Source document: Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited In Administration, Joint Administrators’ Six-Month Progress Report, Cork Gully LLP, dated 26 October 2026, covering 27 March to 26 September 2026 (filed at Companies House with form AM10).
Joint Administrators’ Six Month Progress Report, Cork Gully
Figures are taken from the report unless stated. GBP equivalents and percentages marked as such are my calculations.
Statements by John Textor, Eagle Football Holdings, Botafogo and the press are their own and are largely unverified. Nothing in this article is legal or investment advice.
1. Summary
Cork Gully’s first progress report on Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited is the first full account of what the administration has actually realised. The answer is very little in cash.
The US$30m sale of Bidco’s 87.78% stake in Eagle Football Group S.A. (EFG), the listed parent of Olympique Lyonnais, to Michele Kang’s Olympe Bidco SAS was mostly a credit bid on debt Kang’s own vehicle had already bought. Secured liabilities of US$20.2m have been discharged against a secured claim of US$547.4m. Unsecured creditors, now estimated at about £87.8m, will receive nothing. RWDM went for €1. Since the reporting period closed, the Botafogo stake has been diluted to 0.82%.
This piece continues the Analysis Series’ coverage of the Eagle collapse, including the Ares/Bidco debt architecture, the administrators’ Proposals and the planned creditor enforcement.
Headline conclusions
1. The Lyon sale was a credit-bid recapitalisation, not a cash sale. Of the US$30.0m headline price, US$17.92m (59.7%) was a reduction in YMK Holdings’ own secured debt. US$8.78m repaid the lenders’ funding of the administration. Only US$61,604 went to noteholders who did not take part.
2. The true price of Lyon is not in the report. YMK Holdings bought a majority of Bidco’s secured loan notes before the sale. Neither the progress report nor OL’s 2025/26 annual report discloses what it paid. That private note trade is where the economic consideration for control of OL sits.
3. The process was documented, but not arm’s-length in substance. The administrators treated the sale as a connected-party disposal under SIP 13 and obtained an independent evaluator’s report. But the buyer and the enforcing creditor were aligned from at least July 2025.
4. Unsecured creditors get nothing. About £87.8m of claims, excluding un-quantified intra-group and connected-party claims; prescribed part nil.
5. On John Textor, the report concedes his narrow point and undermines his big ones. Kang was conflicted: the administrators say so themselves. Nothing in the report supports the claim that the clubs were “stolen”, and on RWDM and Botafogo his ownership statements contradict the company’s own records.
Key figures
| Item | Figure |
|---|---|
| Date of administration | 27 March 2026 |
| Secured claim (Proposals) | US$547,372,900 |
| OL/EFG sale headline price | US$30,000,000 |
| of which credit bid (YMK Holdings) | US$17,923,942 |
| of which AFA repayment | US$8,776,732 |
| of which to non-participating noteholders | US$61,604 |
| Secured liabilities discharged | US$20,246,969 (3.7% of claim, CWTE) |
| Unsecured creditors (estimate) | c.£87.8m, nil return |
| Administrators’ remuneration paid | £2,135,382 |
| Legal fees paid | £1,302,819 |
| Irrecoverable VAT | £688,084 |
| RWDM sale price | €1 |
| Botafogo interest after 25 October 2026 | 0.82% (press reports) |
| Cash in hand, 26 September 2026 | £2,925,362 |
2. Status and process
Ares Capital Corporation, as Security Agent and qualifying floating charge holder, appointed Stephen Cork and Anthony Cork of Cork Gully LLP on 27 March 2026 (High Court, Insolvency and Companies List No. 2493 of 2026). The Proposals were deemed approved on 4 June 2026.
At appointment Bidco held 87.78% of EFG, 90% of SAF Botafogo (90,000 Class B shares) and 99.5% of RWDM. Above it sit Eagle Football Holdings Midco Ltd and Eagle Football Holdings Ltd, owned 64.1% by John Textor, 16.4% by Iconic Sports Eagle Investment LLC and 19.5% by others.
