The Esk


Independent analysis of football's money, owners and rules

The Analysis Series: A-CAP, 777 Partners & the former 777 football portfolio. The position at November 2026

CWTE

33 minutes

Position as at 18 November 2026. This is an update to my earlier work on Josh Wander, 777 Partners and A-CAP. It covers A-CAP’s remaining 777 exposure, the regulatory status of its insurers, the rating agency record, and the ownership and finances of each club in the former 777 multi-club portfolio.

Summary

A-CAP has not escaped its 777 exposure.

Kenneth King’s group is now the principal creditor of a bankrupt 777. According to 777’s own sworn First Day Declaration in the Chapter 11, entities affiliated with A-CAP are owed almost US$1.3 billion, all of it in default.

On 11 November 2026 AM Best cut A-CAP’s two rated insurers, Atlantic Coast Life and Sentinel Security Life, to C- (Weak), after the Oaktree recapitalisation collapsed. Atlantic Coast Life faces a pending rehabilitation petition in South Carolina, a suspended licence in Florida and a halt on new business in Virginia.

Most of the football portfolio A-CAP took from 777 has been sold or has broken free:

  • Standard Liège was sold to Giacomo Angelini.
  • The Melbourne Victory stake was given up for no consideration.
  • Genoa was recapitalised by Dan Șucu over A-CAP’s objections.
  • Vasco da Gama is mid-way through a sale of 90% of a new SAF, the club’s football company, to Marcos Lamacchia.

A-CAP still holds 78.8% of Hertha BSC’s KGaA, all of Red Star, about 12–14% of Sevilla and about 22% of Genoa. All of these are for sale.

My conclusions are firm:

  1. The 777 exposure is a recovery exercise, not an investment. In 2025 A-CAP told the Southern District of New York that it had cut its 777 exposure by nearly US$1 billion and expected to liquidate the rest by the end of that year. That did not happen.
  2. A-CAP has lost control of the bankruptcy process. On 28 September 2026 the Texas bankruptcy court approved a US$10m debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan from Leadenhall, rejecting the competing insider facility from A-CAP and the other existing lenders. The party suing A-CAP for fraud now funds the estate that will investigate A-CAP’s pre-petition dealings.
  3. The insurers are in their weakest position to date. AM Best has cut both rated insurers by three steps in under ten months, from B++ to C-. A-CAP has no announced, committed source of replacement capital.
  4. The cost of 777’s football failure has fallen mainly on insurance balance sheets and club creditors. A-CAP’s club-level recoveries were mostly non-cash: credit bids, debt-for-equity swaps, and capital increases funded by the buyers. This is my inference from the disclosed deal structures. A-CAP has not published any recovery figures.

1. A-CAP’s 777 Exposure: The Latest Position

The size of the exposure over time

Date / source Measure Figure Comment
31 Dec 2022, 777 Re statutory data 777 Re related-party exposure within its funds-withheld receivable US$1.5bn, including US$232.7m Triple 7 Finance Leasing, US$103.0m Nutmeg Acquisition (the football holding vehicle) and US$58.1m Flair Airlines 98.3% of 777 Re’s US$3.0bn of assets was a single funds-withheld receivable, and a 777 affiliate managed the funds-withheld accounts
Apr 2024, Utah and South Carolina regulators 777-related positions across five A-CAP insurers US$2.9bn of US$11.5bn assets, about US$1.8bn above single-issuer limits Single-issuer limits are 3% of admitted assets in South Carolina and 10% in Utah
Dec 2024, Utah Emergency Order 2024-4699 Collective deficit at Sentinel, Haymarket and Jazz Re More than US$520m Expected recoveries on certain loans were valued at 0–11 cents on the dollar
2025, SDNY Doc. 291 (Leadenhall v Wander) Reduction in A-CAP’s 777 exposure “Nearly $1 billion” Full liquidation by the end of 2025 was forecast but did not happen
2023 loan (per Genoa court reporting) A-CAP loan to 777 €440m The basis of A-CAP’s challenge to the Genoa recapitalisation
Aug 2026, 777 First Day Declaration Owed by 777 entities to A-CAP affiliates Almost US$1.3bn, all in default Group-wide figure
Aug 2026, First Day Declaration Total pre-petition funded debt across 12 facilities About US$2.71bn Includes the US$1.19bn National Founders (Knightsbridge) facility
End-2025, South Carolina petition Investments tied to King and A-CAP More than US$400m at Atlantic Coast Life and more than US$350m at Southern Atlantic Re Atlantic Coast Life is more than US$150m over its single-issuer limit

Methodology note. These figures measure different things and cannot be added together. Some measure 777-originated assets held inside A-CAP’s insurers. Some measure A-CAP’s direct lending to 777 at holding-company level. Some measure affiliated, King-linked investments generally. The most reliable current measure is the “almost US$1.3 billion” in 777’s sworn First Day Declaration. I have not verified how that figure splits between creditors: the A-CAP holding company, Haymarket, and the Sentinel and Atlantic Coast Life funds-withheld positions.

