The Esk


Independent analysis of football's money, owners and rules

The Analysis Series: City Football Group – A Funding Review, 2013 to October 2026

CWTE

18 minutes

The reported October 2026 Abu Dhabi injection into City Football Group is real. On 14 October 2026 City Football Group Limited (CFG) allotted 11,327,163 new shares for approximately £100m, and a CFG spokesperson confirmed to City AM that all of them were taken up by Sheikh Mansour’s Newton Investment and Development. It is the fifth owner-side equity issue since mid-2024, bringing approximately £650m of new equity in around 28 months. Over the same period the group’s pre-tax loss widened to £292.3m (FY to 30 June 2025), and Manchester City was found guilty on 114 of the 115 Premier League charges.

Summary

  • Companies House filings show 11,327,163 CFG shares allotted on 14 October 2026 for about £100m. A CFG spokesperson described the money as “equity from our largest shareholder”, to be used “for normal corporate purposes against our strategic plans, funding planned investments into the City Football Group”. City AM reports that Sheikh Mansour now owns around 81% of CFG, with Silver Lake holding most of the remainder, and that the issue implies a valuation of £5.9bn. No standalone CFG press release has been found, and the SH01 allotment return has not been read directly.
  • Between 2015 and 2019 it brought in about US$900m of outside primary equity (CMC/CITIC and Silver Lake) and later US$650m of bank debt. Since 2024 its new money has come from the owner: about £650m of share issues at a near-constant ~£8.83 per share. Cumulative pre-tax losses now exceed £1.2bn.
  • Boards and regulators face three principal risks: the unresolved 115-charges sanction and appeal; an equity valuation that has not been market-tested since 2019 and is effectively set by the controlling shareholder; and a significant data gap, since CFG’s FY2025 consolidated balance sheet line items (borrowings, intangibles, cash) could not be verified from the primary accounts.

Key Findings

  1. October 2026 injection. Confirmed: about £100m in equity, allotted 14 October 2026, subscribed by Newton Investment and Development LLC. It marginally increases Newton’s majority. City AM’s implied valuation is £5.9bn.
  2. Funding has shifted back to the owner. Outside investors contributed primary equity only in 2015 (CMC/CITIC, US$400m) and 2019 (Silver Lake, US$500m). Every later change in minority holdings was a secondary trade between shareholders, other than dilution from new issues. Since June 2024 at least £420m of new equity is attributed to Newton. A further £130m (the 2025 and October 2025 allotments) is attributed to “the owners” but not individually confirmed, and £100m (October 2026) is confirmed as Newton’s.
  3. The valuation has been flat since 2024. Owner-subscribed issues from 2024 to 2026 were all priced at about £8.83–£8.84 per share, equating to about £5.9bn (≈US$7.9bn). That is below the “10bn dollars minimum” that chairman Khaldoon Al Mubarak said CFG would fetch if sold, in a June 2026 interview on Manchester City’s own channels. The only arm’s-length price points are US$3.0bn (2015) and US$4.8bn (2019).
  4. Losses are worsening, not improving. Pre-tax losses were £126.9m (FY23, as reported by Sportcal), £122.2m (FY24) and £292.3m (FY25). FY25 revenue fell to £888.0m, partly because Girona was deconsolidated.
  5. Manchester City carries the group. MCFC produced £694.1m of the £888.0m FY25 group revenue (about 78%) and lost £9.9m pre-tax. By implication, the rest of the group plus central costs lost about £280m pre-tax in FY25.
  6. The portfolio is now being trimmed. CFG exited Mumbai City (December 2025) and Yokohama F. Marinos (2026). Girona sits in a blind trust for UEFA purposes. Capital is now concentrated on Etihad Park (New York) and the Etihad Campus “Entertainment Destination” (Manchester).