The appointment was planned. Cork Gully was engaged by the Security Agent on 2 March 2026, 25 days before appointment. Pre-appointment costs (Cork Gully £364,964, CMS £343,972, Comarco £30,926) were approved by the Security Agent and secured creditors on 27 March and paid from the administration funding agreement (AFA). That is consistent with the thesis I set out in June. Planning is normal practice in a lender-led appointment, and it does not make the appointment unlawful.
3. The Lyon sale: what was actually exchanged
| Component | US$ | Share | Economic character |
|---|---|---|---|
| Repayment of AFA funding | 8,776,732.32 | 29.3% | Returns lenders’ administration funding |
| Reduction of YMK Holdings’ secured debt (credit bid) | 17,923,942.19 | 59.7% | Non-cash; buyer releases its own claim |
| Security Agent costs paid directly | 2,261,423.36 | 7.5% | Cost reimbursement to Ares as agent |
| Withholding tax cash funding | 976,298.45 | 3.3% | Tax leakage |
| Distribution to non-participating noteholders | 61,603.68 | 0.2% | The only cash to independent creditors |
| Total | 30,000,000.00 | 100% |
Source: progress report, Appendix II. Percentages are my calculations.
The key structural fact is that YMK Holdings, ultimately controlled by Kang, acquired a majority of Bidco’s secured loan notes before the sale. The credit bid therefore extinguished Kang’s own claim, not Ares’s. Ares’s recovery came from selling its notes to YMK, at a price nobody has disclosed. OL’s annual report confirms that the 23 June 2026 Transaction Implementation Agreement covered “the acquisition of the relevant notes by YMK Holdings LLC”, but it too is silent on price (see my review of OL Groupe’s 2025/26 annual report).
Non-participating noteholders received US$61,604 against a US$17.92m credit bid. If distributed pro rata, that implies the participating holders held about 99.7% of the relevant entitlement. That is my inference; the report does not say so.
The sale agreement provides for further consideration if EFG is sold on within 12 months of completion, i.e. by about 26 June 2027. Given that Kang has also committed up to €71m of shareholder loans, that is protection against a quick flip rather than a realistic source of recovery.
Valuation context
| Comparator | Value |
|---|---|
| 2022 Eagle acquisition, price per EFG share | c.€3.00 |
| EFG quoted price, 30 June 2026 | €1.80 |
| 2026 block price per share | €0.1713 (c.US$0.194) |
| Discount to quoted price | 90.5% |
| OL consolidated equity, 30 June 2026 | −€248.3m |
Sources: EFG closing release, 26 June 2026; OL URD 2025/26; my comparison of the 2022 and 2026 transactions (en français).
The administrators obtained a going-concern and a liquidation valuation from Sorgem Evaluation SAS (€69,310) and supplemental advice from Hilco (£15,000). They concluded that OL’s liquidation would have produced materially lower and more uncertain recoveries, given OL’s secured debt: about €298m of stadium notes plus the Goldman Sachs/MUFG term loan and RCF. One other party expressed material interest and then withdrew. The DNCG timetable was decisive.
On the evidence disclosed, US$30m for an equity stake with deeply negative book value, a hard regulatory deadline and one bidder capable of completing is a defensible price. What is not established is that the creditor body as a whole received fair value. That depends on the note-purchase terms, which remain invisible.
4. Connected party, conflicted buyer
The administrators treated the disposal as one to a connected party under Statement of Insolvency Practice 13: Kang was Chairwoman of EFG and, through YMK, a secured creditor. Because the sale completed outside the first eight weeks of the administration, the Administration (Restrictions on Disposal etc. to Connected Persons) Regulations 2021 did not strictly apply. The administrators nevertheless obtained a report from Compass Evaluator Reports Limited, which concluded that the consideration and grounds for the disposal were reasonable.
