Eagle Football Group (formerly known as OL Groupe) is a French holding company that owns and manages Olympique Lyonnais.

French translation (here)

Le Document d’Enregistrement Universel (French)

This analysis examines the consolidated accounts as of June 30, 2025, providing an evaluation of the Profit and Loss account, Balance Sheet, and Cash Flow statements, while reconciling these figures with the post-balance sheet collapse and administration of the holding company in March 2026. The primary focus of this investigation is the structural insolvency of the entity, the use of financial engineering to manage regulatory oversight, and the eventual disintegration of the relationship between the majority shareholder, institutional creditors, and the executive board.

Analysis of the Profit and Loss account

The consolidated income statement for the period ending June 30, 2025, reflects an institution in deep operational distress, characterised by a staggering net loss (Group share) of €201.2 million. 

This result follows a loss of €25.2 million in the prior year, signaling a rapid acceleration of financial instability. The  reality of the P&L is that the Group’s core activities, ticketing, sponsorship, and media rights, are no longer sufficient to sustain its fixed cost base, leaving the entity entirely dependent on the volatile player trading market and emergency shareholder injections.

Operating revenue and media rights collapse

Total operating revenue, which the Group classifies as produits des activités, reached €273.7 million, representing a 24% decrease from the €361.4 million recorded in the previous fiscal year. However, an adjustment is required to understand the underlying trend: the 2023/2024 figures were artificially inflated by €76.9 million in non-recurring items. 

These included the final €50 million installment of the CVC Capital Partners investment (via the LFP commercial subsidiary) and a €26.9 million one-off brand licensing fee paid by the newly independent OL Féminin.

The collapse in LFP Media Rights (-76%) is a critical failure point. While €50 million of this drop was expected due to the exhaustion of the CVC aid, the remaining balance reflects the disastrous outcome of the 2024-2029 domestic broadcast cycle. The initial deal with DAZN and beIN Sports yielded significantly lower returns than anticipated, a situation that worsened when DAZN exercised a premature exit clause in June 2025. 

The Group has attempted to mitigate this by launching its own Ligue 1+ platform, but the LFP anticipates that the first two years of this model will be financially difficult, with any future progressive ramp-up coming too late to satisfy current debt obligations.

The return to the UEFA Europa League provided a vital but insufficient cushion, contributing €22.9 million in media rights and €7.7 million in matchday income. Scrutiny of the Events segment shows a 57% decline, largely due to the de-consolidation of the LDLC Arena (sold in June 2024) and the absence of high-margin events like the 2023 Rugby World Cup.

Operational expenditure

The Group’s EBITDA (Excédent Brut d’Exploitation) collapsed from a positive €44.2 million in 2024 to a negative €47.7 million in 2025. This €91.9 million downward swing is the primary metric indicating structural insolvency.

 examination of the cost base reveals that management failed to implement the strict financial discipline publicly promised to the DNCG. Personnel costs surged by 10% to €177.7 million. This is particularly egregious when measured against core revenues: the wage bill now represents 109% of total revenue excluding player trading. The driver of this increase was the Summer 2024 transfer window, where aggressive recruitment added €34.1 million to the professional team’s payroll. This was only partially offset by an €8.3 million reduction in administrative staff costs and the departure of the women’s team payroll.

The P&L is further weighed down by a large increase in the amortisation of player contracts, which skyrocketed by 122% to €70.8 million. This is the accounting hangover of the high-spend model adopted by John Textor upon takeover, creating a massive non-cash expense that will persist until these player contracts expire or are sold.

