The Analysis Series: The Burnley Football & Athletic Company Limited annual report & financial statements 2025/26

For the year ended 31 July 2026. The Burnley Football & Athletic Company Limited (Companies House 00054222). Accounts signed 2 November 2026; auditor BDO LLP (senior statutory auditor Paul Williams). Prepared on the basis of the audited statutory accounts, together with publicly available filings for Burnley FC Holdings Limited, Velocity Capital (UK) Holdings Ltd and Longside Properties Limited, the Premier League Commission decision in PLJP 2023/3, and press reporting current to 4 November 2026.

Burnley’s 2025/26 accounts report a £9.6m loss, but £38.8m of that year’s income is a compensation award from Everton that is still under appeal. Strip it out and the club lost about £48.4m. Its solvency now rests on three things: that the award survives Everton’s January 2027 appeal, that £45.9m of bank facilities maturing in January and August 2027 are refinanced, and that the owners keep supporting the club, as they have confirmed in writing.

Summary

• The headline loss hides a much deeper one. The reported pre-tax loss is £9.55m. Without the £38.84m Commission award (£26.0m booked as other operating income, £12.84m as interest income) the loss is about £48.4m. Strip out the £36.2m profit on player disposals as well and it is about £84.6m. No provision has been made, yet if Everton win, the club’s £19.3m of net assets become net liabilities of about £19.5m, and the repayment would exceed the £23.3m cash held at the year end by about £15.5m.
• Debt has fallen, but the risk has not gone away. Borrowings fell from £142.4m to £86.2m. That was paid for by the owners returning the club’s own money, not by new equity: amounts owed to the club by group undertakings fell from £103.1m to £24.1m, and the group-level Velocity receivable fell from £81.0m to £3.3m. Net current liabilities still widened to £87.1m. £45.9m of facilities mature in January and August 2027 and had not been refinanced at signing. The auditor’s material uncertainty paragraph names three dependencies: player trading, refinancing and the Everton appeal.
• Control is opaque, and the owners take fees in all conditions. The £77.7m that Velocity paid back down the chain is widely understood to come from the roughly $200m (about £150m at prevailing rates) that Cynosure | Checketts Sports Capital Fund I committed to the ownership group in November 2025, a fund managed by Burnley director Dave Checketts. The accounts do not say this; it is the working assumption of the journalists who follow the club’s finances most closely. Management fees paid to ALK Capital LLC since the takeover now total £12.0m, including £2.5m in 2025/26. The immediate parent, Velocity Capital (UK) Holdings, has never filed accounts, has had two compulsory strike-off notices, and has granted security to a Delaware credit fund. The Independent Football Regulator, the EFL and Everton all have legitimate reasons to require binding, collateralised owner support before the appeal hearing.

1. Context: the season, the structure and the timetable

Burnley spent 2025/26 in the Premier League after automatic promotion as 2024/25 Championship runners-up. Relegation was confirmed on 22 April 2026 with a home defeat to Manchester City, and the club finished 19th. Scott Parker left by mutual consent on 30 April 2026 and Mike Jackson took over as interim. Nicky Hayen was appointed for the Championship campaign and sacked on 24 October 2026 after a 4-1 defeat at Lincoln City, 106 days and 14 competitive matches into his tenure, having won one of 12 league games and leaving the club 22nd. Fabio Celestini, formerly of Basel and CSKA Moscow, was appointed four days later. The post-balance-sheet note’s reference to Hayen’s departure is therefore correct.

The operating club, The Burnley Football & Athletic Company Limited, is the entity analysed here. It sits within this chain:

Entity	Company no.	Role	Status
Cynosure | Checketts Sports Capital Fund I	US fund	Investor above ALK (c.$200m, Nov 2025); managed by club director Dave Checketts	Press-reported
ALK Capital LLC	US (reported Delaware)	Ultimate parent; does not prepare consolidated accounts	Club disclosure
Velocity Sports Partners LLC / Velocity Sports Limited	US / not established	Intermediate holding entities	Club disclosure
Velocity Capital (UK) Holdings Ltd	14755517	Immediate UK parent; 82.7% of Burnley FC Holdings; no accounts ever filed	Verified
Burnley FC Holdings Limited	08335231	Group holding company; files consolidated accounts	Verified
The Burnley Football & Athletic Company Limited	00054222	The operating club; leaseholder of Turf Moor	Verified
Longside Properties Limited	05202619	Freeholder of Turf Moor, the Leisure Centre and Home Farm (Barnfield)	Verified
Burnley FC Women Limited	13192796	Women’s football entity; guarantor/chargor of group bank debt	Verified (security)

Alan Pace is named as ultimate controlling party. The club’s directors are A G Pace, S Hunt, M L Smith and D W Checketts. A D Parra resigned in November 2025, shortly after the Espanyol acquisition; V Torgovnik sits on the Holdings board rather than the club’s.