Commissioning that report when it was not required is good practice. But an evaluator’s report addresses the asset sale; it does not test the note trade that preceded it. And the public record shows the buyer and the enforcing creditor aligned well before the administration:
- the 7 July 2025 letter agreement between Ares, Kang and Bidco (disclosed by EFG on 10 March 2026) provided that no sale would be launched before 30 June 2026 and that Kang would not be removed as CEO before 30 June 2027;
- EFG disclosed on 14 April 2026 confidentiality agreements with a consortium of Ares funds and a Kang affiliate;
- OL’s annual report confirms a tripartite NDA with Ares-linked entities dated 13 April 2026.
The process was documented. It was not arm’s-length in substance.
5. The €242.2m release
The report states that, before the EFG sale, Ares as Security Agent implemented arrangements releasing intercompany indebtedness owed by EFG and its subsidiaries “to the Company and certain other persons”. The progress report does not quantify it. OL’s annual report does: €242.2m, owed to Eagle Bidco, Eagle Football Holdings LLC and John Textor personally, including Textor’s current account of about €18.4m.
Three consequences follow:
- An estate asset, Bidco’s receivables from the OL group, was given up by the Security Agent under its security rights rather than realised by the administrators.
- Textor’s personal current account appears to have been released by his lender’s agent. The legal basis has not been published, and it is the point on which his €20.9m Lyon Commercial Court claim will turn.
- Botafogo’s claim against OL was not released. I corrected my earlier analysis on this on 27 October (see Corrections).
6. What the administration has cost
| Receipts and payments, 27 March – 26 September 2026 (GBP) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Total receipts | 12,228,392 |
| of which AFA funding (borrowed) | 10,679,878 |
| Receipts excluding AFA funding (CWTE) | c.1,548,514 |
| Administrators’ remuneration | 2,135,382 |
| Pre-appointment remuneration and expenses | 739,862 |
| Legal fees and expenses | 1,302,819 |
| Historic (pre-appointment) liabilities | 3,192,724 |
| Withholding tax | 739,788 |
| VAT (recoverability being assessed) | 688,084 |
| Brazilian arbitration costs | 228,919 |
| Valuation costs | 74,662 |
| Total payments | 9,183,195 |
| Balance (cash £2,925,362 plus FX difference) | 3,045,197 |
Source: progress report, Appendix II.
Further costs are incurred but unpaid. CMS has incurred £1,929,898 and been paid £1,186,138; CMS France has incurred €84,510 and been paid €65,700. Two Brazilian firms have claims the administrators dispute: Mattos Filho US$1,114,937 (US$80,000 paid) and Bermudes Advogados £541,718.
Excluding borrowed AFA money, the estate’s own receipts were about £1.55m. Against that, the administrators’ remuneration alone was £2.14m. Bidco is not VAT registered, so the £688k of VAT is likely to be a straight cost. The fee basis for floating-charge realisations has not been fixed, every cost so far has been charged to the fixed charge, and no statutory expenses estimate has been given.
Because no unsecured dividend is expected, the fees are approved by the secured creditors, the same lender group that funds the administration. Unsecured creditors retain their statutory rights (21 days to request fee information with 5% by value; eight weeks to challenge remuneration with 10%). With a nil return, they have little economic reason to use them.
7. RWDM
Bidco’s 99.5% stake in RWDM was sold on 31 July 2026 for €1. The sale released €696,523 and US$125,000 that had been frozen before the appointment. Bidco keeps a €400,000 intercompany receivable, which may be partly recoverable through RWDM’s Belgian judicial reorganisation. Belgian press identify the buyer as Thierry Dailly, returning to the club with around €20–21m of debt still to address.
John Textor’s statement of 3 August 2026 says Dailly cannot own 100% because of the 2023–24 capital increases. That is inconsistent with the 99.5% the administrators record. Earlier coverage: RWDM Brussels and the urgency for a solution.
8. Botafogo
At 26 September the Botafogo stake was unsold. The administrators report proceedings in Brazil, the USA and England over Bidco’s ownership and shareholder rights, with injunctions granted in Brazil on SAF Botafogo’s application and in England on Textor’s (the English injunction is analysed here; the Florida default judgment followed on 15 September). They flagged that the 24 September capital increase of 200 million new shares could “significantly” dilute the holding.