Specific A-CAP and Haymarket claims and structures

  • The JARM “up-tiering”. In December 2020 Haymarket lent about US$170m to JARM Capital, Wander’s personal vehicle, to fund his buyout of Steve Pasko and the early shareholders. On 4 March 2024 King told Leadenhall that the JARM security would be folded into the HoldCo facility. That moved the debt onto 777 Partners itself, with a claimed first lien. Leadenhall seeks to void both the obligation and the lien as actual and constructive fraudulent transfers.
  • The EFOA participations. Employee Funding of America, one of the debtors, sold Haymarket participations in a US$76.4m loan to law firms linked to Martin Phipps. On 16 February 2024, 777 and 600 Partners signed a guaranteed-return agreement in Haymarket’s favour, secured on all their personal property. About US$74.4m is reported outstanding.
  • The football credit bid. There were no third-party bids at the New York auction under the Uniform Commercial Code on 6 June 2025. ACM Delegate LLC, an A-CAP subsidiary, took the club collateral by credit bid. Exhibit B to the First Day Declaration records the transfer of Nutmeg Acquisition LLC’s equity in satisfaction of US$157m. That is the clearest disclosed price for the football portfolio as a whole. It was a debt offset, not cash.
  • When A-CAP took control. A-CAP engaged Moelis in May 2024 and wrote to the clubs in July 2024 asserting ownership. It funded the wind-down through protective advances from May 2024 onwards, including the “ACAP Unsecured Facility” and a promissory note dated 28 May 2025.

Leadenhall: the priority dispute, double-pledging and the claims against A-CAP

Leadenhall lent through a borrowing-base facility of up to US$350m, agreed in May 2021, to four special-purpose borrowers. 777 and 600 Partners guaranteed it on an unsecured basis. Leadenhall’s case is that collateral was double-pledged or never owned at all:

  • In March 2023 Credigy identified more than 1,600 receivables, worth about US$185m, that appeared on the books of both lenders.
  • Bank statements were allegedly altered.
  • One borrowing base was restated from about US$188m to US$64m.

Leadenhall accelerated the facility on 15 March 2024 for US$609.5m. 777’s chief operating officer, Mark Shapiro, testified that the collateral shortfall was about US$320m at that date.

The Leadenhall action in the Southern District of New York (1:24-cv-03453, Koeltl J) was filed on 3 May 2024. The amended complaint names 14 defendants, including King and A-CAP, and pleads 12 claims, among them civil RICO, fraud, aiding and abetting, and fraudulent transfer. Leadenhall describes it as a US$1.8bn civil RICO case, a figure that reflects treble damages. Its central theory against A-CAP is that A-CAP held a first-priority lien over all of 777’s assets, acted as 777’s de facto controller, and benefited at Leadenhall’s expense.

Forbes reported that on 21 September 2026 Leadenhall’s fraud and racketeering claims against A-CAP survived a motion to dismiss. I have not seen the opinion. Surviving a motion to dismiss is not a finding of liability, but it does mean A-CAP and King now face discovery.

On 23 March 2026 the Second Circuit (24-2647), applying Grupo Mexicano, vacated the July 2024 preliminary injunction so far as it froze the assets of the guarantors, 777 and 600. The rule in Grupo Mexicano is that a court cannot freeze assets before judgment where the claimant has no lien or equitable interest in them. Restraints on the borrowers’ own collateral survived. The ruling removed the freeze on the holding-company assets that secure A-CAP’s senior loan. Brazilian reporting linked it directly to A-CAP being free to deal in its Vasco position.

Leadenhall withdrew its contempt motion against A-CAP in April 2026. A-CAP is pursuing its own contempt motion over Leadenhall’s May 2025 foreclosures, in which Leadenhall credit-bid US$1 per pool for three borrowers’ portfolios, having previously valued those assets at more than US$180m. Separately, 777 and 600 are seeking a declaration in the New York state courts that they owe no deficiency. In January 2026 Haymarket sued Leadenhall in the Southern District for fraud. It alleges that Leadenhall knew of the collateral problems, that its staff joked about double-pledging in text messages, and that it was concealing about US$650m of troubled exposure unrelated to 777.

Assessment. The priority contest has moved in A-CAP’s favour on the holding-company assets, through the Second Circuit ruling, and in Leadenhall’s favour on control of the bankruptcy, through the DIP. Two questions will decide the outcome, and both remain open:

  • whether A-CAP’s liens, including the JARM up-tier, survive avoidance challenges in the Chapter 11; and
  • whether A-CAP is liable on the RICO and aiding-and-abetting claims.

No settlement between A-CAP and Leadenhall has been reported.

The Chapter 11: Signal National LLC (N.D. Tex., Fort Worth, No. 26-90190)

Twenty-three debtors filed on 9 August 2026. Three weeks earlier, on 16 July 2026, the Vida funds had filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against 777 in Florida, based on a US$26m consent judgment. The Florida court transferred that case to Texas. Later filings refer to Signal National “and 28 affiliates”, which indicates that a second wave of affiliates has filed.