1. The October 2026 Abu Dhabi injection

Item Finding Status
Date of allotment 14 October 2026 Verified via reported Companies House filing (City AM, 26 Oct 2026)
Shares issued 11,327,163 new CFG shares Verified (reported filing)
Amount About £100m (≈US$133.5m) Reported; ≈£8.83/share implied
Investor Newton Investment and Development LLC, wholly owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan Confirmed by CFG spokesperson to City AM
Instrument New equity (share allotment). Share class not stated in coverage; the four previous issues were A Preference Shares at about £8.83 Share class unverified
Stated purpose Normal corporate purposes against strategic plans, funding planned investments into CFG CFG spokesperson (City AM)
Shareholding effect Newton’s majority marginally increased, to about 81%. Silver Lake holds most of the remainder Reported (City AM); exact post-issue percentages not published
Implied valuation £5.9bn City AM calculation; consistent with ~£8.83 × ~670m shares (The Esk’s arithmetic)
Official press release None found Gap

Interpretation. The money arrived about two weeks after the Premier League confirmed the commission’s verdict (29 September 2026). Its size, pricing and subscriber match the 2024–25 pattern, so it reads as routine working-capital and capex funding rather than a one-off rescue. It also demonstrates that CFG’s continuing losses and capital projects are being financed by owner equity, not by operating cash flow or new third-party capital.

2. Capital raised since inception

Table 1: Chronology of capital raises and financing (CFG level unless stated)

Date Event Amount Investor / lender Stake / terms Implied valuation Instrument Status
May 2013 (inc. Jan 2013) CFG formed as holding company for MCFC and NYCFC (Melbourne added 2014). Company no. 08355862 Not disclosed ADUG (Sheikh Mansour) 100% n/a Ordinary equity / contributed assets Verified (Companies House, CFG)
1 Dec 2015 CMC Holdings / CITIC Capital consortium US$400m China Media Capital, CITIC Capital ~13%; new shares issued; Li Ruigang joins board US$3.0bn Primary equity Verified (CFG statement via The National, Irish Times, China Daily). Conflict: Sportcal later gives US$485m
27 Nov 2019 Silver Lake investment US$500m (≈£389m) Silver Lake Just over 10%; no existing shareholders selling; board grows from 8 to 9 (Egon Durban); ADUG c.77% after US$4.8bn post-money Primary equity (later reported as A Preference Shares) Verified (CFG announcement via Gulf News / Reuters)
Jul 2021 Term loan US$650m, 7-year, due July 2028 Underwritten by Barclays; HSBC and KKR Capital Markets arrange/distribute Infrastructure (incl. NYCFC stadium) n/a Senior bank debt Reported (FT, via SportsPro / Irish Times); current balance unverified
Jul 2021 Revolving credit facility £100m Same lender group No immediate intention to draw n/a RCF Reported (FT); drawn status unverified
2021–Sep 2022 Silver Lake buys 4.1% from CMC, reaching 14.5% Undisclosed Silver Lake (buyer), CMC (seller) CMC falls to 8.2% Undisclosed Secondary sale, no new CFG cash Reported (FT via SportsPro, Sportcal)
Nov 2022 CMC sells 7.24%, split about half each to Silver Lake and Newton Undisclosed Silver Lake, Newton Silver Lake >18%; CMC ~1%; Li Ruigang leaves board Undisclosed Secondary, no new CFG cash Verified (CFG statement via Inside World Football)
Sep 2024 Marcelo Claure buys 10% of NYCFC holding (City Football Group US Holdco LLC) Undisclosed Marcelo Claure NYCFC: CFG 80%, Claure 10%, Yankee Global 10% NYCFC US$1.5bn (reported) Subsidiary-level equity Reported (SportsPro, Reuters)
30 Jun 2024 allotment (filed 28 Aug 2024) Share issue £210m Newton (attributed) Silver Lake diluted to nearly 17% ~£5.9bn A Preference Shares Amount reported (SportBusiness); subscriber attributed by Football Insider, not confirmed by CFG
1 Nov 2024 (filed 29 Nov 2024) Share issue £210m (≈23.77m shares at ≈£8.836) Newton (attributed) As above ~£5.9bn A Preference Shares Reported (Football Insider)
Late 2024 Etihad Park construction financing Project cost US$780m (>US$900m incl. capitalised interest) J.P. Morgan (per architect HOK) Floating-rate, delayed-draw, non-recourse, 5-year, secured on stadium; bond refinancing expected later n/a Project debt (NYCFC level) Reported (IFR, HOK); loan size unverified
14 Mar 2025 (filed 9 Apr 2025) Share issue ~£70m (≈7.92m shares) “Owners” (Newton implied) — ~£5.9bn A Preference Shares Reported; subscriber unconfirmed
31 Oct 2025 (filed 19 Jan 2026) Share issue ~£60m (≈6.80m shares at ≈£8.83) “Owners” (Newton implied) — ~£5.9bn A Preference Shares Reported (Off The Pitch, Football Insider); subscriber unconfirmed
14 Oct 2026 Share issue ~£100m (11,327,163 shares) Newton Newton ~81% £5.9bn New shares (class unstated) Confirmed (CFG spokesperson to City AM)