Evaluation of other operating items

The Group recognised a negative €11.9 million in “Other Operating Products and Charges,” a sharp reversal from the €38.5 million profit in the prior year. This line item contains critical  evidence of the club’s regulatory and legal pressures:

1. UEFA settlement: A €12.5 million charge was recognised following a settlement with the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) for failing to meet stability requirements during the 2024/2025 monitoring period. This agreement includes conditional penalties that could reach €37.5 million if the Group fails to achieve break-even by 2028.
2. Botafogo economic rights: A loss of €0.3 million was recorded on the disposal of economic rights for players acquired from and then resold to SAF Botafogo. This “phantom transfer” mechanism is a major point of discrepancy explored later in this report.
3. OL Féminin gain: An €8.0 million accounting gain was recognised upon the final de-consolidation of the women’s team in December 2024.

The net result of these dynamics is a Résultat Opérationnel (EBIT) of negative €150.7 million, representing a 55% loss margin on total revenue.

Balance Sheet:

As of June 30, 2025, the consolidated balance sheet of Eagle Football Group demonstrates a state of technical insolvency. Total equity (including minority interests) has plummeted to negative €163.6 million, a deterioration of over €200 million in a single year.

1. Asset Concentration and Valuation Risks

The Group’s total assets stand at €800.1 million, but the composition of this asset base reveals extreme illiquidity.

The Groupama Stadium remains the Group’s most significant tangible asset, representing €271.2 million in net value. However, the Group utilises an approach by component for amortisation, with lifespans ranging from 25 to 50 years.This long-term amortisation period may overestimate the real-world liquidation value of a specialised asset in a distressed market.

The player contract asset of €132.5 million is subject to extreme volatility. While management claims a squad market value of €214.1 million, this is based on external metrics from Transfermarkt and CIES, which do not account for the distressed seller discount Lyon would likely face. The shrinking delta between book value and market value (€81.6 million) limits the club’s ability to perform the player trading miracle required to fix the equity deficit.

The €124.2 million Botafogo receivable

The most contentious item on the balance sheet is the recognition of €109.6 million (net) / €124.2 million (nominal) in receivables from SAF Botafogo, a sister club under the control of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco.

The mechanism for this entry was the “transfer of economic rights” for four players from Lyon to Botafogo. These economic rights were valued at €117.7 million, with an additional €7.6 million in related costs. This transaction allowed Lyon to record a massive non-current asset on its balance sheet, thereby artificially supporting its equity position for the DNCG’s June 2025 review.

However,  evidence suggests this is a “phantom asset”:

• Contradictory Claims: In April 2026 litigation, Botafogo alleged that the funds were never actually transferred and that the transaction was a “sophisticated form of financial engineering” designed to extract value from the Brazilian entity.
• Note 10.1 states that Eagle Football Holdings Bidco “engaged to take over the €124.2 million debt” if Botafogo could not pay. Given that Bidco was placed into administration in March 2026 with an estimated $1.2 billion in debt, this guarantee is effectively worthless.
• Impairment risk: No depreciation was recognised on this receivable as of June 30, 2025. Had a standard impairment been applied, the Group’s net loss would have exceeded €300 million and its negative equity would have neared €300 million.

Analysis of current liabilities and liquidity gap

The Group’s liquidity position is precarious. Current liabilities total €470.5 million, while current assets are only €258.7 million, creating a working capital deficit of €211.8 million.

 Analysis of current debt reveals a systematic delay in payments to operational creditors:

• Trade payables: Increased by €17.4 million to €70.4 million.
• Tax and social debts: Increased by €20.5 million to €73.6 million, indicating the Group has deferred payroll taxes and social security contributions to preserve cash.
• Player registration payables: Current debt for player transfers rose to €77.5 million, emphasising the ongoing cost of the 2024 recruitment drive.

Analysis of long-term debt and financing sources

The Group’s debt structure was radically transformed on December 7, 2023, through a comprehensive refinancing of €385 million in existing liabilities. This move consolidated the Groupama Stadium debt, the COVID-era State Guaranteed Loans (PGE), and various private tranches into a new, two-pronged facility.

FCT (Securitisation) structure

The cornerstone of the refinancing is the €320 million “Fonds Commun de Titrisation” (FCT), a dedicated French law securitisation fund.