The first-day financing proposal came from the existing lenders: AAV2024, A-CAP, Dacian, Haymarket and National Founders, with ACM Delegate as agent. It was a priming DIP of up to US$24.95m, with 11.5% interest payable in kind, a 3:1 roll-up of existing debt, and liens over recoveries from avoidance actions. Leadenhall objected that this was insider financing that would release the estate’s claims against insiders. The court granted only US$600,000 on an interim basis on 20 August 2026. On 28 September 2026 it approved a US$10m DIP from Leadenhall at zero per cent interest, rejecting the existing lenders’ competing facility.

For A-CAP this is the single most important procedural development. A-CAP is a secured pre-petition lender whose liens and JARM consolidation are open to challenge, and it is now a creditor without control of the estate’s funding. The stated aim of the case is to sell the remaining assets, chiefly structured receivables and servicing, resolve claims, and move longer-dated assets and causes of action into a liquidating trust. A hearing on the sale of a Miami Beach condominium was listed for 4 November 2026, with net proceeds to be held in escrow until the competing liens are resolved. I have not verified the outcome. Nor have I verified the challenge-period mechanics under the Leadenhall DIP.

The criminal and SEC proceedings

Proceeding Status at mid-November 2026
US v Wander, 25-cr-473 (SDNY, Oetken J) On 15 October 2026, four days before trial, Wander pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and one of securities fraud. The scheme defrauded lenders and investors of more than US$500m, and he agreed to forfeit at least US$500m. A Fatico hearing, to resolve disputed facts for sentencing, was set for 2 November 2026; I have not verified the outcome. Sentencing is set for 1 March 2027. The maximum is 20 years per count.
Superseding indictment S1 25 Cr. 473 Filed on 30 June 2026 and made public on 1 July. It reportedly names Advantage Capital Holdings as “Lender-4” and alleges that A-CAP was given altered bank statements to induce a loan.
Damien Alfalla (former CFO) Pleaded guilty on 14 October 2025 and is cooperating.
SEC v Wander, Pasko, Alfalla, 777 and 600 (filed 16 Oct 2025) Alleges a US$237m preferred-equity fraud, about US$33m diverted to Wander and Pasko, and an overdraw of US$300m on a facility. Wander’s motion to dismiss was pending at last report. Pasko faces civil charges only.
ING Capital (Miami-Dade) Alleges that more than US$28m of assets 777 did not own were pledged. The case was stayed in June 2026, then the stay was reconsidered on 6 August 2026 to allow expert discovery.

Wander’s plea, and the “Lender-4” allegation in particular, strengthens A-CAP’s case that it was itself a victim of the fraud. That helps A-CAP answer Leadenhall’s allegation that it controlled 777. It does nothing to repair the solvency damage that regulators attribute to A-CAP’s concentrated holdings of affiliated and 777-linked assets.

Other 777 assets

  • Bonza: entered voluntary administration in April 2024. I can identify no recovery for A-CAP.
  • Flair Airlines: 777’s stake had fallen to 10% by August 2024, and its role is now mainly that of a lender.
  • London Lions: sold by administrators to Tesonet in August 2024.
  • 777 Re: the Bermuda Monetary Authority cancelled its registration with effect from 6 September 2024. The ceding insurers, A-CAP’s among them, took the business back.
  • UK: a London court wound up 777 in October 2024.

2. A-CAP’s Insurance Subsidiaries

Entity Regulator Status at mid-November 2026
Atlantic Coast Life Insurance Co. South Carolina DOI Rehabilitation petition pending (filed 15 Sept 2026). Florida licence suspended (30 Sept 2026). Virginia new-business halt from 1 Nov 2026. AM Best C- (Weak), under review with negative implications.
Southern Atlantic Re Inc. South Carolina DOI (captive wholly owned by ACL) Named in the same petition. Has assumed US$2.37bn of Atlantic Coast Life’s reserves.
Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co. Utah Insurance Department Not in rehabilitation (Utah petition dismissed 23 May 2025). AM Best C- (Weak), under review with negative implications. Whether Utah’s December 2024 stop-writing order has been lifted is not public.
Haymarket Insurance Co. Utah Named in Utah’s 2024 order and 2025 petition. Active as a 777 creditor, a proposer of the rejected DIP, and plaintiff against Leadenhall. Not rated by AM Best on the evidence reviewed.
Jazz Reinsurance Utah Named in Utah’s 2024 order and 2025 petition. Current position not verified.
Advantage Capital Holdings LLC Not an insurer Holding company, ultimately owned by Kenneth King through Advantage Capital Partners LLC. Claimed assets of “over $15 billion” in April 2026.

Data gaps. I could not verify any current A-CAP link to Midwest Holding or American Life & Security Corp, or any A-CAP-owned reinsurer in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands. Aureum Re and Converge Re II appear in the South Carolina petition as reinsurance counterparties whose credit is disputed. I have not verified their ownership or any affiliation with A-CAP.

Utah

  • 2 December 2024: Emergency Order 2024-4699 found Sentinel, Haymarket and Jazz Re in hazardous financial condition and ordered them to stop writing new business by 31 December 2024.
  • 21 March 2025: Commissioner Jon Pike petitioned for rehabilitation, alleging insolvency, regulatory violations and failure to follow directives.
  • 23 May 2025: after mediation, Judge Amber Mettler of the Third District Court dismissed the case without prejudice. The terms were not disclosed, and A-CAP resumed new business on a phased basis.
  • 2 April 2026: A-CAP appointed Kirk Cullimore as President of Sentinel. I have not verified whether he is the Utah state senator of the same name. If he is, that raises an obvious question about proximity to the state’s regulator.