Totals. Outside primary equity: about US$900m (2015 and 2019). Owner-side equity since June 2024: about £650m, of which £520m is attributed to or confirmed as Newton’s and £130m is implied but not individually confirmed. Earlier ADUG funding of CFG between 2013 and 2015, and any shareholder loans to CFG, cannot be quantified without the accounts.

Intra-group financing. In July 2024 City Football Group USA LLC lent MCFC US$140m (≈£102m at June 2025 rates) through a quoted Eurobond, repayable 2030, to fund the North Stand / Entertainment Destination. MCFC remains a net lender to the group: at 30 June 2025 it was owed £366.9m by group undertakings and owed £253.9m to them (MCFC accounts, as analysed by Greg Cordell and Matchday Finance).

3. Shareholder register and governance

Table 2: Shareholding over time

Date ADUG / Newton CMC / CITIC consortium Silver Lake Source / status
2013 – Nov 2015 100% — — CFG statement (2015): Mansour sole shareholder before CMC deal
Dec 2015 ~87% ~13% — CFG statement, verified
Nov 2019 c.77% ~12% (diluted) just over 10% CFG announcement, verified
2021 – Sep 2022 ~77% 8.2% 14.5% FT-reported
Nov 2022 ~81% ~1% >18% (18.16% per Guardian) CFG statement, verified
2024 – 2025 >80% (register extract: 80.7%) ~1% or less (CITIC Capital noted) nearly 17% CFG website (primary)
Oct 2026 ~81% residual most of the remainder City AM, reported

Ultimate beneficial ownership. Newton Investment and Development LLC (Abu Dhabi) has been CFG’s majority shareholder and ultimate parent since July 2021. CFG states it is fully owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Vice President of the UAE. Mansour is the registered person with significant control (75%+ of shares and votes, notified 6 April 2016). ADUG was the original 2008 MCFC buyer.

Board representation. CMC held a seat (Li Ruigang) from 2015 to November 2022. Silver Lake has held a seat (Egon Durban) since 2019, when the board grew to nine. Khaldoon Al Mubarak chairs CFG and MCFC; Ferran Soriano is CEO. My September 2026 board relationship mapping counts seven directors.

How independent is the minority? In September 2020 Mubadala, an Abu Dhabi sovereign fund, took a stake of about 5% in Silver Lake, acquired from Dyal (part of Neuberger Berman), and committed US$2bn to a new 25-year Silver Lake strategy (Bloomberg, 30 September 2020). The Mubadala executive who announced the deal was Khaldoon Al Mubarak, who also chairs CFG. CFG’s principal “independent” minority investor is therefore itself partly owned by Abu Dhabi state capital. Regulators should not treat Silver Lake as a fully arm’s-length counterweight. No Silver Lake exit or top-up since 2022 has been reported; its percentage has only been diluted.