Unusually, Burnley FC Holdings filed its 2025/26 group accounts on 4 November 2026, nearly six months before the 30 April 2027 deadline. The early filing landed in the week Velocity’s second compulsory strike-off notice was discontinued, and two months before the Everton appeal hearing. The Athletic’s Chris Weatherspoon noted that the figures were released well ahead of the usual timetable following concern about non-disclosure. That supports our reading that publication was brought forward in response to the Velocity strike-off episodes and supporter pressure, and to put the debt reduction on the public record before the IFR licence window (November 2026 to February 2027) and the appeal.

2. Profit and loss account

Revenue

£’000	2025/26 (PL, 19th)	2024/25 (Champ., 2nd)	Change
Match income	10,258	9,095	+12.8%
Television	118,884	55,219	+115.3%
Catering	330	351	−6.0%
Commercial	12,579	4,358	+188.6%
Retail	2,450	2,723	−10.0%
Turnover	144,501	71,746	+101.4%

Turnover reached a record £144.5m, but 82.3% of it came from broadcasting. That is the pattern of a club whose revenue base is the Premier League central distribution, not its own commercial engine. Commercial income of £12.6m is very low for a Premier League club and only modestly above the £10.7m achieved in the 2023/24 Premier League season. It confirms that the US-facing minority investors (JJ and Kealia Watt, Dude Perfect) have not yet produced a step change in commercial revenue. Retail fell even as the club played in the top flight. Average attendance rose to 21,005 (2024/25: 19,876), close to Turf Moor’s practical capacity, so matchday has little room to grow.

Costs

£’000	2025/26	2024/25	Change
Staff costs	(123,118)	(82,263)	+49.7%
of which wages and salaries	(107,245)	(72,381)
of which social security	(15,574)	(9,714)
of which pension	(299)	(168)
Other operating expenses	(40,526)	(31,721)	+27.8%
Depreciation	(2,282)	(1,841)	+24.0%
Other operating income	33,803	5,576	n/m
Operating profit/(loss) before player trading	6,904	(43,099)

Wages to turnover improved to 85.2% from 114.65%. That is still well above the 70% level we regard as sustainable for a club without a benefactor, and it was achieved in a Premier League revenue year that will not repeat in 2026/27. Staff costs rose by £40.9m, or half as much again: a promotion squad strengthened and paid Premier League wages, plus promotion bonuses paid and accrued. The board budgeted to compete rather than to survive a likely relegation, the same strategic choice criticised in our 2024/25 analysis.

The headline operating profit before player trading of £6.9m exists only because of the Everton award. Other operating income of £33.8m consists of £28.3m of non-player-trading income, including the £26.0m of compensation, plus £5.5m of player loan fees. Excluding the compensation, the club made an underlying operating loss before player trading of about £19.1m in a Premier League season. Treating the loan fees as player trading, the loss is about £24.6m.

3. Player trading

£’000	2025/26	2024/25
Player loan fees (in other operating income)	5,474	4,596
Amortisation (total; player registrations £52,518k)	(52,714)	(36,679)
Profit on disposal of registrations	36,215	58,954
Net player trading contribution	(11,025)	26,871

Player registrations at cost rose to £199.5m after £67.5m of additions and £45.4m of disposals at cost. Amortisation rose 43.7% to £52.7m, the accounting echo of the 2025 promotion spending. Disposal profits of £36.2m were £22.7m lower than 2024/25’s £59.0m. This is the third consecutive year in which disposal profits have been needed to keep the result away from catastrophe, and the trading model has stopped being self-financing: disposal profit no longer covers amortisation.

Squad cost is now heavy. Staff costs plus amortisation came to £175.8m, or 121.7% of turnover. On a squad-cost-ratio basis that adds profit on disposal to the denominator (£180.7m), total staff cost plus amortisation was 97.3%. Player and coaching wages within total staff costs are not disclosed, so the true SCR is lower, but the direction is clear: even in the Premier League, the club was spending close to every pound it earned on the squad.

The intangible asset base of £118.1m (2025: £129.8m) is the main collateral value behind the club. It is also the asset class relegation damages most, because Championship-registered players realise lower fees.

4. Below the operating line and the cost of debt

£’000	2025/26	2024/25
Bank interest receivable	84	358
Other interest income (Everton award interest)	12,842	–
Discount unwinding on player debtors	4,888	6,587
Interest receivable	17,814	6,945
Bank loan interest	(12,859)	(12,132)
Other loan interest (factoring etc.)	(2,028)	(3,132)
Discount unwinding on player creditors	(8,357)	(5,170)
Interest payable	(23,244)	(20,434)
Net finance cost	(5,430)	(13,489)

Net finance costs fell from £13.5m to £5.4m, but only because of the £12.8m interest element of the award. Without it, net finance cost would have been £18.3m, the highest since the takeover. Strip out the discount-unwinding items (net £3.5m charge) and cash-type borrowing costs were £14.9m: bank interest of £12.9m plus other loan interest of £2.0m.

Effective cost of debt. Bank interest of £12.86m against an average bank loan balance of £87.7m (opening £105.3m, closing £70.1m) gives an effective rate of about 14.7%, above the 12% top of the disclosed 7.25%–12% fixed-rate range. There are two explanations, and either matters to a board:

1. The bank balance fell late in the year, so the average outstanding balance was nearer the opening £105m. On that basis the yield is about 12.2%, at the top of the range.
2. Arrangement, extension or exit fees are being amortised through the interest line under the effective-interest method.