With Sentinel now rated C-, Utah’s decision to step back in 2025 looks harder to defend. The dismissal was without prejudice, and a renewed Utah action is a realistic risk.

South Carolina, Florida and Virginia

South Carolina placed Atlantic Coast Life and Southern Atlantic Re under confidential administrative supervision from 10 April 2024. It issued a cease-and-desist order on 11 December 2024. On 13 February 2025 Administrative Law Judge Ralph King Anderson III reversed that order, finding that the company kept a positive cash flow and noting 2024 capital and surplus of nearly US$101m. A full examination began on 1 August 2025.

The 56-page rehabilitation petition filed on 15 September 2026 sets out the regulator’s case:

Allegation Figure
Below-investment-grade private credit and unrated collateral loans (limit 10%) 23.8% as reported at YE2025; 30.2% after SCDOI reclassification
Affiliated investments More than US$400m at ACL and more than US$350m at SAR; ACL more than US$150m over its single-issuer limit
Reinsurance credit overstated About US$180m (Converge Re II, at ACL) and about US$245m (Aureum Re, at SAR)
Operating losses US$25.2m (2025); US$14.8m (H1 2026)
Capital and surplus US$81.7m (YE2025) falling to US$47.4m (30 June 2026), down 42% in six months
Risk-based capital (RBC) ratio, against the 500% condition set at acquisition 278% (YE2024), 239% (YE2025), below 185% (mid-2026 estimate); negative on SCDOI’s adjustments, with total adjusted capital of about -US$41m
Surrenders, H1 2026 US$463m gross; US$165m net of reinsurance
Annuity value leaving surrender-charge periods About US$900m (2026), US$900m (2027) and US$800m (2028)

In February 2026 A-CAP said its legacy 777 risk had been removed. South Carolina says 777’s own bankruptcy filing contradicts that. Atlantic Coast Life and Southern Atlantic Re moved to dismiss the petition and sued Director Michael Wise. They dropped that suit without prejudice on 28 September 2026, when both sides agreed to mediate. No outcome from the mediation has been made public, and no rehabilitation order had been reported by early November.

Florida’s Immediate Final Order (403552-26-IFO), signed on 30 September 2026 by Commissioner Michael Yaworsky, suspended Atlantic Coast Life’s certificate of authority. It found that the company’s reported surplus of US$47.4m was US$8.0m below Florida’s minimum of US$55.4m. After disallowing the excess affiliated investments, it found “an impaired surplus of $170 million as of June 30”. Florida’s earlier calculations of the impairment were US$139.6m (September 2025), US$98.7m (December 2025) and US$144.9m (March 2026).

On 15 October 2026 Virginia’s State Corporation Commission approved a settlement barring new Atlantic Coast Life business from 1 November. The order can be revisited if South Carolina withdraws its petition, if A-CAP raises at least US$50m, or if a change-of-control filing is made.

The impact on policyholders. There is no moratorium on surrenders or withdrawals, and A-CAP says claims are being paid. If a rehabilitation order follows, precedent suggests moratoria are likely: Colorado Bankers Life (2019) and PHL Variable (2024) both had them. Guaranty-association cover is generally triggered only by liquidation with a finding of insolvency.

The collapse of the Oaktree deal

A-CAP and Oaktree signed a master transaction agreement on 13 March 2026. Oaktree was to take control of Atlantic Coast Life and fund a surplus note supporting Sentinel. Bloomberg reported on 16 October 2026 that the deal was off. A-CAP said it was still working with Oaktree on a transaction structure, but AM Best’s release of 11 November treats the agreement as terminated. AM Best notes that A-CAP is talking to another possible capital provider, but names none, and no replacement has been announced. A-CAP’s capital plan has failed.

3. The Rating Agencies

Date Agency Entity Action Rationale cited
8 Nov 2023 AM Best 777 Re Financial strength rating (FSR) A- to B; issuer credit rating (ICR) a- to bb; under review with negative implications Fall in risk-adjusted capital; concentration in 777-originated assets; no audited 777 accounts for two years
Feb 2024 AM Best 777 Re Downgraded to C-; rating later withdrawn after the BMA cancelled its registration Very weak balance sheet; barred from new business
23 Jan 2026 AM Best ACL and Sentinel FSR B++ to B; under review with negative implications Lower new premium, higher surrenders, illiquid assets, pending capital raise
22 Sept 2026 AM Best ACL and Sentinel FSR B to C+; ICR bb+ to b-; under review with negative implications Capital and regulatory ratios deteriorated in H1 2026, continuing a trend since 2024; illiquid assets, affiliated investments and concentration in Level 3 assets (those valued on unobservable inputs); the South Carolina petition
11 Nov 2026 AM Best ACL and Sentinel FSR C+ to C- (Weak); ICR b- to ccc-; under review with negative implications Termination of the Oaktree agreement. Balance sheet strength cut from weak to very weak and business profile to very limited; operating performance and enterprise risk management assessed as marginal

I found no current public ratings or rating actions on A-CAP entities from Fitch, Moody’s, S&P, KBRA or Egan-Jones. C- sits immediately above the D, E and F categories that AM Best uses for insurers that are poorly placed, under regulatory supervision or in liquidation. With the rating still under review with negative implications, the next action will most likely follow either a South Carolina court order or confirmed new capital.