• OL SASU transferred its future commercial receivables from the stadium (ticketing, hospitality, naming rights) to the FCT as collateral.
• The FCT issued notes to institutional investors, primarily in the United States, with a 20-year amortisation schedule at a fixed interest rate of 5.83%.
• The FCT is subject to a Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of 1.375, calculated both on historical (rolling 12 months) and projected bases. A breach of this ratio allows the FCT to seize the stadium revenues directly, bypassing the Group’s operational control.

Senior debt and revolving credit facility

In addition to the FCT, the Group secured a €65 million (subsequently increased to €75 million) senior facility from a syndicate of international banks.

• Term loan: €32.5 million (increased by €10 million in June 2024 to €42.5 million), maturing in 2028 with a bullet repayment.
• RCF: €32.5 million revolving line, which was 100% drawn as of June 30, 2025.
• Pricing: The facility bears interest at Euribor plus a margin, resulting in an effective rate of between 6% and 7%.
• Covenants: Subject to a “Gearing” ratio (Net Debt/Equity) of 4.0, which is scheduled to decrease to 2.5 by December 2026. The Group’s current negative equity makes this covenant mathematically impossible to meet without a massive re-capitalisation. On November 10, 2025, the Group secured a waiver from lenders for the June 30, 2025, test date, but this is a temporary reprieve.

Orange Bank (Groupama) Loan

The construction of the training and youth centers was financed through a €14 million loan from Groupama Banque (now Orange Bank), signed in June 2015.

• Status: As of June 30, 2025, the remaining principal is €1.1 million.
• Security: This loan is secured by a first-rank mortgage on the training center land and the pledging of naming rights receivables from Groupama.

Shareholder and related party debt

The Group is heavily reliant on high-cost debt from its parent company, Eagle Football Holdings Bidco.

• December 2022 loan: €27.4 million outstanding, bearing interest at SOFR (min 2%, max 8%) plus 8%. This implies an effective rate of 10% to 16%, significantly higher than market rates for healthy corporate debt.
• John Textor advances: Direct current account advances from Textor totaled €17.5 million as of June 30, 2025, bearing interest at Euribor 3M + 3.5%. These were partially repaid during the year using cash extracted from Botafogo.

Source and use of capital & cash flow statement 

The consolidated cash flow statement for 2024-2025 reveals an institution burning through its available liquidity to fund a loss-making operational model.

1. Analysis of operating cash flows

The self-financing capacity (CAF) before tax was a negative €183.2 million, a huge decline from the negative €100.3 million in the prior year. This indicates that even after adding back non-cash charges like amortisation, the Group is losing nearly €200 million annually on its core operations.

The only reason the Group reported a near-neutral net cash flow from activity (-€4.3 million) was a €151.4 million positive variation in Working Capital. Analysis shows this improvement was driven by:

• Collecting €55.7 million from clients (including the CVC receivable).
• Increasing debts to suppliers and tax/social authorities by €95.8 million. This is a forced source of capital; the Group is effectively financing itself by not paying its bills, i.e. buying time.

2. Investing and player trading cash flows

The Group realised a net positive flow of €36.2 million from investing activities. This was the primary engine of liquidity for the year.

• Sources: €103.8 million in cash from player sales (net of receivables) and €24.2 million from the liquidation of other assets (OLF, Arena).
• Uses: €75.7 million in cash payments for player acquisitions and €14.3 million for other intangible assets.

3. Financing cash flows and debt service

The Group recorded a negative €99.7 million in financing flows, reflecting the heavy cost of its debt stack.

• Interest paid: €23.2 million in cash interest.
• Debt repayment: €32.9 million.
• Inter-company flows: A €40.0 million outflow related to current account advances, likely moving cash back to the parent to service Bidco-level debt.

The Group ended the year with €62.1 million in cash, down from €129.5 million. This cash reserve was insufficient to cover the €206 million in current trade and tax payables, necessitating the emergency interventions of July 2025.