Either way, Burnley’s senior secured debt costs double-digit yields. That is private-credit pricing, not bank pricing, and is consistent with the Fasanara Capital facility registered against Turf Moor in January 2025. Factoring at a disclosed 12.75% is dearer still. The award interest rate of 11.81% sits almost exactly at the club’s own marginal cost of borrowing; in effect, the Commission compensated Burnley at its cost of capital.

Tax was nil (2024/25: £0.66m credit), and the loss after tax was £9.55m (2024/25: £29.06m).

5. The normalised result

£’000	2025/26
Reported loss before tax	(9,551)
Remove compensation, other operating income	(26,000)
Remove compensation, interest income	(12,842)
Loss before tax excluding award	(48,393)
Remove profit on disposal of registrations	(36,215)
Loss before tax excluding award and disposals	(84,608)

In its one Premier League season, with record turnover, the club’s recurring business lost about £48m before the windfall. The comparable 2024/25 figure was a £29.7m loss before tax, in the Championship and flattered by £59.0m of disposals. The Premier League money did not close the gap; spending absorbed it. The award did not top up a sound business. It covered most of an operating deficit that the owners would otherwise have had to fund or borrow against.

6. Balance sheet

£’000	31 July 2026	31 July 2025
Intangible assets	118,061	129,803
Tangible assets	16,212	14,479
Debtors due after one year	43,537	55,054
Stock	1,286	919
Debtors due within one year	88,686	159,571
Cash	23,346	12,909
Creditors due within one year	(200,399)	(234,968)
Net current liabilities	(87,081)	(61,569)
Creditors due after one year	(71,383)	(108,870)
Net assets	19,346	28,897
Share capital	77	77
Share premium	11,219	11,219
Profit and loss reserve	8,050	17,601

First, net current liabilities widened by £25.5m even though borrowings fell by £56m. The debtor side shrank faster than the creditor side. Amounts owed by group undertakings fell by £79.0m as the owners settled intra-group balances, and that cash was used to repay debt. Working-capital “assets” that were in substance illiquid owner receivables were converted into debt repayment. That cleans the balance sheet, but leaves current liabilities of £200.4m against cash of £23.3m.

Second, the Commission’s “£62m net current liabilities” figure is this entity’s. When it refused Everton’s stay application, the Commission recorded Burnley’s July 2025 accounts as showing £62m of net current liabilities and £142m of financial debt. Our 2024/25 analysis reported group net current liabilities of £83.7m. The two reconcile: £61.6m is the operating club’s figure (00054222) and £83.7m the consolidated group’s (08335231). On the same basis the club entity now shows £87.1m, 41% worse than the position the Commission judged acceptable when it concluded Burnley would probably be capable of repaying.

Third, net assets of £19.3m are smaller than the award. Equity fell by the £9.55m loss and nothing else; there was no share issue into the club. The award added £38.8m to reserves. Without it, the profit and loss reserve would be negative by about £30.8m and net assets negative by about £19.5m. The club’s balance-sheet solvency literally depends on the result of the appeal.

Debtors

£’000	2026	2025
Trade debtors < 1 year	57,016	45,676
of which from football clubs	50,719	38,007
Amounts owed by group undertakings	24,092	103,051
Other debtors	975	442
Prepayments < 1 year	6,603	10,402
Trade debtors > 1 year (all clubs)	40,744	47,763
Prepayments > 1 year	2,793	7,291

The £24.1m still owed by group undertakings is interest-free and repayable on demand. It includes amounts due from Longside Properties that are to be offset against future lease commitments. In substance, the club has prepaid Turf Moor rent to a sister company whose freehold is charged to a private lender. The Velocity balance in this entity, £16.0m at July 2025 and described as arising mostly from the acquisition of Burnley FC Holdings, is now nil, as is the £1.25m prepayment to ALK Capital LLC.

Creditors

£’000	< 1 year	> 1 year	Total 2026
Bank loans	67,543	2,563	70,106
Factored debts	10,326	5,784	16,110
Trade creditors	65,904	56,091	121,995
of which to clubs	61,301	56,091	117,392
Tax and social security	11,409	–	11,409
Other creditors	1,144	–	1,144
Accruals and deferred income	44,073	6,945	51,018
of which to clubs	3,869	3,853	7,722

Total factoring is £16.1m (2025: £37.0m) and total borrowings £86.2m (2025: £142.4m), matching the group’s published borrowing figure. Tax and social security creditors rose 29.7% to £11.4m, consistent with a larger payroll, but worth watching in a Championship year: HMRC is a preferential creditor and the EFL treats arrears seriously.