4. The Former 777 Football Clubs

Club 777 entry Owner at mid-Nov 2026 How and when it changed Consideration A-CAP’s remaining interest
Genoa CFC Sept 2021, 99.99%, about €150m reported Dan Șucu, about 77–78% Capital increase announced 18 Dec 2024; A-CAP challenges rejected in Apr 2025, Jul 2025 and Jun 2026 €45m capital increase, plus €40m more from Șucu About 22–23%, with no governance role
Standard Liège Mar 2022, 100%, €55m Giacomo Angelini (SDL Holding) Agreed 2 Apr 2025; completed Jun 2025 Price undisclosed; €28.7m capital increase, €9.75m debt clean-up and about €25m of loans converted to capital None
Vasco da Gama SAF Feb 2022, 70%, R$700m commitment In transition to Almirante Participações (Marcos Lamacchia), 90% of a new SAF Judicial recovery filed Feb 2025; plan confirmed Dec 2025; 777 settlement Sept 2026; club approvals Oct 2026 R$500m of capital in R$100m annual instalments; total value disputed 777 Carioca’s interest to be diluted out
Red Star FC 2022, about €14m for the shares A-CAP (777 nominally) Control asserted Jul 2024; credit bid Jun 2025 No sale 100%
Hertha BSC Mar 2023, 64.7%, later 78.8% ACM Delegate (A-CAP), 78.8% of KGaA capital, subject to 50+1 Credit bid, New York auction, 6 Jun 2025 Part of the US$157m Nutmeg offset 78.8%, for sale
Melbourne Victory Oct 2022, 19.9% for AU$8.7m Club and new investors (Tony Bloom minority) Divested 4 Mar 2025 No money exchanged (ESPN) None
Sevilla FC Minority stake, via Sevillistas Unidos 2020 SL A-CAP, about 12–14% New York auction, 6 Jun 2025 Credit bid 12–14%, being marketed
Everton Agreed Sept 2023 for Moshiri’s 94.1% The Friedkin Group (from Dec 2024) 777 deal lapsed 1 Jun 2024 About £200m of 777/A-CAP loans extinguished at completion; cash element undisclosed None identified

Genoa CFC

Genoa’s board announced on 18 December 2024 that Dan Șucu had taken about 77% through a €45m capital increase. A-CAP’s ACM Delegate challenged the recapitalisation in the Court of Genoa, relying on the €440m it lent 777 in 2023 and on its voting rights over the pledged shares. On 7 April 2025 the court dismissed the challenge, holding that A-CAP had no standing because it was not a shareholder. A second challenge failed in July 2025. A third was reportedly rejected on 23 June 2026, although the report of that ruling is sponsored content and should be treated with caution. A-CAP keeps about 22%, with no governance role. Romanian press reports that Șucu wants to buy the remainder.

Genoa (FY to 30 June) FY2024/25 Prior period
Revenue More than €120m €85m
Costs €147.9m €116.9m
Net loss €33.3m €38.8m
Financial debt €129m €160m
Total liabilities €283.6m €318.9m
Equity €17.9m €1.05m

Șucu injected €40m through a Romanian company. Debts to Lega Serie A fell by €14.1m and tax debts by €5.1m under instalment plans. A ten-year restructuring agreement with the Agenzia delle Entrate, and SACE-guaranteed loans costing about €3m a quarter, remain fixed charges. I have not located the FY2025/26 accounts.

Assessment: Genoa has been stabilised but depends on its owner’s money. A-CAP’s remaining stake has nuisance value only, unless Șucu buys it.

Standard Liège

Under 777, Standard Liège received an indefinite transfer ban in December 2023 over unpaid taxes, salaries and fees. In May 2024 former owner Bruno Venanzi obtained court permission to seize 777’s Belgian assets. A-CAP put the club up for sale in September 2024 and agreed terms with Giacomo Angelini on 2 April 2025. The sale completed in June 2025 on the back of a €28.7m capital increase, a €9.75m debt clean-up and the conversion of about €25m of loans into capital. Equity had been -€39m at June 2024.

Standard Liège FY2025/26 FY2024/25 FY2023/24
Revenue €30.9m n/a n/a
Operating loss €8m n/a n/a
Net loss €9.3m €13.3m €25m

The accounts were approved on 26–27 October 2026. Operating costs fell by about €5m. Sporting director Marc Wilmots says the club must generate €14m from outgoing transfers and can reinvest only €7m. Local press notes that the club still needs investors. Assessment: this is the cleanest exit from 777, but the club remains loss-making and dependent on player sales. I identified no current licensing sanction.