Analysis of player trading and transfer discrepancies

Player trading is a significant part of the EFG business model, but in 2024-2025, it was used as an instrument of aggressive financial reporting.

1. Legitimate trading activity and P&L gains

The Group generated €111.1 million in disposal revenue, resulting in a net capital gain of €71.2 million.

note: The Cherki sale was critical for the DNCG review, though later reports indicated the total value could rise to €36.5 million plus add-ons.

2. The “phantom transfer” and economic rights scandal

A significant portion of the Group’s reported asset base and other products involves the circular movement of player rights between Lyon and Botafogo.

• October 2024 agreement: Lyon agreed to pay €120 million over four years to Botafogo for the economic rights of five players: Igor Jesus, Thiago Almada, Luis Henrique, Jair, and Savarino.
• Only Thiago Almada ever wore the Lyon jersey, and only on loan. Luis Henrique was sold by Botafogo to Zenit St. Petersburg for €30 million; while the funds were supposed to go to Lyon (who held the rights), Botafogo allegedly retained the cash.
• Factoring mechanism: Botafogo allegedly took the €120 million receivable from Lyon to Brazilian banks to secure immediate factoring cash of ~€100 million.
• Litigation Outcome: In April 2026, Botafogo sued Lyon for €125.5 million, claiming these contributions were actually loans that were never repaid. This directly contradicts Lyon’s 2024/25 accounts, which list Botafogo as the debtor.

VI. Owner and director relationships:

The governance of Eagle Football Group transitioned from a partnership between John Textor and Michele Kang to an open legal conflict involving institutional creditors.

On June 30, 2025, John Textor resigned as President and CEO of EFG, replaced by Michele Kang. Michael Gerlinger (formerly of Bayern Munich) was appointed Director General.

• The Shadow Board: Textor subsequently alleged that Kang had entered into a secret side agreement with Ares Management on July 7, 2025. This agreement reportedly created a five-person shadow board that bypassed official governance to control player budgets and executive hires.
• Ares Intervention: Ares executive Juan Arciniegas stated that the side agreement was necessary due to the Group’s severe financial distress caused by Textor’s management.

On January 28, 2026, John Textor formally notified the French AMF of what he described as an illegal takeover of a publicly listed entity. He argued that the shadow board violated market disclosure rules and disenfranchised public shareholders. This governance instability was cited by auditors as a key reason for the delay in finalising the 2025/2026 half-year audits.

Post-balance sheet events and re-capitalisation analysis

The months following the June 30, 2025, closure saw a series of desperate maneuvers to maintain the Group’s “Going Concern” status.

1. July 2025 rescue package

To satisfy the DNCG’s appeals commission, the Group secured a €117.3 million stability package:

• Shareholder loan: EFH Bidco provided an €87.3 million loan at SOFR + 8%.
• Bank guarantee: Michele Kang provided a direct €30 million personal guarantee to OL SASU.
• Effect: This successfully overturned the relegation order on July 9, 2025, allowing Lyon to remain in Ligue 1 and the Europa League.

2. The March 2026 administration of Eagle Bidco

The structural failure of the Eagle model was finalised on March 27, 2026, when Ares Management placed Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited into administration.

• EFH Bidco defaulted on its “Series A, B, and C” notes, which had ballooned to an estimated $1.2 billion through the compounding of Payment-in-Kind (PIK) interest.
• Administrator: Cork Gully has taken control of Bidco’s assets, including the 87.78% stake in EFG.
• Impact on Lyon: While EFG is not in administration, it is effectively for sale. Existing creditors, including Michele Kang and Ares, are likely to credit-bid for the club, potentially wiping out Textor’s remaining equity interest.

VIII. Current shareholding and control agreements

The shareholding structure of Eagle Football Group as of June 30, 2025, is highly concentrated, providing the majority shareholder with absolute control over ordinary and extraordinary resolutions.