7. Debt, factoring and the refinancing cliff

Net debt, £’000	2026	2025
Bank loans	70,106	105,343
Factored debts	16,110	37,029
Gross borrowings	86,216	142,372
Cash	(23,346)	(12,909)
Net debt	62,870	129,463
Net transfer payables	33,651
Extended net debt	c.96,521

Net transfer position, £’000	2026
Transfer creditors (trade, < 1 yr)	61,301
Transfer creditors (trade, > 1 yr)	56,091
Accruals to clubs	7,722
Total owed to clubs	125,114
Transfer debtors (< 1 yr)	(50,719)
Transfer debtors (> 1 yr)	(40,744)
Total owed by clubs	(91,463)
Net transfer payables	33,651

Burnley owes other clubs £33.7m more than other clubs owe it, and that understates the liquidity pressure. Factoring with recourse leaves the underlying receivables on the balance sheet, so about £16.1m of the £91.5m receivable book has already been turned into cash. Unencumbered transfer receivables are closer to £75m. Of the payables, £65.2m (trade plus accruals) falls due within 12 months.

Security and pricing

Bank loans carry fixed rates of 7.25%–12%. They are secured over the assets of the club, Burnley FC Holdings, Longside Properties and Burnley FC Women Ltd, including freehold Turf Moor, the Leisure Centre and Home Farm (Barnfield), through charges registered on 15 January 2025 in favour of Fasanara Capital Ltd. Factoring at 12.75% is secured on transfer receivables. Above the group, Velocity has granted an outstanding security-agent charge (14 October 2025) to CCM Entertainment II Holdings, LLC, a Delaware fund vehicle administered by Corrum Capital Management. If that charge covers the Burnley FC Holdings shares, control of the club is itself pledged.

The refinancing cliff

Maturity	Amount (£’000)	Status at signing
January 2027	24,265	Not refinanced
August 2027	21,609	Not refinanced
Total	45,874
Other current bank debt	c.21,669	Classified < 1 yr

Every pound of senior bank debt bar £2.6m is classified as current. The January 2027 facility falls due in the same month as the Everton appeal hearing and the transfer window, the worst possible clustering: a lender asked to roll £24.3m will want to know whether £38.8m is about to leave the club. Our assessment is that refinancing on acceptable terms before the appeal outcome is unlikely. The realistic routes are a short extension at a higher price, repayment from January sales, or a further owner injection.

8. Liquidity runway

As a subsidiary, the club uses the FRS 102 exemption from publishing a cash flow statement, so the runway below is reconstructed from the balance sheet. It is indicative only.

Next 12 months, £m (indicative)	Outflow	Inflow
Bank loans due < 1 yr	67.5
Factored debt due < 1 yr	10.3
Transfer creditors and accruals to clubs < 1 yr	65.2
Tax and social security	11.4
Opening cash		23.3
Transfer debtors < 1 yr (part factored)		50.7
Post-balance-sheet sales less purchases		22.2
Year 1 parachute payment (press-reported c.£55m)		c.55
Subtotal before operating cash flow	154.4	c.151.2

Before a single Championship wage is paid, committed outflows roughly equal identifiable inflows. Operating cash flow in the Championship will be negative unless wages fall sharply: 2024/25 staff costs were £82.3m against £71.7m of turnover. The structural funding gap is at least the 2026/27 operating deficit plus any refinancing shortfall, and it grows by £38.8m if the award has to be repaid. There are only three sources of cover: further player sales, rolled facilities, and the owners. That is exactly what the directors’ going-concern note says.

9. Going concern: reading the material uncertainty

Note 1.2 and BDO’s report contain a Material Uncertainty Related to Going Concern, the second consecutive year with one. The opinion itself is unmodified. The directors’ forecasts depend on the club’s finishing position; player trading; refinancing the facilities maturing in January 2027 (£24.3m) and August 2027 (£21.6m); receipts from the parent company; and the outcome of the compensation appeal. If facilities are not renewed, the company would have to raise additional finance to repay them. The parent and the wider investor group have confirmed their continued support in writing.

Our reading. This is a stronger uncertainty than in 2024/25. Last year it rested on player trading and receipts from the parent. This year the parent receivable has largely been collected, which removes one dependency, but in its place are an uncompleted refinancing and a live appeal over an amount larger than the club’s net assets and cash. The written support is a comfort letter, not a guarantee. It comes from a parent that has never filed accounts, so neither the auditor nor any outside reader can test its capacity. Above Velocity, the “wider investor group” includes Cynosure | Checketts Sports Capital Fund I, which Bloomberg reported in November 2025 was investing approximately $200m in the venture, the first deployment from a fund targeting $1.2bn. That is real capital, but it is spread across Burnley and Espanyol, and the support it provides is not legally binding on the club (see section 13A).

10. Contingent liabilities, prior-year restatement and post-balance-sheet events

Contingent liabilities on player purchases were £53.4m (2025: £61.3m). Relegation reduces the chance that promotion-linked add-ons crystallise in 2026/27, but they become live again on a return to the Premier League. Contingent assets of £36.35m are correctly not recognised.

Prior-year adjustment. The 2025 disclosure was restated to include £15.5m of contingent agent payments that had been omitted, 25% of the restated contingent-liability total. It points to a weakness in disclosure controls over intermediary commitments that should be fixed ahead of the IFR financial-soundness regime.