4. Historic P&L performance

Table 3: CFG consolidated P&L (£m, FY to 30 June)

FY Revenue Staff costs Wages / revenue Pre-tax result Post-tax result MCFC revenue MCFC pre-tax Source / status
2014–2018 Not verified Not verified — Not verified Not verified — — Gap: accounts not accessed
2019 ~631 n/v — Operating loss 83.7; £82m unrealised NYCFC revaluation gain; total comprehensive loss 21.3 n/v — — Forbes (secondary)
2020 544.4 n/v — Operating loss 165.9 (205.2) — (125) Weak sourcing; Covid-affected
2021 n/v n/v — n/v n/v 569.8 2.4 MCFC annual report (via Gulf News)
2022 705.1 n/v — n/v n/v — — Sportcal / SportsPro comparative
2023 877.1 n/v — (126.9) per Sportcal; £112m in other reports n/v 712.6 80.4 Conflict: £126.9m vs £112m (possibly operating vs pre-tax)
2024 933.1 664.3 71.2% (calc.) (122.2) [(122.3) in FY25 comparative] (91.9) 715.0 73.8 The Athletic, Sportcal, SportBusiness
2025 888.0 (977.1 incl. Girona) n/v — (292.3) (291.1) 694.1 (9.9) SportBusiness, 2Playbook; MCFC annual report

MCFC FY25 revenue split: broadcasting £278.6m, commercial £340.4m, matchday £75.1m. Player-sale proceeds were £144.6m and gross transfer spend a record £352.9m. Other clubs’ FY25 revenue: NYCFC £57.6m, Bahia £38.4m, Palermo £20.1m, Troyes £7.9m, Melbourne City £7.8m, Mumbai City £3.6m.

What the numbers mean.

  • The deficit sits outside MCFC. In FY24 MCFC made a pre-tax profit of £73.8m while CFG lost £122.2m, implying about £196m of losses elsewhere in the group. In FY25 the implied loss outside MCFC was about £282m. These are my calculations, before intra-group eliminations, and should be treated as indicative.
  • FY25 was a double hit. MCFC slipped into loss as UEFA income fell to £71m, while the network deficit grew.
  • Cumulative losses. The Athletic puts CFG’s cumulative pre-tax losses at £972.8m from 2013 to FY24. Adding FY25 gives about £1.27bn, consistent with SportBusiness’s reporting that the £1bn mark has been passed. 2Playbook’s ~£1.79bn uses a different, unexplained basis, and a widely circulated “£7.3bn” figure is not credible.
  • Conflict to note. One report attributes a £103.4m FY24 pre-tax profit to MCFC, but the club’s own accounts show £73.8m. The club accounts are used here.
  • Accounting points. Girona was deconsolidated in FY25 after CFG’s shareholding was placed in a blind trust for UEFA compliance, which makes year-on-year revenue comparisons misleading. CFG recognised an £82m unrealised revaluation gain on NYCFC in FY19. Impairments of non-City clubs could not be verified without the accounts.

5. Latest balance sheet (CFG consolidated, 30 June 2025)

Table 4: Latest balance sheet

Line item Figure Status
Net assets £1.05bn (FY24: £978.6m) Reported (SportBusiness). An aggregator gives £964.9m, possibly excluding minority interests (unverified)
Cash £390.9m Unverified (aggregator only)
Bank borrowings US$650m term loan (due July 2028) and £100m RCF arranged in 2021; 30 June 2025 balances not verified Gap
NYCFC stadium debt Non-recourse construction loan; US$780m project cost Reported; balance not verified
Intangible assets (player registrations, goodwill) Not verified Gap
Tangible fixed assets Not verified Gap
Transfer debtors / creditors Not verified at group level. At MCFC, transfer payables rose £193.1m year on year and receivables fell £24.7m MCFC level only
Share capital / premium Nominal share capital ~£620.5m (June 2024) rising to ~£659.0m (Oct 2025 allotment), per SH01 statements of capital; share premium not verified Reported from filing-history totals
MCFC standalone (30 Jun 2025) Net assets £858.0m; cash £174m; gross financial debt incl. leases £171.7m Secondary analysis of MCFC accounts

Post-balance-sheet events (after 30 June 2025): £60m share issue (31 October 2025); Mumbai City divestment (December 2025); Nissan ended its CFG global sponsorship and then bought back CFG’s Yokohama stake (2026); verdict on 114 of 115 charges (29 September 2026); £100m share issue (14 October 2026). FY2026 (to 30 June 2026) consolidated accounts have not yet been filed. The FY2025 accounts were filed on 6 March 2026, so FY2026 accounts are likely in early 2027.