The discrepancy between capital and voting rights for EFH Bidco is due to the allocation of double voting rights and the conversion of the OSRANE instruments in 2023.

1. The Holnest-Eagle shareholder agreement

The relationship between the former and current owners is governed by a pact signed on December 19, 2022, and amended in May 2023.

• Buyback obligations: EFH Bidco was required to buy back one-third of Holnest’s remaining shares (4.8 million shares) at €3.00 per share by August 2023.
• Put option: Holnest holds a put option to sell its remaining 2.41% stake to Bidco at market value starting 18 months after the May 2023 amendment. Given the current insolvency, the value of this option is likely negligible.

2. Change of control provisions

The Group’s primary financing agreements (FCT, Senior Debt) contain a change of control clause(s). A default at the Bidco level that leads to a takeover by Ares Management would theoretically trigger an acceleration of the €576 million in consolidated debt. This interlocking default risk is the primary reason why the administrators, Cork Gully, have sought to maintain Michele Kang in her executive role to provide a stability bridge for the subsidiary clubs.

IX. Solvency assessment

The  analysis of the 2024-2025 Universal Registration Document reveals a business that has moved beyond financial distress into structural collapse.

The Group’s solvency is predicated on the €124.2 million receivable from Botafogo. However, Botafogo’s own financial statements (reporting a R$300 million loss in 2024) and their 2025 FIFA transfer ban indicate they have no capacity to repay Lyon. By failing to impair this receivable, management has potentially misrepresented the Group’s net asset value by over €120 million.

The debt trap inherent in the Eagle model is evidenced by the interest rates on shareholder debt (SOFR + 8%). With an operating loss of €150 million and interest costs that compound rather than being paid in cash (PIK), the Group’s debt is growing faster than the appreciation of its assets (players and stadium).

Eagle Football Group is currently a distressed asset operating under the moratorium provided by the administration of its parent company. The  evidence suggests that the entity will require a complete debt-for-equity swap, likely led by Ares Management and Michele Kang, which will result in the formal removal of John Textor and the dissolution of the Eagle Football brand in favor of an autonomous Lyon-centric governance model. 

The sustainability of the club now rests on its ability to drastically reduce its €177 million payroll while maintaining its position in the lucrative UEFA competitions, a balance that has not been achieved in any of the last three fiscal years.

Additional notes on the Eagle Football Holdings Bidco insolvency:

The collapse of the Eagle Football multi-club structure was finalised on March 27, 2026, with the placement of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited into administration. This event, coupled with the unprecedented €125 million litigation launched by SAF Botafogo against its sister club, Olympique Lyonnais, represents the terminal phase of the conglomerate’s financial engineering.

The administration of Eagle Football Holdings Bidco Limited (the UK-based intermediate holding company) was triggered by Ares Capital Corporation following repeated financial and technical defaults.

Debt stack and PIK mechanism

The administration was the result of a debt trap created by the reliance on high-cost mezzanine notes. As of March 2026, the total secured debt managed by Ares had ballooned to approximately $1.2 billion.

• Series A & B Notes: Initially totaling ~$547 million, these carried annual interest rates of 16% to 18%.
• Series C & D Notes: Issued in July and October 2025 to fund emergency liquidity for Lyon, these carried rates as high as 22%.
• The PIK trap: These instruments utilised a Payment-in-Kind (PIK) mechanism, where interest was not serviced in cash but added to the principal balance. This guaranteed that the debt burden would outpace the operational revenues and valuation increases of the football clubs.

The administration process (Cork Gully)

Stephen and Anthony Cork of Cork Gully LLP were appointed as Joint Administrators on March 27, 2026.