Post-balance-sheet events. Players acquired for £11.9m and sold for £34.1m: a net inflow of £22.2m that front-loads the 2026/27 liquidity plan. The departure of head coach Nicky Hayen, 106 days into a contract whose termination cost has not been disclosed, is a further unbudgeted cost.

Audit. BDO’s fees include £98k for other tax services. Separately, BDO partners acted as joint liquidators of Calder Vale Holdings Limited, the original 2020 takeover vehicle, in its 2024 members’ voluntary liquidation. That is permissible, but the board should explain how independence was assessed, given that the audit opinion relies on support from the same ownership chain.

11. The Everton compensation award: accounting, appeal and repayment risk

The award

• Forum: Premier League Independent Disciplinary Commission, case PLJP 2023/3, chaired by David Phillips KC FCIArb, sitting with HH Alan Greenwood and Nick Igoe ACA.
• Decision: dated 2 June 2026 (draft 7 April 2026), published 10 June 2026.
• Quantum: £26.0m damages plus £9.1m pre-award interest at 11.81%, against Burnley’s claim of £51.7m, with post-award interest on top.
• Causation: the Commission accepted a probabilistic model showing a 51.47% probability that Everton rather than Burnley would have been relegated in 2021/22 but for Everton’s PSR overspend, which exceeded the £105m allowable losses by £19.5m.
• Stay: Everton applied for a stay, escrow or bank guarantee, citing a real risk that Burnley could not repay. The Commission refused, while accepting there was some force in the concern, relying on its view that Burnley would probably be capable of repaying and on the Football Creditors Rule mechanism over Premier League central funds.

Payment

Everton’s owners, The Friedkin Group, funded the payment through a share allotment. Everton’s SH01, filed on 30 July 2026, shows 221,954 new ordinary shares allotted at £175 each (£38.84m). That matches Burnley’s recognised £38,842k almost to the pound, confirming the full award, including post-award interest, was paid in cash before the year end.

Burnley’s accounting

The £38.84m is split between £26.0m of other operating income and £12.84m of interest income. No provision has been made for possible repayment; note 26 discloses the appeal as a contingent liability, with outcomes ranging from nil to the full award being repayable.

Assessment. The treatment is defensible under FRS 102, but sits at the aggressive end of the acceptable range. The award is an enforceable first-instance determination, the cash has been received, and an appeal does not automatically make repayment probable. But the decision ran to 290 pages and is contested on matters of law, including Everton’s argument that no PSR breach exists until the financial year end, and the use of a 51.47% probability to satisfy a balance-of-probabilities test. Everton has re-engaged Laurence Rabinowitz KC and James Segan KC, the team that reduced its ten-point deduction to six on appeal in February 2024, with Slaughter and May instructed. A more conservative board could have deferred some or all of the interest element until the appeal was decided. Recognising everything maximises reported reserves at precisely the moment those reserves are being tested.

Appeal status (as at 4 November 2026)

The appeal was lodged on 10 June 2026, with Everton calling the ruling fundamentally flawed in law and fact and an unworkable precedent. The hearing is reported for January 2027. The award has been paid, with no escrow and no stay.

Repayment exposure

Scenario	P&L impact	Net assets after	Cash after (from £23.3m)
Appeal dismissed	Nil	£19.3m	£23.3m
Interest element only reversed	c.£(12.8)m	c.£6.5m	c.£10.5m
Damages halved, interest pro rata	c.£(19.4)m	c.£(0.1)m	c.£3.9m
Appeal fully succeeds	c.£(38.8)m	c.£(19.5)m	c.£(15.5)m shortfall
Full success plus repayment interest/costs	c.£(42)m+	c.£(23)m	c.£(19)m shortfall

If Everton wins outright, Burnley cannot repay from its own balance sheet. It would need owner cash, new debt or a fire sale in a single window. The Commission’s fallback, central funds, now means parachute payments, the main pillar of the club’s Championship budget; diverting them to Everton would leave a gap of the same size in the operating plan. Everton is therefore rational to watch the Velocity strike-off episodes closely. Repayment risk ultimately rests on owner support that cannot be seen.

12. Leeds, Manchester City and the wider litigation pipeline

Leeds United settled with Everton out of court over the same 2021/22 breach, a settlement revealed in September 2025. The sum was not disclosed; the one-place merit-payment difference between the clubs that season was £1.9m, the natural ceiling of such a claim. Leicester City, Southampton and Nottingham Forest reserved their rights in 2023 but did not pursue claims. Burnley’s is therefore the only adjudicated claim against Everton, and the appeal will decide whether it is precedent or anomaly.

Manchester City. The Premier League confirmed on 29 September 2026 that an independent commission had found City guilty of 114 of 115 charges covering 2009/10 to 2017/18. Sanctions will be decided separately, and City lodged an appeal on 1 October 2026. Arsenal, Liverpool, Manchester United and Tottenham have reserved compensation rights.

Why it matters for Burnley. The Everton appeal is the first appellate test of Rule W.51.5 compensation for a financial-rule breach. If the appeal board narrows causation, or accepts that a PSR breach crystallises only at the year end, the claims against City lose force, and so does the theory of Burnley’s award. Clubs facing City-scale exposures therefore have an interest in the Burnley award being limited on appeal. That raises the systemic stakes and, in our view, the appeal risk to Burnley.