Vasco da Gama SAF

In May 2024 a Rio court suspended 777’s control on a preliminary basis after payment delays. The club and its SAF filed for judicial recovery on 24 February 2025 with debts of about R$1.4bn. The recovery plan was confirmed in December 2025 with 97.7% creditor approval. The process has been turbulent: the first judge recused herself in July 2026, and a court-appointed intervenor resigned citing threats from organised fan groups.

Under the plan, the football assets move into a new SAF, and 90% of it is sold through a judicially supervised isolated productive unit (UPI), a mechanism designed to transfer the assets free of the old liabilities. In August 2026, 777 Carioca LLC, still the registered holder of the 777 shares, warned of asset-stripping. In September 2026, Vasco and 777 Carioca settled their arbitration, and 777 consented to the sale. The club’s deliberative council approved the sale on 6 October 2026, by 175 votes to 26, and members approved it on 23 October, by 4,675 to 437.

Almirante Participações e Empreendimentos, owned by Marcos Lamacchia and guaranteed by José Roberto Lamacchia of Crefisa, will contribute R$500m of capital in R$100m annual instalments, indexed to inflation. That money cannot be used to pay old debts. The club keeps 10% with special rights. Headline values conflict: the club speaks of about R$4bn on an all-in basis, while ESPN reports about R$1.5bn. Neither figure can be verified until the UPI documents are public.

Several issues remain open:

  • Brazil’s competition authority (CADE) and the sports regulator (ANRESF) are reviewing the deal, including a possible conflict of interest: Lamacchia is the stepson of Palmeiras president Leila Pereira.
  • A court has kept an attachment over 777 Carioca’s shares in Matix Capital’s claim for an unpaid commission.
  • Reports conflict on the size of the A-CAP-controlled stake, with figures of about 31% and 70% both in circulation.

Pedrinho was re-elected club president on 14 November 2026. Assessment: the sale is approved but has not closed. 777 and A-CAP will probably be left with a heavily diluted or worthless legacy interest. Any recovery depends on the settlement terms, which have not been disclosed.

Red Star FC

Red Star has not been sold. A-CAP has controlled the club since mid-2024 and has owned the collateral since the credit bid of June 2025. Moelis is running a sale process. Talks with Todd Interests and then with Stephen Pagliuca’s PagsGroup did not complete. President Patrice Haddad says A-CAP has provided financial guarantees, approved by the DNCG (French football’s financial regulator), for a budget of about €15m. The DNCG imposed no restrictive measures for 2026/27. The club finished fourth in Ligue 2 in 2025/26.

DNCG documents released in February 2026, after four years of litigation by supporters, indicate that the regulator’s 2022 review of 777 was superficial. 777 showed €16.17m of verified funds and a five-year plan to lose about €24–25m. I have located no published accounts for 2024/25 or 2025/26.

Assessment: Red Star’s licence rests on guarantees from a group whose insurers are rated C-. That is the most acute contagion risk left in the portfolio.

Hertha BSC

777 bought Lars Windhorst’s 64.7% of Hertha’s KGaA in March 2023 and raised it to 78.8% through a capital increase. Under German football’s 50+1 rule, the members’ association keeps voting control. ACM Delegate took the stake by credit bid on 6 June 2025. A-CAP portfolio manager David Shaw has sat on the KGaA supervisory board since autumn 2024. Hertha’s management says openly that A-CAP wants to sell. The club holds a contractual veto over the buyer and wants to buy back at least a majority itself. Reported interest from former New Jersey governor Phil Murphy is unverified.

Hertha BSC KGaA (FY to 30 June) FY2025/26 FY2024/25
Revenue €89.9m €90.7m
Total operating income €106.2m about €95m
EBITDA €8.0m n/a
EBIT €5.0m -€11.1m
Net result +€1.2m (first profit since 2018/19) -€15.6m
Liabilities €54.1m about €51m
Deficit not covered by equity €37.2m €38.4m
Nordic bond outstanding €18.8m (6.5%, maturing Nov 2028) after a €21.2m buyback €40m (10.5%)
Other interest-bearing debt €22.1m n/a

Hertha received a further €18.3m from transfers between July and September 2026, and finished seventh in the 2. Bundesliga in 2025/26. Assessment: the club is recovering but remains insolvent on a balance-sheet basis, with a €37.2m deficit not covered by equity. A-CAP’s need for capital makes a discounted sale of the 78.8% stake likely in 2027, and Hertha’s veto gives the club unusual leverage in that sale.

Melbourne Victory

777 bought 19.9% of Melbourne Victory in October 2022 for AU$8.7m, with an option to increase to 70% for up to AU$30m. A-CAP announced the divestment on 4 March 2025, and ESPN reported that no money changed hands. Brighton owner Tony Bloom later took a minority stake. I have identified no remaining 777 claim.

Sevilla FC

A-CAP took 777’s stake of about 12–14%, held through Sevillistas Unidos 2020 SL, at the auction on 6 June 2025. In 2026 regional outlets reported that A-CAP had put the whole package up for sale, including an offer to Sevilla’s largest individual shareholder. A separate collateral claim linked to a loan through Nakula Management remains unresolved on the public record. Reports put the loan at about US$10m or €8.5m. It is unclear whether that claim encumbers the shares.

