UEFA looks beyond mere legalistic interpretations of ownership percentages or formal separation. The Friedkin Group cannot merely rely on legalistic interpretations of ownership percentages or formal separation. They must actively demonstrate, through operational practices and transparent reporting, that each club’s management and sporting performance are genuinely independent. This requires careful management of shared resources, personnel, and strategic planning across the group to avoid triggering UEFA’s “decisive influence” clause. The challenge for the Friedkin Group is therefore to maintain the central strategic oversight that is a key benefit of the MCO model, while simultaneously proving sufficient operational autonomy to UEFA. 
• 6.3. Implications for Player Transfers and Commercial Synergies: UEFA is increasingly “keen to ensure that clubs remain independent from one another” , a stance that has direct implications for the traditional MCO advantages related to player movement and commercial synergies. UEFA has actively sought and obtained commitments from other prominent MCOs, such as City Football Group and INEOS, to restrict player transfers between affiliated clubs (until September 2025 in some cases), and to avoid concluding joint technical or commercial agreements or using shared scouting or player databases. While these restrictions currently apply primarily when clubs are in UEFA competitions, the broader regulatory intent is to “cut out a lot of the negatives and try stop pyramids forming”. This trend could significantly limit the strategic advantage that MCOs typically derive from efficient player development pathways and seamless player movement across their portfolio. If the Friedkin Group’s clubs, particularly Roma and Everton, regularly qualify for European competitions, they may face increasing restrictions on inter-club transfers and shared commercial initiatives. Furthermore, even within domestic leagues, the Premier League already mandates that any transfers between “associated parties” (i.e., clubs within the same ownership group) must be assessed by the Premier League first to ensure they represent “fair market value”. This long-term erosion of MCO synergies means that over time, UEFA might tighten these restrictions further, even for clubs not in the same competition, or apply them more broadly. The Friedkin Group might find their ability to leverage cross-club synergies increasingly constrained, potentially impacting the long-term value proposition of their multi-club model.   
• 6.4. Navigating Evolving UEFA Stance: While UEFA has demonstrated a pragmatic shift by modernizing its rules to permit MCOs in different European competitions , the overall regulatory trend indicates a move towards “tighter rules” to “cut out a lot of the negatives and try stop pyramids forming”. UEFA President Čeferin’s acknowledgment that “we shouldn’t just say no to the investments” confirms a recognition of the economic benefits of MCO, but this is balanced by a strong desire to maintain competitive integrity.   

  The frequent use of “blind trusts” is promoted by UEFA as a compliance mechanism , but their unilaterally revocable nature by the original owner raises fundamental questions about true independence. This creates a situation where the letter of the law might be met, but the spirit of independence could be debated, potentially leading to future scrutiny. There is a continuous risk of stricter interpretations or new regulations being introduced, especially if MCOs are perceived to be circumventing the spirit of the rules. The Friedkin Group must remain highly adaptive and proactive in its compliance strategies, as the regulatory landscape is dynamic and subject to ongoing refinement based on observed practices and precedents.   

7. Conclusion and Outlook

The Friedkin Group has strategically established a significant multi-club ownership model in European football, encompassing AS Roma, Everton FC, and AS Cannes, with Roundhouse Capital Holdings Limited serving as a key acquisition vehicle for Everton. This expansion is underpinned by substantial financial resources and a long-term vision focused on stability, sustainability, and strategic integration of diverse expertise across the portfolio. The tiered acquisition strategy, from top-tier clubs to developmental entities, aims to create synergies in player development, scouting, and commercial operations.

However, this MCO model operates within a complex and increasingly scrutinized regulatory environment governed by UEFA. The core challenge lies in reconciling the inherent drive for synergistic control within an MCO with UEFA’s paramount objective of safeguarding competitive integrity and ensuring the operational independence of clubs participating in its competitions.

While UEFA has evolved its stance to permit clubs under common ownership to participate in different European competitions, the threat of simultaneous qualification for the same competition remains a primary operational risk. Recent enforcement cases, such as the demotion of Crystal Palace, serve as clear precedents for the consequences of failing to meet UEFA’s stringent criteria for “decisive influence” and the critical March 1st compliance deadline.

The presence of Friedkin Group executives in leadership roles at multiple clubs, while beneficial for operational oversight, intensifies the scrutiny regarding perceived control. Furthermore, UEFA’s increasing focus on restricting inter-club transactions and shared commercial agreements could gradually erode some of the key strategic advantages of the MCO model.

Strategic Recommendations for Mitigating Future Regulatory Risks:

To navigate this intricate landscape and mitigate potential threats, The Friedkin Group should consider the following strategic recommendations:

• Proactive Performance Monitoring and Contingency Planning: Implement advanced analytics to continuously monitor the league standings and European qualification probabilities of all clubs. Develop clear, pre-approved contingency plans, including the potential use of blind trusts, well in advance of the March 1st UEFA compliance deadline, ensuring readiness for swift action if multiple clubs approach qualification for the same competition.
• Demonstrable Independent Governance Structures: Establish and rigorously maintain genuinely independent governance structures for each club. While strategic oversight from the Friedkin Group is natural, minimize overlapping personnel in key decision-making roles (e.g., sporting directors, CEOs) across clubs that could potentially qualify for UEFA competitions. Document and communicate clear lines of autonomy for each club’s management.
• Transparent Inter-Club Transaction Management: Implement robust internal protocols for any inter-club transactions, such as player transfers or loan arrangements. Ensure all such dealings are conducted strictly at fair market value and are independently verifiable, aligning with Premier League and UEFA guidelines. Avoid any joint technical or commercial agreements, or shared scouting databases, between clubs that could potentially compete in the same UEFA competition.
• Continuous Regulatory Engagement and Adaptation: Maintain an ongoing dialogue with UEFA and relevant domestic football associations to stay abreast of evolving multi-club ownership regulations and their interpretations. Be prepared to adapt corporate and operational structures in response to new precedents or stricter enforcement, demonstrating a proactive commitment to compliance rather than reactive adjustments.
• Enhanced Transparency in Ownership and Operations: Foster a culture of transparency in ownership structures and operational practices. Clear and public disclosures regarding the relationship between The Friedkin Group and its individual clubs can help build trust with regulatory bodies, fans, and the broader football community, mitigating perceptions of undue influence or conflicts of interest.

Outlook on the Future of MCO in European Football:

Multi-club ownership is an undeniable and growing trend in European football, driven by the significant investment it brings and the strategic benefits it offers. It is highly unlikely that UEFA will seek an outright ban on MCO, given its pragmatic recognition of the financial contributions to the sport. However, the regulatory environment will continue to evolve, with UEFA likely refining and enforcing rules to maintain competitive integrity, focusing intently on perceived conflicts of interest and “decisive influence”. The inherent tension between the commercial interests driving MCO and the sporting integrity UEFA aims to protect will remain a defining feature of the multi-club ownership landscape. For groups like The Friedkin Group, success will hinge not only on financial strength and strategic vision but also on their ability to navigate this complex regulatory terrain with foresight, adaptability, and an unwavering commitment to both the letter and spirit of the rules. The increasing sophistication of compliance demands that MCOs invest in dedicated regulatory expertise and proactive strategies to ensure long-term sustainability and avoid punitive measures.