13. Owners, funding and related parties

The 2020 leveraged takeover

ALK Capital’s Velocity Sports Partners bought 84% of the club through Calder Vale Holdings Limited on 30–31 December 2020, at a reported valuation of about £170m. The structure was a classic leveraged buyout. An MSD UK Holdings loan of about £60–65m, reportedly carrying a relegation acceleration clause, was pushed down into the group and secured on Turf Moor. The club’s own cash reserves were upstreamed to fund the consideration, creating intra-group receivables. Reported ALK cash equity was small.

Lender history

Date	Lender	Event	Status
Dec 2020	MSD UK Holdings	Takeover loan, secured on Turf Moor	Charge satisfied Feb 2023
Jun 2023	Macquarie Bank	Facility secured on Turf Moor, Barnfield and PL payments	Reported
Jan 2024	MGG	Facility replacing MSD	Charges satisfied Feb 2025
Jan 2025	Fasanara Capital	All-asset charges incl. freehold and leasehold Turf Moor	Outstanding
Oct 2025	CCM Entertainment II Holdings (Corrum)	Security-agent charge over Velocity	Outstanding
2026	None identified at club level	Jan/Aug 2027 facilities unrefinanced at signing	Gap

Investor group and capital raises

• Minority investors: JJ and Kealia Watt; Dude Perfect; Vlad Torgovnik (Holdings director, CIO of Millennium Management); Malcolm Jenkins; legacy fan shareholders.
• Cynosure | Checketts Sports Capital Fund I: Bloomberg reported on 3 November 2025 that Checketts was investing about $200m in the venture, the fund’s first deployment from a $1.2bn target. On the day the 2025/26 accounts were published, business journalist Ian Halstead stated that the owner funding came from this money, which he described as “gifted to ALK”. Chris Weatherspoon of The Athletic agreed that this was not explicitly stated but that he assumed the same. We take the same view. The timing and scale fit, and no other source of about £78m of new owner liquidity has been identified. It remains an inference, not a disclosed fact.
  
  “Gifted” should not be taken literally. A private equity fund raising external capital invests for a return. Its $200m will have bought equity, preferred equity or a structured instrument in ALK, Velocity Sports Partners or another entity in the chain. None of those entities publishes accounts, so we cannot tell which. If it was preferred or debt-like, the 2025/26 “deleveraging” has moved leverage above the club rather than removed it.
• Rastar Group: reported 16.45% of the investment vehicle, arising from the October 2025 Espanyol acquisition.
• No share capital has been issued into the club. The owners’ money reached Burnley as repayment of intra-group balances, not as equity.

Turf Moor and Longside Properties

Turf Moor and the former Gawthorpe training ground were sold to Longside Properties in 2006, when the club was short of cash after the ITV Digital collapse. Longside, once owned by the club’s then-directors, is now a subsidiary of Burnley FC Holdings. The club leases Turf Moor from it for 78 years at about £1.32m a year, giving operating lease commitments of £103.95m, and the accounts state that amendments are at the group board’s discretion. Two consequences follow. First, the club’s occupancy cost is set by a related party, not by the market; rent can be flexed to move profit between entities, which matters for P&S/SCR computations and for the IFR’s assessment of the licensed entity. Second, the freehold is charged to Fasanara: on enforcement, the club’s home ground and its landlord both sit behind a private-credit lender.

Related-party balances and fees

Item	2026	2025
Velocity Capital (UK) Holdings debtor (club)	Nil	£15,989k
Velocity receivable (group)	£3.3m	£81.0m
Amounts owed by group undertakings (club)	£24,092k	£103,051k
Prepayment to ALK Capital LLC	Nil	£1,250k
Management fee to ALK Capital LLC	£2.5m	£4.0m
Directors’ remuneration	Nil	Nil

The directors receive no pay from the club, but the management fee goes to ALK Capital LLC, the entity the controlling director owns. Functionally, that is the remuneration route.

13A. Director, fund manager, funder

Dave Checketts sits on the board of the club that is being funded. He also runs the fund that is understood to have provided the money, and he is reported to be a long-standing associate and former colleague of Alan Pace. In practice this makes him a likely provider of capital to the ownership chain and a decision-maker over how that capital is used at the club. Four points follow.

• No related-party disclosure. The club accounts disclose nothing on this. The FRS 102 s33.1A exemption covers transactions within the group, but the fund sits outside the group in the investor layer. Its relationship with a serving director should be disclosed by the club, or at minimum by Burnley FC Holdings.
• Directors’ duties. Checketts’ duty under s175 Companies Act 2006 to avoid conflicts is engaged whenever the board decides on owner support, refinancing or the Everton exposure. The fund’s interests as an investor in ALK may not match the club’s interests as a borrower.
• IFR ownership tests. If the fund’s investment carries control, veto or information rights over ALK or Velocity, it may amount to significant influence. That would bring the fund and its backers within the IFR owners’ and directors’ test, not just Pace and ALK.
• The going-concern letter. The written support relied on by the directors and BDO comes from the Parent Company and the wider investor group. If the wider investor group means Cynosure, the director whose fund provides the support is also one of the directors relying on it. The board should state who signed the comfort letter and in what capacity.