6. Capital allocation since inception

Table 5: Capital allocation

Asset Date Stake / action Cost Status
New York City FC May 2013 (founded) 80% after 2024 restructuring (Claure 10%, Yankees 10%) Expansion fee not verified Ownership verified
Melbourne City 2014 (80%), 2015 (100%) 100% Not disclosed Verified
Yokohama F. Marinos May 2014 Minority (<20%); sold back to Nissan in 2026; now a partner club Not disclosed Verified (City AM)
Montevideo City Torque Apr 2017 100% Not disclosed Verified
Girona Aug 2017 44.3% (2017), 47% (2020; Claure 35%, GFG 16%); in UEFA blind trust and deconsolidated in FY25 Reported ~€7m (2017) Ownership verified; price reported
Sichuan Jiuniu / Shenzhen Peng City 2019 Co-owned (~47%) Not disclosed Reported
Mumbai City Nov 2019 65%; fully divested Dec 2025 to founding owners Ranbir Kapoor and Bimal Parekh after a commercial review Not disclosed Verified (club/CFG statement)
Lommel SK 2020 ~99% Not disclosed Reported
ESTAC Troyes 2020 100% Not disclosed Reported
Palermo Jul 2022 80%, later ~94.9% Part of a combined ~£77m for FY23 club additions (mostly deferred) Reported 
EC Bahia 2023 90% As above Reported
Shanghai Port — No evidence of any CFG holding; not in CFG’s FY25 investment list — Unverified; treat as false
Etihad Park, Queens Groundbreaking Dec 2024; opening planned 2027 25,000-seat stadium on a 49-year ground lease; 20-year Etihad naming rights US$780m (>US$900m all-in) Reported (NYCFC, IFR)
Etihad Campus North Stand / Entertainment Destination 2024–26 Stand opens in phases from 2025/26 ~£300m; MCFC FY25 infrastructure net spend £125.3m MCFC annual report
Player investment (MCFC) FY25 Gross spend £352.9m; net player spend £208.3m — MCFC accounts (secondary analysis)

Other businesses (City Football Marketing/Services, academies, Co-op Live arena interest, Goals Soccer Centres) appear in secondary listings; their costs and returns could not be verified.

Assessment. Capital has flowed to three places: (a) MCFC squad and stadium spending, which MCFC largely funds itself; (b) a long tail of low-revenue clubs (six of them generated £135m combined in FY25) that produce the group deficit; and (c) Etihad Park, the largest single non-Manchester commitment. The 2025–26 exits from Mumbai and Yokohama indicate the dispersed-portfolio model is being scaled back.

  • 115 charges. On 29 September 2026 the Premier League confirmed that an independent commission had found MCFC guilty of 114 of the 115 charges: all 80 financial counts and 34 of 35 non-cooperation counts, spanning 2009–10 to 2017–18. Reports state the commission found that ADUG-supplied money was disguised as sponsorship; the full written decision has not been reviewed for this article. No sanction has been set. City has appealed, stating the decision “contains clear material errors of law, principle and fact and is unsafe”, and the appeal goes to a further independent commission. Available sanctions include fines, points deductions and expulsion. Points-deduction figures of 60–100 quoted in the media are speculation.
  • The verdict concerns the same channel this review tracks. The finding relates to owner funding routed through Abu Dhabi-linked sponsors. Ferran Soriano has rejected it as a single false accusation that the owners’ personal money was secretly put into the club via sponsors. Owner funding is now openly arriving as CFG equity.
  • APT rules. A tribunal’s first partial award (September 2024) found parts of the APT rules unlawful, including the exclusion of shareholder loans. A second award (13 February 2025) declared the pre-November 2024 rules void. City began a fresh arbitration against the November 2024 rules, then settled on 8 September 2025, accepting in a joint statement that the current APT rules are valid and binding. Abu Dhabi-linked commercial deals, including Etihad’s MCFC and Etihad Park contracts, are therefore subject to fair-market-value review.
  • Multi-club ownership. For UEFA purposes Girona was placed in a blind trust when it and MCFC both qualified for the 2024–25 Champions League. That arrangement drove the FY25 deconsolidation.
  • Independent Football Regulator. The IFR has powers to require owners found to have committed wrongdoing to divest by a deadline. How the owners’ test would apply after a final sanction is untested.