Everton (for context)

777’s agreement to buy Farhad Moshiri’s 94.1% of Everton lapsed on 1 June 2024, after the Premier League required proof of the source and sufficiency of funds. A-CAP-sourced working-capital loans of about £200m were left stranded behind US freezing orders. The Friedkin Group completed its takeover on 18–19 December 2024. Companies House filings show Roundhouse subscribing £233.44m for new shares to fund repayment of the Rights and Media Funding loans and the 777/A-CAP loans. Later Roundhouse accounts show £251.9m of debt repaid to club lenders.

The 777/A-CAP debt was not repaid entirely in cash, and the cash A-CAP actually received has not been disclosed. One account describes a discounted cash settlement of about £66m plus preferred equity and warrants. I treat it as low-confidence, because it conflicts with later shareholder filings. The frequently quoted figure of about £158m relates to TFG’s bridge refinancing of the MSP debt, not to the 777/A-CAP debt.

5. Chronology, 2023 to November 2026

Date Event
Mar 2023 777 acquires 64.7% (later 78.8%) of Hertha’s KGaA
Sept 2023 777 agrees to buy 94.1% of Everton
8 Nov 2023 AM Best downgrades 777 Re to B
Dec 2023 Standard Liège transfer ban; Leadenhall notice of breach
Feb 2024 777 Re downgraded to C-
15 Mar 2024 Leadenhall accelerates US$609.5m
10 Apr 2024 South Carolina places ACL and SAR under confidential supervision
Apr 2024 Bonza enters administration
3 May 2024 Leadenhall sues in SDNY
6 May 2024 Wander and Pasko resign; GlassRatner takes over
1 Jun 2024 Everton deal lapses
Jul 2024 A-CAP tells the clubs it has assumed ownership; SDNY preliminary injunction (8 Jul)
6 Sept 2024 777 Re registration cancellation takes effect
Oct 2024 London court winds up 777
2 Dec 2024 Utah Emergency Order 2024-4699
11 Dec 2024 South Carolina cease-and-desist (reversed 13 Feb 2025)
18–19 Dec 2024 Șucu recapitalises Genoa; Friedkin completes Everton takeover
24 Feb 2025 Vasco files for judicial recovery
4 Mar 2025 Melbourne Victory stake divested
21 Mar 2025 Utah rehabilitation petition
7 Apr 2025 Genoa court rejects A-CAP’s first challenge
May 2025 Leadenhall’s US$1 credit-bid foreclosures; Utah petition dismissed (23 May)
6 Jun 2025 New York auction: ACM Delegate credit-bids the club stakes (US$157m Nutmeg offset)
Jun 2025 Standard Liège sale to Angelini completes
1 Aug 2025 South Carolina full examination begins
14–16 Oct 2025 Alfalla pleads guilty; Wander indicted; SEC sues
Dec 2025 Vasco recovery plan confirmed
Jan 2026 Haymarket sues Leadenhall; AM Best cuts ACL and Sentinel to B (23 Jan)
13 Mar 2026 A-CAP–Oaktree master transaction agreement
23 Mar 2026 Second Circuit vacates the freeze on the guarantors’ assets
2 Apr 2026 Cullimore appointed President of Sentinel
Apr 2026 Leadenhall withdraws its contempt motion against A-CAP
23 Jun 2026 Genoa court rejects A-CAP’s third challenge (reported)
30 Jun 2026 Superseding indictment filed (made public 1 Jul); reportedly names A-CAP as “Lender-4”
16 Jul 2026 Vida funds file involuntary Chapter 7 against 777 in Florida
9 Aug 2026 Signal National et al. file Chapter 11 (N.D. Tex. 26-90190)
15 Sept 2026 South Carolina rehabilitation petition against ACL and SAR
Sept 2026 Vasco–777 Carioca settlement
21 Sept 2026 Leadenhall’s RICO and fraud claims against A-CAP reportedly survive a motion to dismiss
22 Sept 2026 AM Best cuts ACL and Sentinel to C+
28 Sept 2026 Leadenhall US$10m DIP approved; ACL suit against the South Carolina director dropped and mediation agreed
30 Sept 2026 Florida suspends ACL’s certificate of authority
6 and 23 Oct 2026 Vasco council and members approve sale to Almirante
15 Oct 2026 Wander pleads guilty; Virginia settlement (new-business halt from 1 Nov)
16 Oct 2026 Bloomberg reports the Oaktree deal is off
Oct 2026 Standard Liège FY25/26 loss of €9.3m; Hertha FY25/26 profit of €1.2m
4 Nov 2026 Hearing on Miami Beach condominium sale in the Chapter 11
11 Nov 2026 AM Best cuts ACL and Sentinel to C-

6. Key Risks

  1. Insurer resolution. Unless new capital arrives, a South Carolina rehabilitation order for Atlantic Coast Life is more likely than not. Virginia’s conditions for reopening the company to new business suggest that US$50m is the minimum credible injection. A renewed Utah action against Sentinel is a material secondary risk.
  2. Litigation against A-CAP. Three fronts are live: Leadenhall’s RICO and aiding-and-abetting claims, now past the pleading stage; possible avoidance actions in the Chapter 11, investigated by an estate that Leadenhall funds; and A-CAP’s own counterclaims. Wander’s plea supports A-CAP’s account of itself as a victim, but it does not decide A-CAP’s civil liability.
  3. Forced sales of the clubs. Hertha, Red Star and the Sevilla and Genoa minority stakes are now assets for sale by a group short of capital. Red Star depends on A-CAP guarantees for its DNCG compliance. If A-CAP’s insurers enter receivership, control of these holdings could pass to a rehabilitator rather than A-CAP. Whether it does depends on which entity legally holds the club equity, which I have not verified.
  4. Opacity. A-CAP publishes no consolidated audited accounts, recoveries on the football assets are undisclosed, regulators and the company dispute asset values, and the decisive documents are partly sealed.