After the period, Brazilian press report that on 22 October Bidco told the SAF it would not take up its entitlement, which would have cost about R$980,000, and that the social club now holds 99.18% against Bidco’s 0.82%. Textor says Cork Gully asked him for a US$200,000 loan to fund the subscription (FogãoNET). I have not been able to verify that.
The estate has spent £228,919 on Brazilian arbitration and US$11,000 on preparing an independent director for the Botafogo board. For Botafogo’s own claims, it offers nothing. I said in April that the insolvency would satisfy none of the clubs, particularly Botafogo. The report confirms it.
9. Investigations
The administrators say their investigations have been restricted by the limited availability of books and records. Some information has been provided, but full records are still awaited. No recovery proceedings have been commenced. The confidential report on directors’ conduct goes to the Secretary of State. Material relevant to that report is discussed in my review of Textor’s Eagle Football memoranda.
10. Textor’s claims against the report
| Textor’s claim | What the report shows | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Ares did not act with “clean hands”; the defaults were technical and lender-caused (Eagle Bidco statement, 27 March 2026) | Cork Gully engaged 2 March; pre-appointment costs approved; QFCH appointment | Planned, yes. Unlawful, unproven: no court has set the appointment aside |
| The clubs were effectively stolen; the process was designed to succeed (Front Office Sports) | SIP 13 treatment; evaluator report; marketing process; Sorgem and Hilco valuations; liquidation judged worse | Not established. But 59.7% of the price was the buyer’s own claim, and the note price is undisclosed |
| Kang was conflicted (“Call for Oversight”) | The administrators themselves treat the sale as connected-party | Supported |
| A secret side agreement gave Ares and Kang control of OL from July 2025 | Not addressed; the 7 July 2025 letter agreement is a matter of record | Agreement exists; its effect is disputed and outside the report |
| RWDM: Dailly cannot own 100% because of dilution | Bidco held 99.5% at appointment | Contradicted |
| The 90% of Botafogo belongs to him after the Florida judgment | Bidco held the 90,000 Class B shares; his own 26 January 2026 letter describes Bidco as majority shareholder | An undefended judgment binding Bidco; Brazilian title is for the Brazilian courts |
| Books and records | Investigations hampered; full records still awaited | The administrators’ account stands |
The wider claims are tested in my assessment of the Textor v Kang filings and my assessment of the Florida filing.
Textor’s strongest point, the conflict, is one the administrators concede; their answer to it was procedural. His weakest points are the ownership claims. The report gives no support to the idea that a lawful enforcement was a theft. It does give a fair-minded critic one legitimate grievance: the estate’s creditors cannot see the price at which the controlling debt changed hands.
11. What it means for Olympique Lyonnais supporters
- OL is out of the Eagle structure, and the €242.2m release is the biggest gain. Lyon no longer owes Eagle Bidco, Eagle LLC or Textor.
- The alternative was worse. The administrators judged liquidation materially worse for creditors, and the DNCG timetable governed everything.
- The club is not out of danger. Consolidated equity is −€248.3m; senior debt service is suspended until 31 December 2027; going concern partly rests on European qualification for 2027/28; €96.9m of contested factoring liabilities to Botafogo’s creditors remain, alongside three Textor-signed guarantees with a combined nominal maximum of about €80m.
- Minority shareholders face a mandatory offer at €0.1713 a share, 90.5% below the last pre-deal quoted price.
- A quick onward sale is unlikely while the earn-out runs to June 2027.
- Textor’s litigation targets Kang and OL, not the transfer itself. Nothing in the progress report threatens the completed sale of the EFG shares.
See also: Groupama Stadium debt, Michele Kang: ambition, complexity and the Textor question, and the 23 June 2026 sale announcement.
12. What it means for Botafogo supporters
- The Bidco estate will pay Botafogo nothing. The £87.8m unsecured estimate excludes intra-group and connected-party claims, and no unsecured dividend is expected. Any recovery has to come from OL, which disputes the claim.
