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The Analysis Series: Has investor appetite for European football equity peaked? Ten years of capital raises, 2015–2026

CWTE

11 minutes

Paul Quinn, CWTE Limited · 22 November 2026

Summary

For the best part of a decade, the story of European football finance has been one of outside money pouring in: Chinese conglomerates, Gulf sovereigns, American sports owners, then private equity and private credit. The question I keep being asked by boards and investors is whether that wave has broken.

I have looked at more than ten years of equity transactions, from rights issues and owner injections to minority stake sales, takeovers and the deals that failed. My conclusion is clear. Appetite for control of European clubs peaked in 2022 and has since approximately halved. Appetite for the sector as a whole has not collapsed; it has rotated. Money is moving into minority stakes, into equity with downside protection, into a small group of elite “trophy” clubs, and into private credit. Meanwhile, listed and retail appetite is plainly waning, and much of what is labelled new equity is incumbent owners covering losses rather than new investors buying growth.

The headline numbers

UEFA’s European Club Finance and Investment Landscape report is the most reliable measure of volume. On its latest, restated figures, changes of controlling ownership at top-division clubs ran as follows:

Year Top-division takeovers (UEFA) Other context My reading
2022 48 Record year for multi-club deals (46) Control peak
2023 44 €2.1bn of equity increases and contributions; 37 multi-club majority deals, 13 minority Plateau; first failures
2024 23 8 multi-club majority deals, 18 minority; PitchBook puts European club M&A value at almost €2.2bn Control halves; minority rises
2025 29 A record 123 investment transactions; one third of takeovers by North American investors Activity at a record, control at a lower plateau
2026 (to date) Not yet published CVC’s €3.7bn structured raise; Eagle administration; Chelsea insider buy-out Division sharpens

Two points need stating plainly, because both have been misreported. First, 2025 was not a “third consecutive decline” in takeovers, as some coverage has claimed: on UEFA’s own numbers, 23 to 29 is a rise. The right description is a step down from a pandemic-era buying frenzy to a lower plateau. Second, UEFA has restated its figures substantially (2023 moved from 21 to 44 between editions), so anyone citing earlier reports is likely using the wrong numbers.

The more interesting fact is the contrast. Takeovers have halved, yet total transactions hit an all-time high in 2025. Deals have become smaller, more numerous and more structured. Multi-club groups illustrate it best: majority acquisitions by multi-club owners fell from 37 in 2023 to 8 in 2024, while their minority deals rose from 13 to 18. PitchBook puts private-capital participation at 36.5% of Big Five league clubs at the start of 2025–26, against 35.7% two seasons earlier. After the rapid build-up of 2019–23, penetration is flattening.

Valuations have split in two

If you only read the headline deals, you would conclude appetite has never been stronger. If you only read the share prices, you would conclude it is collapsing. Both are true, for different parts of the market.

Asset Then Now Direction
City Football Group c.$3bn (2015, CMC/CITIC) c.$4.8bn (2019, Silver Lake) Up
Chelsea £2.5bn plus £1.75bn committed (2022) c.£5bn reported (2026, insider sale) Up, on a seller’s number
Atlético de Madrid Ares minority (2021) c.€2.5bn reported (Apollo, 2026) Up
Manchester United $33 a share (Ineos, 2024) c.$20–22 Down about a third
Olympique Lyonnais €3.00 a share (Eagle, 2022) €0.1713 a share (Kang, 2026) Down 94%
LFP Media (Ligue 1) €750m CVC equity (2022) c.€200m reported NAV Down 73%
Juventus €2.58 bookbuild (Nov 2025) €0.96 rights issue price (Nov 2026) Down
Ajax c.€22 (2019 peak) c.€8.50 (end 2025) Down

Private marks for scarce elite brands keep rising. Public-market and distressed prices for the same sector keep falling. That gap is itself the evidence: the marginal, price-setting investor is less enthusiastic than the private headlines suggest. As I argued in my piece on Chelsea’s valuation, a price agreed between insiders is not market price discovery.

Most new equity is owners covering losses

Strip out the takeovers and look at money actually going into clubs, and a single pattern dominates 2024–26: incumbent owners writing cheques to fund deficits.

  • Juventus. Five raises since 2019, about €998m between 2019 and 2025, against about €1,006m of cumulative losses over the same period. The current issue of up to €200.2m at €0.96 is a 28.36% discount to TERP, with no bank underwriting; Exor’s pro rata take-up and backstop guarantee completion. On the first day of trading the rights fell as much as 42%. I covered this in detail in yesterday’s Analysis Series piece.
  • Tottenham Hotspur. The Lewis family has put in about £320m through ENIC in approximately twelve months: £100m in late 2025, a reported £100m in mid-2026 and £120m in September 2026, taking ENIC to 89.06% of the club.
  • Leeds United. 49ers Enterprises raised £120m in May 2025 from around 100 limited partners at an internal mark of £527.5m, described at the time as the “last fundraise”. Eighteen months later Allen & Co is running a valuation exercise and sounding out new money. I set out the detail in my Leeds analysis.
  • Ajax. The telling case is the raise that did not happen. Despite a €37.3m loss in 2024/25, the share count is unchanged at 18,333,333; shareholders proposed issues but none took place.