14. The cash cycle between the club and its owners

1. Up to 2025: the club’s own cash had been used to fund the 2020 acquisition, creating receivables from Holdings and Velocity. At July 2025 the club was owed £103.1m by group undertakings, and the group was owed £81.0m by Velocity.
2. 2025/26: the ownership group took in new capital. The most likely source is the about $200m committed by Cynosure | Checketts Sports Capital Fund I in November 2025. Halstead and Weatherspoon both read it that way, though the accounts do not say so. A role for the CCM Entertainment II facility secured over Velocity (October 2025, three weeks before the Cynosure announcement) cannot be ruled out. Velocity made a net repayment of £77.7m to the group.
3. Down to the club: Holdings and Velocity settled about £79.0m of intra-group balances owed to the club.
4. Out to lenders: the club repaid £35.2m of bank debt and £20.9m of factoring, £56.2m in total, and cash rose by £10.4m.
5. Residual: the other roughly £51m of the combined £117.8m inflow (£79.0m from the group plus the £38.8m award) was absorbed by operating losses, net player capex and interest.

What this means. The owners have returned roughly £78m of the club’s own money. That is good for Burnley: it reverses most of the 2020 pushdown and cuts external debt by £56m. But it is not an equity injection and does not recapitalise the club. Equity moved by nothing beyond retained losses, and the award was needed to keep net assets positive. The repayment also exhausts the intra-group “reserve” the directors cited last year as a source of liquidity. Future owner support must now be new money, which has not reached the club as equity since 2020.

The unexplained balance. About $200m (about £150m) came in at the top of the structure, but only £77.7m reached the Burnley group. The other approximately £70m+ is unaccounted for in any public filing. Plausible uses include Velocity’s own creditors (including CCM), the October 2025 Espanyol acquisition, and ALK-level costs. Each matters to Burnley’s creditors differently. The IFR should require a sources-and-uses statement for the Cynosure money down to club level.

15. Value extracted since 2020

Year	Management fee to affiliated entity
2021/22	£1.5m
2022/23	£2.5m
2023/24	£1.5m
2024/25	£4.0m
2025/26	£2.5m
Total	£12.0m

Two further items add to the cost of the ownership model. First, external interest borne by the club as a direct result of the leveraged structure: cash-type borrowing costs of £14.9m in 2025/26 alone, and more than £40m across the last three years on our reading of the bank and other-loan interest lines. Second, about £112m of the club’s cash and borrowing capacity was committed to the acquisition and has been outstanding for five years without interest. At a 10% cost of capital, the club’s own cost of debt, that interest-free use is worth more than £50m. The fees are modest next to those amounts, but they have been paid regardless of results, including £4.0m and £2.5m in years ending in relegation or a funding gap, and in cash to an entity that does not publish accounts.

16. Relegation, parachute payments and SCR in 2026/27

• Revenue reset. Television income falls from £118.9m to a Year 1 parachute payment (press-reported at about £55m) plus Championship central income. We expect 2026/27 turnover of roughly £80–85m, a fall of about £60m, broadly what happened between 2023/24 and 2024/25.
• Cost reset. A 2026/27 wage bill near the 2024/25 level of £82m would put wages above 95% of turnover again. Relegation clauses and the summer sales (£34.1m post year end) help, but a squad assembled on Premier League wages cannot be resized in one window.
• Sporting risk. The club was 22nd in the Championship at the end of October 2026. A second consecutive relegation would cut parachute eligibility and wipe out much of the collateral value of the squad. It is now a real tail risk.
• Regulation. The EFL’s May 2026 AGM statement sets the 2026/27 SCR allowance at 85% of income, with a flexible equity top-up of £33m over three years (maximum £15m a season). On that basis a £55m parachute supports about £46.8m of squad spending, plus whatever the club earns in its own right. Whether the £26m award counts as relevant revenue, and whether it must be reversed in prior-period assessments if the appeal succeeds, is a real compliance question. The club should obtain an EFL ruling before relying on it.

17. Comparison with prior years and the 2020 takeover

£m	2021/22 (group)	2022/23 (group)	2023/24 (group)	2024/25 (group)	2025/26 (club)
League	PL (relegated)	Champ. (1st)	PL (relegated)	Champ. (2nd)	PL (relegated)
Turnover	123	65	133.6	71.7	144.5
Profit/(loss) before tax	36	(35.1)	(28.4)	(29.2)	(9.6)
Profit on player disposals	54	11	15.1	59.0	36.2
Gross borrowings	n/d	c.70	112.4	142.4	86.2

Group figures for 2021/22 to 2024/25 come from prior published analyses; the group reported a £9.0m loss for 2025/26. Since the takeover, Burnley has made losses before tax in every year except the 2021/22 relegation year, which was rescued by player sales. Pre-takeover, the club carried no acquisition debt. Five and a half years later it carries £86.2m of borrowings at double-digit cost and £62.9m of net debt, despite the return of about £78m of upstreamed cash. That the club has gone down and come back twice is accurate as sporting history. It does not answer the financial question, which is how much downside the structure can absorb. This set of accounts gives the answer: about one adverse appeal.