- The administrators were boxed in, and in the end walked away. Injunctions in two jurisdictions, suspended political rights and a stake with negative equity made a sale impossible. On press reports, the social club now holds 99.18%.
- The estate is still spending in Brazil, and disputes about US$1.1m and £0.5m of Brazilian legal claims.
- John Textor is not finished. He is pursuing recognition of the Florida judgment in Brazil and contesting the dilution. Until the Brazilian courts and the arbitration rule, any buyer, including GDA Luma, faces title risk. See GDA Luma and the Botafogo acquisition and Credivalores v GDA Luma.
13. What it means for Ares
Ares Capital Corporation’s Q3 10-Q shows its Eagle Bidco debt replaced by common equity acquired in June 2026 and valued at US$2.6m, after a realised loss of about US$69m in the first half (10-Q). For a lender of Ares’s size that is immaterial. The remaining upside is limited to:
- the earn-out, which pays only on an onward sale of EFG before about June 2027;
- a contested 0.82% interest in Botafogo;
- the €400,000 RWDM receivable;
- about £2.9m of cash, against outstanding CMS fees and disputed Brazilian legal claims;
- any claims arising from the investigations, none yet commenced.
The open risks are reputational and legal rather than financial: the undisclosed note sale price, the release of intra-group debt including a personal creditor’s claim, the undefended Florida judgment, and the decision not to protect the Botafogo stake for about R$980,000 if GDA Luma’s reported US$130m deal for the SAF goes ahead. See my Ares corporate update, the Bidco notes inventory and the Football Capital Tracker entry on Ares’s Q3.
14. Questions the administrators should answer
- What did YMK Holdings pay for the notes it credit-bid, and did the Compass evaluator consider it?
- What was the value of the receivables released by the Security Agent, and on what basis was Textor’s personal current account released?
- Why was the Florida action left undefended?
- Why was the Botafogo pre-emption right, costing about R$980,000, not exercised?
- When will a statutory expenses estimate and a floating-charge fee basis be put to creditors?
15. Methodology and caveats
- Figures are from the administrators’ report. Percentages, the “receipts excluding AFA” figure and pro-rata inferences are my calculations and are labelled as such.
- The administrators record 90,000 Class B shares (90%) in Botafogo. Club statements described a 49% Eagle holding before the capital increase and 0.82% after it. The gap has not been explained publicly. Post-period Botafogo figures come from press reports.
- The note-purchase price is not public, so Ares’s true recovery cannot be calculated.
- Statements by John Textor, Eagle Football Holdings, Botafogo and the press are their own and are largely unverified. As with previous articles, Mr Textor is welcome to submit corrections under the corrections policy.
Further reading on The Esk
- Eagle Football, OL & John Textor hub
- The Analysis Series
- Private credit & football finance and The Football Capital Tracker
- The Eagle Football Holdings legal and creditor landscape
- The Eagle collapse and the Botafogo–OL litigation
- Systemic collapse of the Eagle multi-club model
- Textor v Iconic Sports Eagle Investment LLC
- Labels: Olympique Lyonnais · Botafogo · RWDM Brussels · Ares Management · Eagle Football / John Textor · Michele Kang · DNCG
Sources
- Cork Gully LLP, Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited In Administration, Joint Administrators’ Six-Month Progress Report, 26 October 2026 (Companies House, company 14385313).
- Eagle Football Group, closing release, 26 June 2026 Actusnews
- Eagle Football Group, agreement for a proposed takeover by Michele Kang, 23 June 2026 Actusnews
- Eagle Football Group, information on the Eagle Bidco administration, 14 April 2026 Actusnews
- Olympique Lyonnais Groupe, Document d’Enregistrement Universel 2025-2026, 26 October 2026
- Ares Capital Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026 SEC
- John Textor, public statements Call for Oversight; RWDM statement; OL statements
- Eagle Football Holdings, administration statement eaglefootball.com
- Front Office Sports, Textor suit against Kang frontofficesports.com
- Lance!, Botafogo social club takes 99% of the SAF lance.com.br
- BX1, Thierry Dailly’s return to RWDM bx1.be
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