This is replacement capital, not growth capital. It keeps clubs solvent and compliant, and increasingly that is literal: Juventus’s 2026 UEFA settlement allows a deficit of up to €60m only if it is covered by equity. Regulation is now writing owner equity into the compliance mechanism.

Where the failures are

The failed and distressed transactions are not random. They cluster in two places: leveraged multi-club groups and league-level deals.

When Transaction What happened
2021 Serie A / CVC-Advent-FSI (c.€1.7bn for 10%) Rejected by the clubs
2022–23 Manchester United full sale Abandoned; Ineos took 25% instead
May 2023 DFL private equity deal (c.€2bn for 12.5%) Failed the two-thirds vote
Feb 2024 DFL second process Abandoned after fan protests
2023–24 Everton / 777 Partners Never closed; 777 collapsed, taking Hertha, Genoa and Standard Liège stakes with it
Mar 2026 Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Administration; Ares owed more than $547m per the administrators’ filing
2026 AC Milan minority; Eight Sports / ENIC One reported then denied; one announced but contested and unclosed

Eagle is the clearest case study of the decade. John Textor paid €3.00 a share for Lyon in 2022. Michele Kang bought 87.78% in June 2026 for $30m, about €0.1713 a share, while more than €230m of intercompany debt was released. Lyon’s minority shareholders were left holding a quoted price around ten times what was paid for control. I set out both transactions in my Lyon analysis.

League-level equity tells a similar story. LaLiga’s €1.994bn deal with CVC held because the Spanish media contract held. Ligue 1’s €1.5bn deal for 13% of LFP Media came apart when the domestic rights market collapsed, and CVC’s equity has reportedly been marked down by 73%. Germany has twice refused private equity, and 50+1 has effectively closed the Bundesliga to it.

Investors now want protection

One of the most important signals is the shape of the equity being written. At Chelsea, Boehly and Walter held junior Class B interests behind Clearlake’s senior Class A position. CVC’s €3.7bn Global Sport Group raise in March 2026 included about €1.4bn from KKR, of which about €1bn was preferred equity, plus about €1.5bn of PIMCO debt. KKR’s up to €200m for 6% implied an equity value of €3.5bn, after CVC had reportedly spent months trying, and failing, to sell a large stake at €9bn. Apollo’s sports platform explicitly invests “across the capital stack”.

An investor who demands a liquidation preference and senior ranking is telling you something about their view of the downside. More euros are being deployed, but with less risk appetite per euro. Equity in football is becoming steadily more debt-like.

Debt is filling the gaps equity used to fill

Where equity was unavailable or too expensive, credit stepped in. Elliott financed RedBird’s purchase of AC Milan with a vendor loan. Oaktree took Inter when Suning defaulted on a loan of about €395m. 777’s loans to Everton were left as debt when its takeover failed. Ares lent heavily to Eagle. At Lyon, Kang has committed up to €71m as a shareholder loan rather than a capital increase. Apollo reportedly lent Nottingham Forest €93m at 8.75%, secured on its stadium. Readers of the Football Capital Tracker will recognise the pattern. This will be the subject of the second phase of this work.

The case against my conclusion

There is real counter-evidence, and it should be stated fairly. 2025 saw a record number of transactions and nine new US majority owners. Apollo paid a reported €2.5bn valuation for 55% of Atlético de Madrid, closing on 12 March 2026: a large fund paying a full price for control of a club outside the Premier League. Woody Johnson paid £190m for a non-controlling 43% of Crystal Palace. KKR, PIMCO, Arctos, Ares and Sixth Street all remain active, and women’s football is emerging as a niche of its own.

But look at where that money went: elite brands, league vehicles, structured instruments and, in Palace’s case, a forced seller under UEFA’s multi-club rules. None of it amounts to broad-based demand. It is consistent with rotation, not renewed growth.

Country by country

  • England: still the strongest market. US sports, private equity and sovereign capital continue to bid, supported by Premier League media income. The Independent Football Regulator adds time and cost but has not stopped elite deals. Mid-table raises such as Leeds are the test for 2027.
  • Spain: elite only. Atlético and CVC’s LaLiga deal; Real Madrid and Barcelona use revenue shares and asset sales rather than selling equity.
  • Italy: ownership turns over through distress and enforcement (Milan, Inter); Juventus is funded by its controlling shareholder.
  • Germany: closed by 50+1 at club and league level.
  • France: the weakest major market, after the media-rights collapse, the LFP Media markdown and the Eagle failure.
  • Elsewhere: I found no evidence of significant new third-party equity in the listed clubs of Portugal, Turkey, Scotland or Scandinavia in 2024–26. Belgium and Switzerland are largely satellites of multi-club groups. Coverage of these markets is thinner, and I say so.