• Status of subsidiaries: While Bidco is in administration, its subsidiaries, Eagle Football Group (Lyon), SAF Botafogo, and RWDM Brussels, are not in administration. They continue to operate as normal in a sporting sense, but their financial destiny is now controlled by the insolvency process.
• Objective: The administrators’ primary mission is to rescue Bidco as a going concern or, failing that, to realise its assets (the club stakes) for the benefit of creditors.
• Removal of control: John Textor has been stripped of all operational powers over the holding company. Ares utilised a qualifying floating charge to appoint administrators out of court, effectively bypassing Textor’s ability to contest the default.

Botafogo claim: 

On April 4, 2026, SAF Botafogo initiated litigation against Olympique Lyonnais (Eagle Football Group) seeking €125.5 million (approx. R$ 745 million). This claim exposes a one-way liquidity bridge where Brazilian assets were systematically extracted to support the French flagship.

 Flings suggest the claim is comprised of the following :

• Inter-group loans (€25 million): Funds provided by Botafogo to Lyon in late 2022 to prevent the latter’s technical insolvency during the initial takeover.
• Diverted investment (R$ 110 million): Portions of Textor’s mandatory R$ 400 million investment intended for Botafogo’s operations that were instead transferred to Lyon to cover DNCG-mandated deficits.
• RWDM Inter-company debt (€12 million): Outstanding balances owed by Lyon to the Belgian affiliate, which Botafogo is seeking to recover as part of an aggregated claim.

The most contentious element involves the 2024 transfers of Luis Henrique and Igor Jesus.

• Mechanism: Botafogo announced the sale of these players to Lyon in July 2024 to improve Lyon’s balance sheet for regulatory purposes.
• Discrepancy: These players were never officially registered with the French League (LFP). Instead, Luis Henrique was sold to Zenit St. Petersburg and Igor Jesus to Nottingham Forest.
• Factoring scandal: Botafogo alleges it sold the economic rights of these players to Lyon for €120 million to be paid over four years. Botafogo then took this Lyon receivable to external lenders (e.g., PRPF LLC) to secure immediate cash (factoring). When Lyon defaulted on the first payments, the internal debt spiraled into massive external liabilities.

Systemic impact on stakeholders

John Textor: Has lost control of the central cash register. He remains in charge at Botafogo only because a Brazilian court froze Eagle’s stake there, preventing the UK administrators from immediately seizing the asset. He has alleged a clandestine seizure of power by his partners and creditors.

Michele Kang: Continues to lead Lyon through a “side agreement” with Ares executed in July 2025. This agreement established a shadow board that bypassed official governance to control player budgets. Kang is now positioned as a primary credit-bidder who may acquire Lyon outright from the administrators.

Ares holds a first-ranking pledge over all inter-company receivables. This means any cash moving from the clubs to the holding company is automatically diverted to service the Ares debt. Ares is protected by a “Letter Agreement” that prevents any sale process of Lyon before June 30, 2026, and ensures Kang’s tenure as CEO until at least June 30, 2027.

The subsidiary clubs

• Olympique Lyonnais: While remaining in Ligue 1, the club is financially hollowed out. The publication of half-year accounts as of December 31, 2025, has been postponed indefinitely due to the Bidco administration.
• Botafogo: The lack of repayment from Lyon triggered a FIFA transfer ban in late 2025 because Botafogo could not settle its own debts for players like Thiago Almada. The club’s assets are currently under a precautionary injunction in Rio de Janeiro to prevent further capital flight to Europe.

The “Global Solution” mentioned in the 2024/25 accounts, where Eagle Bidco would take over the Botafogo debt, is now legally impossible due to Bidco’s insolvency.

The Eagle Football Group is currently a completely unsustainable entity held together by a statutory moratorium (the administration) in the UK and a secret governance agreement in France. The €125 million Botafogo claim represents a piercing of the corporate veil within the MCO, suggesting that the inter-club transactions were not arms-length agreements but a form of unauthorised capital extraction. The eventual outcome will likely involve the liquidation of the multi-club model, with Lyon and Botafogo being sold to separate, autonomous ownership groups to part satisfy the circa $1.2 billion secured debt stack.