7. Open Questions and What to Watch

Six questions remain unanswered:

  • What share of the US$1.3bn owed by 777 sits with Atlantic Coast Life and Sentinel, and at what value is it carried at 30 September 2026?
  • What were the terms of the Utah settlement in 2025, and has Sentinel’s stop-writing order been lifted?
  • How much cash did A-CAP receive when the Everton takeover completed?
  • Which A-CAP entity legally holds the Hertha, Red Star, Sevilla and Genoa shares?
  • Who is the unnamed capital provider referred to by AM Best?
  • What did the Fatico hearing decide about the attribution of losses, including any loss attributed to A-CAP?
Item Expected timing
Q3 2026 statutory statements (ACL, Sentinel) Mid-November 2026
South Carolina mediation outcome or court ruling on rehabilitation Open; could come at any time
AM Best resolution of the under-review status On capital news or a court order
Florida administrative complaint Open
Signal National: challenge period, second-wave debtors, plan and liquidating trust Q4 2026 to Q1 2027
Leadenhall v Wander: discovery against A-CAP and King Ongoing
Wander sentencing 1 March 2027
SEC v Wander: ruling on motion to dismiss Pending
Vasco: CADE and ANRESF approvals and closing Late 2026 to early 2027
Hertha, Red Star and Sevilla sale processes 2027
Genoa: any appeal, or a buy-out of A-CAP’s stake Open

8. Lessons for Football Regulators

  1. Source-of-funds checks must look through to the ultimate capital provider. 777’s football purchases were largely funded with annuity policyholders’ money. It flowed from A-CAP’s insurers, through funds-withheld accounts managed by a 777 affiliate, into loans to Nutmeg Acquisition. A test that checks only the bidder’s bank balance misses this, as the DNCG’s 2022 acceptance of €16.17m in “verified funds” shows. The Independent Football Regulator’s owners’ and directors’ test under the Football Governance Act 2025 should require disclosure of the lender behind the bidder, and of that lender’s own regulatory standing.
  2. Insurance-linked and private-credit capital carries its own contagion risk. When the lender is a regulated insurer, the club becomes an affiliated, illiquid Level 3 asset on a policyholder balance sheet. It is then exposed to regulatory seizure, forced sale or transfer by credit bid, all decided outside football.
  3. Enforcing security can transfer control with no fit-and-proper review. One New York auction morning in June 2025 moved stakes in several clubs to a creditor. Change-of-control rules should expressly cover the enforcement of pledges and credit bids, and should require lenders taking security over club shares to notify the regulator in advance.
  4. The Premier League’s tests protected Everton; regulators elsewhere did not. The Premier League’s insistence on proof of funds stopped the Everton deal. Belgium, France and Brazil admitted 777, and their clubs went on to suffer transfer bans, asset seizures and judicial recovery. That contrast is the strongest practical argument for robust, evidence-based ownership tests applied before completion.

Caveats and Methodology

  • Secondary sources. Several key facts come from secondary summaries of primary documents: the First Day Declaration, the South Carolina petition, the Florida order and the 21 September ruling. I have not read the 21 September opinion or the full First Day Declaration directly.
  • Source reliability. The SportsPro report on Genoa is sponsored content. CorpGov’s coverage reads favourably to A-CAP, and some investigative coverage reads unfavourably to it. Brazilian and Spanish fan-site reporting on Vasco and Sevilla is unverified.
  • Conflicting figures, deliberately not reconciled. These are the Vasco sale value (R$4bn against R$1.5bn), the A-CAP-controlled Vasco stake (31% against 70%), the cash element of the Everton repayment, and A-CAP’s total assets (US$12bn in 2025 against US$15bn in 2026).
  • Not verified. The Fatico hearing outcome, the Miami Beach condominium sale, Genoa’s FY2025/26 accounts, Red Star’s financial statements, any A-CAP link to Midwest Holding or American Life & Security, and ratings from agencies other than AM Best.
  • Allegations versus determinations. Regulatory petitions, Leadenhall’s complaint and Haymarket’s counter-suit contain allegations only. The determinations are Wander’s and Alfalla’s guilty pleas, the Second Circuit opinion, the Genoa rulings, Florida’s order (a regulator’s determination, open to challenge) and AM Best’s ratings.

Sources

Paul Quinn

Independent analyst of the finance, ownership, governance and regulation of professional football. Publishes The Esk through CWTE. About · Methodology · Corrections

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