What this means for boards, investors and regulators

For boards. Outside the top ten or twelve European brands, plan on minority-only investment with preference, ratchet or senior-ranking terms. Buyers willing to pay a full price for control in ordinary equity are scarce. Treat owner support as the base case for funding losses, and call it what it is. If you are listed, price rights issues at a deep discount with a full shareholder backstop, and do not assume retail investors will follow. Be wary of any buyer whose equity is funded by borrowing at holding-company level: 777 and Eagle show where that ends.

For investors. Separate scarcity value (elite brands, stadium and property optionality) from operating value. Most recent up-rounds are insider or flagship transactions, not broad price discovery. Underwrite to the public comparables (Manchester United, Juventus, Ajax, Dortmund), which imply materially lower multiples than the private marks.

For regulators. Look through the equity label. Preferred, junior and senior, and vendor-financed structures can be economically debt-like and should be stress-tested as such in financial-resources tests. Watch holding-company leverage in multi-club groups: Eagle showed that a lender can take control above the club without any club-level insolvency. And require disclosure of the full consideration in distressed related-party transfers of control; Lyon’s minority shareholders were not told what was paid for Eagle Bidco’s notes.

What to watch

  • Juventus take-up, due after subscriptions close on 1 December: how much did minorities follow?
  • The Leeds process: the mix of new and existing money, any preference terms, and the price against the £527.5m mark. Commentators suggest £600m–£800m against the 49ers’ target of about £1bn.
  • Kang’s mandatory offer for Lyon’s minority shareholders.
  • Eight Sports and ENIC: whether the announced 24.99% stake ever closes.
  • UEFA’s 2026 takeover count, due in early 2027: a fall below the 23–29 range would move my view from plateau to decline.

My conclusion

Investor appetite for control of European football clubs peaked in 2022. Appetite for football as an asset class has not ended, but it has changed character: smaller cheques, minority positions, protected terms, a concentration on a handful of elite clubs, and a growing reliance on credit. The listed market, where prices are set every day by people with no seat at the table, is telling the least flattering story, and I think it is the most honest one. For most clubs outside the elite, the era of an outside buyer arriving with open-ended equity is over. The money that comes next will want to be repaid first.


Methodology note: this article summarises a board-level report covering about 70 landmark equity transactions from 2015 to November 2026, drawn from club and exchange filings (CONSOB, AMF, SEC, Companies House), UEFA’s European Club Finance and Investment Landscape reports (2023–2025 editions, using the latest restated figures), PitchBook analyst notes, and named press reports including Bloomberg, Reuters, the FT, ESPN, SportsPro and Off The Pitch. The transaction register is a sample of signal-bearing deals, not a census; volume measures rely on UEFA’s annual counts, and I have not interpolated them into quarters. Valuations for Chelsea (£5bn), Atlético (€2.5bn), PSG (c.€4.25bn) and Milan (€1.6bn) are press-reported rather than filed, and the LFP Media markdown is as reported by Off The Pitch citing L’Équipe. Coverage of Portugal, Turkey, Scandinavia, Belgium, Switzerland and of 2015–2019 is thinner. Position as at 22 November 2026. Nothing here is investment advice.

Paul Quinn

Independent analyst of the finance, ownership, governance and regulation of professional football. Publishes The Esk through CWTE. About · Methodology · Corrections

One response to “The Analysis Series: Has investor appetite for European football equity peaked? Ten years of capital raises, 2015–2026”

  1. Jerome Shields

    Paul in Everton’s case TFG’s appetite is conditional on (a) UEFA allowing the dual-club structure or a workable alternative, and (b) Roma not requiring the capital Everton needs. Neither condition is within Everton’s control. The club’s financial position is genuinely improved—record revenue, losses narrowed, SCR headroom, long-term stadium debt—but that improvement is the precondition for exit, not the foundation for stability. Long-term stability requires an owner whose appetite is unconditional, and your data says that buyer is scarce outside the top ten or twelve European brand If TFG sells at a price reflecting the repaired balance sheet, the market has rewarded the non-extraction model—but the buyer will likely be a protected-capital provider, not an open-ended one.like TFG . Everton’s stability then depends on whether that structure keeps the capital loss-absorbing at the club through the next change of control. That is exactly the disclosure the IFR still doesn’t require, and exactly the question Apollo asked CFG. Everton is not exempt from it just because TFG’s intentions were clean.Everton.TFG emphasis at Everton was stability , but it was never a core asset. Even with a acceptable Multi Club model I don’t think this would have changed but it would have been longer before with realised it.

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