18. Risk ratings

Risk	Rating	Basis
Litigation (Everton appeal)	High	£38.8m exceeds net assets (£19.3m) and cash (£23.3m); hearing January 2027
Refinancing	High	£45.9m maturing Jan/Aug 2027; not refinanced at signing
Liquidity	High	NCL £87.1m; committed 12-month outflows c.£154m
Sporting / double relegation	High	22nd in Championship, October 2026
Owner transparency	High	Velocity never filed accounts; two strike-off notices; ALK unconsolidated; funding source undisclosed
Encumbered control	High	CCM security-agent charge over Velocity; Fasanara all-asset charges
Board conflicts	Medium–High	Director’s fund understood to be the source of owner funding; no disclosure
Related-party extraction	Medium	£12.0m fees since 2020; rent set at group discretion
Disclosure controls	Medium	£15.5m agent contingency restatement
Cost of debt	Medium–High	Effective bank yield c.12–15%; factoring 12.75%

19. What the board, lenders and regulators should do

For the Burnley board

1. Obtain legally binding, collateralised owner support for the Everton exposure, through an escrow-equivalent or a guarantee from an entity with filed accounts, before the January 2027 hearing.
2. Agree a refinancing or extension of the January 2027 facility conditional on the appeal outcome, rather than negotiating after it.
3. Publish the basis on which Longside rent is set, and fix it at arm’s length for the IFR licence period.
4. Suspend the management fee until the club is cash-generative, or link it to stated deliverables.
5. Disclose the Cynosure | Checketts relationship, state who signed the going-concern support letter and in what capacity, and record how Dave Checketts’ conflict is managed in board decisions on funding.

For lenders

6. Treat the award as a contingent claw-back on liquidity, and model parachute diversion under the Football Creditors Rule fallback.

For the Independent Football Regulator and the EFL

7. Require Velocity’s overdue accounts and the CCM facility documents as a condition of the provisional licence.
8. Confirm the treatment of the £26m award for SCR purposes, and require a reversal plan if the appeal succeeds.
9. Require a sources-and-uses statement for the Cynosure capital down to club level, confirm whether any of the £77.7m is debt at Velocity or above, and assess whether the fund holds significant influence for the owners’ and directors’ test.

For Everton

10. Keep pressing for security. The Commission’s assumption that central funds would be available has weakened since relegation, because those funds are now parachute payments the club needs to operate.

20. Data limitations

• No cash flow statement. The club uses the subsidiary exemption; the cash cycle in section 14 is reconstructed from balance-sheet movements and the group’s published headline figures.
• Group accounts. Burnley FC Holdings’ 2025/26 consolidated accounts were filed on 4 November 2026. This analysis uses the group’s headline figures (turnover £144.5m, loss £9.0m, borrowings £86.2m, net debt £62.9m, Velocity receivable £3.3m, £77.7m net repayment); the full group cash flow statement and notes have not yet been reviewed.
• ALK and Velocity. ALK Capital LLC does not prepare consolidated accounts and Velocity has filed none. Owner capacity and the scope of the CCM security cannot be verified.
• Source of owner funding. That the £77.7m came from Cynosure is our inference, and two journalists have reached the same view (Ian Halstead, Chris Weatherspoon, 4 November 2026). No filing confirms it, or shows the instrument, the issuing entity or the full use of the $200m.
• Facility terms. Lender identity per facility, covenants and fees are not disclosed; the effective-rate analysis is derived.
• Award interest. The split of the £12.84m between pre-award interest (£9.1m) and post-award interest or costs is inferred, not disclosed.
• Earlier management fees for 2021/22–2023/24 come from secondary extractions of prior-year accounts.
• Regulation and forecasts. The 2026/27 parachute figure is press-reported and the Championship SCR parameters come from the EFL’s May 2026 AGM statement as reported; both should be confirmed against EFL regulations. Forward-looking statements on 2026/27 revenue, costs and appeal outcomes are projections, not facts.

Sources

• The Burnley Football & Athletic Company Limited, Annual Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 July 2026 (Companies House 00054222)
• Companies House filings: Burnley FC Holdings Limited (08335231), Velocity Capital (UK) Holdings Ltd (14755517), Longside Properties Limited (05202619), Everton SH01 (30 July 2026)
• Premier League: Burnley v Everton compensation decision (PLJP 2023/3)
• Bloomberg, Checketts / Cynosure investment in Burnley ownership group, 3 November 2025
• Chris Weatherspoon (@CWeatherspoon_, The Athletic) and Ian Halstead, posts on X, 4 November 2026
• The Esk: Burnley FC Holdings Limited annual report 2024/25
• The Esk: Velocity Capital (UK) Holdings, Burnley’s parent
• The Esk: Continuing to analyse the Burnley case PLJP 2023/3 (II)
• Burnley Express, Lancashire Telegraph, The Athletic, ESPN, ITV Granada, Inside World Football and Teesside Live reporting, June–November 2026