8. Key risks and conclusions

  1. Dependence on Abu Dhabi capital is high and rising. From 2015 to 2021 CFG raised outside money (CMC, Silver Lake, Western banks). Since 2024 it has relied on about £650m of owner equity, and its chosen minority investor is itself partly owned by Mubadala. CFG’s going-concern position rests on Newton’s continued willingness to fund it.
  2. The valuation is not market-tested. Every issue since 2024 has been priced at about £8.83 per share, roughly £5.9bn, between related parties. The last arm’s-length primary price was US$4.8bn in 2019. A final adverse sanction, particularly relegation or a forced sale under IFR powers, would directly undermine that figure. £5.9bn should be treated as an accounting reference point, not a fair-value opinion.
  3. Leverage is moderate but opaque. The 2021 US$650m term loan matures in July 2028 and will need refinancing in the 2027–28 window while sanction risk is live. Etihad Park debt is non-recourse at NYCFC level. Group net debt at 30 June 2025 could not be verified.
  4. The network loses money structurally. Outside MCFC, the group lost an implied ~£196m (FY24) and ~£282m (FY25). Recent disposals reduce the drag, but there is no evidence yet of a path to group-level break-even.
  5. Multi-club ownership and regulation. UEFA rules on co-owned clubs, the APT rules City accepted in 2025, and IFR divestment powers together constrain how CFG can move money between its clubs and sponsors.
  6. Data gaps (material). CFG accounts for FY2014–FY2023 and the FY2025 balance-sheet line items were not accessed directly. Consideration for most acquisitions is undisclosed. The subscriber to the £70m and £60m issues is unconfirmed. The share class of the October 2026 issue is not stated.

Recommendations for boards, regulators and investors

  • Obtain CFG’s consolidated accounts for FY2014–FY2025 and the SH01 returns for August 2024 to October 2026 directly from Companies House (company 08355862), to confirm share classes, holders, borrowings and impairments before relying on the group balance-sheet figures above.
  • Treat owner equity as the group’s real funding source, and stress-test CFG against two scenarios: Newton ceases funding, and the 2028 loan must be refinanced under sanction risk.
  • When assessing CFG’s independence, look through Silver Lake to its Mubadala link.
  • Monitor: the sanction decision and appeal outcome; CFG’s FY2026 accounts (expected around March 2027); Etihad Park’s opening and bond refinancing; and any further CFG allotments.

Methodology and caveats

  • Figures marked “reported” come from reputable press reporting of Companies House filings, not from direct reading of the filings. Figures marked “calc.” are my derivations.
  • Several sources conflict and are flagged above: the CMC consideration (US$400m vs US$485m), the FY23 loss (£126.9m vs £112m), MCFC’s FY24 profit (£73.8m vs £103.4m) and cumulative losses (£1.27bn vs £1.79bn).
  • Currency conversions follow each source’s own rates, so dollar figures are not directly comparable with each other.
  • Some 2026 developments (the verdict and appeal, the IFR’s powers in practice) are still moving. This article reflects information available on 27 October 2026.

Sources

Paul Quinn

Independent analyst of the finance, ownership, governance and regulation of professional football. Publishes The Esk through CWTE. About · Methodology · Corrections

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